Administrative United Kingdom

Seven Capital (Highgate Hill) Ltd v The Information Commissioner

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] UKFTT 01483 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/EA/2026/0154

First-tier Tribunal

(General Regulatory Chamber)

Information Rights

Determined without a hearing

Decision given on: 27 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHENAZ MUZAFFER

TRIBUNAL MEMBER PAUL TAYLOR

TRIBUNAL MEMBER JOHN MCINNES

Between

SEVEN CAPITAL (HIGHGATE HILL) LTD

Appellant

and

THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER

Respondent

DECISION: The appeal is dismissed.

REASONS

1. This is an appeal against a decision of the Information Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) dated 20 March 2026, reference IC-395277-Y4G5 (“the Decision Notice”).

2. The parties opted for a paper determination of the appeal. The Tribunal is satisfied that it can properly determine the issues without a hearing in accordance with rule 2 and rule 32(1)(b) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (as amended).

Factual background

3. The appeal relates to the application of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“the FOIA”) and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (“the EIR”). It concerns a request for information made to the London Borough of Islington (“the Council”).

The request and response

4. The request which is the subject of this appeal was made on 17 March 2025 in writing as follows:

“To fully understand the Council's position, and establish whetherthe Council is complying with its statutory duty under section 93 of the Act, [requester’s name redacted] requires the followinginformation from the Council:

1) full details of the time spent by the Council's officers on theProposed Development pursuant to the agreement dated 26November 2021;

2) full details of the time spent by the Council's officers on theProposed Development pursuant to the agreement dated 15February 2023. In particular confirmation that:

a. 100% of [name redacted] time (the dedicated planningcase officer);

b. 40% of the [name redacted] time (the Principal UrbanDesign Officer);

c. 25% of [name redacted]/replacement officer's time (theDesign and Conservation Officer); and

d. 10% of [name redacted] time/ replacement officer's(Team Leader); has been spent in accordance withclause 4.8.1 (ii) of such agreement;

3) full details of the time spent by the Council's officers on the Proposed Development pursuant to the agreement dated 3December 2024;

4) full details of the Design Review Panel's costs and timeincurred;

5) full details of the Council's reasonable costs incurred inrelation to the appointment of Etude;

6) full details of the Council's reasonable costs incurred inrelation to the appointment of BPS;

7) full details of the Council's reasonable costs incurred inrelation to the appointment of Ridge and Partners LLP;

8) full details of the Council's reasonable costs incurred inrelation to the appointment of Waterman Infrastructure andEnvironment;

9) full details of the Council's reasonable costs incurred in relation to the appointment of Steer Group;

10) full details of the Council's reasonable costs incurred in relation to the appointment of any other consultants; and

11) that the above information should be provided within twenty-one working days (Tuesday 22 April 2025) along with supporting evidence such as timesheets/records, accounting records, internal invoices notes emails and memoranda. With respect to external consultants this should include letters of appointment,”

5. The Council responded on 11 April 2025, providing a response to parts 2(a), and parts 4-11 of the request. The Council stated that it did not hold any information in relation to parts 1, 2(b)-(d), or 3 of the request.

6. The Appellant wrote to the Council on 25 April 2025 to request an internal review. In its letter, the Appellant stated the following:

i. It had been assumed by the Council that the request was made under the EIR. The request should also have been considered under the FOIA, and therefore the Appellant requested that it was considered under that statutory regime as well;

ii. Where the Council had indicated that information did not exist, the Council’s response did not meet the requirements of the Commissioner’s EIR guidance, which required adequate and properly directed searches to be carried out;

iii. In relation to information that was not held, the Appellant asked the Council to explain why the information was not held, and to provide information relating to the Council’s decision, or omission, not to hold the information. The Appellant also requested information on the procedures and record-keeping arrangements in place to ensure that the Council complied with section 93 of the Local Government Act 2003;

iv. Additionally in relation to those responses where the Council had stated that the requested information was not held, the Appellant requested information on how the costs paid to the Council pursuant to the relevant agreement had been calculated;

v. In relation to the responses provided regarding parts 5 to 12 (which has been read to refer to part 11), the Appellant stated that the answers provided did not relate to the questions raised, and did not justify the provision of no documentation in response to the questions. The Appellant requested that those questions were reviewed again, having particular regard to the FOIA.

