Administrative United Kingdom
LR v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/68450/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester
On 15th October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE hollings-tennant
Between
LR
(anonymity order Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Saleem, Malik & Malik Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Ainsworth, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Albania. She has appealed under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision to refuse her claim for international protection lodged on 26th September 2022. Her appeal is brought on grounds that her removal would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
2. I have considered whether it is appropriate to make an anonymity order, bearing in mind the importance of the principle of open justice. I have decided to do so because this case involves matters relating to international protection and the importance of fulfilling the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice. Further, the Appellant is a vulnerable woman who has suffered domestic abuse and has mental health concerns. I also take into account there are three children involved who are dependent on her claim.
BACKGROUND
3. The background to this appeal is set out in documentation contained on MyHMCTS, with all relevant evidence contained in a consolidated hearing bundle of [271] pages and a separate [2] page statement. The Appellant left Albania in September 2022 and travelled through several countries, including Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Hungary, Germany, Belgium and France on her journey to the United Kingdom. She entered this country illegally by small boat on 23rd September 2022 and claimed asylum three days later. The Respondent refused that claim by way of a decision dated 11th July 2024. The refusal of that claim is the subject of this appeal.
The Appellant’s claim
4. The Appellant claims she suffered serious domestic abuse at the hands of her husband (‘E’) for several years. She met ‘E’ in May 2012, they started a relationship and moved to Tirana before getting married in December 2013. In May 2015, ‘E’ told her he had problems and they were going to claim asylum in Germany. Whilst resident there ‘E’ started drinking and became physically and verbally abusive. He forced her to borrow money from family members because he was ashamed to ask his family himself and she later found out he was gambling. They returned to Tirana when their claim was refused and stayed for six or seven months before travelling to France to seek asylum. The Appellant gave birth to her son there before returning to Tirana in 2018 when their claim in France was refused. ‘E’ continued to subject her to domestic abuse.
5. The Appellant says she tried to leave her husband many times but he always found her. She stayed with her parents for six months and during that period her brother and ‘E’s family members told him to change his behaviour. He came to her parents’ house and convinced her he would not misbehave so she returned with him but after three days he started drinking and gambling again. In August or September 2021, he beat her whilst his sister was present. The Appellant called the police but they did not take action because they knew her mother-in-law, who arrived at the house having been informed by her daughter. Whilst they were taken to the police station, the officer driving told her not to tell the truth and her husband and his parents also threatened her. She was placed in a separate room at the police station but did not tell officers the truth because she was scared. She returned to the family home for four or five days before ‘E’ kicked her out of the house.
6. The Appellant went to stay with her parents for around one year and asserts that her husband constantly came to their home and threatened her and her parents. She started working in a bakery and when ‘E’ found out he came to the shop and demanded money and when she refused he assaulted her. After this incident she borrowed money from her employer and left Albania with her children. The Appellant fears ‘E’ will kill her on return. She is also scared of her employer from whom she borrowed money. She cannot report threats to the police because ‘E’ has connections or relocate to another area because he will find her. It is also argued there are very significant obstacles to integration and return is not in the best interest of the children such that removal would amount to a disproportionate interference with their right to a family and private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’).
The Respondent’s case
7. The Respondent accepts the Appellant is a victim of domestic abuse and that she borrowed money from her employer before leaving Albania but does not accept her husband’s family have any power or influence over the state authorities. In her reasons for refusal letter (RFRL), the Respondent argues that the Appellant gave inconsistent evidence as to what happened when she reported matters to the police. Her evidence is deemed to be vague as to the extent of her husband’s alleged family connections within the police force. Reliance is placed on section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’) as the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in a first safe country is considered to damage her credibility.
8. The Respondent argues there is effective state protection available to the Appellant in Tirana should her husband threaten her on return, with reliance placed on relevant background information in two separate Home Office Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs) on actors of protection and domestic violence. It is also argued there is a reasonable internal relocation alternative within Albania and no real risk that the person from whom she borrowed money would target her on return. With regards to the risk of trafficking, the Respondent points out the Appellant is not a victim of trafficking and argues her personal circumstances do not give rise to a real risk of such on return, with reliance placed on TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92.
9. With regards to Article 8 of the ECHR, the Respondent argues the Appellant does not qualify on family life grounds as a parent because her three children have not lived in this country for seven years and would be returning to Albania with her. It is argued there are no very significant obstacles to integration or exceptional circumstances such that the decision to refuse does not amount to a disproportionate interference with her right, or her children’s right, to a family or private life.
