Administrative United Kingdom

Mirella Wesoamo Denzie v Entry Clearance Officer

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: HU/66615/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester

On 27th October 2026

Before

first-tier tribunal JUDGE hollings-tennant

Between

ms mirella wesoamo denzie

(no anonymity order)

Appellant

and

entry clearance officer

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mrs Maxima Tibile Moke (Sponsor)

For the Respondent: Ms Ainsworth, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a citizen of Ghana who is four years’ old. She appeals under section 82(1)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’) against the Respondent’s decision of 10th October 2025 to refuse her application for leave to enter the United Kingdom to join her mother, who is a Ghanaian citizen resident in this country having been granted limited leave to enter to join her spouse. The Appellant’s appeal is brought on grounds that the decision to refuse entry clearance is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

2. There was no specific request for anonymity, though I have nonetheless considered whether to make an anonymity order, bearing in mind the importance of the principle of open justice. In this case, whilst the Appellant is a young child, there are no particular circumstances arising which would lead me to conclude such an order is necessary to protect her best interests or welfare.

BACKGROUND

3. The background to this appeal is set out in documentation contained on MyHMCTS, with relevant evidence contained in a consolidated appeal bundle of [363] pages. The Appellant currently lives in Bawku, Ghana. On 30th August 2025, she applied for entry clearance as the child of a parent who has limited leave to remain in this country, with her mother acting as the Sponsor. The Respondent refused that application by way of a decision dated 10th October 2025. That refusal is the subject of this appeal.

The Appellant’s claim

4. The Appellant is seeking to join her mother, Mrs Maxima Tibile Moke, who is resident in this country having been granted entry clearance herself to join her husband. She is currently living with her grandmother, though she is 71 years’ old and has developed significant health problems affecting her ability to provide daily care. Mrs Moke claims to have had sole parental responsibility for her daughter since birth as her biological father has never been involved in her life. Mrs Moke says she cared for the Appellant personally until January 2023, when her daughter went to live with her grandmother so Mrs Moke could study at university. The Sponsor says that when she relocated to join her husband in this country, in October 2023, her daughter stayed in Ghana temporarily so she could complete a Master’s degree here before bringing her to join the family.

5. The Sponsor claims she continues to have sole parental responsibility for her daughter, having made all the important decisions with regards to her education, healthcare and living arrangements. Mrs Moke also says she has provided financial support to meet her daughter’s needs, including school fees and medical expenses, and communicates regularly with her through WhatsApp video calls. The Sponsor asserts that her and her husband are able to provide suitable accommodation, financial support and a stable environment for the Appellant here. It is argued that refusing entry clearance amounts to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s and her mother’s right to a family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the ECHR’).

The Respondent’s case

6. The Respondent accepts the Appellant is related as claimed to her Sponsor and it is not in dispute that Mrs Moke is lawfully resident in this country with limited leave to remain. However, it is not accepted that she has or continues to have sole parental responsibility for her daughter’s upbringing. The documentary evidence adduced is said to be self-serving, having been obtained for the purposes of the entry clearance application, and it is argued that money transfer receipts showing financial support does not, in itself, demonstrate sole responsibility. The Respondent also argues there is no evidence to establish there are any exceptional circumstances and that refusal does not amount to a breach of anyone’s rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.

HEARING

7. This matter was allocated to me as a ‘float case’ and was called on after Ms Ainsworth had been afforded sufficient time to read the documents and prepare for the hearing. I am grateful to Ms Ainsworth for her assistance in picking this matter up at short notice thereby avoiding further unnecessary delay, particularly given the Sponsor had made a request for the matter to be expedited. The hearing took place by way of a face to face hearing, with the Sponsor and her husband, Mr Kakoko Moke, attending in person on behalf of the Appellant. The hearing was recorded by the Tribunal and that shall stand as the record of proceedings.