7. The Council provided the outcome of its internal review on 23 May 2025, stating as follows:

i. It was acknowledged that the request should have been considered under both the FOIA and the EIR. It was agreed that elements of the request fell under both regimes and so the full request had been reconsidered under both frameworks. In particular, requests relating to planning activity, officer time on development proposals, and consultant engagement had been considered under the EIR, and requests relating to financial records, cost calculations, and internal procedures had been considered under the FOIA;

ii. Whilst detailed time logs were not maintained by the Council, proportionate and directed searches had been conducted and relevant records such as Project Programmes, calendars, and financial documentation had been reviewed;

iii. The Planning Performance Agreement (“PPA”) was a project management tool which set out standards relating to a mutual commitment to collaborative working, rather than a requirement for time-tracking. The Council indicated that it was satisfied that the officer resource provided was in line with the agreed programme and that the service was delivered as required;

iv. To ensure compliance with section 93 of the Local Government Act 2003, the Council had internal procedures and financial controls in place, including oversight by the finance team, retention of payment and invoicing records, and periodic review of charging schedules and service delivery models;

v. The consultants referenced in the Appellant’s request were appointed to support the Council’s assessment of the proposed development. In each case, the consultants invoiced the Appellant directly and the Appellant held copies of those invoices. The Council did not hold additional documentation beyond which had already been provided to the Appellant.

8. The internal review concluded in the following terms:

“After careful consideration, I have decided to partially uphold your complaint. While the Council acted reasonably and in line with its standard procedures, the original response could have more clearly explained why certain information – particularly officer time records and cost calculations – was not held. It also could have better distinguished between information considered under FOIA and EIR.

This internal review has now provided that clarification. We remain committed to transparency and continuous improvement in our handling of information requests”.

The complaint and the Commissioner’s investigation

9. The Appellant lodged a complaint with the Commissioner on 16 June 2025, stating that it disagreed with the Council’s refusal to provide the requested information. The Appellant stated that “The Council has responded to the requests inappropriately by not fully considering that both FOIA and EIR are invoked, they have responded in a block manner indicating that records do not exist but not applying the ICO guidance appropriately in this respect, and they have misapplied exemptions and the public interest test. The legislation has a presumption in favour of disclosure and it is inconceivable that no information exists”.

10. The request was accepted for consideration on 09 July 2025.

11. The Commissioner wrote to the Council on 16 January 2026 and invited the Council to review the way in which the request had been handled. The Council was asked to respond to a series of questions about the searches that had been conducted, how information was held, whether any relevant information had been destroyed, and regarding the records management policies.

12. The Council responded to the Commissioner on 23 January 2026. The Council summarised their response to the questions asked as follows:

“The Council does not hold per-officer PPA timesheets, as such records were never created. While officer calendars evidence the occurrence of meetings, they do not record or evidence total time spent in a way that would fall within scope.

The named consultants were commissioned and invoiced directly by the applicant. Accordingly, any related invoices or timesheets are not held by the Council, nor are they held on the Council’s behalf.

Elements within scope that constitute environmental information have been identified and considered under the EIR. Where the outcome is that information is not held, the Council relies on regulation 12(4)(a).

As set out in the attached form, the Council relies on the thorough, proportionate searches and staff consultations undertaken at internal review stage, which satisfy the balance of probabilities test as to what information is and is not held”.

13. In relation to the specific questions asked by the Commissioner, the Council’s response is summarised as follows:

i. The Council did not undertake further searches in January 2026 and instead relied on the “proportionate, well directed searches and staff consultations completed during the internal review (April-May 2025), which covered every repository where, if held, the information would reasonably be expected to be found”;

ii. The checks comprised of:

• Planning case management system, specifically Archway/Highgate Campus workspace and linked PPA folders for 26/11/2021, 15/02/2023 and 03/12/2024;

• Corporate Electronic Document and Record Management System (“EDRMS”)/SharePoint, namely PPA, Design Review Panel (“DRP”) and site-specific libraries;

• Microsoft 365 – Major Applications, Urban Design & Conservation, and DRP channels, case team mailboxes and calendars (included Archives);

• Finance ledgers – Planning/DRP cost centres, and supplier lookups for Etude, BPS, Ridge, Waterman and Steer;

