Miscellaneous United Kingdom
NHS Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland ICB v AA & Ors
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCOP 56 (T1)
Case No: 20014887
IN THE COURT OF PROTECITON
Leicester Combined Court Centre
90 Wellington St,
Leicester LE1 6HG
Judgment handed down on 15 October 2026
Before:
Tribunal Judge Sharron
(sitting as a nominated judge of the Court of Protection at Tier 1)
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Between:
NHS LEICESTER, LEICESTERSHIRE AND RUTLAND ICB
Applicant
– and –
(1)AA
(by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor)
(2) KA
(3) TT
Respondents
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Adam Fullwood (instructed by Browne Jacobson Solicitors) for the Applicant
Pippa Pudney (instructed by Welford Solicitors) for the First Respondent
The Second Respondent in person
Katherine Hampshire (instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors) for the Second Respondent
Hearing dates 28-29 September 2026
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APPROVED JUDGMENT
1. In these proceedings I am concerned with the welfare of AA, a young man aged 26, who has learning disabilities, epilepsy and diabetes. AA resides at a supported living placement, where he was discharged from hospital on 25 June 2025, and he receives a package of care from Provider A.
2. AA’s care package is funded by the applicant ICB, which was represented at the hearing by Mr Fullwood of counsel.
3. AA is represented in these proceedings by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor, and at the hearing by Ms Pudney of counsel.
4. AA’s mother is KA, the second respondent in the proceedings, and she has represented herself in person at the hearing.
5. AA’s father is TT, who is the third respondent, and who has been represented at the hearing by Ms Hampshire of counsel.
6. AA’s sister also attended the hearing, however she did not address the court.
The proceedings
7. There have been previous declarations under section 15 Mental Capacity Act 2005, made on 27 January 2026 and 03 June 2026, that AA lacks capacity to conduct these proceedings and to make decisions regarding his residence, care, contact with others and social media use. No party has sought to disturb these declarations.
8. The hearing was listed for a two-day hearing on 28 and 29 September 2026 to make best interests decisions as to where AA should reside and receive care, and the contact he should have with his family.
9. AA’s parents would ideally wish AA to return to live at the family home, with support from his family, and a package of care. Earlier on in these proceedings, the ICB made a decision that it was not prepared to commission a package of care for AA in the family home, and as at the date of this judgment, AA’s parents, whilst disappointed with this decision, have not challenged it on public law grounds. AA’s parents reluctantly recognise that it is not a realistic option for AA to return home without a package of care in place, to supplement the care that the family would wish to provide, and so it was not an issue that I was asked to consider at the hearing. I am invited by the ICB and the Official Solicitor to make a determination that it is in AA’s best interests to remain at his current placement, and this is not opposed by AA’s parents. I am content to make that order, noting that there are no other alternative options being proposed, and there is no dispute that AA’s needs are being met at the placement.
10. AA’s parents retain the hope that AA may be able to return home in the future. Decisions regarding what is in a person’s best interest are time and decision specific, and so a determination that it is currently in AA’s best interests to reside at his supported living placement, does not close the door to AA ever returning to live with his family in the future.
11. I note that relationships between AA’s family and his care provider have been strained, and further work is intended to improve these relationships and the ease with which the carers and AA’s family are able to work together. That process will be important as part of reviewing the arrangements for AA in the future.
12. There had also been a dispute about the contact regime that should be in place for AA to spend time with his family. It was expected that the court would be required to resolve these differences, however a lot of work had taken place in the days leading up to the hearing to resolve areas of difference and to agree a contact framework. Given the progress that had been made, time was requested on the first day to continue those discussions which the court granted. With that time, and some observations from the court, the parties were able to agree a Contact Agreement, which at its core, provides for AA to spend time with his family for 7 hours on 3 fixed days per week, and for there to be an additional contact of 7 hours on a ‘floating’ day, which affords the family some flexibility to fit contact around their own commitments. The Contact Agreement also sets out further detail regarding how the contact will operate in practice. I am satisfied that the proposed contact arrangements are operable and in AA’s best interests, and I am happy to endorse the same.
13. It is of credit to the parties that they have been able to work through the disputed issues, to reach an agreed position on the substantive welfare issues. This provides cause for optimism that a collaborative approach can take place going forward, which AA will inevitably benefit from.
14. The remaining issue for the court to consider is whether AA is deprived of his liberty under the new ‘multifactorial test’ set out in A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland [2026] UKSC 16 (hereafter ‘AGNI’).
