Civil United Kingdom

Mohammed Akram Arain v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2853 (KB)

Case No: KA-2025-000193

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE

APPEALS

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: Friday, 6 November 2026

Before :

MR JUSTICE RITCHIE

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Between :

MOHAMMED AKRAM ARAIN

Claimant/Appellant

-and-

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Defendant/Respondent

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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Mr Zainul Jafferji, counsel for the Appellant/Claimant

Matthew Howarth, counsel instructed by the Government Legal Department, for the Respondent/Defendant

Hearing date: 16.10.2026

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Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 06.11.2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

Mr Justice Ritchie:

The appeal

1. This is an appeal from a decision of HHJ Saggerson (the Judge) made on 24.9.2025 dismissing the claim for false imprisonment.

Permission to appeal was granted for five of the seven grounds earlier this year.

Bundles and evidence

2. The Court was provided with an Appeal Bundle (AB); a Supplementary Bundle (SB); two skeleton arguments and two authorities bundles.

The issues

3. The issues arising from the permitted grounds in the appeal can be summarised shortly as follows:

(i) Did the Judge fail to consider and determine the pleaded allegations (I will define them below)?

(ii) Did the Judge fail to apply the burden of proof correctly?

(iii) Did the Judge fail to determine the case on the pleaded defence?

(iv) Did the Judge make wrong findings of fact on the evidence?

(v) Did the Judge fail to have proper regard to the Defendant’s policies?

Appeals – CPR r. 52

Review of the decision

4. Under CPR r. 52.21 every appeal is a review of the decision of the lower Court, not a rehearing, unless the Court decides otherwise (or a Regulation or Act provides that it is a rehearing), and will only be granted if the decision below was wrong or unjust due to a serious procedural or other irregularity. This is a review appeal.

Fresh Evidence

5. This appeal is restricted to the evidence before the lower Court unless this Court grants permission under CPR r. 52.21(2). The decision to grant permission is informed by the three grounds enunciated in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1489 (CA). New evidence maybe allowed in when it: (1) was not obtainable with reasonable diligence to be put before the lower Court, (2) would have had an important influence on the result and (3) is apparently credible, though not incontrovertible.

6. No fresh evidence was put before the appellate court. The Appellant applied verbally at the start of the hearing for the Court to admit in evidence: (1) an email dated 12.2.2025 and (2) the whole of the trial bundle. No notice of application had been filed or served, in breach of the CPR requirements for such. No copies of the email and trial bundle were filed on time with the appeal bundle or at all until the day before the hearing, when the email was filed. No witness statement in support was filed or served. The reason given for the late application was that the lawyer representing the Appellant had not thought to do so until recently. I refused the application in an extempore judgment, basically because the rules governing appeal procedure are designed to maintain a level playing field and to inform the Court what the issues are and should be followed. Last-minute verbal applications need exceptionally sound justification. This one did not have such.

Findings of fact and credibility

7. I take into account the decisions in Henderson v Foxworth [2014] UKSC 41, per Lord Reed at [67]; Grizzly Business v Stena Drilling [2017] EWCA Civ. 94, per Longmore LJ at [39-40] and Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings [2023] EWCA Civ. 191, per Lord Justice Males at [48] – [55], to the effect that any challenges to findings of fact, when the case was determined at trial in the Court below, have to pass a high threshold test. The Appellant needs to show the Judge was wrong in the sense that: (1) there was no sufficient evidence upon which the decision could have been reached, or (2) no reasonable Judge could have reached that decision, or (3) the Judge took into account an irrelevant matter or failed to take into account a material and relevant matter. Two deferential principles are generally applied on such appeals. Firstly, where the trial Judge heard and saw the evidence being given live over the course of the trial he/she was better placed to assess the evidence than the appellate court is, having only the transcript and documents. Secondly, there is a generous ambit for disagreement allowed to the Judge on such findings. The threshold for appeals against findings of fact was summarised by Lord Justice Lewison in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ. 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48, at [2-4 and 52] thus:

"2. The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal Court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:

(i) An appeal Court should not interfere with the trial Judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

(ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal Court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial Judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal Court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable Judge could have reached.

(iii) An appeal Court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial Judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a Judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

(iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial Judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial Judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

(v) An appeal Court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the Judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the Judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

(vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal Court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.