8. As a preliminary matter at the start of the hearing, I confirmed with the parties that I had all relevant documentary evidence and discussed the issues to be decided. Ms Ainsworth agreed the principal disputed issue is whether the Sponsor has sole parental responsibility for her daughter, though clarified the Respondent’s case is based on what is said to be a lack of evidence that the child’s father has not been involved in her life rather than any assertion that her grandmother has shared parental responsibility.

Issues in dispute

9. As such, it was agreed with the parties that the following principal disputed issues fall to be decided by the Tribunal:

(i) whether the Sponsor has had and continues to have sole responsibility for her daughter such that the Appellant qualifies for entry clearance under Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules;

(ii) if not, whether there are otherwise exceptional circumstances such that refusing entry clearance amounts to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s or her Sponsor’s right to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR.

Evidence and submissions

10. Thereafter, I heard oral evidence from the Sponsor, who gave her evidence in English having confirmed she was content to do so. Whilst her husband provided a witness statement in support of the appeal and attended the hearing, Mrs Moke confirmed she did not intend to call him to give oral evidence. Having heard from the Sponsor, I proceeded to hear submissions from Ms Ainsworth before inviting Mrs Moke to address me on anything else she wished to say in support of the Appellant’s appeal. Having considered the evidence presented and closing submissions from the parties, I gave a brief extempore decision allowing this appeal and indicated that I would provide more detailed written reasons in due course, which I now set out below.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

11. The relevant legal provisions are set out in Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules, which specifies requirements to be met by a person seeking entry as the child of a parent with limited leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The specific provisions of relevance to the disputed issues in this appeal are paragraphs E-ECC.1.6(b) and (c)which require an applicant to show their Sponsor has sole parental responsibility for them or establish there are serious and compelling family or other considerations which make exclusion undesirable and suitable arrangements have been made for their care.

12. I have considered this appeal with reference to Article 8 of the ECHR. The question is whether refusal amounts to an unjustified lack of respect for the Appellant’s or her mother’s right to family life here. This is a qualified right. She must first establish on the balance of probabilities that she enjoys a family life with her mother such that Article 8(1) is engaged.If it is, I must decide whether interference with those rights is justified under Article 8(2). Where an applicant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules, the public interest will normally be to refuse leave to enter. The exception is where refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or a family member such that it is not proportionate when balanced against the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control.

13. In considering this issue, I have followed the approach set out in relevant authorities, including Razgar [2004] UKHL 27, Huang [2007] UKHL 11 and TZ (Pakistan & Another [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, and taken into account relevant factors set out in section 117B of the 2002 Act, balancing public interest considerations against factors relied upon by the Appellant. I must also have regard to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 regarding the best interests of children affected by the decision. As set out in ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4 and Zoumbas v SSHD [2013] UKSC 7, the best interests of children are an integral part of the proportionality assessment and a primary consideration, though they are not paramount and may be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other matters that weigh in the public interest.

FINDINGS

14. In coming to a decision in this appeal, I have taken into account all relevant evidence submitted as at the date of the hearing. I have referred in my findings to the material aspects of the claim and considered all evidence in the round, applying the relevant standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities, but any absence of a reference to a particular piece of evidence should not be taken to mean that I have not considered that evidence before reaching my decision.

Issue (i) – sole parental responsibility

15. The first issue to be decided is whether the Appellant’s mother has had and continues to have sole responsibility for her upbringing such that she satisfies the requirements for entry clearance as a child joining their parent under Appendix FM. On the evidence presented before me, I find the Sponsor has provided sufficient evidence to discharge the burden of proof on the Appellant to establish it is more likely than not her mother has sole responsibility for her and that her biological father has not played any role in her life. I reach that conclusion for reasons set out in paragraphs [16] to [25] below.

16. Whilst the Respondent does not accept the Appellant’s biological father has not been involved in her life, it is not suggested that her current living arrangements are not as stated – that she lives with her grandmother in Ghana, who has provided day-to-day care but has recently found it more difficult to look after her because her health has deteriorated. There is no discernible challenge to the Sponsor’s detailed evidence as to how such arrangements arose. In her witness statement, Mrs Moke explains that when she started post-graduate studies in January 2023, her daughter went to live with her grandmother as a temporary family childcare arrangement. She also says that she decided it would more stable for her daughter to stay there while she relocated to this country and established herself rather than moving a young child at the same time. I find the Sponsor has provided an entirely credible explanation as to why her daughter was placed in the temporary care of her grandmother and it is noteworthy that she was not asked any questions about this aspect of her evidence in cross-examination.