The restrictions
15. The restrictions which AA is subject to include the following:
a. AA is required to live at the supported living placement. He is not able to choose to reside or stay overnight elsewhere;
b. AA receives 2:1 support day and night (with waking night staff). He is under eyesight observations during the day with observations every 15 minutes at night;
c. There is a bed sensor in place;
d. The front door of the property is locked as are windows and gates; [C4]
e. If AA were to attempt to leave the property unaccompanied, he would be brought back; [C4]
f. There is a lap strap on AA’s wheelchair;
g. When travelling child safety locks are activated on the vehicle; [C4]
h. AA’s access to the kitchen is supervised and AA’s food is stored in a locked cupboard; [C1072]
i. AA’s food shopping is undertaken by staff in line with AA’s dietary needs; [C1072]
j. AA’s dietary intake is strictly controlled;
k. AA is accompanied by staff whenever he leaves the property. AA is offered a choice of activities that have been risk assessed as being appropriate by staff;
l. AA has been prescribed Risperidone since 03.10.25 which was introduced as a response to the severity of AA’s headbanging and self-injurious behaviour;
m. AA’s contact with his family is restricted in accordance with the contact orders in place and is supervised by staff;
n. AA is not able to visit the family home;
o. AA does not have access to his own money which is kept in a locked safe at the placement; [C572]
p. Physical restraint is authorised in AA’s positive behaviour support plan, including:
i. Escorting, rear-view escort, and single-hand wrist grab release; [C803]
ii. Straight arm hold, double cup fist hold, ‘other authorised safeholds in line with PMVA training and DoLS authorisation. [C803]
Legal framework
16. The three part criteria, set out inStorck v Germany (2005) 43 EHRR 6, continues to form the framework through which evaluation of whether a person is deprived of their liberty takes place:
(i) the ‘objective element’, i.e. the person is confined to a particular restricted space for a material period of time;
(ii) the ‘subjective element’, where there is no ‘valid consent’ to that confinement, as that concept is used by the European court; and
(iii) attribution, in other words, the state is responsible, either directly or indirectly for that confinement.
17. In AGNI the Supreme Court has given guidance on how the objective and subjective element should now be approached in domestic law, summarising the position at § 53 as follows:
‘(i) The starting point in assessing whether someone has been deprived of liberty within the meaning of article 5 is the specific situation of the individual concerned, and the assessment is multifactorial, with account taken of a whole range of factors including the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question… no single factor is determinative.
(ii) In addition to the objective element of confinement in a restricted space for a significant period, an individual will only be considered to be deprived of liberty if, as an additional subjective element, they have not validly consented to the confinement in question (Storck). Valid consent is therefore a powerful factor in the assessment. It is an autonomous concept and not to be equated with the concepts of consent for the purpose of waiver of rights under the Convention or of legal capacity in domestic law. The fact that an individual lacks legal capacity to decide on their living and care arrangements does not necessarily mean that they are de facto unable to understand and consent to those arrangements in a manner that prevents those arrangements from becoming a deprivation of liberty … an individual without legal capacity under domestic law, but who is conscious of their environment and has a basic understanding of their living circumstances so that they can express their view about their situation, who manifests their acceptance of the situation they are in, should have their opinion respected when an assessment is made of whether they are deprived of liberty under article 5.
(iii) Although the objective and subjective elements of deprivation of liberty are often considered sequentially by the European court in its assessment of an applicant’s specific situation, there is an overlap. The requirement to take account of the “type” and “effects and manner of implementation” of the measure in question means that the assessment of the objective element can take account of the specific context and circumstances of restrictive measures that are different from the paradigm of confinement in a cell.
(iv) The approach of the European court means that the effect of restrictions on an individual, including their compliance and the lack of objection if they are capable of objecting or giving tacit agreement, is relevant in assessing the objective element of confinement. The relative normality of the placement is also a relevant factor in this assessment. Similarly, in situations that are far from the paradigm of confinement in a cell, the purpose for which a measure has been taken is a factor to be considered.
(v) The European court has recognised that the process of assessing whether there has been a deprivation of liberty is no easy task in some contexts and may give rise to difficulties, especially in borderline or marginal cases. Equally, it may sometimes be difficult to ascertain the true feelings or preferences of vulnerable individuals who do not have mental capacity to decide on their living arrangements. The approach should be practical and realistic. Where there is serious doubt, no inference of valid consent should be drawn.’
18. I have been referred to a number of first instance post AGNI decisions. Some of these are Tier 2 decisions, which the parties note are not citable as authorities, but are provided as examples of how AGNI has been applied in other situations at first instance. The circumstances of individuals who come before the Court of Protection are infinitely variable. As determining whether arrangements constitute a deprivation of liberty post AGNI is highly fact sensitive, requiring an intense focus of the concrete situation of the protected party concerned, there is inevitably a limit to how far a decision in one case, can be used to map the appropriate outcome in another.
19. In terms of Tier 3 decisions, I have been referred to London Borough of Brent v Mustafa’s mother & Mustafa’s father & Mustafa [2026] EWHC 2159 (Fam). As per §§4 and 9, this involved a 15 year old child in a 52 week residential school. Mustafa had 1:1 support at the placement, up to 2:1 support to access the community, there were locked doors, and he was subject to physical restraint approximately every 9-10 days In terms of Mustafa’s concrete situation, it was noted:
‘He attends school, accesses community activities, maintains peer relationships, participates in leisure activities and enjoys regular family contact. The evidence demonstrates a young person who is integrated into his placement rather than isolated in it.’ [§5(a)]
20. The judgment notes the specific common law powers that apply in school settings to the use of restraint (see FXS (through his father and litigation JLM) v Mulberry Bush Organisation Ltd [2026[ EWCA Civ 451). In Re Mustafa, it was held that the arrangement did not amount to a deprivation of liberty as Mustafa was generally happy at the placement, and insofar as restraint was involved, Mustafa either consented to it, or the school was entitled to use it under other common law powers (§14).