HEARING
10. The hearing took place by way of a face-to-face hearing with the Appellant attending in person along with both legal representatives and a court appointed Albanian language interpreter. The hearing was recorded by the Tribunal and that shall stand as the record of proceedings. As a preliminary matter at the start of the hearing, I confirmed with the parties that all necessary documentary evidence was included in the consolidated hearing bundle and discussed the outstanding issues to be decided. Both parties agreed that the principal disputed issues are whether there is effective state protection or a safe and reasonable internal relocation alternative. Ms Ainsworth maintained the Respondent’s position that there is no Refugee Convention reason and Mr Saleem argued there is a separate free-standing claim brought on family and private life grounds under Article 8 of the ECHR, so those matters also need to be considered.
Issues in dispute
11. As such, it was agreed with the parties that the following principal disputed issues fall to be decided by the Tribunal:
(i) whether there is a real risk that the Appellant will be targeted by her husband in Tirana and whether this brings her within the scope of the Refugee Convention;
(ii) if so, whether there is effective state protection available to her in that area;
(iii) if not, whether there is a viable and reasonable internal relocation alternative to another area within Albania where the Appellant would be safe;
(iv) whether there are very significant obstacles to integration or otherwise exceptional circumstances such that removal would amount to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s right to a family and private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.
Evidence and submissions
12. Thereafter, the Appellant was called to give oral evidence. She started to give her evidence in Albanian through the interpreter having confirmed that she fully understood the interpreter. However, in response to the first question put in cross-examination it became apparent there may be an issue. The interpreter explained this was nothing to do with understanding but acknowledged he was unable to express in English what the Appellant had said. Following brief discussion with the legal representatives it was agreed that the matter could proceed by way of submissions only.
13. In the circumstances, I decided to proceed with the hearing. This matter has previously been adjourned and the Appellant has made a specific request to expedite on grounds that the prolonged uncertainty as to her immigration status is having a detrimental effect on her mental health. Given credibility is not in issue to any significant extent and there is a detailed witness statement, I considered there was no procedural unfairness arising by hearing the matter without further cross-examination, particularly given both parties were in agreement. As such, I proceeded to hear submissions from the legal representatives before reserving my decision. I am grateful to Ms Ainsworth and Mr Saleem for their assistance and I have taken note of the documentary evidence presented and closing submissions on behalf of the Respondent and the Appellant.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
14. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must establish she is a refugee as defined in Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. Given her asylum claim was lodged after 28th June 2022, I must apply a two-stage test pursuant to section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’). I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause her to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to her by an actor of persecution); and
(b) whether she does in fact fear persecution in Albania as a result of that characteristic.
15. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic and fears persecution as a result, I must determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that she would face persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, there would not be effective state protection available to her and she could not safely relocate to another part of Albania.
16. If I am not satisfied the Appellant is a refugee, I must consider whether she meets the requirements for humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. To qualify, she must show there are substantial grounds for believing she faces a real risk of suffering serious harm in Albania and is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail herself of state protection there. I must consider whether the decision to refuse, and as a consequence of that decision her removal to Albania, breaches her human rights on grounds that she faces a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.
17. With regards to Article 8 of the ECHR, the question is whether removal breaches the Appellant’s right, or anyone else’s right, to respect for their family or private life here. This is a qualified right. She must first establish on the balance of probabilities that she has established a family or private life in the United Kingdom of such quality to engage Article 8(1). If it is, I must decide whether the interference with the Appellant’s rights is justified under Article 8(2). If she does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, the public interest would normally mean refusing leave to enter or remain unless this would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant or a family member such that refusal is not proportionate. In considering this issue, I have followed the approach in Razgar [2004] UKHL 27, Huang [2007] UKHL 11 and Agyarko [2018] UKSC 11 and taken into account factors in section 117B of the 2002 Act, balancing public interest considerations against factors relied upon by the Appellant.
18. I must also have regard to Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 as regards the best interests of any children affected by the decision. As set out in ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4 and Zoumbas v SSHD [2013] UKSC 7, the best interests of children are an integral part of the proportionality assessment and must be a primary consideration, though they are not paramount and may be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other matters that weigh in the public interest.
FINDINGS
19. In coming to a decision in this appeal, I have taken into account all relevant evidence adduced. I have referred in my findings to material aspects of the claim and considered all the evidence in the round, applying the relevant standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities, when assessing whether the Appellant genuinely fears persecution and the lower standard of proof, that of a reasonable degree of likelihood, when considering whether she would face persecution on return. Any absence of a reference to a particular piece of evidence should not be taken to mean I have not considered that evidence before reaching my decision.