3. …

4. Similar caution applies to appeals against a trial Judge's evaluation of expert evidence: Byers v Saudi National Bank [2022] EWCA Civ. 43, [2022] 4 WLR 22. It is also pertinent to recall that where facts are disputed it is for the Judge, not the expert, to decide those facts. Even where expert evidence is uncontroverted, a trial Judge is not bound to accept it: see, most recently, Griffiths v TUI (UK) Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ. 1442, [2022] 1 WLR 973 (although the Court was divided over whether it was necessary to cross-examine an expert before challenging their evidence). In a handwriting case, for example, where the issue is whether a party signed a document a Judge may prefer the evidence of a witness to the opinion of a handwriting expert based on stylistic comparisons: Kingley Developments Ltd v Brudenell [2016] EWCA Civ. 980."

…

“52 … It need hardly be emphasised that "plainly wrong", "a decision … that no reasonable Judge could have reached" and "rationally insupportable", different ways of expressing the same idea, set a very high hurdle for an appellant.

54. These considerations apply with particular force when an appeal involves a challenge to the Judge's assessment of the credibility of a witness. Assessment of credibility is quintessentially a matter for the trial Judge, with whose assessment this Court will not interfere unless it is clear that something has gone very seriously wrong. It is not for this Court to attempt to assess the credibility of a witness, even if that were possible, but only to decide, applying the stringent tests to which I have referred, whether the Judge has made so serious an error that her assessment must be set aside."

Chronology of the action

8. The key events which were the subject of the claim occurred between 21.11.2016 and 9.1.2017, so nearly 10 years ago. The claim form was dated 7.11.2022, but received by the Court on 24.1.2023 and issued on 20.2.2023. The cause of action in false imprisonment was pleaded and the burden of proof was set out. In the Particulars of Claim (PoC), which were undated in the bundle, the Claimant sought damages and aggravated damages for false imprisonment, for 50 days of detention between 21.11.2016 and 9.1.2017. His family history was pleaded, covering his lawful entry into the UK on 16.7.2013, his marriage to a divorced British Citizen in 2013, his children’s births in 2014 and 2015 and his first application for leave to remain on 10.1.2014, which was refused due to a fraud which he practised when passing his English Language Test. In August 2015 he submitted further representations for leave to remain on the basis of his family life, which was refused on 21.9.2015, in part due to his previous fraud. He was no longer entitled to remain in the UK by that time. He was detained for 13 days in December 2015 and then released. He brought a judicial review claim in late 2015 challenging the refusal of his further representations. Permission was refused, both on paper and at a renewal hearing in May 2016. He then appealed that refusal of permission to the Court of Appeal (the Appeal). Such appeals generally have slim prospects. The Defendant was told of the Appeal in June 2016 and made a record of that.

9. Having no right to live in England, on 21.11.2026, the Claimant was detained when he reported. AB315 shows part of the Claimant’s GCID (the General Case Information Database, the name for the case log, as I understand it). It had an entry dated 16.11.2016, five days before he was detained, which stated:

“Minute/Case Notes: Detention Gatekeeper Pre Verification Proforma

For completion by the referring officer:

Name: Mohammad Akram Arain, HO/Port Ref: A1854462

Nationality: Pakistan, D.O.B: 20-Mar-1974, Sex: Male

Legal basis for detention (section/Act): Legal basis for detention (section/Act): S120- The power to detain an illegal entrant, seaman deserter, port removal or a person liable to administrative removal (or someone suspected to be such a person) is in paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 2 to the 1971 Act (as applied by section 10(7) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999).

Referring team:

Name and contact details of the referring officer: Mubarak Patel

Name and contact details of the CIO/ HEO: Deepak Tanna

Date of planned detention: 21/11/2016

Location of planned detention: Becket House

PNC check: No Trace

WICU check: No

Brief summary of immigration history: Admin Removal: Overstayer Served with RED.0001

Has the individual been offered voluntary departure?: Yes

If Y, what was the outcome?: No Response to be asked on the day of DOR

If N, why not?:

Travel documentation status (including location of documents or timescales for obtaining, and whether an

ETD pack/bio data has been completed): Valid PPT

Current barriers to removal (excluding documentation): No

Removability (low/medium/high and reasons): High

Risk of absconding (low/medium/high and reasons): Low

Risk of harm to the public (low/medium/high and reasons): Low

Harm Matrix Score: B

Known or claimed medical conditions (including medication required): N/K To be confirmed on Day of DOR