21. I have also been referred to the case of Essex County Council v MH & GH & ST [2026] EWHC 2328 (Fam), in which Mrs Justice Theis determined that a young person who was subject to up to 3:1 support, locked doors, and physical restraint, was deprived of her liberty. In this case, Mrs Justice Theis determined that the arrangements did give rise to an objective deprivation of liberty, and the court could not rely on the consent of the young person.
22. In terms of Tier 3 guidance regarding how the principles in AGNI may be approached, at §§66-7 Mrs Justice Theis set out as follows:
‘[66] An evaluation of the overall nature and effect of the arrangements in place is now required in determining whether measures amount to a deprivation of liberty when viewed in their full context. Relevant considerations for the court to take into account in undertaking this evaluation can include:
i) The degree of control exercised over that person.
ii) The extent to which their movements are restricted.
iii) The opportunities available to maintain relationships.
iv) Participation in ordinary circumstances.
v) The duration of the arrangements.
vi) The purpose and necessity of the arrangements.
vii) Whether less restrictive alternatives exist.
[67] Part of that evaluation should include the individual's own experience of the arrangements including matters such as their wishes and feelings, level of contentment and any signs of objections to the arrangements’.
23. All of the advocates agreed that the factors set out in Essex County Councilv MH & GH & ST are relevant factors for the court to address.
The parties’ positions
The Applicant ICB
24. In a position statement dated 23 September 2026, the ICB’s initial position was that it was ‘arguable’ that AA was not deprived of his liberty [§ 3(d)]. The ICB recognised that the situation was ‘finely balanced’ but contended that, on balance, AA was not deprived of his liberty and invited the court to find the same [§ 34]. In the event that the court found that AA was deprived of his liberty, or there was a ‘real doubt’ in respect of the same, then the ICB invited the court to authorise the arrangements [§ 34].
25. On the first day of the hearing the court raised some queries in relation to post AGNI case law, and what the parties’ positions were on whether any of AA’s behaviour may indicate objection to his arrangements, which was something that had been troubling the court. The parties requested further time to consider those issues and to advance further written submissions.
26. The ICB subsequently lodged a further position statement dated 29 September 2026, in which it was less equivocal in its position as to whether AA’s care arrangements represent a deprivation of liberty. When asked about this shift in the ICB’s position, Mr Fullwood outlined that having reflected on the binary nature of the determination required, (the arrangements either constitute a deprivation of liberty or they do not), the ICB had taken the view that a more definitive stance was required.
27. The ICB submits that the objective element of a deprivation of liberty is not met, as AA’s arrangements are as close to normal as possible, the purpose of any restrictions is protective (rather than coercive) and examples of AA displaying challenging behaviour are attributable to his condition rather than being indicative of objection. The ICB points to the fact that incidents of headbanging and self-injurious or aggressive behaviour have declined considerably over the last 12 months and that there has only been one incident of restraint since April 2026. The ICB acknowledges that Risperidone has been prescribed since October 2025, but highlights that it is being administered at the lowest possible therapeutic dose. AA is described by others at various times as being ‘happy’ or ‘settled’ and the ICB points to the fact that AA can recognise pictures of his home, and will point to it, if he wants to come home when he is out in the community.
28. Mr Fullwood invited the court to find that examples of challenging or self-injurious behaviour are either ‘sensory seeking’ or forms of ‘communication’. I am quite content to accept, based upon the evidence, that AA’s challenging or self-injurious behaviour is either sensory seeking, or a form of communication. Where such behaviour is a form of communication, however, I have found it more difficult to be clear as to what AA is expressing through such communication.
29. The ICB submits that AA is offered as much choice as possible consistent with his needs and activities that have been risk assessed as safe for him.
30. In oral submissions, Mr Fullwood accepted that contact restrictions were a relevant factor, but he submitted that this did not change the overall balance of the analysis.
31. In the alternative, the ICB contended, in its position statement, that AA was providing subjective consent to the arrangements, although when this was explored in oral submissions, Mr Fullwood outlined that this was not the ICB’s primary submission and he did not seek to advance it.
32. In the ICB’s supplemental position statement, Mr Fullwood addresses the two Tier 3 decisions set out above, namely Essex County Council v MH & GH & ST [2026] EWHC 2328 (Fam)and Re Mustafa (A Child) [2026] EWHC 2159 (Fam), suggesting that AA’s case was closer to Re Mustafa than Essex County Council v MH & GH & ST. It is not clear to me, however, that AS’s case is as close to the case of Re Mustafa as is suggested, it being noted that Mustafa was a child who was able to verbally articulate that he was happy with the arrangements in place, and consistently did so.
The Official Solicitor
33. An initial position statement was filed on behalf of AA acting by his Official Solicitor on 24 September 2026, which was primarily focussed on the substantive welfare issues in the proceedings. The issue of deprivation of liberty was dealt with in summary terms at §§21-23, largely adopting the analysis of the ICB in relation to the objective element of the test.