Issue (i) – extent of risk from the Appellant’s husband
20. I turn first to the question as to whether the Appellant has a characteristic (or would have such a characteristic attributed to her), which could cause her to fear persecution under section 32(2)(a) of the 2022 Act. Following JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100, this question is to be considered taking the claim at its highest. The Respondent argues the Appellant’s claim does not engage the Refugee Convention because women who have experienced domestic abuse do not form a ‘particular social group’ as they are not perceived as different by surrounding society in Albania whereas the Appellant contends that as a single woman with children who is a victim of domestic abuse she does meet both conditions set out in section 33(3) and (4) of the 2022 Act.
21. To fall within the scope of the Refugee Convention as a member of a particular social group both conditions set out in sections 33(3) and (4) must be satisfied, in accordance with section 33(2) of the 2022 Act. I accept that women who have suffered domestic abuse have an innate characteristic and share a common background that cannot be changed and, as such, the Appellant satisfies the first condition. The more difficult issue is whether women who fear domestic abuse have a distinct social identity in Albania because they are perceived as different by surrounding society, noting this must be assessed in the context of the society in which the group is said to exist. I note the proposed group is defined by reference to the risk of violence of which its members are at risk. It is unfortunate this matter was not properly articulated in the Appellant’s skeleton argument, which amounts to nothing more than bare assertion that she falls within a particular social group and fails to engage either with the Respondent’s position as set out in the CPIN on gender-based violence or findings in DM (sufficiency of protection, PSG, women, domestic violence) [2004] UKIAT 59.
22. In his closing submissions, Mr Saleem argued that the Appellant would be perceived as different as a single woman from northern Albania living with three children. He highlighted background evidence which indicates there is societal discrimination and referred to the strict code of honour governing what remains a largely patriarchal society. There is some merit in this contention for the reasons advanced and I take into account that DM was principally concerned with sufficiency of state protection and pre-dates Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46, TD and AD and the analysis of ‘particular social group’ under section 33(4) of the 2022 Act set out in LR (Male VOTs)(CG) [2026] UKUT 315. Having considered the evidence presented before me, I accept, on balance, that the Appellant does fall within the definition of a ‘particular social group’ as a single woman with children given the background evidence that women still face stigma and societal discrimination despite changing attitudes.
23. The second question under section 32(2)(b) of the 2022 Act is whether the Appellant does in fact fear persecution as a result of that characteristic (the ‘subjective fear test’). Given the Respondent accepts the Appellant was subjected to domestic abuse over several years, this question falls to be answered in her favour. Plainly, the fact that she suffered physical and verbal abuse at the hands of her violent husband when they lived together and was subsequently threatened at her parents’ home and place of work, would far more likely than not give rise to a genuine subjective fear that he may target her again if she returns to Tirana or try to find her if she relocates to another area.
24. Whilst the credibility of her claim is largely accepted, I have some reservations about the evidence in her additional witness statement, in which she describes two very serious incidents in which she was raped and assaulted by her husband. It is unclear to me why these incidents were not mentioned in her initial detailed witness statement. However, the Respondent did not raise concerns about this at the hearing and as both parties agreed the matter should proceed by way of submissions only, the Appellant did not have an opportunity to explain the omission. Further, there is no suggestion that the sustained physical and emotional abuse the Appellant has suffered over a significant period of time at the hands of her husband does not fall within the definition of ‘persecution’ in section 31 of the 2022 Act. Given her lived experiences, even if she has embellished her account in respect of the incident in which she claims to have been dragged from her place of work and raped before a neighbour intervened, I accept the Appellant has a genuine subjective fear of returning to Albania.
25. The next question, under section 32(4)(a) of the 2022 Act, is whether or not there is a reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would face similar treatment on return. First, I take into account paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, which states the fact a person has already been subjected to persecution or serious harm is to be regarded as a serious indication that their fear of such treatment occurring again is well-founded, unless there are good reasons to consider it will not be repeated. The Appellant’s evidence is that her husband continued to harass and threaten her even after she left their marital home. In her additional witness statement, she refers to having received threatening messages and voice notes from ‘E’ in December 2023. This evidence was not challenged by the Respondent, though it is unclear why the Appellant failed to mention in a detailed witness statement dated 20th May 2025 that she has received threats whilst resident in this country. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence before me to establish it is at least reasonably likely that her husband would target her again on return to Tirana such that gives rise to a real risk she may come to serious harm.
