Administrative United Kingdom

MM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: PA/52119/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Birmingham
On 28 October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Athwal

Between

MM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Lane of Counsel, instructed by Kothala & Co.

For the Respondent: Ms Tasnim, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 7 January 2025.

Anonymity

2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.

Background

3. The appellant is an Afghan national born in Kabul. He claims to have worked for the Afghan judiciary as an administrator/computer operator between approximately 2015 and the Taliban takeover in 2021. Following the Taliban takeover he states that employees associated with the previous government were at risk and that he left Afghanistan approximately two months later. He arrived in the United Kingdom clandestinely on 14 December 2022 and claimed asylum on 16 December 2022. His claim is based on a fear of persecution by the Taliban arising from his former employment in the judiciary.

The Hearing

4. The hearing was conducted face to face. It was recorded and that is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

Issues

5. The following matters were agreed between the parties:

(a) The appellant’s identity and nationality are not in dispute.

(b) The Refugee Convention is engaged on the basis of the appellant’s claimed imputed political opinion.

(c) If the appellant’s account is accepted as credible, it is agreed that neither sufficiency of protection nor internal relocation would be available to him.

(d) The appellant’s claims for asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights protection arise from the same factual matrix.

6. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:

(a) Findings of fact, applying the relevant evidential tests, on the following:

(i) Whether pursuant to s.8(4) Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 the appellant had a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum in Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, or France.

(ii) Whether the appellant was an administrator for the judiciary.

(iii) If so, whether he came to the adverse attention of the Taliban.

(b) If so, on the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?

(c) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?

(d) Is the appellant at real risk of torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment?

7. At the hearing, Mr Lane confirmed that the appellant no longer advanced a claim that he would be at risk on return to Afghanistan by reason of westernisation. Nor was it argued that the appellant faced a real risk of serious harm arising from the general security or humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan.

8. Those aspects of the claim were therefore not pursued, and I make no findings in relation to them.

Evidence

9. I heard evidence from the appellant (through a Pashtu interpreter), who adopted his witness statement, as well as the representatives’ submissions. I considered the oral evidence and submissions together with the documentation contained on myHMCTS.

Legal Framework

10. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine both the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a) Does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?

(b) Does the appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?

11. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(a) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and

(b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the appellant.

12. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

13. For the appellant to succeed on Article 3 ECHR grounds, the appellant has the burden to prove to the lower standard a real risk of torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment ("the treatment"). Article 3 is a non-derogable right. The treatment complained of must reach a minimum level of severity, which is a relative threshold and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of execution, duration, physical or mental effects and the appellant's sex, age and state of health. Article 3 includes both positive and negative obligations on the state to refrain from the treatment and/or to take measures to effectively protect people from such treatment.

14. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.

15. Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.

16. I have taken into consideration the country guidance cases of AK (Article 15(c)) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 00163(IAC), and AS(Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan (CG) [2020] UKUT 130 (IAC), noting that these pre-date the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.

Facts

S.8(4) AITCA 2004

17. The appellant’s behaviour engages s.8(4) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004.

18. Pursuant to section 8, I am required to take into account, as potentially damaging to the appellant’s credibility, any failure to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum in a safe country. The appellant’s evidence is that before arriving in the United Kingdom, he travelled through Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, Switzerland and France. The weight to be attached to this matter is a question for me.

19. I find that the appellant’s evidence as to whether he sought asylum in another safe country was inconsistent. In his oral evidence, he stated that he was under the control of smugglers and that he had claimed asylum in Switzerland, but left after being threatened with removal.

20. However, at question 103 of his asylum interview, the appellant confirmed that he had intended to come to the United Kingdom from the outset because of its human rights protections and made no mention of being under the control of smugglers. When this discrepancy was put to him, he asserted that he had referred to the smugglers in earlier accounts.

21. At question 3.6 of his screening interview, when specifically asked whether he had claimed asylum in any other country, the appellant stated that this had not been possible because it had not been offered by the smugglers. When invited to explain the inconsistencies between the three accounts provided, he was unable to provide a satisfactory or cogent explanation.

22. Having considered the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant failed to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum in a safe country. In accordance with section 8(4), I therefore approach the appellant’s evidence with caution when assessing its credibility and reliability as a whole.

Whether the appellant was an administrator for the judiciary

23. I have considered the evidence as a whole and, even applying the lower standard of proof applicable in humanitarian protection and human rights claims, I am not satisfied that the appellant has established that he was employed as an administrator within the judiciary. These are my reasons.

24. The appellant relies upon documentary evidence relating to his employment, namely an employee identity card issued in December 2015 and training certificates relating to training undertaken in October 2016 and November 2018.

25. The respondent submits that the appellant has provided inconsistent evidence regarding the commencement of his employment. In his asylum interview, he stated that he began work on 4 May 2015 (AIR Q49), whereas the employee identity card upon which he relies was issued on 7 December 2015.

26. The appellant sought to explain this discrepancy by asserting, in his witness statement and oral evidence, that he had been issued with an earlier identity card in May 2015 and a replacement card in December 2015. He claimed that he remained in possession of both cards and had provided both to his solicitors.