34. In a position statement dated 28 September 2026, submissions on behalf of the Official Solicitor were developed at greater depth. In essence, it is contended that AA is not objectively confined, on the basis that the arrangements are relatively normal for him, the purpose of the restrictions is protective, and the degree and intensity of the restrictions is not sufficient to cross the line into confinement. It is further submitted that AA’s challenging behaviours should be seen as part of his presentation, rather than evidence of objection, and that he appeared happy/content at the placement when his representatives have visited.
35. The Official Solicitor’s position is that AA is not able to provide valid consent to his confinement, as he is not sufficiently aware of his arrangements to do so, and it is submitted that this is not considered to be borderline.
36. In response to oral submissions from Ms Hampshire, Ms Pudney, on behalf of the Official Solicitor agreed that the restrictions on family contact, and the fact that the placement prevented AA from living with his family, were relevant factors to consider. However, Ms Pudney submitted that this did not tip the overall balance of the restrictions in favour of a deprivation of liberty arising on the facts.
37. There is no reference within the Official Solicitor’s analysis as to the significant role that Risperidone appears to have played in addressing what were extremely high levels of self-injurious behaviour that AA was displaying, within the last 12 months. This is an issue which has troubled the court, when it comes to assessing what AA’s experience of his care arrangements may be.
38. I am conscious that because of the unusual way that the parties’ positions regarding the deprivation of liberty unfolded, that the Official Solicitor did not have an opportunity to consider the positive case put forward by AA’s parents (asserting deprivation of liberty) before advancing her own position in written submissions on behalf of AA.
AA’s parents
39. On 24 September 2026, a position statement was filed on behalf of AA’s father, TT, in which the ICB’s analysis in relation to deprivation of liberty was agreed. TT later resiled from this position, and in a supplementary position statement filed on 29 September 2026, Ms Hampshire invites the court to find that AA’s arrangements do constitute a deprivation of his liberty, which should be authorised. This submission is on the basis that AA’s care arrangements are highly restrictive and that his behaviour is indicative of objection. In the alternative, Ms Hampshire submitted that if the court finds that there is ‘serious doubt’ as to whether AA is objecting to all or part of his arrangements, then the court should err on the side of caution and find a deprivation of liberty.
40. KA set out her views to the court orally, and in two emails submitted ahead of the second day.
41. The positions of KA and TT are aligned, so I will deal with them together, as set out below. They contend that the following factors point towards the objective element of deprivation of liberty being met:
(i) AA is subject to high levels of control as part of his care plan and he has limited real choice or freedom (including in relation to contact, and his diet). Ms Hampshire points to the intensity of the restrictions in place in relation to AA’s food intake, and a reference in AA’s care plan as to how he may experience this restriction:
‘AA may become aggressive or agitated around food if he is denied access or perceives a lack of control. Staff must follow behavioural support plans to de-escalate appropriately while maintaining firm boundaries.’ [C1258]
(ii) AA’s parents accept that some of AA’s challenging or self-injurious behaviour is sensory seeking, or a form of communication, but contend that when it arises, AA is typically communicating frustration or that he is not happy. In support of this, Ms Hampshire drew the court’s attention to the following matter:
a) Headbanging has been noted as an indicator of distress. Significantly, on 18 August 2025, headbanging was noted to be a sign of objection in relation to returning to the placement during community access: ‘In relation to community access, early attempts to take AA for wheelchair walks led to distress and headbanging upon return’. [C178]
b) A learning disability occupational therapist completed an assessment of AA in February 2026 in which she considered whether AA’s headbanging may be linked to an un-met sensory need. The occupational therapist outlined that the behavioural analysis conducted indicated the ‘behaviour was often related to communication, frustration and difficulties with transitions.’ [C640] This is also reflected in his PBS plan at C819.
c) AA was prescribed Risperidone in October 2025 with the specific aim of reducing his challenging behaviour. This is the point from which AA’s self-injurious behaviour began reducing.
a) Sometimes identifiable triggers are noted in relation to self injurious or aggressive behaviour, but at other times, no trigger is identified. On 03 August 2025, AA was so heightened he punched a hole through a bath, with no identifiable trigger being noted [C178], and there are other more recent incidents where no trigger is identified.
(iv) AA’s parents expressed concern that they regularly attend to find AA has punched holes in the walls, or has injuries, but they do not receive ABC incidents of what is leading to this. They consider such behaviour is, or may be, evidence of objection.
(v) AA’s parents acknowledge that AA can identify that he lives at the placement, and will be able to point to a picture of it if he is out and wants to return to where he lives. They consider that if AA had a choice, however, that he would want to live at home with his family.
(vi) AS’s parents are concerned about the narrow nature of AA’s existence. AA’s parents state that AA previously enjoyed a much greater range of activities, which KA outlined in court, included travelling to 30 countries on holiday, regular horse riding, swimming and other activities. They believe that AA’s limited participation in the outside world is a feature of the institutional way that care is delivered within the placement.
(vii) AA’s contact with his parents is subject to restrictions.
(viii) AA’s parents have at various points described AA as appearing happy or settled at the placement. AA’s mother clarified that when family visit AA he appears happy and excited and keen to do as many activities as possible, however he does not want family to leave at the end of the visit.