26. The Appellant also claims to fear the person from whom she borrowed money to leave Albania. However, there is no evidence to suggest she has ever been threatened by this individual. In her witness statement, she says she borrowed from her employer, who knew about the situation with her husband and understood. She also confirms she has had no contact with her manager since she left Albania (at paragraph [51]). Whilst she remains in contact with her parents, there is no evidence to suggest they have been approached at any stage by her previous employer or anyone else in relation to outstanding debts said to be owed. On the evidence presented, I find the Appellant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to show she faces any risk from her employer or anyone else due to an outstanding debt, either in Tirana or elsewhere within Albania.
Issue (ii) – state protection in Albania
27. Whilst the Appellant has a genuine fear of returning to her home area and I find there is a real risk she will be targeted by her husband again, this does not necessarily mean she qualifies for international protection. She must also establish there is no effective state protection available to her in Tirana. In considering this issue, I first note the principles set out in Horvath [2000] UKHL 37. It is the duty of the home state to provide effective protection but if that system is lacking, international protection is available as a substitute. However, no state in the world can achieve complete protection against isolated or random attacks by non-state agents. The relevant standard is therefore not that which eliminates all risk or provides guarantees of protection but rather a practical standard that takes into account the duty a state owes to its citizens (see also Bagdanavicius [2005] EWCA Civ 1605).
28. The Respondent argues there is effective state protection available for this Appellant on return to Albania. The Home Office CPIN on actors of protection states that the government takes reasonable steps to prevent persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts amounting to persecution. In DM and TD and AD (Trafficked women), the Tribunal found there was, in general, effective state protection, though it may not be effective in every case. The CPIN on gender-based violence, published in April 2026, states the Constitution guarantees equality and prohibits discrimination based on gender and refers to legislation having been introduced to strengthen protections against domestic violence. The criminal code includes penalties for those found guilty of such abuse which reflect the severity of the offence and there are protection orders available to victims which can impose a range of measures, including banning an abuser from the residence or prohibiting contact (see sections [4.1.4], [4.1.5] and [4.1.10]). There is a dedicated referral mechanism designed to protect and support victims which is comprised of community professionals with institutional responsibility to respond to and address their needs, which includes a 24/7 national hotline. I place significant weight on these factors as indicative that there is effective protection for victims of domestic violence.
29. I have taken into account country background information provided in the Appellant’s schedule of country evidence (consolidated bundle, page [93]). However, most of the links are to reports that are now somewhat dated. For example, the research brief on violence against women and girls is based on a survey conducted in 2018 and the document from Amnesty International, ‘Albania: violence against women in the family: It’s not her shame’ was published over 20 years ago, in March 2006. The schedule also refers to an outdated CPIN and makes no reference to the most recent version covering gender-based violence. Further, the additional schedule of country evidence (consolidated bundle, page [189]) also cites an Amnesty International report from March 2009 and again relies upon extracts from outdated CPINs. I find the documents cited necessarily carry less weight in assessing the extent to which more recent improvements in law enforcement and the authorities response to domestic abuse demonstrate there is effective state protection in Albania. Having considered the country evidence presented, I find there is no cogent evidence to depart from findings in DM and TD and AD that there is, in general, effective state protection and find the provision for female victims of domestic abuse has in fact improved since those cases were heard given the introduction of further legislation and ongoing efforts to tackle corruption and violence against women and girls despite prevailing societal attitudes in what remains a largely patriarchal society.
30. Whilst the Appellant claims to have suffered verbal, physical and sexual abuse at the hands of her husband over several years, by her own account she only approached the police on one occasion (Asylum Interview Record (AIR), question [80]). This was in August or September 2021 just before she left him and returned to her parents’ home. In her witness statement, she states the two police officers who attended were from the same place as her mother-in-law, who had also come to the house. The Appellant was told by her in-laws not to say anything because ‘E’ would end up in prison before being taken to the police station in the same car as her husband, who threatened her in front of the officers. When they arrived at the station she was placed in a separate room and asked what happened but she did not tell police officers the truth because she was fearful after being threatened (witness statement, paragraph [45]). Whilst this is understandable, the police cannot provide effective protection until and unless such matters are properly reported. There is no evidence to suggest she reported the particularly serious incidents of sexual violence to which she refers in her additional statement, despite the fact there were witnesses to such abuse. Further, there is no evidence either the Appellant or her parents’ reported what she describes as constant harassment and threats whilst she was living at her parents’ house.
