Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Lockett v. United States

Official source
                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



 BERNADETTE TAYLOR LOCKETT,

         Plaintiff,
                 v.                                           Civil Action No. 26-2267 (JEB)


 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

         Defendant.



                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        May a parent succeed on a tort action to recover for the alleged invasion of her adult

child’s privacy? Plaintiff Bernadette Taylor Lockett thinks so and thus brings this pro se action

against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for invasion of privacy and negligent

supervision. She alleges that former Ambassador Carlos Trujillo, while acting within the scope

of his employment with the United States Department of State, published a document containing

sensitive information about her daughter. Defendant now moves to dismiss, contending that the

Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter and that, in any event, Plaintiff fails to state a claim.

Because an invasion-of-privacy claim belongs only to the individual whose privacy was

allegedly invaded, and because Plaintiff does not allege the kind of knowledge required for a

negligent-supervision claim, the Court will grant the Motion.

I.      Background

        The Court draws the following facts — which it construes in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff — from the Complaint and judicially noticeable resources. See Naz v. Wright, 

177

F.4th 1242

, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2026). These include public records, such as official government

                                                   1
documents. See, e.g., Kaempe v. Myers, 

367 F.3d 958, 965

 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (government

records); Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 

43 F. Supp. 3d

28, 33

 (D.D.C. 2014) (information posted on government websites). The Court also treats

Plaintiff’s complaints and correspondence with the Government as part of the pleadings. See

ECF Nos. 11-5 (2021 Claim); 8-3 (2021 Response); 11-6 (2024 Claim); 11-7 (2024 Response);

11-8 (Documentation Mail Receipt); 11-9 (Intent to File Claim). Such documents are referred to

in the Complaint, see ECF No. 1 (Compl.), ¶¶ 22–25, and are “integral” to Plaintiff’s suit. See

Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 

798 F.3d 1119

, 1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation

omitted).

       In August 2019, Carlos Trujillo, then-U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American

States, posted a letter identifying by name Plaintiff’s daughter, who is an alleged sexual-assault

victim. See Compl., ¶¶ 16–18. The letter was addressed to the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights regarding a petition before that body involving Plaintiff’s daughter. See ECF No.

11-2 (Letter). Lockett contends that the Department of State posted the letter online. See

Compl., ¶ 16. At that time, Plaintiff’s daughter was already an adult. See ECF Nos. 8 (Mot.) at

1; 11 (Opp.) at 1, 3, 11. Although the letter itself contained scant private information concerning

the daughter — it only directed the IACHR to “require updated information from” and “seek to

hear directly from [Plaintiff’s daughter],” Letter at 2 — Plaintiff contends that “the public

document linked the child’s identity to an IACHR case concerning allegations of sexual assault”

because the letter’s subject line contained the IACHR petition number. See Opp. at 12; Compl, ¶

19.

       On September 18, 2020, Lockett discovered the letter’s online publication and called the

Government to request that it be taken down. See Compl., ¶ 21. On August 27, 2021, she then



                                                 2
filed a claim for damages or injury with Defendant, as required by the FTCA. See Opp. at 4; 

28

U.S.C. § 2675

(a); 2021 Claim. The claim alleged that “Carlos Trujillo former Ambassador of

the U.S. to the OAS authorized a letter on 8/26/2019 in which he named a child rape victim,

revealed the state in which she resides, and identified by name her maternal siblings.” 2021

Claim at ECF p. 1. Lockett described her injury as not “fully known” because “the document

remains public,” suggesting that the harm is ongoing. 

Id.

 She contended that “Trujillo’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress was outrageous, reckless, criminal and intended to

inflict emotional and psychological harm.” 

Id.

 On November 16, 2021, the Government

responded, objecting to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s description of her injury and requesting that

she provide “any and all documentation” to “support the merits of [her] claim.” 2021 Response

at 1. Lockett asserts that she never received that correspondence. See Opp. at 4.

       On January 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed another claim. Id.; 2024 Claim. This one maintained

that “[t]he extent [of the injury] isn’t fully known as the document remains public,” but it alleges

that Trujillo intentionally inflicted emotional distress. See 2024 Claim at ECF p. 1. Defendant

again objected to the adequacy of Lockett’s description. See Compl., ¶ 24; 2024 Response

at ECF pp. 1–2. This time around, Plaintiff received that response. 

Id.