Factors falling under ch55.10 of the EIG:

Compassionate circumstances/ties to the UK (including family splits): Authorised by AD Tonia Ginders

Any other relevant facts: No

What alternatives can been considered for detention?: Vol Dep

Reasons for recommending detention: Admin Removal: Admin Removal: Overstayer

For completion by the Detention Gatekeeper:

Detention Gatekeeper decision and reasons:

Onward Action Plan:” (I have added the emboldening to the relevant words)

10. Five days later, on 21.11.2016, when he was detained the GCID had this entry:

“Current Circumstances – interviewed in English The subject confirmed that they were fit and well to be interviewed Subject arrived @ 14:00

Mit Circs conducted

– Married: … Brit Cit, been together since 2013, lived together since 2013

Minute/Case Notes:

– Children:, Male &, Female

– Medical: Subject stated he walks with a limp due to a painful hip from 6-7 years ago, has not had an operation nor has any planned

– medication: painkillers from Pakistan

– No UK D/L

– Reps: Salman Shah, Stratford

– Not working – the subject stated that his wife works and supports him

– POA:

– Family in the UK ¿ wife and children

– Family in PAK ¿ mother

– Criminal Convictions: none

– Not claiming benefits, wife claims child tax credits

– Religion: Islam diet Halal

– Any Outstanding Apps: States he has an outstanding appeal from 3 months ago. No info of this on CID, court of appeal tracker searched and shows has applied for permission to appeal against non allowed JR, not a barrier to removal.

– No Self Harm issues: none mentioned when asked

Vol dep: The subject was informed of the implications of remaining in the UK illegally.

Declined as wants to stay with family in the UK

Removal window: Open ¿ RED.0004 fresh served today as no evidence of an appeal outstanding. If evidence of an appeal is submitted, then RED.0004 can be withdrawn but appears nothing outstanding at this time.

Documentation: PPT

I referred the case to CIO D Tanna who authorised detention ¿ there are no barriers to removal.

Case referred to the gatekeeper and accepted 21.11.2016

BHRC – L Whittaker-Shaw … Unit:- BERC Date: 21-Nov-2016” (I have highlighted the key text in bold).

11. Thus, the records show that at the start of his detention the Claimant told the Defendant’s staff that he had an outstanding appeal and the officer checked and found or confirmed that it was an appeal against refusal of permission for judicial review and considered that such an appeal was not a barrier to removal. This was correct in law, see Pharis summarised below.

12. His first detention review was at 24 hours on 24.11.2016. His solicitors faxed information about his appeal to the Defendant the next day, on 23.11.2016 and wrote to them with the appeal information again on 29.11.2016. The Defendant noted on the second detention review on 28.11.2016, carried out by Mr Phil Dermer, that the Claimant had started judicial review (JR) and failed at the permission stage. Mr Dermer noted that “Law Lane” (the Claimant’s lawyers) had informed the Defendant of the JR appeal and Mr Dermer stated that there were “no barriers to removal”. Handwritten notes recorded that Mr Dermer had checked the outstanding appeal system and found n/a. The record noted that a “family split” from his wife and child had been authorised by Dian Stanley.

13. By the time of the third review, on 5.12.2016, Mr Dermer had recorded that the Government Legal Department (GLD) had provided confirmation on 10.6.2016 that the Claimant had applied direct to the Court of Appeal for permission to proceed with the appeal from the JR claim. The Defendant’s Litigation Operations had contact the GLD for an update. Mr Dermer wrote in handwriting to “await advice from the GLD about whether the appeal was a barrier to removal”.

14. By the fourth review, on 19.12.2016, Mr Dermer hand wrote to “maintain detention and effect removal” and “has sub lodged a JR?”

15. The Claimant applied for bail and then, after receiving the removal notice, applied for an injunction in the Court of Appeal. This was granted on 22.12.2016 by Beatson LJ who referred to other cases involving fraudulent English Language Tests and an announcement by the Defendant that a review was taking place which was ending in late January 2017.

16. Thereafter it took 15 days before the Defendant decided to release the Claimant and a further 3 days for the procedure to be put into effect.

