Miscellaneous Etats-Unis
Randall Williams v. Colton Moore
SECOND DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
DAVIS and WHITAKER, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after
the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
October 29, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1553. WILLIAMS v. MOORE.
WHITAKER, Judge.
After he was arrested and charged with obstruction for attempting to enter the
House Chamber of the Georgia General Assembly, now-former State Senator Colton
Moore filed a warrant application seeking the issuance of an arrest warrant against
Randall Keith Williams, a House of Representatives employee. The magistrate court
denied Moore’s application, and Moore filed a petition for review in the superior
court. The superior court held a hearing but ultimately determined that it could not
issue a ruling on the magistrate judge’s decision, remanding the case for an entirely
new warrant application hearing in magistrate court. Williams appeals from that
ruling. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the superior court’s ruling and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The record shows that on January 27, 2025, Moore applied for a warrant to
have Williams arrested. A warrant application hearing was held on March 7, 2025.
During the hearing, several witnesses testified, and at least two videos of the incident
at issue were introduced into evidence and viewed by the magistrate judge. The
evidence presented at the warrant application hearing showed the following:
In March 2024, the Speaker of the House of Representatives ordered that
Moore be banned from entering the House Chamber. The day before a scheduled joint
session of the General Assembly, Moore made a statement that he would “never back
down,” by which he meant that he intended to enter the House Chamber during the
joint session despite the ban. On the day of the joint session, January 16, 2025, Moore
did attempt to enter the House Chamber, and as he approached the door, Williams
and Cory Mulkey, another House of Representatives employee, prevented his entry.
The director of the capitol police, who was present during the incident, had been
informed that Moore was “banned” from the chamber and would not be allowed to
enter. The director observed Moore, who is “a pretty big guy,” using his body to try
2
to gain access to the House Chamber, while Williams tried to prevent him from doing
so. According to the director, Moore used his body to lean against and push people,
including the director, Williams, Mulkey, and a state trooper. The director testified
that as Moore was trying to enter, Williams did not physically tackle him, but did push
him, at which time Moore lost his footing and fell backwards. Based on his actions that
day, Moore was arrested for misdemeanor obstruction of law enforcement officers.
Moore’s account of the event differed. According to Moore, as he was
approaching the Chamber door, Williams grabbed him by the shoulders, rocked him
over sideways, pushed up against him, and shoved him to the ground, injuring his
hand.
At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, Moore argued that Williams
should be arrested for battery, aggravated battery, interference with government
property, disruption of a General Assembly session, and unauthorized practice of law.
The magistrate court denied the application the same day, discussing on the record
the elements of each specific offense alleged, as well as the offenses of simple battery,
disorderly conduct, and simple assault, and finding insufficient probable cause as to
each one based on the evidence presented.
3
On April 7, 2025, Moore filed a petition for review in superior court. On
October 30, 2025, a hearing was held. At the time of the hearing, the transcript of the
hearing before the magistrate court had been filed with the superior court but not the
record of the magistrate court proceedings, which should have included the videos
entered into evidence. During this hearing, there appeared to be some confusion as to
whether Moore had ever served the magistrate court with his petition for review,1 and
what, if anything, the private court reporter had filed with the magistrate court. The
superior court gave the parties two options, it would reschedule the hearing once the
record was complete or proceed with the hearing as scheduled, after which the court
stated it would delay its ruling until the record was complete. The parties opted to go
forward with the hearing, during which Moore played one video of the incident.2 At
1
Moore was required by statute to serve the magistrate court with a copy of his filed
petition for review within five days after filing the petition in the superior court. OCGA §
5-3-7(h).
2
Counsel for Williams initially objected to the playing of the video because it had not
been made a part of the record and he had not had an opportunity to verify that it was the
same video played in the magistrate court. But he later withdrew his objection. Contrary
to the finding in the superior court’s order and the statement in Moore’s brief on appeal,
there was no stipulation that the video played in the superior court was the same as any of
the videos that had been admitted during the magistrate court hearing.
4
the conclusion of the hearing, Moore — as the petitioner — was ordered to ensure
that the entirety of the record was filed with the superior court within five days.