 Dated March 6, 2024,

the response acknowledged that “[t]his appears to be the second claim . . . regarding this matter”

and requested documentation “to support the merits” of Lockett’s claim. See 2024 Response at

ECF p. 1. Plaintiff obliged, providing the Government with medical documents supporting her

assertions of “experiencing ‘increased stress’ that ultimately required being medicated.” Compl.,

¶ 25. Not having heard from the Government, in September 2025, Lockett gave notice of her

intent to file a suit. See Opp. at 5; Intent to File Claim at 1–2. Nine months later, she brought

the current action, which asserts two counts under the FTCA: (1) invasion of privacy and (2)



                                                 3
negligent supervision and retention. See Compl., ¶¶ 30–41. The Government now moves to

dismiss, contending that Lockett failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA and

that, in any event, both counts are deficient as a matter of law. See Mot. at 4–12.

II.      Legal Standard

          The Government’s Motion invokes the legal standards for dismissal under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Id. at 1. When a defendant files a Rule 12(b)(1)

motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the court indeed has subject-matter

jurisdiction to hear her claims. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 561

 (1992); U.S.

Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 

231 F.3d 20, 24

 (D.C. Cir. 2000). “Because subject-

matter jurisdiction focuses on the court’s power to hear the plaintiff’s claim, a Rule 12(b)(1)

motion [also] imposes on the court an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the

scope of its jurisdictional authority.” Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 

185

F. Supp. 2d 9, 13

 (D.D.C. 2001). For this reason, “the plaintiff’s factual allegations in the

complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6)

motion for failure to state a claim.” 

Id.

 at 13–14 (cleaned up). In policing its jurisdictional

borders, the court must scrutinize the complaint and treat its factual allegations as true. See

Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 

402 F.3d 1249

, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The court need

not rely “on the complaint standing alone,” however, but may also look to undisputed facts in the

record or resolve disputed ones. See Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 

974 F.2d 192, 197

 (D.C. Cir.

1992).

         Rule 12(b)(6), conversely, provides for the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails

to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are

not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544

,



                                                  4
555 (2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678

 (2009) (quotations

marks and citation omitted). In weighing a motion to dismiss, a court “may consider only the

facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the

complaint[,] and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis

Xavier Parochial Sch., 

117 F.3d 621, 624

 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The court must “accept the well-

pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in

the plaintiff’s favor.” Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Vilsack, 

111 F.4th 1219, 1223

 (D.C. Cir.

2024) (citation omitted). It need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau

v. FTC, 

456 F.3d 178, 193

 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286


(1986)). Pro se litigants are given more leeway, as the court must consider and accept as true the

allegations in both their complaint and opposition to a motion to dismiss. See Brown v. Whole

Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 

789 F.3d. 146, 152

 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

III.   Analysis

       The Court begins with the threshold question of exhaustion and then moves on to

Defendant’s merits-based assertions.

       A. Exhaustion

       The Government first contends that Lockett never exhausted her required administrative

remedies before bringing her FTCA suit because she did not provide it with notice of the nature

of her injuries and failed to respond to its request for additional information. See Mot. at 5.

Plaintiffs asserting claims under the FTCA must indeed satisfy administrative-exhaustion

requirements by “present[ing] the claim to the appropriate Federal agency.” 28 U.S.C.



                                                 5
§ 2675(a). Claimants are required to file “(1) a written statement sufficiently describing the

injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum certain damages claim.”

GAF Corp. v. United States, 

818 F.2d 901, 919

 (D.C. Cir. 1987). This exhaustion requirement

“is a jurisdictional prerequisite; and the Court lacks subject[-]matter jurisdiction over common

law tort claims against the United States for which a plaintiff has not exhausted [her]

administrative remedies.” Hayes v. United States, 

539 F. Supp. 2d 393

, 398–99 (D.D.C. 2008)

(citing, inter alia, Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 

108 F.3d 366, 371

 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

       Although Lockett’s 2021 claim asserted that “Trujillo’s intentional infliction of emotional

distress was outrageous, reckless, criminal and intended to inflict emotional and psychological

harm,” she conceded that the nature of her injuries was not “fully known.” 2021 Claim at 1.

Such a barebones complaint standing alone is not sufficient to provide notice about the nature of

Plaintiff’s injuries. See, e.g., Goziker v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 

2025 WL 2220025

, at *6 (D.D.C.

