Civil United Kingdom
London Borough of Havering v William Stokes & Ors
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2729 (KB)
Claim No: QB-2019-002737
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 23 October 2026
Before :
ROBERT PALMER KC
sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court
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Between :
| LONDON BOROUGH OF HAVERING | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| (1) WILLIAM STOKES (2)-(105) OTHER NAMED DEFENDANTS (106) PERSONS UNKNOWN FORMING UNAUTHORISED ENCAMPMENTS WITHIN THE LONDON BOROUGH OF HAVERING |
Defendants |
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Natalie Pratt (instructed by OneSource Legal Services for LB Havering) appeared for the Claimant
The Defendants did not appear and were not represented
Hearing date: 6 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on [date] by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
ROBERT PALMER KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court:
Introduction
1. The Claimant is the local planning authority for the London Borough of Havering (“the Borough”) which covers some 44 square miles in the north-east of Greater London. The Claimant seeks the renewal of an injunction against “persons unknown forming unauthorised encampments within the London Borough of Havering” (“the Injunction”), pursuant to section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Such “Persons Unknown” are the 106th defendant in this claim: there have been 105 named defendants over time, but many of them have since ceased to be parties. No injunction is sought against any of the named defendants.
2. The Injunction was originally made by Eyre J on 3 October 2024 against 43 named defendants with effect until 19 October 2025, as well as against Persons Unknown. The judge gave his reasons for making the Order in a judgment which is reported at [2024] EWHC 2496 (KB) (“the Eyre J judgment”). The Injunction was made pursuant to the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton City Council & Ors v London Gypsies and Travellers & Ors [2023] UKSC 47; [2024] 2 WLR 45 (“Wolverhampton”).
3. The Injunction was reviewed and then renewed on 13 October 2025 for a further year by order of Jonathan Glasson KC (sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court) for a further period of 12 months, against Persons Unknown only (“the Glasson order”). The deputy judge’s reasons for renewing the Injunction were set out in his judgment [2025] EWHC 2603 (KB) (“the Glasson judgment”). The Glasson order provided that it would expire by the effluxion of time at 23:59 on 19 October 2026, but that the Claimant could, if so advised, apply for the renewal of the order against Persons Unknown by 15 September 2026, with a hearing to be listed on 6 October 2026.
4. The Claimant duly made such an application to renew the Injunction for a further 12 months. The Claimant was represented by Ms Natalie Pratt of counsel. None of the defendants were represented, but as was the case on the occasion of the review hearing before the deputy judge, I received a direct communication from the London Gypsy and Travellers Group on the morning of the hearing. I return to this below at paragraphs 22-26.
5. At the close of the hearing on 6 October, I announced my decision to renew the Injunction for a further 12 months until 19 October 2027. These are my reasons for that decision.
Factual background
6. The factual background that led to the making of the Injunction is set out at [14]-[25] of the Eyre J judgment. The factual circumstances which led to its renewal for a further year upon its review by the deputy judge are set out at [21]-[29] of the Glasson judgment.
7. In short, injunctive relief had been sought in response to the Borough experiencing a high volume of unauthorised encampments and resulting harm. Between 2014 and September 2019, 177 unauthorised encampments had been formed in the Borough, many of which had aggravating features. An especially prevalent aggravating feature of the encampments was extensive fly-tipping: many encampments tipped waste, including hazardous waste in support of their commercial enterprises. Between 2016 and March 2019 alone, the Claimant removed 685.5 tons of fly-tipped waste. Private landowners also incurred significant costs in waste removal, with the cumulative sum running into the hundreds of thousands of pounds. Other harms suffered by reason of the encampments included risks to public health (including by the depositing of untreated human waste), threats and intimidation to the inhabitants of the Borough, various nuisances and financial harm to the Claimant in seeking to deter, enforce against and clean up after encampments. As both Eyre J and the deputy judge have previously emphasised, it is important to keep in mind at all times that, as the Claimant expressly recognises, to the extent that those who engage in such behaviour are members of the Traveller or Gypsy communities they form a small and non-representative minority in such groups.
8. The Injunction made against Persons Unknown has never been sought in respect of the Borough as a whole, but was targeted against a list of “Sensitive Sites”. When the Injunction was first made, it was applied to 306 specific sensitive sites, amounting to just under 23% of the land in the Borough. The Sensitive Sites were selected by the Claimant as being those that were frequently targeted by unauthorised encampments visiting the Borough. They included parks and open spaces, school grounds, retail sites and car parks. By the time of the Glasson Order, the number of sensitive sites had been reduced to some 291. On the renewal application before me, the number has been further reduced to 286.