31. The Appellant now has documentary evidence of what are said to be threatening messages from her husband sent to her via WhatsApp in December 2023. However, there is no evidence to suggest she has taken any steps to report these messages to the Albanian authorities, despite a direct threat to her family members (consolidated bundle page [169]). Whilst her father has provided a short statement confirming that his daughter would not be safe if she returns to his house, he gives no indication as to whether ‘E’ has continued to visit the property or that he has himself reported matters to the police, notwithstanding what appears to be a direct threat. There are no cogent reasons as to why the family would be unable to take this documentary evidence to the local police and they could do so even before she returns to Albania.
32. I take into account the Appellant is likely to have been apprehensive about reporting the abuse to police given the initial reaction of the two officers who attended when she first reported matters to them. I also take into account her evidence that ‘E’ boasted about having connections in the police and that his uncle used to be a police officer, though she does not know what position he held and confirmed he no longer works for the police (AIR, questions [104] and [105]). I would not expect the Appellant to be able to adduce independent evidence of such links and I note corroborative evidence is not required in asylum claims (see MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216). Nevertheless, I find the Appellant’s evidence is somewhat vague as to the extent of her husband’s or his family’s connections with the authorities and it is noteworthy she was told by her mother-in-law not to report matters because otherwise ‘E’ would go to prison (witness statement, paragraph [42]). I consider such a reaction is not indicative of the family holding sufficient power or influence so as to enable him to avoid prosecution or render state protection for the Appellant ineffective.
33. By her own account, her husband was unemployed most of the time and an alcoholic who also had a gambling addiction. In her witness statement, she refers to him having told her he had problems in Albania before they travelled first to Germany and later to France to claim asylum there. I consider these factors are not indicative of ‘E’ having any degree of power or influence over the state authorities and rather lead me to the opposite conclusion. In her asylum interview, she asserts that those with money can get out of situations, though it is clear from her own evidence that her husband did not have money and instead kept asking her for money to fund his drinking and gambling. The Appellant also refers to ‘E’ having started drinking after finding out his sister had killed someone in Albania. She gives no further evidence about this incident and there is nothing to suggest his sister was able to avoid prosecution, which may have given some indication as to the extent of any wider influence the family had.
34. Further, neither the Appellant nor her parents made any complaints to the local police or to any other authority about the way in which the two police officers who attended her home handled the matter. The CPIN on actors of protection in Albania refers to avenues of redress, including the People’s Advocate (Ombudsman), and a legal framework to tackle corruption through a specialised structure for anti-corruption and organised crime (‘SPAK’). Since the Appellant left Albania, the government have also introduced a strategy for the protection of victims of crime (see section [2.1.9]). The country information refers to government commitments to reforming the police force through better training, an integrity verification process and encouraging anonymous reporting of police misconduct. There is no evidence to suggest the Appellant could not raise her concerns through such avenues of redress before she returns to Albania or through her parents, who have themselves been threatened.
35. Having considered the evidence presented, I find the Appellant has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish she would be unable to turn to the relevant authorities for effective state protection on return to Albania, at least to the practical standard envisaged in Horvath and Bagdanavicius. Whilst I take into account that women may be reluctant to report domestic abuse due to stigma, societal discrimination and potentially a lack of awareness of services available to them, the Appellant has the support of her parents and had the courage to leave her abusive husband. It is sufficiently clear the Albanian authorities would be willing and able to provide effective protection if further threats or incidents are reported to them. I also find that any issues which may arise due to the Appellant having borrowed money can be raised with the relevant authorities and there is no reasonable likelihood that adequate state protection would not be forthcoming given the distinct lack of any evidence to suggest the person from whom she borrowed has any connections with the police or to organised crime.
Issue (iii) – internal relocation
36. Given my findings on the issue of state protection, it is not strictly necessary to consider this issue because the Appellant can return to Tirana and seek state protection if necessary from further threats received. However, I will briefly address it because I can understand entirely why she does not wish to live in Tirana given there is an element of risk of a chance encounter. To qualify for international protection, she also needs to show she cannot relocate to another area in Albania in which she would not face treatment amounting to persecution or serious harm, and if there is a place of safety, that it would be unreasonable to expect her to do so. This is reflected in section 35 of the 2022 Act and paragraph 339O of the Immigration Rules and requires an holistic assessment of her particular circumstances (see Januzi [2006] UKHL 5 and AS (Afghanistan) [2019] EWCA Civ 873).