Aug. 5, 2025) (“By failing to specify the precise nature of the alleged injury, Plaintiff did not

provide sufficient notice of the claim to enable the agency to investigate and ascertain the

strength of the claim.”) (quoting GAF Corp., 

818 F.2d at 919

) (cleaned up); cf. 2021 Response at

1 (requesting “specific documentation” and “documentation” in support of Plaintiff’s claim).

       Lockett’s 2024 claim and subsequent supporting documentation, however, cure the

presentment deficiencies and sufficiently describe her claimed injuries. See 2024 Claim; Opp. at

4–5 (“Plaintiff responded [to the Government] with medical documentation supporting increased

stress that ultimately required medication.”) (citing Documentation Mail Receipt). Defendant

concedes as much. See Mot. at 7 (acknowledging that Lockett “submitt[ed] subsequent demands

that otherwise complied with the FTCA’s presentment requirement”).

       The Government contends that because Plaintiff’s 2024 claim and subsequent



                                                  6
supplemental documentation were not “presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency

within two years after such claim accrue[d],” 

28 U.S.C. § 2401

(b), the Court should deem them

time-barred and consider only “whether Plaintiff’s first FTCA demand satisfied the

[presentment] requirements.” ECF No. 12 (Reply) at 5 (emphasis added); see also Mot. at 5–7.

Lockett counters that because she never received the Government’s 2021 response noting the

inadequacy of her presentment and requesting that she provide more specific information, she

was unaware of any deficiencies in her presentment. See Opp. at 8–9. She thus invokes the

doctrine of equitable tolling to save her suit. 

Id.


       As a preliminary matter, nothing in the FTCA precludes reliance on that doctrine. United

States v. Wong, 

575 U.S. 402

, 411 (2015) (holding that FTCA’s statute of limitations “does not

define a federal court’s jurisdiction over tort claims generally, address its authority to hear

untimely suits, or in any way cabin its usual equitable powers”). And because the statute of

limitations is set by federal statute, the federal common law of equitable tolling applies. Cf.

Arellano v. McDonough, 

598 U.S. 1

, 6 (2023).

       Under federal law, “[t]o show that equitable tolling is warranted, a plaintiff must

demonstrate ‘(1) that [she] has been pursuing [her] rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstances stood in [her] way.’” Gable v. United States, 

319 F. Supp. 3d 37, 43


(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Pace v. DiGugliemlo, 

544 U.S. 408, 418

 (2005)). Both prongs must be

met. See, e.g., Vuyyuru v. Bank of N. Am., Inc., 

2022 WL 1124800

, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 14,

2022), aff’d sub nom. Vuyyuru v. LSF9 Master Participation Tr., Inc., 

2023 WL 2905258

 (D.C.

Cir. Apr. 10, 2023). Equitable tolling is appropriate where, as here, “the claimant has actively

pursued [her] judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period,”

Norman v. United States, 

467 F.3d 773, 776

 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Vet.



                                                      7
Affairs, 

498 U.S. 89, 96

 (1990)), and “despite all due diligence [the plaintiff] is unable to obtain

vital information bearing on the existence of her claim.” 

Id.

 (quoting Smith-Haynie v. District of

Columbia, 

155 F.3d 575, 579

 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). In applying these principles, moreover, the

Court is mindful of the special solicitude it must exercise when construing the pleadings of pro

se plaintiffs like Lockett. See Yellen v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 

301 F. Supp. 3d 43, 47

 (D.D.C.

2018).

         Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court infers that she did not

receive Defendant’s response letter, which would have prompted her to provide supplemental

documentation. See Opp. at 8–9. Even if it seems logical that Lockett should have reached out

to the State Department during the years that passed between her first and second claims, see

Reply at 5–6, what counts as sufficient diligence is “often fact-intensive” and requires that

judges consider “in detail” all relevant circumstances. Nelson v. Blinken, 

2024 WL 3985365

, at

*3 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2024) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 

560 U.S. 631

, 653–54 (2010)); see also

Momenian v. Davidson, 

878 F.3d 381, 387

 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that complaint may be

dismissed as “conclusively time-barred” only if “a trial court determines that the allegation of

other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency”)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court will therefore deem the FTCA’s presentment

requirement satisfied and Lockett’s exhaustion thus complete.

         B. Merits

         The FTCA allows those injured by federal employees to sue the United States for

damages by “waiving the sovereign immunity of the federal government,” Smith Thee v. U.S.