(ix) AA’s mother expressed concern that AA is active and engaged on the days family visit, but spends extended periods of time sleeping during the day on the days the family are not there. KA expressed concern that AA is a young man and there is no reason for him to be spending his days sleeping and considers this is a sign that he is not happy.
Analysis and findings
42. In approaching the issue of whether AA is deprived of his liberty, I have found it helpful to structure my analysis around the factors identified by Mrs Justice Theis at §§ 66-67 of Essex County Council v MH & GH & ST, which all parties agreed were relevant.
43. The degree of control exercised over the person. In my view, AA is subject to a high degree of control as part of his care plan. He is subject to 2:1 care at all times, including a bed sensor, and 15 minute observations over night, locked doors, and he is unable to leave his placement without support. Whilst AA’s care plans seek to promote his opportunities for choice throughout the day, the reality is that AA has little opportunity to exercise choice or autonomy in respect of most aspects of his life. His food choices are tightly controlled, he does not have access to his own money, and decisions regarding contact are made for him. AA is able to exercise some limited choices from within options that have been assessed as suitable for him (for example, in relation to food, and activities risk assessed as being safe for him, and capable of being suitably staffed).
44. At the outset of the first day, I was asked to consider a Working Together Agreement for the arrangements for contact, and community access. I was struck by the degree of control, and moment by moment management it contained, regarding the process of AA being offered the opportunity to go out with his family. These provisions were ultimately taken out of the final Contact Agreement, as it was accepted that they were better described as care planning provisions. However, I include them here to illustrate the degree of control exercised over each step of AA’s existence, as part of his daily life. This is not a value judgment on the arrangements but an example of how they operate in practice:
i. ‘The Provider’s staff shall remain present for the duration of the activity. If the activity is during Family contact the Family will take lead of the activity with staff providing support for AA, to allow AA to enjoy quality time with his family.
ii. There is a mutual understanding that there may be occasions where no driver is assigned to AA’s team. However, the Provider will make efforts to try to prioritise drivers for planned, routine or scheduled outings.
iii. The Motability vehicle assigned to AA shall be operated solely by Provider staff; the Family shall meet AA and staff at the approved location. However, should AA allow family may be able to attend the approved venue with AA in his car. The Provider will not unreasonably prevent AA’s family from travelling in his car.
iv. Family and staff will utilise PECS to outline a choice of destinations and activities, at least two different options will be available, to assist AA in choosing whether he wishes to participate in an activity. Family and staff will monitor AA’s mood as to when it may be appropriate to suggest an activity to AA.
v. If on the first attempt AA refuses to choose an activity then staff and family will remove the PECS and will attempt to reoffer AA a choice at a later time (a short period of time around 30-40 minutes might be appropriate before attempting to reoffer).
vi. AA will be supported, by either staff or family, to encourage AA to choose an appropriate outfit before attending any outdoor activity and upon his return from an outing.
vii. AA benefits from continued reassurance and reminding of the chosen destination or activity throughout any travel and activity. Staff and family will make sure that the following PECS are available and used throughout travel and outdoor activities to support AA’s understanding prior to taking the next step such as returning home. These include pictures of: the car, home, and the chosen activity/destination. These pictures are to be actual images of the place or activity offered to AA rather than cartoon images.
viii. Upon arrival at a destination, staff and family will make sure that it is safe for AA to exit the vehicle and support him to open the car door to reduce risks of AA injuring himself.’
45. In terms of other restrictions which may be considered coercive, AA’s care plan includes provision for restraint, although this has only been required once since April 2026, and I accept the submission, that the fact that a person is subject to occasional restraint, does not automatically mean that their care plan gives rise to a deprivation of liberty. In AA’s care plan, there appears to be very little reliance on physical restraint, and this is a factor, which points away from confinement.
46. AA is, however, being treated with Risperidone (on a daily basis, rather than on a PRN basis). The second position statement of the ICB suggests that this is a low dose antipsychotic prescribed by a psychiatrist, and is not used for compliance [§ 7], such that it should not weigh heavily in favour of there being confinement. However, I note that AA does not have an underlying diagnosis of a psychotic mental disorder and the rationale for the introduction of the medication was explicitly to seek to reduce AA’s challenging/self -injurious behaviour:
‘This medication has been introduced on a trial basis to support a period of assessment and monitoring, due to the escalation in behaviours that have placed him at significant risk of harm, including episodes of headbanging. The psychiatrist’s intention is that Risperidone may help stabilise AA’s presentation and support him through his current period of transition.’ [C1247]
47. At the point that Risperidone was introduced in October 2025, the severity of AA’s headbanging was so intense, that the provider identified that it posed a risk to life:
‘16. Provider A want to stress the severity of the headbanging behaviours and the
associated risks. One blow to the head could result in a serious or even life-threatening
brain injury, and therefore the collective priority of everyone involved should be to
continue reducing the frequency and intensity of these episodes.’ [C374]
48. The introduction of Risperidone appears to have had an immediate and significant impact on managing AA’s challenging and self-injurious behaviour, and a decline in incidents from November 2025, attributable to the same, is recorded in the evidence.