9. In support of the application for renewal, the Claimant produced witness statements from:
i) Ms Mandeep Mehat, a solicitor employed by OneSource Legal Services and is Head of Law Enforcement and Litigation. Ms Mehat has given evidence previously in this matter: this was her fifth witness statement.
ii) Ms Jill Warren, the Deputy Team Leader in Development Planning in the Claimant’s Planning Department. Ms Warren has also given evidence previously: this was her second witness statement.
10. It is apparent from Ms Mehat’s witness statement that the effect of the Injunction to date has been marked. Following the original grant of the Injunction in October 2024, three unauthorised encampments formed in the Borough, each of which was formed on a Sensitive Site. Since the renewal of the Injunction in October 2025, no unauthorised encampments are recorded as having been formed in the Borough. The harms suffered by the Claimant and the inhabitants of the Borough have reduced commensurately. Most notably, the costs incurred by the Claimant in the clearance of fly-tipped waste have reduced to nil (or such a negligible amount that they did not warrant recording).
The legal framework
11. The legal framework was set out by Mr Glasson KC at [30]-[32] as follows:
30. In Wolverhampton the Supreme Court (Lords Reed, Briggs and Kitchin with whom Lords Hodge and Lloyd-Jones agreed) set out at [225] the need for review of injunctions against persons unknown and the issues to be addressed at such a review. The Supreme Court explained that the review:
“give[s] all parties an opportunity to make full and complete disclosure to the court, supported by appropriate evidence, as to how effective the order has been; whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made.”
31. The correct approach to review of such injunctions has been considered in a number of first instance cases. Those were comprehensively reviewed by Garnham J in [Rochdale MBC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 1314 (KB)] who concluded:
“51. In my judgment the correct approach is dictated by the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton and in particular in [225]. This is not a “tick box” exercise, but the matters on which evidence should be adduced and argument focused are (i) how effective the order has been; (ii) whether any reasons or grounds for its discharge have emerged; (iii) whether there is any proper justification for its continuance; and (iv) whether and on what basis a further order ought to be made. The parties should give full disclosure, supported by appropriate evidence, directed towards those questions.
52. There will be cases, such as Basingstoke, where an issue has emerged, whether at the original hearing or in preparation for the renewed hearing, which needs to be addressed expressly at that renewal hearing. Whether that necessitates an expanded renewal hearing or what [the Deputy Judge in Basingstoke & Deane BC v Persons Unknown [2025] EWHC 738 (KB)] calls a de novo hearing will depend on the facts. The position may also be different where the application for further injunctive relief is not made during the currency of the previous order, but after it has expired. But the guiding light will always be the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wolverhampton.”
32. Finally, I note that, on the basis that in this case the Claimant is seeking an element of precautionary relief, the Court would usually be required to have regard to the multifactorial test stated by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 2. That test requires these two questions to be answered in the affirmative before injunctive relief could be granted. First, is there a strong possibility that, unless restrained by an injunction, the defendant will act in breach of the claimant’s rights? Secondly, if the defendant did act in contravention of the claimant’s rights, would the resulting harm be so grave and irreparable that, notwithstanding the grant of an immediate interlocutory injunction (at the time of the actual infringement of the claimant’s rights) to restrain further occurrence of the acts complained of, a remedy of damages would be inadequate. However, I respectfully concur with the conclusion of Garnham J at [78] of Rochdale that the test articulated by Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2019] 4 WLR 2and approved by Sir Geoffrey Vos MR in Barking and Dagenham v Persons Unknown [2022] EWCA Civ 13 has been subsumed into the Wolverhampton framework. The Vastint test, however, provides a useful double check.”
12. I shall apply the same approach to the present review.
Discussion and decision
13. As was the position before the Deputy Judge, there has been no material change of circumstances since the grant of the Injunction such as to justify a full Wolverhampton review.