The judgment

17. After the trial of the false imprisonment claim the Judge gave judgment, on 24.9.2025. The hearing took place over 2 days during which he heard evidence from the Claimant, the Claimant’s wife and Liam Lynch for the Defendant. The Judge was determining the preliminary issue of liability. It is apparent from the early paragraphs of the judgment that the Judge was unimpressed by the Claimant’s failure to follow the directions of HHJ Hellman relating to late delivery of the trial bundle, lack of agreement of the contents of the trial bundle, the lack of a chronology, a list of issues or a case summary and the disadvantages caused to the Defendant by the Claimant’s said breaches. The Judge put out of his mind that the Claimant’s lawyers could have been engaged in a tactical ploy to disadvantage the Defendant at trial. The Judge noted the lack of focus by the Claimant on which policies and guidance were relevant to any claims for breach of policy or guidance. The Judge also stated there had been no application to amend the Particulars of Claim (PoC) either before or at trial. At [J81] the Judge ruled that:

“Bearing in mind that the defendant, at all material times, has the burden of proving lawfulness, not the other way round, it is still important to note that it is necessary for a claimant in a case such as this to raise the issues on which potential grounds for criticism arise and which fall to the Secretary of State to justify. Otherwise, one would simply end up in a position where a claimant could say and issue proceedings on the basis of an allegation of (a) I was detained, and (b) you justify it.”

The Judge explained how he considered that would be unworkable and unfair to the Defendant at [J82-83].

18. The Judge noted the Defendant’s normal procedure of putting up an experienced witness to summarise and interpret their decisions, but who had not made any of the decisions and had not handled the file in issue. This was the case with Mr Lynch. The Judge called this process “vehicular evidence”. He found Mr Lynch’s evidence to have been both conscientious and reliable and noted that he had made some concessions. The Judge was not impressed at all by the evidence from the Claimant and his wife and rejected it for the reasons given at [J13-24].

19. The Judge made factual findings about the chronology at [J26-36] covering the findings in the judgment of HHJ Kelly made in 2015, (which I have not been provided with) which included adverse findings about fraud by the Claimant in his immigration process. HHJ Kelly’s judgment and order were not appealed. There is no need for me to recite the full chronology here. The Judge noted that the Claimant’s fraud by proxy over the English Language Test was part of a wider enquiry into the integrity of such testing. He took into account that the Claimant’s appeal against the refusal of permission for judicial review had failed and been marked totally without merit by Davis LJ in May 2022.

20. As to the detention, the Judge noted that the Claimant never applied to the Court of Appeal for a stay of the removal decision dated 15.12.2016 and had made but withdrawn an application for bail, but then applied, at the last minute, for an injunction, which he obtained from Beatson LJ.

21. Focussing on the claim for false imprisonment from [J46] onwards, the Judge grounded his consideration of the claims for false imprisonment on the pleaded case [J46-49]. To put the judgment in context, the PoC contained the following four relevant allegations:

“15. The Claimant avers that his detention was unlawful from the outset because the Defendant had detained the Claimant without unlawful justification. Without prejudice to the requirement that the Defendant establishes that the Claimant’s detention was lawful at all times, the Claimant avers that his detention was unlawful on the following grounds:

i. The Defendant failed to take any proper account of the fact that he had a pending appeal before the Court of Appeal at the time that he was detained and that this was a barrier to his removal.

ii. The Defendant failed to take any proper account of the impact of detention on his children, failed to follow her own policy guidance in relation to detaining a person with a subsisting relationship with children, and failed to discharge her duty under section 55 of Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of his children.

iii. The Defendant failed to give any proper consideration to alternatives to detention

iv. ….

v. The Defendant maintained detention after the Claimant’s scheduled removal had been cancelled (the purpose of his initial detention), and the Court of Appeal had granted an injunction preventing the Claimant’s removal from the UK until after his pending appeal had been decided.”

22. The Judge noted that the burden of proof was on the Defendant to show the detention was lawful [J46]. He noted that particular (iv) had not been pursued at trial. Thus, there were four particulars of unlawfulness (Allegations) to be determined.