Secret Service, 

2025 WL 2959630

, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2025), and granting federal district

courts jurisdiction over “state-law torts committed by government employees within the scope of



                                                  8
their employment.” Stoddard v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 

900 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41

 (D.D.C. 2012)

(quoting Harbury v. Hayden, 

522 F.3d 413, 416

 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Tort liability under the FTCA

“is determined according to the law of the place where the alleged acts or omissions occurred

— in this case, the District of Columbia.” Harris v. U.S. Dep’t of Vet. Affairs, 

776 F.3d 907,

911

 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The two torts at issue here are invasion of privacy and negligent

supervision.

               1. Invasion of Privacy

       On this first count, Defendant maintains that Lockett’s asserted invasion-of-privacy tort

belongs not to herself but instead to the individual whose privacy interest was allegedly invaded.

See Mot. at 9. The D.C. Court of Appeals “has relied on the Restatement[ ] (Second) [of Torts’]

formulation of the law applicable to ‘invasion of privacy’ in determining the appropriate

contours of a cause of action for invasion of that right.” Kitt v. Capital Concerts, Inc., 

742 A.2d

856, 859

 (D.C. 1999) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Restatement, in turn, directs

that “[e]xcept for the appropriation of one’s name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy

can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded.” Restatement (Second)

of Torts § 652I (1977). Under D.C. law, invasion-of-privacy claims must relate to statements

“understood to be of and concerning the plaintiff” rather than a third party. See Kitt, 

742 A.2d at

859

 (emphasis added).

       Here, conversely, Lockett brings this count on behalf of her daughter’s privacy interest

rather than her own. See, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 16, 18, 19; Opp. at 13. Her daughter is no longer a

minor and could assert these injuries in her own right. Plaintiff concedes as much, “agree[ing]

with the general proposition that an invasion-of-privacy claim protects the person whose privacy

interest is invaded.” Opp. at 13. Yet she nevertheless contends that the principle “does not



                                                 9
require dismissal here because [she] alleges her own direct injuries.” 

Id.

 More particularly, she

alleges that she has suffered “increased stress” from the episode. See Compl., ¶ 25. That may

well be true, and others may also feel injured by invasions of the privacy of loved ones. As just

explained, however, those feelings are irrelevant unless their own privacy was invaded. As a

result, Lockett is out of luck on this count.

               2. Negligent Supervision

       The tort of negligent supervision in the District of Columbia requires a plaintiff to plead

that a person conducting activity through “servants or other agents” was “negligent or reckless”

in “employ[ing] . . . persons . . . in work involving risk or harm to others” and in “supervis[ing]”

such work. Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 

28 F.3d 120, 123

 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Murphy v.

Army Distaff Found., Inc., 

458 A.2d 61, 64

 (D.C. 1983)).

       As an initial matter, it is unclear whether one can state a claim for negligent supervision

without some underlying tort committed by the servant. Even assuming that Plaintiff had

plausibly alleged a privacy tort, she has not sufficiently pled, as D.C. law requires, that “an

employer knew or should have known its employee behaved in a dangerous or otherwise

incompetent manner, and that the employer, armed with actual or constructive knowledge, failed

to adequately supervise [or train] the employee.” Spiller v. District of Columbia, 

302 F. Supp.

3d 240

, 254–55 (D.D.C. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Giles v. Shell Oil Corp., 

487 A.2d

610, 612

 (D.C. 1985)). Instead, Lockett merely speculates that “[t]he Department of State had a

duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising and retaining employees,” that Trujillo disclosed

private information regarding her daughter, and that the Department “breached [its] duty by

failing to properly supervise its employees and by retaining employees who it knew or should

have known could cause the wrongful disclosure of private and sensitive information.” Compl.,



                                                 10
¶¶ 39–40; see also Opp. at 16. Such allegations, pled without any facts to support the inference

that State did in fact have actual or constructive knowledge at the time of the posting that Trujillo

would cause the wrongful disclosure of private and sensitive information, are the sort of

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements,” that are insufficient to plausibly indicate that the Government is liable. Iqbal, 

556

U.S. at 678

.

       Because Plaintiff has not stated a claim for either count, her suit against Defendant must

be dismissed.

IV.    Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Government’s Motion to Dismiss. A

separate Order so stating will issue this day.

                                                              /s/ James E. Boasberg
                                                              JAMES E. BOASBERG
                                                              Chief Judge
Date: October 29, 2026




                                                 11

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