37. First, the Appellant’s fear is in respect of a non-state agent and I have found there is insufficient evidence to establish her husband has any power or influence such that would enable him to find her in any area of relocation or preclude her from seeking police protection in that location. Whilst I cannot discount the possibility that he may continue to look for her and take into account Albania is a relatively small country, I find she could safely relocate to another area, potentially calling upon her sister, who lives in their home area, for at least some degree of emotional support. It is noteworthy that in her asylum interview the Appellant says her husband knows she is in this country and she would not stop him from seeing the children here. She refers to him having to adjust to the law here, though it is unclear why she considers he would abide by the laws in this country but not in Albania (AIR, questions [120] to [123]). Her evidence in this regard implies she would report matters to the police here and I find there is no reason why she could not do the same in any area of relocation in Albania.
38. With regards to the question of reasonableness, I take into account that the Appellant has a genuine subjective fear of being located and targeted again by her husband if she returns to Albania and that she feels safer in this country. This factor is capable of carrying some weight in her favour because it is likely to have a detrimental impact on her ability to integrate and make a living for herself in any area of relocation. However, she has the support of her parents with whom she remains in contact and to whom she can turn for at least some degree of practical and emotional support on return. Whilst I take into account her evidence that her father initially told her to listen to her husband (witness statement, paragraph [23]), there is no evidence that her family disowned her or took the view themselves that she had brought shame on them. She was able to return to live with her parents for six months after returning to Albania from France and also after she left her husband around one year before leaving the country again. It is noteworthy that in her asylum interview, the Appellant said she had received financial support from both her own family and her husband’s family, whom she says criticised his behaviour (AIR, question [139]). Whilst the latter are unlikely to offer further support on return, there is no cogent reasons as to why her own family, her parents or sister, could not provide at least some financial support whilst she seeks to reintegrate.
39. I take into account relevant country background information in the Home Office CPIN on gender based violence which states that single women with children may find it difficult due to the lack of financial support, stigma and discrimination within society. The fact this Appellant will be returning with three children is of some relevance, though she can work whilst they are at school and previously did so for around one year. She has benefitted from an education in Albania, having completed secondary school and also started a nursing course at university before dropping out when she met her husband. Whilst resident in this country, she has attended college and is studying English. She has some work experience having worked in a bakery (witness statement, paragraph [7]). It is also noteworthy that the children are not illegitimate, having all been born whilst the Appellant was married to her husband, though I accept she may not disclose this to people in any area of relocation for fear that he may find her. There will no doubt be practical difficulties for the Appellant, though the background evidence suggests that single woman can and do live independently and in the bigger cities there is a greater degree of acceptance, with employment, financial support and social benefits more accessible for those who need such support (see CPIN on gender-based violence, section [5.1.3]). The evidence presented does not support the contention that she would face stigma or societal discrimination to the extent that this would preclude her from finding suitable employment and providing for herself and her children.
40. The Appellant’s skeleton argument refers to the risk factors identified in TD and AD and argues she faces a real risk of being trafficked, though there is no suggestion she has previously been trafficked. Having considered the various risk factors identified in TD and AD, I find there is no real risk that the Appellant will fall victim to trafficking on return. Whilst I place some weight on the evidence that her family are of poor socio-economic standing from northern Albania, her parents were nonetheless able to move to Tirana themselves and her mother works as a seamstress. The factors to which I have referred above (at paragraphs [38] and [39]) also serve to reduce the extent of any risk of trafficking. The Appellant can also take advantage of the various shelters which are available to victims of domestic abuse and offer support.
41. I take into account the fact that the Appellant is suffering with mental health concerns and has been diagnosed with mixed anxiety and depression. There is a letter from her general practitioner (GP), dated 17th September 2026, who confirms the Appellant’s diagnosis and refers to her requiring ongoing treatment and support. She has also received psychological therapy through the Family Refugee Support Project, who have provided a letter which refers to an initial assessment indicating she had symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), severe depression and expressed thoughts of suicidal ideation. However, there is no expert medical report from a consultant psychiatrist to attest to the severity of her mental health concerns, the Appellant makes no reference to suicidal ideation in either witness statement, the letter from her GP does not mention self-harm and her medical records state she has no suicidal thoughts (consolidated bundle, page [142]). Nevertheless, I accept her mental health may deteriorate to some extent if she is required to return to Albania given her genuine subjective fears of being targeted again by her husband, though at least the anxiety arising through uncertainty as to her immigration status would be resolved and she could make arrangements to return with support from her family. Further, I note her GP refers to the Appellant having reported increased anxiety following an assault which is said to have taken place in this country and that she did not feel safe when she encountered the person whom she reported, though there is no evidence to suggest this person was her husband.