27. I do not accept that explanation. The appellant was unable to explain why only the December 2015 identity card was included in the appeal bundle if, as he claimed, he had provided both documents to his representatives. I further note that the Appellant's Skeleton Argument makes no reference to the appellant being in possession of a separate identity card issued in May 2015, which was provided to his representatives.

28. Having considered the evidence in the round, I do not accept that the appellant was in possession of an employee identity card issued in May 2015. I find that this account was advanced in an attempt to reconcile the inconsistency between the commencement date given in his asylum interview and the date recorded on the identity card upon which he relies. I therefore find that this aspect of the appellant’s evidence undermines his credibility.

29. The respondent submits that the appellant was unable to provide sufficient detail about the location at which he worked. The appellant stated in his witness statement that he had identified the correct location, explaining that Stera Mahkama simply means Supreme Court and that he had described its location in the Macroyan area. In his oral evidence, he stated that the buildings within the complex did not have individual names and were collectively referred to as the High Court.

30. I do not accept that explanation. The appellant's knowledge of the location of the Supreme Court and the fact that the complex contains judicial residences and administrative buildings would be consistent with general knowledge. However, someone who had worked there for six years would be expected to possess a more detailed knowledge of the complex. In particular, I would expect such a person to be able to identify the specific building in which they worked. A complex of that nature would necessarily require individual buildings to be identifiable so that offices, documents and personnel could be located and directed appropriately. The appellant was unable to identify the building in which he worked. I find that this aspect of his evidence further undermines his credibility.

31. I turn to the training certificates, appreciation letter and employee card. The appellant asserts that he has the originals but they were not produced at the hearing. He stated that these documents were sent to him by family members from Afghanistan. However, he has produced no evidence to corroborate that the documents were received in that way.

32. The respondent relies on country evidence indicating that the unlawful production of documents is widespread in Afghanistan, that genuine documents may contain inaccurate information, and that there is a substantial market for counterfeit documents. The appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation as to why his family would retain documents evidencing his employment as a civil servant when his case is that such employment places him at risk from the Taliban.

33. Applying the principles in Tanveer Ahmed, I am not satisfied that the appellant has established the provenance or reliability of these documents. I therefore attach little weight to them as evidence of his claimed employment.

Whether the appellant came to the adverse attention of the Taliban.

34. I carry forward my findings above. Having found that the appellant has not established that he was employed as an administrator within the judiciary, I do not accept the factual basis upon which his claim to have come to the adverse attention of the Taliban is advanced.

35. Accordingly, I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that the appellant came to the adverse attention of the Taliban as claimed.

Determination of the Issues

Does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?

36. I carry forward my findings above. I am not satisfied that the appellant has established that he was employed as an administrator within the judiciary. I am also not satisfied that the documentary evidence relied upon to support that claim is reliable, nor that the appellant has established the provenance of those documents.

37. For the reasons already given, I am not satisfied that the appellant came to the adverse attention of the Taliban as claimed.

38. I find that the factual premise of the appellant’s protection claim has not been established.

Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?

39. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would be persecuted by the Taliban on account of an imputed political opinion.

40. In any event, even if I were satisfied that the appellant had been employed as an administrator within the judiciary, I am not satisfied that the background evidence establishes that he would face a real risk on return to Afghanistan for that reason alone.

41. The Country Policy and Information Note, Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban(Version 6.0, February 2026), states at §3.2 that persons unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the Taliban include current or former government officials in civilian roles (civil servants), or those formerly in official or advisory roles, where the claim is based solely on that association.

42. Whilst I have considered the material relied upon in the appellant's country information schedule, I am not satisfied that it demonstrates that former civil servants such as the appellant face a real risk of persecution merely by reason of that employment. Nor am I satisfied that it displaces the assessment contained in the February 2026 CPIN.

43. Accordingly, even if the appellant had established his former employment within the judiciary, I am not satisfied that he has established a reasonable likelihood that such employment would bring him to the adverse attention of the Taliban or otherwise place him at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Afghanistan.

Is the appellant at real risk of serious harm, torture, inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment?

44. The appellant’s claims for Humanitarian Protection and under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR are advanced on the same factual basis as his protection claim.

45. Given my findings that the appellant has not established either his claimed employment within the judiciary or that he came to the adverse attention of the Taliban, I am not satisfied that he faces a real risk of serious harm, torture, inhuman treatment, degrading treatment, or punishment on return to Afghanistan.

46. Accordingly, the appellant has not established that he qualifies for Humanitarian Protection or that his removal would give rise to a breach of Article 3 ECHR. Further, on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the appellant has established any basis upon which his removal would constitute a disproportionate interference with his rights under Article 8 ECHR.

Notice of Decision

PROTECTION: The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds, on humanitarian protection grounds, and on human rights grounds.

ANONYMITY ORDER

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

To the Respondent – Fee Award

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed Date 30 October 2026

H.Athwal

First-tier Tribunal Judge Athwal

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our immigration lawyer in Paris.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

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