• Procurement records, namely any Council let consultant appointments;

• Local/network storage, namely relevant network shares and permitted user profiles.

iii. At the internal review stage, staff had been consulted and asked to confirm whether they held, or had ever held, timesheets, internal recharges, letters of appointment, invoices or logs relevant to the request. Staff consulted included the Major Applications Case Officer, Urban Design lead, Design & Conservation Officer, Team Leader, the DRP coordinator/administrator, the Planning Service Manager, the Finance Business Partner (Planning) and Procurement;

iv. The Council had used twenty-one specified different search terms in combinations and with date filters. The terms included references to the developer, site, case and PPA; key PPA dates; references to the DRP; terms associated with financial or time-recording information; and relevant supplier names. The scope of the searches included local user profiles, network shares, and SharePoint/Teams and Outlook mailboxes/calendars, including archived items;

v. Any information that was held by the Council would primarily be held in electronic format, with paper documents being limited to signed agreements or meeting packs which would have been scanned into the EDRMS;

vi. Fees were agreed under the relevant PPAs and invoiced accordingly, rather than being recorded through individual officer time logs;

vii. No recorded information that was ever held that was relevant to the scope of the request had been deleted or destroyed;

viii. Records were either maintained under the Council’s Financial Governance retention schedule or their Corporate Records Retention Schedule for Planning & Development, as referenced in the Council’s Retention Schedule Policy and Records Management Policy. As the Council did not create per officer PPA timesheets, there was no applicable retention class for such records;

ix. The named consultants were appointed by the Appellant and they invoiced the Appellant directly. The Council would only hold per officer timesheets if it had commissioned the consultants itself, which it did not do in this case;

x. There was no statutory duty imposed on the Council to create or retain per officer time logs for PPAs;

xi. The Council stated that “Further searches now are not reasonably likely to locate additional recorded information, given the unchanged repositories, the Council’s confirmation that per-officer PPA timesheets were never created, and the position that consultant invoices / timesheets are not held by or on behalf of the Council”.

Decision notice

14. The Decision Notice was issued on 20 March 2026.

15. The Commissioner’s decision was that, on the balance of probabilities, the Council did not hold further information within the scope of the request.

16. However, the Commissioner recorded a procedural breach of regulation 14 of the EIR in that the Council had initially handled part of the request under the incorrect legislation and, when addressing this in the internal review, had failed to specify the exception under regulation 12(4)(a) of the EIR, as required by regulation 14 of the EIR. However, the Commissioner did not require the Council to take any further action.

17. The Commissioner’s view was as follows:

i. The relevant test under both the FOIA and the EIR was whether, on the balance of probabilities, the Council held additional recorded information that was relevant to the request;

ii. The Commissioner took the Appellant’s submissions that the Council should hold records showing how the fee was calculated and justified into account, but noted that the fact that information ought to have been created was not, in itself, evidence that it was created or was held;

iii. The Council had provided a clear and detailed account of its systems and processes, and had described the searches that had been carried out and the staff that had been consulted. The Commissioner was satisfied that the searches were reasonable and proportionate;

iv. The Decision Notice concluded that “Having considered the council’s explanation, the steps it took to identify any relevant information, and its description of the types of records that were and were not created, the Commissioner is satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the council does not hold any further information within the scope of the request”;

v. The Commissioner noted that, whilst regulation 12(4)(a) of the EIR contains a public interest test, the Commissioner had not gone on to consider whether the public interest favoured disclosure in this case as the Commissioner could not envisage a public interest argument that would require a public authority to disclose information that it does not hold.

Grounds of appeal

18. The Appellant lodged its appeal on 16 April 2026. The remedy sought was for the Tribunal to allow the appeal and set aside the Decision Notice. In addition, the Appellant requested that the matter be remitted to the Commissioner for a fresh decision, with appropriate directions for the Commissioner to make clear findings on whether any finance/charging records and supporting evidence were held; whether any consultant-related information was held by the Council or on its behalf; and whether a compliant refusal notice pursuant to regulation 14 of the EIR should be required.

19. The Appellant submitted that the basis for the appeal was that “the ICO’s conclusion that no further information was held at the relevant time is unsafe because of errors of approach and inadequate scrutiny of the evidence said to support LBI’s [the Council] “not held” position”.