42. In her review of the decision under challenge, the Respondent refers to the CPIN on mental healthcare in Albania, published in January 2025, which confirms there is treatment available for mental health issues, including anxiety, PTSD and depression. In fairness, Mr Saleem did not suggest the Appellant would be unable to obtain suitable treatment for her mental health conditions on return to Tirana or elsewhere in Albania, and no claim was advanced on Article 3 medical grounds. Whilst I accept that the Appellant’s experiences in suffering sustained abuse over a significant period of time will make it more difficult for her to relocate whilst caring for three children, she can nonetheless turn to her parents for emotional support.
43. Having considered the evidence presented, whilst the Appellant and her children are likely to face some practical and financial difficulties on return to another area within Albania, I find it would not be unduly harsh to expect them to do so if they chose not to return to Tirana. I have reached that conclusion having assessed all relevant factors both individually and cumulatively. By her own account, she has the support of her own family, has a reasonable level of education and some work experience. She can also take advantage of the government support available for victims of domestic abuse and seek medical treatment for her mental health concerns. I do not underestimate the extent to which her fears may adversely impact on her ability to re-integrate or the fact that she may face some societal discrimination as a single woman with three children, though I do not consider such factors render internal relocation unduly harsh. I note that even in this country victims of domestic abuse are often, regrettably, forced to move to other areas and continue to live in fear of partners from whom they have fled.
Issue (iv) – Article 8 of the ECHR
44. There is no suggestion the Appellant can qualify for leave to remain on family life grounds as a parent because her children have not been resident in this country for at least seven years. As such, they do not meet the requirements under paragraph E-LTRPT.2.2 of Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules. Further, the children would be returning with their mother so removal does not interfere with their family life.
45. The Appellant does not qualify for leave to remain on private life grounds either as she has only been resident here for just over four years and I find there are no very significant obstacles to integration on return to Albania for the same reasons as set out above (see paragraphs [38] to [43]). There was no suggestion any of the children could qualify under the Immigration Rules. Whilst I take into account they have genuine fears, the Appellant and her children are familiar with the culture and society in Albania, speak the language, and they can turn to her parents for support. Notwithstanding the practical challenges, I find they will have a reasonable opportunity to develop a variety of relationships so as to give substance to their private lives (see Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932 and SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813), at least to a similar extent as they have so far been able to whilst resident in this country.
46. Given the Appellant has lived in this country for just over four years, I accept she has developed a private life here with her children which at least engages Article 8(1) of the ECHR. However, there remains a public interest in removal, in pursuit of the legitimate aim of maintaining effective immigration control. The Appellant travelled here with her children illegally and whilst I accept she has a genuine and well-founded fear that her abusive husband will threaten her again, I have found she does not qualify for international protection because there is effective state protection available to her in Albania. Those who come here illegally cannot expect to be granted a right to remain here if they do not otherwise qualify under the Immigration Rules nor can they expect any private life accrued during periods of unlawful residence to be given significant weight. In accordance with section 117B(4) of the 2002 Act, I can give little weight to the Appellant’s private life as established here.
47. However, little weight does not mean no weight and I find there are factors weighing in the Appellant’s favour in the balancing exercise. First, I have carefully considered the position of the three children involved in this matter, all of whom are under 18 years of age. I take into account they are likely to have genuine fears that their father may target their mother again bearing in mind they witnessed the abuse to which he subjected her and her eldest daughter was old enough to understand what was happening during the incident said to have taken place in front of the children in August or September 2021 (see additional witness statement, paragraph [14]). On the other hand, there is limited evidence to suggest he was directly violent towards their children, other than reference to him pushing their eldest daughter when she tried to intervene on behalf of her mother and more general references to him being aggressive with her and the children. It is noteworthy that in her asylum interview, the Appellant said she would not stop him seeing his children and says that he loves them (AIR, question [121]). I consider she is unlikely to have said that if she had genuine concerns that he may harm the children.