‘ABC behaviours have reduced significantly since November 2025. There has been a substantial reduction in behavioural incidents since the introduction of prescribed risperidone. Due to this continued improvement, his daily dose has been reduced from 1 mg twice daily to 0.5 mg once daily’. [C614]
49. I do not have evidence of how many incidents there were in November, but I note that in December, none were recorded, which reflects a very dramatic reduction. [C635]
50. It was also noted, in November 2025, that the ‘Risperidone seems to be making AA very sleepy, he seems to spend most of the day in bed’ [C571]. The dose was subsequently reduced, without the therapeutic benefit of the medication appearing to be impacted, as no increase in behaviour was noted. [C635-6]
51. There are multiple references within the bundle to the family expressing objection to AA being given Risperidone.
52. Whilst I have no doubt that other factors will also have contributed to the decline in AA’s challenging/self-injurious behaviour (such as the provider increasing its understanding of him), it is clear from the evidence that the commencement of Risperidone in October 2025, played a central role in reducing and managing AA’s behaviour.
53. The Supreme Court, at § 188 of AGNI states as follows:
‘Depending on the circumstances, mere compliance or acquiescence may carry little weight in determining whether there is confinement, particularly if it is accompanied by the administration of sedative medication which is capable of suppressing objections: see for example, HL paras 90–91 (paras 152–156 above). The administration of medication (including antipsychotic drugs or tranquilisers) is likely to be highly relevant in supporting the existence of the objective element of confinement because it suppresses the ability and freedom to express wishes and feelings. Its relevance is increased if the administration of it is accompanied by force. But again, the absence of medication may be a relevant factor pointing in the opposite direction.’
54. It is my view, for the reasons set out above, that there is a high level of control exercised over AA, in terms of his daily life. This is a factor which weighs in favour of confinement. The administration of Risperidone, as part of this daily regime, which is not being used to treat an underlying core disorder but to suppress behaviours that challenge, is in my view also significant, both in relation to whether there is objective confinement, as well as what can be interpreted about AA’s wishes and feelings from his current presentation.
55. The extent to which their movements are restricted. AA’s movements are restricted in accordance with his care plan. He is not able to leave his placement unattended, or to go and live elsewhere. I note that AA is not engaging in absconding or exist seeking behaviour, and indeed, for the first few months, AA was not leaving the placement at all. During this period, there are references to AA not wanting to go out, but also to there being problems with AA not wanting to come back [as per the reference to C178 at § 42(ii)(a) above] and so it is difficult to fully understand what AA’s experience was at the time.
56. There have been active efforts with professional input and advice to support AA to start accessing the community and it is positive to note that AA is now accessing The Range, every day, which is an activity that AA indicates a choice for, out of options presented to him.
57. The ICB’s position is that efforts are made to support AA to access the community and to go to different places (risk assessed as suitable) but it is AA’s choice only to go to the Range. I take account of the fact that there appears to be genuine effort and thought being given to how AA can be supported to do more.
58. Conversely, KA expressed frustration that AA is only going to the Range and she considered this was partly attributable to how care is managed at the placement. She noted that it had taken nearly a year to get to a point where swimming was being progressed for AA which was an activity he used to love. Her understanding was that AA was not being taken, because none of the carers could swim. Mr Fullwood explained that there were initially issues with staffing, then getting insurance, finding an appropriate pool and now preparatory work with AA is being undertaken in relation to this. The witness statement of the ICB case manager (dated 10.09.26) records a hope that AA will be able to go swimming by the end of the year. KA by contrast, set out, how the family would facilitate swimming if AA was at home, which she suggested would involve a much less drawn-out process.
59. Whilst I make no findings as to whether AA’s needs could be met at home, I suspect it is right that there would be greater spontaneity around accessing community based activities, such as swimming, if AA was living within a family environment, because of the different way in which families operate compared to commercial care providers. There are simply not the same administrative burdens and requirements on family members providing care, as there are for commercial care providers and public bodies providing and commissioning care.
60. AA is able to move freely around his property, save that his access to the kitchen is supervised.
61. AA’s movement are restricted, in terms of the time he spends with his family. There is a tight (albeit generous) contact regime in place, and AA is not able to choose to spend more time with his family if he wanted to, to go to the family home, or to live with them. When considering the extent of the restrictions imposed upon a person, and their experience of them, the advocates all agreed that Article 8 restrictions are a factor to be weighed in the balance, and I agree with this. In Salford City Council v AR & PR & QR [2026] EWCOP 45 (T2) His Honour Judge Burrows approached the issue in this way:
“objection from anyone other than P is not relevant to whether P was deprived of his liberty … although clearly such an objection can have knock-on effects into the care plan (restrictions on contact, for instance) that can increase the intensity of the restrictions imposed on P. Now that a very wide range of matters need to be taken into account in determining whether Article 5 applies, it is important to recognise that contact is now more significant as a factor when determining whether P is deprived of his liberty … There may be situations where restrictions on contact with friends and family may be such as to change the character of the placement away from a home and closer to a place of detention. This is, in my judgment, not one of them”. [§66]
62. Whilst in my view the restrictions on AA’s contact with his family are not determinative of whether there is an objective deprivation of liberty, they are features of AA’s concrete experience, which increase the restrictive nature of the arrangements, and which need to be weighed in the balance.