20. The Appellant relied on four specific grounds of appeal as summarised below:

i. Improper exercise of discretion / inadequate scrutiny of “not held” (premature acceptance of search adequacy): The Commissioner did not adequately test whether the searches that were carried out were sufficient to answer the request as framed. In particular, whilst the Council asserted that per-officer timesheets were never created for PPAs, the Appellant’s request was not simply confined to per-officer timesheets. The Commissioner’s reasoning did not clearly address whether other categories explicitly requested as supporting evidence, such as finance transaction records, were held at the time of the request. The Commissioner therefore exercised its discretion improperly by accepting a “not held” response without sufficient analysis of the full scope of the request and the likely locations/record types that would fall within that scope;

ii. Error of approach on “held” / “held on behalf of” in relation to consultant related records: The Decision Notice did not contain any clear analysis as to the statutory concept of information “held on behalf of” the Council in relation to their position that consultant records were not held by or on their behalf. The Commissioner failed to explain how it was satisfied that no consultant-related records were held by the Council or on its behalf. The Commissioner’s acceptance of the Council’s assertions, without a reasoned “held/on behalf of” analysis, was therefore a material error of approach;

iii. Inadequate reasons in relation to financial records and fee calculation/justification evidence: The Appellant’s submission was that it was implausible that no further records existed, given the nature of PPAs and the Council’s financial responsibilities. The Decision Notice failed to provide adequate reasons as to how it was concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that no further recorded information was held that evidenced how PPA/DRP charges were calculated and approved, or what costs were incurred/recorded by the Council;

iv. Procedural breach under EIR reg 14 is relevant to the reliability of the “not held” conclusion: Whilst the Appellant accepted that a procedural breach did not itself prove that information was held, the absence of a compliant refusal notice and clear reliance on regulation 12(4)(a) of the EIR was relevant to whether the Council’s “not held” position was properly articulated and tested. The Decision Notice failed to address whether any remedial step was necessary to cure the deficiency.

The response of the Commissioner

21. The Commissioner lodged his response to the appeal on 20 May 2026, resisting the appeal and relying on his findings and reasons as set out in the Decision Notice

22. The Commissioner noted that, when determining whether or not information is held, the applicable standard of proof is the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. The sole issue for the Tribunal to determine is therefore whether the Commissioner was correct in law to conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, the Council did not hold any recorded information within the scope of the Appellant’s request.

23. In relation to the first ground of appeal, the Commissioner submitted that he had asked appropriate questions of the Council during his investigation and that the Council had responded by providing details of the systems searched, the search terms used, and the staff that it had consulted. The Commissioner had concluded that those searches were reasonable and proportionate, and would have been sufficient to identify information falling within the scope of the request.

24. The Commissioner also noted that he was entitled to accept at face value the word of a public authority where there was no evidence of an attempt to mislead the Commissioner or of a motive to withhold information actually in its possession. The Commissioner concluded that there was no such evidence in this case.

25. In relation to the second ground of appeal, the Commissioner was satisfied that any consultant-related records would have been discovered during the searches conducted by the Council if they had been held by it. The Commissioner maintained that he was correct to rely on the representations of the Council that they did not hold any such records, and nor that any were held on their behalf, because external consultants were engaged and invoiced directly by the Appellant.

26. Regarding the third ground of appeal, it was acknowledged that absolute certainty as to whether information was held was rarely possible. However, where sufficiently rigorous searches had been conducted and no information was found, it may be concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that information was not held for the purposes of the FOIA (and, by extension, for the purposes of the EIR). In determining whether the explanation provided by the Council was sufficient to support a conclusion, on the balance of probabilities, that it did not hold the information, the Commissioner had been entitled to rely on the Council’s evidence about their systems, searches, record-keeping practices, and consultation with relevant staff.

27. The Commissioner also noted that the issue was not what should have been recorded and retained, but what was actually recorded and retained. The Commissioner’s investigation was therefore confined to what information was likely to have been actually held, rather than assessing what should have been held.

28. In respect of the fourth ground of appeal, the Commissioner noted that the existence of a procedural breach did not bear upon the substantive question of whether information was held. The Commissioner had expressly considered the breach and had concluded that it did not require any further steps to be taken.