23. The Judge placed the four Allegations into two broad categories. The first was breach of the Hardial Singh principles. I should interject here to explain that the Hardial Singh principles derive from R (Hardial Singh) v Governor of Durham Prison [1984] 1 WLR 704, in which Woolf J outlined the key factors to consider when making any immigration detention decision and determining whether to maintain that detention. The principles are:

(1) the relevant power to detain must only be used for the specific purpose for which it is authorised – this means that a person may only be detained under immigration powers for the purpose of preventing their unauthorised entry or with a view to their removal (not necessarily deportation). Detention for other purposes is not compatible with Article 5 and would be unlawful in domestic law (unless one of the other circumstances in Article 5(1)(a) to (e) applies); and

(2) the detention may only continue for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances for the specific purpose. If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the purpose of the power (for example, removal) cannot be effected within that reasonable period the power to detain should not be exercised; and

(3) the detaining authority (be it the immigration officer or the Secretary of State) must act with reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal (or whatever the purpose of the power in question is).

The Judge summarised those principles and no ground of appeal was raised against his summary. Indeed, no ground of appeal was raised against any of the Judge’s rulings on the law.

24. The second category of Allegations identified by the Judge related to breaches of Regulations, Rules, Guidance or Policies relating to the Defendant’s decisions. He ruled that he was bound to focus on: the pleaded breaches, the Defendant’s responses to the pleaded breaches and the burden of proof. The Judge then carefully considered the Allegations by looking at each pleaded breach set out in paragraph 15 of the PoC in turn.

25. The Judge considered the pleaded breach at para. 15(i), and found at [J60, 63, 72] that the Defendant had proved, on balance, that the documentary evidence showed they had reasonably considered the Claimant’s outstanding appeal and had concluded that it was no barrier to his removal. The Judge noted that: (1) the appeal was “ultimately futile”, to use his words. (2) There was some confusion about the appeal in the Defendant’s staff notes. (3) An appeal against a refusal to grant permission for judicial review of an immigration decision was not a barrier to removal, it did not give rise to an automatic stay and if the Claimant wished a stay he/she had to apply to the Court of Appeal, per Brooke LJ in R (On the Application of Pharis) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ. 654. (4) The decision to detain was with a view to removal within a reasonable period of time.

26. The Judge then considered the multi-factorial nature of the decision to continue detention and, at [J71-72] found that the detention until 23.12.2016 was reasonable in the circumstances.

27. Focussing on PoC para 15(iii) the Judge found that after Beatson LJ’s injunction, the delay period of about 2 weeks before the decision to release was reasonable [J73-76]. I note that he took into account the records showing that the Defendant had considered whether the appeal decision would be expedited but, in the end, when it became clear it would not be expedited, the Claimant was released.

28. Finally, the Judge considered PoC para 15(ii) at [J77-79] and the multifactorial nature of the decision and held that the Defendant did consider family factors and so no unlawfulness had been established under this Allegation of breach.

The appeal

29. The appeal was issued on 10.10.2025 and extensions of time were granted. By an order of Sir Stephen Stewart made on 18.5.2026 the bundle was to be filed and served on 2.2.2026 (an EOT application had been made in time). Grounds of appeal 1-5 were given permission. No application was made to amend the grounds. No application was made to renew the refused grounds, numbered 6 and 7.

The grounds of appeal and analysis of each

30. G1: “The Judge erred in failing to consider and determine the grounds upon which the Appellant specifically pleaded that he was falsely imprisoned by the Respondent.”

31. Analysis – pleading and burden of proof. The pleaded claim was false imprisonment. The pleaded Allegations were set out in para. 15(i) – (v) of the PoC. They were in general terms. They consisted of alleged failures to take any or any proper account of: (1) his appeal; (2) his family life; (3) the alternatives to detention; and (4) an unreasonable delay after the injunction was granted. No further particularity was provided. The Judge noted that the Claimant did not plead whether each particular in para. 15 was a breach: (1) under the Hardial Singh principles, or (2) of the Defendant’s own governing Rules, Regulations, Policy or Guidance. The Claimant did not mention any allegedly broken Rule, Regulation, Guidance or Policy. In response, the Defendant pleaded that the PoC were embarrassing and poorly particularised (see the Defence at para. 26). The Judge carefully considered this and, as set out above, gave a ruling on the need for particularised pleadings and the reasons for that need. In my judgment he was right to do so.