The record as it existed was thereafter transmitted to the superior court, but it
did not include the videos of the incident that had been played before the magistrate
judge and admitted into evidence. Both the court reporter and magistrate court
contended that they did not possess the videos. The superior court ruled that the
omission of the videos was not the fault of either party. In addition, the superior court
ruled that “the operative facts” were established by the video evidence, such that its
review was purely legal. “As such, and without the full and official record of the lower
court,” the superior court determined that it could not “make a finding regarding
whether the lower court’s order was clearly erroneous.” Consequently, the superior
court remanded the case to magistrate court “for a new hearing on the matter by an
5
independent jurist.”3 Williams filed an application for discretionary review, which this
Court granted. This appeal followed.
Williams contends that the superior court erred in ordering a new hearing on
the basis that it lacked the full magistrate court record and that it should instead have
complied with the procedures set out in the Superior and State Court Appellate
Practice Act, OCGA § 5-3-1 et seq. (“SSCAPA”).
Although a superior court may remand a petition for review back to the lower
judicatory with instructions, see OCGA § 5-3-18(a)(1)(C), the remand for an entirely
new warrant application hearing was error. To the extent that the superior court’s
review was hampered by the absence of a complete record, that court could have
remanded the case to the magistrate court with direction to complete the record or
3
The parties seem to read the directive for a new hearing before an “independent
jurist” as a directive that the hearing be held before someone other than the magistrate who
presided over the warrant application hearing. Although the same magistrate judge who
reviewed the warrant application for Moore’s arrest presided over the hearing on Moore’s
application for an arrest warrant against Williams, the superior court made no findings to
explain the need for either a new hearing or an “independent jurist,” and neither party
sought recusal of the magistrate judge on any basis.
6
have the parties stipulate to its contents. See OCGA § 5-3-14(k),(m). Alternatively,
the court could have conducted the SSCAPA review on the record before it.4
In conducting a substantive review of a petition for review, the superior court
must: “(1) Review only matters raised in the record of the proceeding in the lower
judicatory; (2) Accept the findings of fact and credibility of the lower judicatory unless
they are clearly erroneous; (3) Accept a decision regarding an issue within the sound
discretion of the lower judicatory unless such a decision was an abuse of discretion;
(4) Determine whether the final judgment was sustained by sufficient evidence; and
(5) Review questions of law de novo.” OCGA § 5-3-5(a).5
Looking first at the standard for reviewing the magistrate court’s factual
findings, the superior court apparently recognized that the appropriate standard was
“clearly erroneous,” as set forth in OCGA § 5-3-5(a)(2), but then declined to apply
that standard to the record before it. Instead, the superior court ruled that “the
4
The parties have not briefed, and this Court takes no position on, whether some
other disposition of the petition for review may also be available under SSCAPA.
5
This standard of review is not applicable if a de novo proceeding is “specified by
law.” OCGA § 5-3-5(a), (b).
7
operative facts” were established by the video evidence,6 leading it to conclude that
its review was therefore purely legal, but then remanding for a new hearing due to the
record before it not containing the videos.
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that “a magistrate judge has
discretion to determine whether or not probable cause exists for the issuance of an
arrest warrant.” Uzomba v. Cobb County Magistrate Court,
(1) (
SE2d 683
) (2005), citing Chisholm v. Cofer,
(
) (1994). Accord McRae v. Padgett,
(
) (2012). And a magistrate judge’s decision as to whether to issue an arrest warrant is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court. Anderson v. State,
(1) (
793
) (2010). That “substantial deference ... allows for a range of permissible outcomes, as long as that discretionary decision is based on a correct understanding of the law and facts.” Burns v. State,
(2) (
) (2024)
(punctuation omitted). Thus, the proper standard for reviewing the magistrate court’s
decision in this case was the abuse of discretion standard set forth in OCGA § 5-3-
5(a)(3).
6
The superior court viewed one video of the incident during its hearing, but that
video was not a part of the magistrate court record before it for review.
8
The superior court set forth this standard, mistakenly citing it as (a)(4), but
concluded that due to the video that court had reviewed of the incident, its review was
de novo. See generally Walker v. State,
(2)(b) (
) (2021) (explaining that de novo appellate review of a trial court’s findings applies to the extent that the controlling facts are undisputed because they are “indisputably discernible” from a video recording). But it is unclear from the appellate record, which contains no video evidence, whether the controlling facts are “indisputably discernible” from any of the video recordings. And the superior court’s conclusion ignores the fact that there was other evidence of the incident admitted at the hearing before the magistrate court, and the magistrate court relied on that evidence in making its ruling. See Downer v. State,
(2) (
) (2022) (recognizing
that even if controlling facts are discernible from a videotape, “to the extent that
legally significant facts were proved by evidence other than the video recording, the
trial court as fact-finder was entitled to determine the credibility and weight of that
other evidence” (punctuation omitted)).