The reply of the Appellant

29. No reply was lodged by the Appellant.

Legal Framework

30. The relevant provisions of the FOIA are as follows:

s.1 General right of access to information held by public authorities

(1) Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled –

(a) to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds information of the description specified in the request, and

(b) if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.

…….

31. The relevant provisions of the EIR are as follows:

5 Duty to make available environmental information on request

(1) Subject to paragraph (3) and in accordance with paragraphs (2), (4), (5) and (6) and the remaining provisions of this Part and Part 3 of these Regulations, a public authority that holds environmental information shall make it available on request.

…….

32. In addition, regulation 12 of the EIR reads as follows:

12 Exceptions to the duty to disclose environmental information

(1) Subject to paragraphs (2), (3) and (9), a public authority may refuse to disclose environmental information requested if –

(a) an exception to disclosure applies under paragraphs (4) or (5); and

(b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.

(2) A public authority shall apply a presumption in favour of disclosure.

(3) …….

(4) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), a public authority may refuse to disclose information to the extent that –

(a) it does not hold that information when an applicant’s request is received;

…….

33. Sections 45 and 46 of the FOIA direct the Secretary of State to issue Codes of Practice providing guidance to public authorities as to desirable practices in connection with the discharge of their functions under Part 1 of FOIA, and in connection with the keeping, management and destruction of their records.

34. Paragraph 1.12 of the Code of Practice issued pursuant to section 45 of FOIA states that:

“Public authorities need to search for requested information in order to communicate to the applicant whether the information they are seeking is held or not held by that public authority. These searches should be conducted in a reasonable and intelligent way based on an understanding of how the public authority manages its records. Public authorities should concentrate their efforts on areas most likely to hold the requested information. If a reasonable search in the areas most likely to hold the requested information does not reveal the information sought, the public authority may consider that on the balance of probabilities the information is not held”.

35. Whether a public authority holds material is a question of fact to be determined on the balance of probabilities (Linda Bromley v the Information Commissioner and the Environment Agency (EA/2006/0072; 31 August 2007, as approved in Andrew Preston v the Information Commissioner and the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2022] UKUT 344 (AAC)). The First-tier Tribunal held that in determining a dispute as to whether information is ‘held’ that:

“There can seldom be absolute certainty that information relevant to a request does not remain undiscovered somewhere within a public authority's records. This is particularly the case with a large national organisation like the Environment Agency, whose records are inevitably spread across a number of departments in different locations. The Environment Agency properly conceded that it could not be certain that it holds no more information. However, it argued (and was supported in the argument by the Information Commissioner) that the test to be applied was not certainty but the balance of probabilities. This is the normal standard of proof and clearly applies to Appeals before this Tribunal in which the Information Commissioner's findings of fact are reviewed. We think that its application requires us to consider a number of factors including the quality of the public authority's initial analysis of the request, the scope of the search that it decided to make on the basis of that analysis and the rigour and efficiency with which the search was then conducted. Other matters may affect our assessment at each stage, including, for example, the discovery of materials elsewhere whose existence or content point to the existence of further information within the public authority which had not been brought to light. Our task is to decide, on the basis of our review of all of these factors, whether the public authority is likely to be holding relevant information beyond that which has already been disclosed”.

36. The Upper Tribunal in Andrew Preston v the Information Commissioner and the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police also noted that, importantly, in Councillor Jeremy Clyne v the Information Commissioner and London Borough of Lambeth (EA/2011/0190) the Tribunal held that the “issue for the Tribunal is not what should have been recorded and retained but what was recorded and retained”.

37. In Garrard v IC and the Home Office (EA/2009/0107), the First-tier Tribunal noted that:

“Where the critical issue is whether information is held, it is incumbent on the IC to analyse very carefully the searches the public authority report that they have undertaken…..It is only where no such issues arise that the IC should rely upon the assertion of the public authority that the search taken was adequate”.

38. In Oates v IC and Architects Registration Board (EA/2011/0138) the First-tier Tribunal held that:

“As a general principle, the IC was, in the Tribunal’s view, entitled to accept the word of the public authority and not to investigate further in circumstances where there was no evidence as to an inadequate search, any reluctance to carry out a proper search or as to a motive to withhold information actually in its possession. Were this to be otherwise the IC, with its limited resources and its national remit, would be required to carry out a full scale investigation, possibly onsite, in every case in which a public authority is simply not believed by a requester”.