32. I take into account that Chamberlain J summarised the basic principle in relation to the burden of proof in false imprisonment claims in R (Walid) Niagui) v Governor of HMP Wandsworth [2022] EWHC 2911 (Admin) at para 34. Once the Claimant has been detained, the Claimant does not have to show there was no authority to detain him, instead the Defendant has to show their authority to detain. I note that the Defendant pleaded at para. 25 of the Defence that the Claimant was detained under Para. 16 of Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 1971. At trial there was no issue raised about the Defendant’s authority to detain the Claimant for removal or to remove the Claimant. Thus, I spend no time setting out the Defendant’s authority in both of those respects and neither did the Judge. Had either of those issues been raised on the pleadings, they would, no doubt, have been dealt with in evidence and the judgment.

33. The pleaded issues concerned whether, on public-law grounds, the Defendant made unlawful decisions by failing to take into account relevant matters when detaining the Claimant. In false imprisonment claims against State Authorities the usual need to plead facts and matters properly is in place, just as it is in claims against private individuals. CPR r.16.4 requires a concise statement of the facts on which the Claimant relies and such other matters as the Practice Direction (PD) sets out. The PD to CPR r.16 has additional rules for personal injury claims. Accurate and concise pleadings are crucial to identify the issues in any claim and to enfranchise and force parties to focus on the issues arising from the pleadings when they gather and disclose their evidence. The scope of the pleadings determines the scope of the case and the issues at trial. In claims for unlawful imprisonment within the immigration field, there is a plethora of Regulations, Rules, Guidance and Policies, so it is important, in my judgment, that the Claimant pleads the particulars of any alleged breach with particularity and identifies the relevant Regulation, Rule, Policy or Guidance and the section or paragraph number which has allegedly been breached. If, for some good reason, the Claimant is unable to identify the relevant Regulation, Rule, Policy or Guidance or the relevant breaches thereof with particularity before or in the pre-action protocol correspondence then, after the claim is issued, and after disclosure of the Defendant’s documents, the pleaded case should be re-particularised. This Appellant did not ever particularise any assertion of breach of any Regulations, Rules, Policy or Guidance. I agree with the Judge when he ruled that it would be unworkable and unfair in claims for damages for false imprisonment arising from asserted breaches of Regulations, Rules, Guidance or Policy by the Home Office when making decisions, for claimants only to plead: (1) you imprisoned me; (2) prove that you did so lawfully. The facts and matters which are to be relied upon by the Claimant at trial need to be pleaded. The responsibility of pleading the claim rests on the Claimant. Once the case is sufficiently pleaded, the burden of proof of the lawfulness of the imprisonment rests on the Defendant.

34. I shall now consider whether this ground is made out in relation to each pleaded Allegation.

35. PoC 15(i): failing to take any or any proper account of the Claimant’s appeal when detaining and continuing to detain the Claimant. The Appellant relied on some sections of cross-examination of Mr Lynch in which concessions were made. Some of the questions were about the GCID Case Record Sheet for 21.11.2016 written by Liam Whittaker Shaw. The Record stated:

“- Any Outstanding Apps: States he has an outstanding appeal from 3 months ago. No info of this on CID, court of appeal tracker searched and shows has applied for permission to appeal against non allowed JR, not a barrier to removal.

…

Removal window: Open ¿ RED.0004 fresh served today as no evidence of an appeal outstanding. If evidence of an appeal is submitted, then RED.0004 can be withdrawn but appears nothing outstanding at this time.”

This was part of the cross-examination on that note:

“Q. And there he says that he has an outstanding appeal from three months ago and the note is that there is no information of this on CID, the Court of Appeal tracker search, and shows he’s applied for permission to appeal against non-allowed JR, not a barrier to removal. Do you accept that that entry shows that the officers that were dealing with the claimant at the point of detention were not aware of the pending appeal at the Court of Appeal until he pointed it out to them?

A. That appears to be what it suggests.

Q. And it suggests that there’s no information on this on CID. That’s what the record says. We know, we’ve seen the entry that said actually there was but do you accept that the officers that were dealing with him at the time were not aware that there was a pending appeal and were not aware that there was an entry on the GCID relating to the pending appeal?

A. Yes.”

36. The Judge addressed these Allegations and the rest of cross examination, heard all of the evidence and had the documentation before him. He found, on balance that, on the documentary evidence, the Defendant did consider the Claimant’s outstanding appeal when originally detaining him and when reviewing and continuing the detention, albeit there was some confusion on the documentation. Having reviewed the documentation and the evidence I consider that there was sufficient evidence on which to make such findings despite the concessions made in evidence by Mr Lynch, who was not the decision maker on the original detention or the reviews. The documents show notes that the Claimant’s appeal was considered on 21.11.2016. In line with the guidance by the Court in Pharis, it was not a bar to removal. The documents also show continued consideration of the appeal issue, with advice being taken internally on various reviews.