17. The Sponsor has also provided detailed evidence as to how she met her daughter’s biological father. She explains that they met in March 2021 when he visited the region for a friend’s funeral. They started a relationship though this was maintained largely through phone calls as they lived in different regions. He visited her whilst she was living on the university campus and she fell pregnant. When she told him, he became distant and began to avoid her calls. Mrs Moke says that on one occasion a woman answered and asked why she was calling her husband. She has since then been unable to contact him and he has not offered any financial support or otherwise had any involvement in the Appellant’s life. In her submissions, Ms Ainsworth argued the Sponsor has not provided what she described as a ‘full picture’ of the father’s role. I do not agree with this contention. It is hard to envisage what further evidence she could reasonably be expected to provide if she has not been able to contact the individual and has no idea as to his whereabouts. Further, she was not asked any questions in cross-examination about her relationship with the Appellant’s father or efforts made to contact him. I find that Mrs Moke has provided entirely credible evidence in this regard.

18. There is a question as to why the Sponsor decided to record the father’s name on her daughter’s birth certificate if he has never been involved in her life. She was asked about this in cross-examination, though it was not raised as an issue in the decision. Mrs Moke said she included his name in accordance with customary norms to bring dignity to the child’s life as there are cultural implications for illegitimate children. I find this is a reasonable explanation, which is also consistent with her written testimony (see witness statement, paragraph [11]). Further, the fact that his name is cited on the birth certificate does not, in my judgement, undermine the detailed and unchallenged evidence that he has not been involved in the Appellant’s life.

19. The Sponsor has provided documentary evidence to support her assertion that she is responsible for making important decisions about her daughter’s education, healthcare and general welfare. In accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 439, she must demonstrate any documents adduced can be relied upon, though it is noteworthy there is no discernible challenge to the veracity of any of the documents adduced and Mrs Moke was not asked any questions about the contents therein. Whilst the Respondent notes the documents were obtained for the purposes of an entry clearance application, this does not, in itself, render them unreliable. All documents adduced in support of such applications are self-serving, in that they are provided to demonstrate a person meets the requirements of the rules under which they have applied.

20. There is an order for interim custody issued by the District Court in Navrongo on 16th July 2025, which confirms that the Sponsor was granted custody of the Appellant (see consolidated bundle, page [86]). There is also a letter from legal counsel who acted on the Sponsor’s behalf during the course of those proceedings. They confirm the Court accepted the child’s biological father has had no involvement and has never provided financial, emotional or practical support. It is also noted that attempts were made to locate him and serve notice of proceedings but such efforts were unsuccessful. As such, Mrs Moke was granted sole custody (see consolidated bundle, page [87]). I find I can place considerable weight on these documents as corroborative of the Sponsor’s claim to have sole parental responsibility. There is no reason to doubt their authenticity.

21. There are several documents from East Star Academy which confirm the Appellant is registered and that Mrs Moke is responsible for paying her daughter’s tuition fees and is the only parent registered in official records. The Sponsor has also provided a copy of an application form for a place at the academy, completed in January 2023 which cites emergency contacts as the Appellant’s grandmother and her neighbour, Ms Josephine Ayayah, rather than her father (see consolidated bundle, page [97]). There is also a letter from the Academy, dated 19th January 2024, raising concerns about irregular attendance which is consistent with the Sponsor’s assertion that she is the responsible parent and primary contact and her evidence that there are occasions when her mother is unwell and cannot take her to school. There are two further letters, both addressed to the Sponsor, which explicitly refer to the difficulties arising due to the Appellant’s grandmother’s illness. Further, I note the evidence as to ongoing direct involvement in making decisions about the Appellant’s education is necessarily limited to having enrolled her at nursery given she is only four years old.