Further, Moore — as the party pursuing the petition for review — had the
burden of demonstrating error affirmatively by the record. See Westmoreland v. State,
9
(10) (
) (2010). And although the superior court found
that the omission of the videos was not the fault of either party, it reached that
determination by relying almost exclusively on actions taken by Moore after he was
ordered to cause the record, transcript, and all exhibits to be transmitted to the
superior court. The superior court’s ruling does not appear to have taken into account
that the magistrate court record did not include Moore’s petition for review, the
receipt of which was a prerequisite to the magistrate court’s duty to transmit a copy
of the record, or that the record reflects no evidence of any effort by Moore for six
months after he filed his petition for review to ensure that the videos were included
in the record.
OCGA §§ 5-3-14 and 5-3-15 set forth the procedures for maintaining and
transmitting a record from a lower judicatory7 to the reviewing court8 in a petition for
review. As relevant to this case, the clerk of the lower judicatory shall ensure that the
7
A “lower judicatory” is a “court, official, board, tribunal, commission, municipal
or county authority, council, or similar body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers
authorized by law” that is “(A) [i]nferior in authority to the superior and state courts; and
(B) [s]ubject to the appellate jurisdiction of the superior or state courts as provided by the
laws and the Constitution of this state.” OCGA § 5-3-3(5), (6).
8
A “reviewing court” is a “superior or state court reviewing a final judgment
pursuant to [SSCAPA].” OCGA § 5-3-3(12).
10
transcript of the evidence and proceedings is included in the record transmitted to the
reviewing court, see OCGA § 5-3-14(j), and if “anything material to any party is
omitted from or misstated in the record under review, the parties may stipulate, or the
lower judicatory may direct, that the omission or misstatement be corrected before or
after the record is transmitted to the reviewing court.” OCGA § 5-3-14(m).
Furthermore, the lower judicatory or the reviewing court may order the clerk of the
lower judicatory to send up any original exhibits. OCGA § 5-3-14(o). As to
transmission, upon being served with a copy of the petition for review, the clerk of the
lower judicatory must transmit a copy of the record to the reviewing court, usually
within 30 days, and if the clerk does not, the petitioner shall notify the reviewing
court, which shall then order the transmission. OCGA § 5-3-15(a), (d).
As set forth above, because the superior court did not properly apply OCGA §
5-3-5(a)(2) or (a)(3) and improperly ordered a new hearing in the magistrate court, we
reverse its ruling and remand the case to the superior court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.9 See generally Great Am. Dream, Inc. v. DeKalb County,
9
Upon review of all pertinent facts, the superior court on remand may conclude that
it must apply the presumption of regularity. See Holmes v. Roberson-Holmes,
(1) (
) (2010) (recognizing that there is a presumption of regularity that
attaches to all official acts, including judicial proceedings); Tucker v. Crystal Clear Luxury
11
(1) (
) (2012) (reversing a decision based on the
application of the wrong legal standard).
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. Doyle, P. J., and Davis, J.,
concur.
Pools,
361 Ga. App. 369
, 370-71 (
864 SE2d 462
) (2021) (concluding that where appellant’s challenges draw into question the evidence presented at a bench trial, and appellant failed to include a trial transcript, we must assume that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment); Jones v. State,
(1) n.6 (
) (2017) (“[When the record is not supplemented with ... missing exhibits, we must assume that the exhibits support the judgment below.”). See also Bailey v. McIntosh County,
322 Ga. 602
, 616(3) n.13 (
921 SE2d 382
) (2025) (“[G]iven the presumption of regularity, we cannot say that the [lower] court did not properly have the [pertinent document] before it in entering the injunction.”); Nationstar Mtg. LLC v. Brunt,
(2) n.2 (
) (2014) (declining to conclude that the lower court had not considered all documents
within the breast of the court pertinent to the motion at the time the court made its
decision, given the presumption in favor of regularity of proceedings below).
12
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