37. Failing to take any or any proper account of the Claimant’s family life. The Judge found that the Defendant did take into account the Claimant’s wife and children when making the decisions [J77-79] and the documents supported this finding. There was sufficient evidence upon which to make such findings.

38. Failing to take any or any proper account of alternatives to detention. The Judge found that the Defendant did take into account consideration of alternatives to detention and having read the documents, I consider that there was clearly sufficient documentary evidence to justify that finding [J64-70].

39. Maintaining the Claimant’s detention after the injunction prevented the purpose of the detention. At paras. 22 and 102-105 of Lord Dyson’s judgment in Lumba v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ. 111, he ruled thus:

“22. It is convenient to introduce the Hardial Singh principles at this stage, since they infuse much of the debate on the issues that arise on this appeal. It is common ground that my statement in R (I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 888, [2003] INLR 196 para 46 correctly encapsulates the principles as follows:

(i) The Secretary of State must intend to deport the person and can only use the power to detain for that purpose;

(ii) The deportee may only be detained for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances;

(iii) If, before the expiry of the reasonable period, it becomes apparent that the Secretary of State will not be able to effect deportation within a reasonable period, he should not seek to exercise the power of detention;

(iv) The Secretary of State should act with reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal. Application of Hardial Singh principles to the appeal of Mr Lumba.”

…

“102. In addition to the issues that are raised which are common to both appeals, it is submitted on behalf of Mr Lumba (but not Mr Mighty) that his detention is unlawful on the grounds that there has been a breach of the Hardial Singh principles. This part of the appeal raises a number of points about the reach of those principles. I refer to the encapsulation of the principles set out in my judgment in R (I) [2003] INLR 196 at para 22 above.

103. A convenient starting point is to determine whether, and if so when, there is a realistic prospect that deportation will take place. As I said at para 47 of my judgment in R (I), there may be situations where, although a reasonable period has not yet expired, it becomes clear that the Secretary of State will not be able to deport the detained person within a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances, having regard in particular to time that the person has already spent in detention. I deal below with the factors which are relevant to a determination of a reasonable period. But if there is no realistic prospect that deportation will take place within a reasonable time, then continued detention is unlawful.

104. How long is a reasonable period? At para 48 of my judgment in R (I), I said:

“It is not possible or desirable to produce an exhaustive list of all the circumstances that are, or may be, relevant to the question of how long it is reasonable for the Secretary of State to detain a person pending deportation pursuant to paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971. But in my view, they include at least: the length of the period of detention; the nature of the obstacles which stand in the path of the Secretary of State preventing a deportation; the diligence, speed and effectiveness of the steps taken by the Secretary of State to surmount such obstacles; the conditions in

which the detained person is being kept; the effect of detention on him and his family; the risk that if he is released from detention he will abscond; and the danger that, if released, he will commit criminal offences.”

105. So far as I am aware, subject to the following qualifications, the relevance of these factors has not been questioned. The qualifications are first that the relevance of the risk of offending on release is challenged on behalf of the appellants in the present case. Secondly, “the nature of the obstacles” begs two questions that have been raised on this appeal, namely what is the relevance, if any, of delays attributable to the fact that a detained person (i) is challenging the decision to deport him by appeal or judicial review and will generally not be deported until his challenges have been determined; and (ii) has refused to return voluntarily to his country of origin?”

40. The Judge carefully considered the reasonableness of the Defendant’s actions after the injunction was received over the Christmas and New Year period and, as summarised above, considered the reasons for delaying release until evidence was obtained about whether the appeal would be expedited. The Judge found the delay to have been reasonable in all of the circumstances. Various cases were put before me pertaining to the length of such delays. Such decisions are clearly multifactorial and made in a wide range of factual circumstances. The decision on the reasonableness of the length of the delay was a matter for the Judge and I do not consider that his decision was outside the ambit of what a reasonable Judge could have decided on the evidence.

41. Overall, it is clear to me that the Judge considered and determined all of the Allegations set out in each sub-paragraph of Para. 15 of the PoC, in turn in the judgment. Thus, it is incorrect to assert that he did not and I consider this ground to be totally without merit.