22. With regards to healthcare, there is a patient profile report relating to the Appellant from St. Anne hospital in Damongo which cites the Sponsor as the only emergency contact and a letter, dated 15th July 2025, from a senior medical officer at Bawku hospital who confirms that the Appellant has received medical treatment there and that their records indicate her primary care giver is her mother, who has been responsible for medical expenses incurred during hospital visits (see consolidated bundle, pages [123] to [128]). I find that I can place some weight on these documents as corroborative of the Sponsor’s claim to have had sole parental responsibility.

23. Mrs Moke has also provided documentary evidence in the form of photographs, screen shots of WhatsApp video calls with her daughter and text messages exchanged with her neighbour as evidence of ongoing contact and involvement in her daughter’s life, which supports her assertion that she did not abandon the Appellant but rather placed her in the temporary care of her grandmother whilst she established herself in this country. It is also not in dispute that the Sponsor has provided regular financial support for her daughter’s living needs. Further, it is quite clear that Mrs Moke has made every effort to adduce relevant evidence available to her to support the Appellant’s appeal and corroborate her assertions. Alongside documentary evidence establishing legal custody and parental responsibility for education and healthcare, there are detailed witness statements from the Appellant’s grandmother, her neighbour, and step-father attesting to the family circumstances, the contents of which were not challenged.

24. In her closing submissions, Ms Ainsworth confirmed that the Respondent’s case was not that the Appellant’s grandmother shares parental responsibility. Even if that point had been pursued at the hearing, this does not preclude the Sponsor from being able to establish sole responsibility at the date of application. In Emmanuel v SSHD [1972] Imm AR 69, the Tribunal accepted a parent in this country may have sole responsibility for a child even if day-to-day responsibility is necessarily undertaken by relatives abroad (see also Ramos v IAT [1989] Imm AR 148). In TD (Paragraph 297(i)(e): ‘sole responsibility’) Yemen [2006] UKIAT 49, the Tribunal found the test is whether the parent has continuing control and direction over the child’s upbringing, including making important decisions in their life.

25. Overall, I am entirely satisfied it is more likely than not that Mrs Moke has had and continues to have sole parental responsibility for her four year old daughter. Whilst her grandmother has provided daily care as a temporary arrangement, the Sponsor has adduced cogent evidence to establish she has retained parental responsibility, making the decisions about the Appellant’s education, health and welfare, and has continued to provide emotional and financial support.

Application of the law to the facts

26. Having considered all the evidence presented in the round to the appropriate standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities, I find that the Sponsor has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate she has had and continues to have sole responsibility for the Appellant. I accept her evidence that the child’s biological father has not been involved in her life because I found her to be an entirely credible witness whose detailed written evidence is corroborated by documents provided upon which reliance can properly be placed. As such, I find the Appellant has established that she meets the necessary requirements for entry clearance as a child joining a parent under Appendix FM.

27. Given my findings of fact, I find there is family life between the Appellant and her mother such that engages Article 8(1) of the ECHR and the decision to refuse entry clearance amounts to a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for that family life when balanced against the strength of the public interest in immigration control. This is because I have found she meets the requirements of the Immigration Rules. The fact the Appellant meets such requirements is a significant factor weighing in her favour when assessing proportionality as the rules set out the Respondent’s policy as to how applications from children seeking to join parents here on family life grounds under Article 8 of the ECHR are to be determined (see TZ(Pakistan)). At the hearing, Ms Ainsworth acknowledged that if I found the Sponsor has established sole parental responsibility the Appellant’s appeal would fall to be allowed.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal is allowed.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

As I have allowed the appeal and because a fee has been paid, I have considered making a fee award. I have decided to make a fee award in this matter to the sum of £144.00. This is because there was sufficient evidence as to sole parental responsibility placed before the Respondent and there was a failure to properly engage with that evidence.

Signed: D. Hollings-Tennant Date: 4th November 2026

First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant

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