63. The opportunities available to maintain relationships. AA is supported to maintain relationships with his family members, however, as noted above, there are significant contact restrictions in place.
64. AA does not currently have any opportunities for developing other social or peer-based relationships, and outside of his care team, his only social contact is with his family.
65. Participation in ordinary circumstances. As set out above, the only place that AA is going to is the Range. It is positive to see that AA is now starting to leave the placement for some time each day, but I accept the submission of the family that AA is not participating in the types of activity that other young people of his age may do, including people with learning disabilities and autism. AA is not, for example, attending college, a day centre, or any groups where he comes in to contact with peers. AA sees his family at his placement, and they can accompany him to the Range, but he is not able to go and spend time with his family at their homes, or to be part of family gatherings, as most people of his age would do.
66. Linked to the above is the issue of relative normality. In my view, great caution needs to be applied when considering what constitutes relative normality for an individual who is subject to high levels of restriction. It is tempting to draw the conclusion that just because a person is assessed as requiring a particular level of support in one setting, that this must be what is normal for anyone in their position. However, behaviour can be greatly impacted by environment and most people who practice within the Court of Protection will have experience of someone who has moved environment, and who has suddenly required a lot fewer (or indeed perhaps more) restrictions. AA’s parents submit that AA’s current life is not relatively normal for him, and that prior to his hospital admission and discharge to his current supported living placement, AA was accessing lots of different activities and had travelled on holiday to lots of countries. This is a submission with some force and was not challenged, in terms of the evidential background, by the other parties.
67. Many young people with autism and learning disabilities participate in a much greater range of ordinary activities than AA (attending education, day centres, or group activities). Whilst it is clear that those responsible for AA’s care hope that, over time, AA’s life will move in that direction, at this juncture, AA’s day to day existence is much narrower than many people in a similar situation enjoy, and he is isolated from the outside world. This is a factor which, in my view, taken together with the other restrictions on him, weighs in favour of confinement.
68. The duration of the arrangements. The arrangements are enduring.
69. The purpose and necessity of the arrangements. I have no doubt that the purpose of the arrangements is to protect AA and to serve his best interests. In the context of care arrangements considered within the Court of Protection, it is difficult to envisage any scenario where care arrangements are in place for punitive reasons, and such an event would be likely to trigger a safeguarding concern.
70. As to the necessity of the arrangements, I am satisfied that in the current circumstances, the restrictions in the care plan are necessary and proportionate to meet AA’s needs. There are currently no alternative options available which would offer AA a safe level of care, and the care plan allows for him to be cared for safely in his current setting.
71. Whether less restrictive alternatives exist. AA’s family have been clear that they want AA to return to live with his family at the family home. They have not opposed the court making best interests orders that AA should remain living in his current placement, taking a pragmatic approach based on the ICB’s funding decision, however it is clear that they desperately want AA to return to the family home and hold out hope for this in the future.
72. The option of AA returning to live with his family is not currently a realistically available option for the court to consider pursuant to N v ACCG [2017] UKSC 22. However, the potential option of AA returning to live with his family continues to exist, subject to there being a public body willing to fund a care package to support it.
73. I am not able to make a finding as to whether such an option would be less restrictive for AA, as the sort of detail that would be required to make such a finding, is not available. However, I am cognisant of the fact that care within families does typically operate in a less regimented way than within formal care settings, and it may be a less restrictive option, providing it could meet AA’s needs.
74. AA’s experience, level of contentment and signs of objection: AA is not capable of communicating verbally and therefore he is unable to articulate his wishes and feelings, and his behaviour must be interpreted for an indication of what he is experiencing. In the early part of AA’s placement, he was demonstrating high levels of head banging and self-injurious behaviour. I do not think any party would seriously suggest that AA’s behaviour between June 2025 (following admission) to November 2025, was not indicative of objection, and nobody did suggest that. Indeed, the ICB relies on the fact that there has been a dramatic reduction in headbanging incidents, as evidence of AA being more settled and happy at the placement.
75. The fact that someone is happier, does not mean, however, that they are happy/content with the arrangements, or that they would choose them if they were given a choice. AA’s parents believe AA would want to come back to the family home if given a choice; in the absence of it being an available option, AA’s views have not been sought on this (for example, by showing him pictures of the two options) and so it is not possible for the court to know what AA’s response to this would be.
76. It is pleasing to note that AA now appears to be much more settled, that he is engaging with staff, and starting to go out daily. I readily accept that some of AA’s challenging/self-injurious is likely to be sensory related or to be a communication of frustration regarding day to day matters (rather than to signify objection more generally).