48. The children appear to have adapted well after coming to this country and are currently benefitting from education here, though there is no suggestion they would be unable to access education in Albania, either in Tirana where they previously attended school or in another area. I take into account their childhood has already been disrupted. The eldest child went with her parents to Germany and spent nearly two years there before later living in France for around 18 months, though would only have been around four years’ old when she returned to Albania. The children have spent the majority of their lives in Albania and would likely be able to adapt and return to school there. They will also have the benefit of being able to see their grandparents on a regular basis and potentially rebuild a relationship with their father if he can change his behaviour and stay away from alcohol, though the evidence suggests he has not so far been capable. Nevertheless, there would be further disruption as the children would have to leave this country with a parent who is fearful of return and it is plainly not in their interests to ever witness domestic abuse. This leads me to conclude their best interests weigh in the Appellant’s favour in the balancing exercise.
49. I also weigh in the Appellant’s favour her state of mental health. I accept she feels anxious about returning to Albania, where she has experienced dreadful treatment at the hands of an abusive husband. I take into account that she suffers from depression and is currently receiving treatment and such concerns will make it more difficult for her to integrate and build a life for herself and her children. Whilst I find these factors do not render internal relocation unreasonable in the context of her protection claim, they are nonetheless capable of carrying some weight in the proportionality balancing exercise because her mental health issues adversely affect her private life. However, I note that in her screening interview she said she does not suffer from any physical or mental health concerns and her children were said to be very healthy (at questions [2.1] to [2.4]). I also note that an aspect of her current state of mental health is likely to relate to ongoing uncertainty as to her immigration status and given reference in the GP’s letter to the Appellant having reported being assaulted in this country.
50. With regards to section 117B(2) of the 2002 Act, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the Appellant has sufficient command of the English language and I note she gave evidence in Albanian at the hearing, though this was sensible to avoid any potential misunderstanding. Whilst I take into account she is studying at college, in her statement she confirms she does not understand the English language (see additional witness statement, paragraph [20]). I find this factor weighs against her in the balancing exercise in the absence of evidence as to the extent of her current abilities in English. In any event, she can derive no positive benefit from any ability to speak English (see Rhuppiah [2016] EWCA Civ 80).
51. By virtue of section 117B(3) it is also in the public interest that those seeking leave to remain are financially independent such that they are not a burden on taxpayers and better able to integrate into society. There is no evidence before me to establish the Appellant is financially independent and whilst I take into account she will have a right to work here if granted leave to remain, she is currently attending college and has three children, which may make it more difficult to secure gainful employment in a country where she has no family members to whom she can turn and does not, yet, speak the language. I find that this factor also weighs against the Appellant.
52. Having considered all relevant factors in a ‘balance sheet’ approach to proportionality, giving appropriate weight to factors both for and against the Appellant, I find that removing the Appellant and her children would not amount to a disproportionate interference with their right to a family or private life when weighed against the strength of the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. She has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a need for international protection and whilst I can understand entirely why she would prefer to remain in this country, Article 8 is a qualified right, not an automatic right, I find there is insufficient evidence to establish there are exceptional circumstances to outweigh the public interest in removal.
Application of the law to the facts
53. Having considered all the evidence presented in the round to the appropriate standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities when assessing whether the Appellant holds a genuine fear of treatment amounting to persecution and applying the lower standard to the assessment of risk, I accept she has a genuine well-founded fear of her husband on return to Tirana but find she would be able to turn to the Albanian authorities for effective state protection. As such, the Appellant does not qualify for international protection. I also find that it would not be unduly harsh or unreasonable to expect her to relocate to another area within Albania if she does not wish to return to live in Tirana given the increased risk of a chance encounter with her husband in that location. In the circumstances, her appeal on protection grounds falls to be dismissed.
54. With regards to Article 8 of the ECHR, I find neither the Appellant nor her children qualify for leave to remain on family or private life grounds under the Immigration Rules and she has not demonstrated they would face very substantial difficulties or provided sufficient evidence to establish there are exceptional circumstances such that removal would amount to a disproportionate interference with their right to a family or private life here when factors weighing in their favour are balanced against the strength of the public interest in effective immigration control. As such, I find removing the Appellant and her children would not amount to a disproportionate interference with their rights under Article 8(2). I have reached that conclusion having considered factors weighing in favour of the Appellant both individually and cumulatively.
NOTICE OF DECISION
I dismiss the appeal on asylum grounds.
I dismiss the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.
I dismiss the appeal under Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed: D. Hollings-Tennant Date: 27th October 2026
First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant and her children are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their name or address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify her or the children involved. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of Court.
This order does not restrict disclosure of information relating to this appeal to law enforcement or regulatory agencies, the Bar Council, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Law Society, the Immigration Advice Authority, or where disclosure is otherwise required by law.
For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our immigration lawyer.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).