42. G2: “Further and in any event the Judge erred in failing to determine the claim on the basis that it was for the Defendant to prove that detention was lawful. In these circumstances, as specifically pleaded in the particulars of claim, it was not for the Appellant to identify each and every way in which the Respondent had acted unlawfully in detaining him.”

43. Analysis. This ground appears to me to conflate the requirement of pleading a case properly with the burden of proving the pleaded case. The Judge specifically referred to the burden of proof being on the Defendant to prove the lawfulness of the detention at the start and throughout his judgment and he addressed each Allegation. So, this ground does not assert that the Judge failed to understand the burden of proof but instead appears to be an assertion that he failed to apply it. However, the last sentence of the ground reveals that it is really based on the pleading point which I have already addressed above. The Claimant pleaded four Allegations, four failures by the Defendant and the judge addressed each one. I can find no evidence that the Judge reversed the burden of proof when making his factual findings on each Allegation. He found no weight in the evidence of the Claimant or his wife. He listened to the evidence of Mr Lynch but mainly relied on the Defendant’s documentation. Thus, in my judgment, the determination of this Ground falls alongside Ground 1, and is not made out.

44. G3: “The Judge failed to determine the claim on the basis of the pleaded defence. The Judge found that detention was lawful on grounds that were not pleaded by the Defendant. If this was permissible, the Judge ought to have applied the same approach to the Appellant’s case as to why his detention was unlawful.”

45. Analysis. I found this ground rather hard to understand until, in submissions, this was explained. It rested on the assertion that the Defendant’s Guidance on Judicial Review (at section 13) required them to take advice about the appeal in judicial review from their own OSCU (Operational Support and Certification Unit) before detaining or continuing to detain the Claimant. It was asserted that the Defendant did not do so. This allegation was never pleaded in the PoC and was not dealt with in the witness’ evidence in chief as a result. It first emerged in the Claimant’s skeleton argument the day before trial. The Defendant objected to it at the start of the trial and throughout. Mr Lynch had not been asked to give evidence in chief on this and the relevant documentary searches had not been carried out. The Judge stated that the claim would be kept within the pleadings during the trial. No application was made to amend the PoC to add this assertion. The Claimant’s failure to draft and try to agree a list of issues and the late, unagreed trial bundle were tied up with this new allegation not having been raised and addressed long before the first day of the trial.

46. I do not consider that the Judge found the Defendant’s decisions to have been lawful on any unpleaded grounds. It is clear from the judgment that the Judge considered the Allegations in the pleaded claim and the defences thereto, applied the correct burden of proof (on the Defendant) and found for the Defendant on all of the pleaded allegations. Thus, I do not consider that this Ground was made out.

47. G4: “The Judge failed to properly assess the documentary and witness evidence.”

48. Analysis. Counsel for the Appellant rested this ground on the submissions made in the other grounds. In summary, the Appellant submitted that the initial detention was carried out by the Defendant’s staff without knowledge of the Claimant’s appeal and that the Defendant then searched for the information on the appeal and found it. Further, the Appellant submitted that Mr Lynch admitted that the officers might not have detained the Claimant if they had known of the appeal. All of that was a restatement of a main plank of the Claimant’s case at trial but none of it made out the asserted ground. No single document was identified as having been overlooked or incorrectly assessed. I do not consider that the Appellant has come anywhere close to overcoming the considerable latitude granted to Judges on their findings of fact at trial. They hear the evidence and read the documents over the course of a trial and hear the openings and closing submissions. This general ground lacked particularity and was not made out.

49. G5: “The Judge failed to have proper regard to the Respondent’s own policies.”

50. Analysis: It is noteworthy that even here, at the appeal, the ground as drafted did not identify which policy was being relied on and which paragraph within the policy was relied on. In the end, this ground boiled down to a restatement of the unpleaded allegation of failure to refer to OSCU allegation which I have dealt with above. This ground was not made out.

Conclusions

51. For the reasons set out above I dismiss every ground of appeal. I do not consider that the Judge was wrong in any of the ways alleged, nor do I consider that there is any other reason in justice to overturn the decisions made. I consider that the Judge dealt fairly and tolerantly with the case, as pleaded, despite the Claimant’s breaches of the pre-trial directions and made findings of fact well within the scope of the documentary and live evidence before him.

END


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