77. However, there are significant features of AA’s presentation which have given rise to serious doubt in my mind, as to whether AA is genuinely content with the arrangements in place, or whether his behaviour is communicating objection. I identify the following significant question marks regarding what can be interpreted about AA’s experience of his arrangements:
i. The fact that AA’s high levels of self-injurious behaviour reduced suddenly following the administration of Risperidone from 03 October 2025 onwards. The dose of the medication has been reduced, however, the therapeutic effect of the medication appears to have been maintained. I do not know whether AA’s current behavioural presentation would be maintained if the medication was stopped altogether, and this has not been tried. It is hard to reliably interpret what AA’s behaviour is communicating, in circumstances where he is subject to medication which can suppress objection and the ability and freedom to express wishes and feelings;
ii. It is acknowledged in the evidence that AA is likely to perceive the restrictions in place around food as giving rise to a loss of control which may make him agitated/aggressive; [C1258]
iii. The fact that AA continues to display self-injurious or aggressive behaviour which has no obvious trigger. The attendance note of Mr Chapman dated 27 August 2026 records 4 incidents of self-injurious or challenging behaviour between 27 July and 24 August 2026, where no trigger was identified [C159]. One of these involved an attack on a member of his care staff whilst travelling in a car, and the other three involved self-injury. I was informed that AA punched a hole in the wall on 28 August 2026 and in the month of September (up to the date of the hearing) there had been 4 incidents (although I am unaware of whether these were accounted for in terms of known triggers);
iv. AA’s parents are in regular contact with him and they spend sustained periods of time with him throughout the week. They both consider that unexplained challenging behaviour is AA communicating that he is not happy about something, and this is, in my view, consistent with AA’s PBS.
v. There appears to be a consensus that AA enjoys contact with his family. AA’s mother submits that AA is happy during contact but gets agitated when it is time for contact to end. I do not fully understand how AA experiences the restrictions on contact and how this impacts him overall.
vi. AA is reported to be spending long periods of the day in bed/asleep when his family are not there. It is not clear to me if this is evidence of withdrawal, or that AA or is not content, or whether there is some other reason for it.
78. I have considered carefully what the Supreme Court said in AGNI at § 191 as follows:
‘191. We recognise that there may be considerable evidential difficulties in ascertaining whether a person who is severely autistic or who has other profound cognitive disabilities is content with and not objecting to their living arrangements. Inevitably there will be a wide spectrum of cases, with cases at one end where eliciting evidence of positive expressions of wishes and feelings about the care placement will be impossible, and at the other end, cases (like MIG’s and MEG’s in Cheshire West, and the applicant’s attitude to the Lielberze home in Mihailovs) where a tacit positive indication of wishes and feelings showing contentment with the arrangements can be ascertained. In the latter cases, such evidence is relevant and should not be excluded from consideration. The cases between the two ends of the spectrum will create varying degrees of difficulty and will require anxious consideration to determine what effect the applicable restrictions are having and what attitude the affected individual has to them. As we have said, it may be that if nothing more than mere compliance or acquiescence is a feature of the case, that is not enough. If the individual is capable of expressing a view and there is serious doubt about their attitude, no inference should be drawn.’
79. Having anxiously considered a whole range of evidence about AA’s presentation, I do have a serious doubt as to what AA’s experience of his care arrangements is, and whether he is genuinely content, or whether he is objecting to all or part of his arrangements.
80. Subjective consent. I accept the submission of the Official Solicitor that AA is not sufficiently aware of his environment, and what his care arrangements are and what options may be available to him, in order to validly consent to his arrangements. I note that the ICB did not seek to advance any oral submissions in relation to this.
Conclusion
81. Drawing all of the above together, and balancing all the matters set out above, I do consider that AA is objectively confined. Whilst there is no hierarchy of factors, in AA’s case, the factors that I find weigh heavily in reaching this view, are the degree of control exercised over all aspects of his day to day life, his lack of participation in ordinary activities, including activities that were previously normal for him, and would be relatively normal for other young people in his position, the restrictions in place on contact and family life, and the regular use of behaviour suppressing medication. In terms of AA’s wishes and feelings, as set out above, there is a mixed picture and I am left with serious doubt as whether AA is genuinely content or whether he objects to some or all of the arrangements. I therefore do find that there is an objective deprivation of liberty, and I am satisfied that AA is not able to provide valid consent for the same.
82. People who lack capacity are inherently vulnerable and amongst them, those who are unable to speak, are the most vulnerable of all. Whilst I recognise that the determination the court must ultimately make is a binary one, it is important, in my view, to acknowledge those cases where there is genuine uncertainty, and it is appropriate to err on the side of caution.
83. I will therefore make an order authorising the deprivation of liberty that arises from AA’s care arrangements. I note there is no dispute as to whether the arrangements in AA’s care plan are in his best interests. In the lead up to the expiry of the authorisation, there will be a review, outside of the court framework, as to whether AA’s care arrangements still give rise to a deprivation of his liberty. By that point, there may be different considerations which apply (in terms of AA’s behaviour, his medication regime, developments in his contact and community access); those are issues that will need to be considered, however, at the time.
84. I would like to stress, for the benefit of the family, that nothing I have said above is a value judgment on the arrangements; it is a description of the overall arrangements, as I find them to be. I am satisfied that the care plan in place is in AA’s best interests and that everybody is working hard to improve life on the ground for him.
85. I wish AA well over the coming months and hope that he enjoys the additional contact time that has been agreed by the parties in the course of the hearing.
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