14. The fact that there have been no unlawful encampments in the last year (and only three in the year before that) indicates the effectiveness of the Injunction, and not any dissipation of the threat: Ms Mehat provides compelling evidence to that effect in her review of the recent experience of neighbouring and proximate administrative areas that do not have the benefit of similar injunctive relief. It is apparent that they are experiencing unauthorised encampments with greater frequency than the Borough. Most notably, the Essex Countywide Traveller Unit recorded 75 unauthorised encampments in the county between June 2025 and June 2026, nine of which remained in situ for a week or more and 17 of which comprised 10 or more caravans. The Claimant apprehends that, if the Injunction is not continued, encampment numbers in the Borough would again increase.
15. Further, there is an absence of effective alternatives to injunctive relief. The Claimant has considered, and used, other measures and powers in an attempt to control and prohibit unauthorised encampments (including those discussed at [204]-[216]of Wolverhampton). As Ms Mehat explains, the Claimant’s attempts to rely on the powers in sections 77-78 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 have proved to be an ineffective and inefficient way of controlling the formation of, and enforcing against, unauthorised encampments. Reliance on the use of police powers under sections 60C and 61 of that Act has also proven ineffective, and are in any event reliant upon police resource which is not always available.
16. In support of the application for the first review of the injunction before the deputy judge, the Claimant offered an undertaking that it would elevate its Negotiated Tolerance Procedure and Temporary Transit Agreement to the status of a formal Claimant policy. Ms Mehat has provided evidence that this was done: the policy was published on 19 March 2026 and was effective from 26 March 2026. The effect of this policy is to operate a negotiated stopping policy. All negotiations in relation to stopping are treated as if they were being conducted under that policy, even where an approach (or agreement) under the policy has never in fact been made. As Eyre J described at [21] of his judgment, “The Stopping Policy is intended to provide a means whereby those who would otherwise be in breach of the injunction can obtain permission for a temporary encampment. Its scope is limited because it is dependent on the encampment being authorised by the relevant landowner and on such use of the site in question being lawful in terms of the planning legislation. However, it does advance matters to the extent of providing a mechanism whereby permission can be obtained from the Claimant for encampments on its land which would otherwise be caught by the injunction. In addition, if there is an encampment on the Claimant’s land which would otherwise be so caught the Claimant will, if those occupying the land were unaware of the mechanism for seeking permission, approach the matter in the first instance as if an application for such permission was being made.” Like Eyre J, I am satisfied that the policy represents a genuine attempt on the part of the Claimant to address the effect of the injunction on the Convention rights of members of the Traveller and Gypsy communities.
17. Pursuant to the Claimant’s duty of full and frank disclosure, Ms Pratt drew to my attention the fact that the Claimant does not operate a transit site. As Ms Warren explains, no new transit pitches or emergency stopping places were considered necessary in the local plan period, as encampments were increasingly being associated with the dumping of waste, and a transit site would not alleviate the fly-tipping issue. Ms Mehat explains that a negotiated stopping policy is considered to be more flexible and of greater utility to the Gypsy and Traveller community than such a transit site.
18. Lastly, Ms Warren explains in her witness statement that the five-year assessed need for permanent (or seasonal/semi-permanent) pitches for occupation by the Gypsy and Traveller community in the Borough is currently assessed at 162 pitches. 102 pitches have been allocated towards this need, such that there is currently a 60 pitch shortfall. However, this assessed need relates to pitches for permanent (or seasonal/semi-permanent) residence by members of the Travelling community (that is, those who are settled, or wish to settle, in the Borough). By contrast, the Injunction is intended to capture those persons who are transiting through the Borough forming temporary encampments in inappropriate and harmful places, and undertaking harmful activities such as fly-tipping. The Injunction therefore addresses a different issue to that which might be caused by a shortfall in permanent pitches.
19. I am therefore satisfied that it is just and convenient to extend the effect of the Injunction for a further year. In summary, applying the Rochdale approach to the above matters:
i) The Injunction has been very effective.
ii) There are no grounds for discharge of the Injunction.
iii) There is a proper justification for its continuation.
iv) A further order should therefore be granted on materially identical terms to those in place before.
20. No undertaking as to damages is offered by the Claimant; nor in my judgment is any such undertaking required. None was required either by Eyre J or by the Deputy Judge. The position has not materially changed since either of their judgments.