The role of the Tribunal

39. The Tribunal’s remit is governed by section 58 of FOIA. This requires the Tribunal to consider whether the decision made by the Commissioner is in accordance with the law or, where the Commissioner’s decision involved an exercise of his discretion, whether he ought to have exercised it differently. The Tribunal may receive evidence that was not before the Commissioner and may make different findings of fact from the Commissioner.

Issue

40. The issue for the Tribunal to determine is whether the Commissioner was correct in holding, on the balance of probabilities, that the Council did not hold any further relevant information within the scope of the request at the time that the request was made.

Evidence

41. We read and took account of an open bundle containing 110 pages including indexes.

Discussions and conclusions

42. As outlined above, the sole substantive issue for the Tribunal to determine is whether the Commissioner was correct in finding that it was more likely than not that the Council did not hold any further relevant information within the scope of the request at the time that the request was made.

43. The test that the Tribunal has to apply is the same regardless of whether the information falls under the FOIA or the EIR. The Tribunal has not therefore sought to specify which part/s of the requested information fall under which statutory regime.

44. In assessing this question, we have had regard to paragraph 1.12 of the Code of Practice issued pursuant to section 45 of FOIA which, whilst not binding, is instructive of the approach that a public authority may follow when conducting a search, namely:

a. The search should be conducted in a reasonable and intelligent way;

b. The search should concentrate on areas most likely to hold the requested information; and

c. If a reasonable search in the areas most likely to hold the requested information does not reveal the information sought, the public authority may consider that, on the balance of probabilities, the information is not held.

45. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioner asked appropriate questions of the Council during his investigation. We are also satisfied that the Council provided a detailed response to the Commissioner, including in relation to the systems that had been searched, the individual staff members who had been consulted, the search terms that were used, and how the Council’s formal retention and deletion policies were applied. The Tribunal has concluded that the searches were reasonable, relatively extensive and proportionate, and were sufficient to identify information falling within the scope of the request.

46. The Tribunal notes that the Commissioner is entitled to accept, at face value, the response of a public authority where there is no evidence of an attempt to mislead the Commissioner or of a motive to withhold information that was actually in its possession. It is not asserted by the Appellant that the Council is deliberately trying to frustrate the execution of the outstanding parts of the request, and we do not find any basis to conclude that they are attempting to do so.

47. On the basis of the information provided by the Council, particularly in response to the questions asked by the Commissioner during the course of his investigation, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Council’s searches were conducted in a reasonable and intelligent way, and that they concentrated on those areas which were deemed most likely to hold the requested information.

48. The Tribunal does not find any basis, in light of the above, to conclude that the Commissioner failed to properly scrutinise the information that was provided to him about the searches that were conducted, or that he reached an improper conclusion about the adequacy of those searches.

49. The Council has asserted that external contractors were engaged and invoiced directly by the Appellant as an explanation as to why the Council does not hold any records in relation to them. It is noted that the Appellant does not appear to dispute that the external contractors were engaged and invoiced directly by him. In any event, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioner was entitled to rely on these assertions by the Council, particularly in the absence of any material to suggest that the Council was seeking to mislead the Commissioner or conceal information.

50. Further, the Tribunal takes the view that the searches conducted were of a sufficient level of adequacy that, if the Council did hold any consultant-related records, they would have been discovered during those searches.

51. The Tribunal agrees with the contention of the Commissioner that the existence of a procedural breach under regulation 14 of the EIR does not have any bearing on whether information was held at the relevant time, and we therefore disregard this ground of appeal.

52. We accept and agree with the assertion by the Commissioner that, even though regulation 12 of the EIR contains a public interest test, that cannot sensibly be applied in circumstances where information is not held and we have therefore not considered it further.

53. Having regard to the explanation given by the Council regarding the types of records that were created and the detailed steps that it took to identify relevant information, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Commissioner was correct to conclude that, on the balance of probabilities, the Council did not hold any further information within the scope of the request.

Conclusion

54. The Tribunal dismisses the appeal for the reasons given above.

Signed: Tribunal Judge Muzaffer

Dated: 23 October 2026

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our administrative lawyer in Paris.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.