Postscript: the London Gypsy and Travellers Group
21. As I set out at paragraph 3 above, as long ago as 13 October 2025 the date of the hearing for this renewal application was set for 6 October 2026. Paragraph 13 of the Glasson Order expressly provided that any person other than the Claimant who would like to participate in the hearing of the renewal application must file and serve any evidence upon which they intended to rely at the hearing by 22 September 2026 (i.e. a week after the deadline for the making of the renewal application, if any such application was to be made). The Glasson Order further provided that it should be served not only by being affixed on each of the Sensitive Sites, but also on the group known as the London Gypsy and Traveller Group (“LGT”). LGT is a charitable NGO who were ordered to be served with proceedings relating to injunctions against persons unknown by the Supreme Court in Wolverhampton.
22. At paragraph 13 of the Glasson Judgment, the Deputy Judge recorded that in the early hours of the day of the hearing, the Public Interest Law Centre had sent to him direct a letter on behalf of LGT. He directed that the KB Listing Office should return the letter to the solicitors referring them to the provisions of CPR 39.8 that provides that all communications with the Court should be copied to the parties (as well as to R (Jasseh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 47 (Admin)). The letter was subsequently resubmitted and copied to the Claimant. It concerned a proposal for the future case management of the case, the terms upon which LGT might be permitted to intervene in it, and a request to be permitted to apply to vary any Order made at any future date. I observe that the letter was not one which was purely routine, uncontentious and administrative (so as to fall within the exclusion to the ordinary rule provided by CPR 39.8(2)).
23. Just after 5pm on the eve of the hearing, I received an email marked “Extremely urgent” from the Public Interest Law Centre on behalf of LGT. It was sent directly to my own judicial email address. It was not copied to the Claimant. In accordance with CPR 39.8(5), I directed that the email be returned by the KB Listings Office to the solicitors drawing attention to CPR 39.8, the judgment in Jasseh, and the remarks of the deputy judge in his judgment.
24. The email was subsequently resubmitted (again, by direct email to me) but this time copied to the Claimant. It recorded that LGT had asked the Claimant to consent to its being joined as an intervener and for an adjournment of the application so that LGT could be represented by counsel at the hearing. It stated that the Claimant had refused to give consent to any adjournment and had indicated it would seek the costs of any application to adjourn, and that as a small charity LGT did not have funds to meet a costs order. It attached the associated correspondence between LGT and the Claimant. It concluded: “LGT request that in the event the court makes an injunction order that there is a direction that allows the parties to apply to vary it on notice and that any application to vary by LGT will not incur any costs or costs will be capped at a maximum of £2,000. This in our view is proportionate to the matters at stake and the role of LGT as envisaged by the Judges in the Supreme Court in the ‘Wolverhampton case’ in policing this type of injunction by the Claimant.” There was no request for permission to intervene, nor any application notice in respect of the requested costs capping order, nor any evidence in support.
25. It should hardly need to be said that this is not the manner in which an application should be made.
i) First, any application to court should be made in accordance with CPR Part 23, and should be both filed at court and served on the parties as required by CPR 23.3, 23.4 and 23.7. It is wholly inappropriate to react to the listing of a hearing by emailing the judge directly in order to make an application.
ii) Secondly, any application should be made in an orderly way and in good time before a hearing (usually to be served at least 3 days before a hearing in accordance with CPR 23.7(1)(b)). There was no possible urgency justifying shorter notice in the present case pursuant to CPR 23.7(4): LGT had been on notice since the Glasson order was made on 13 October 2025 that any review application would be heard on 6 October 2025. Further, LGT had been served with the review application on 28 August 2026. It had sought the Claimant’s consent to its intervention and for an adjournment by email of 17 September 2026 and had received a response from the Claimant on 23 September 2026. There is no possible basis upon which it could or should have been thought appropriate to wait nearly 2 weeks after that before sending an email marked “extremely urgent” to the judge on the eve of the hearing setting out LGT’s position and purporting to make an application to the court by such means.
26. The result is that there is no application from LGT for permission to intervene before the court, nor any properly constituted application for a costs capping order. I therefore decline to make any order to that effect.
27. Insofar as LGT requested that the order contained a liberty to apply provision to enable them to make an application to vary any order made at a future date, I note that both the Glasson order and the draft order submitted to me has provision by which the defendants or anyone notified of the order may each of them apply to the court on 72 hours written notice to both the court and the Claimant (without prejudice to the right of that person to apply to shorten the time for written notice) to vary or discharge the Order or so much of it as affects that person. Like the deputy judge, I direct that the order which I make should be served on LGT accordingly.
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