Tax United Kingdom

Shelley Fullerton v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01479 (TC)

Case Number: TC10067

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

By remote video hearing

Appeal reference: TC/2024/00300

INCOME TAX – validity of discovery assessment – penalty —settlement agreement with liquidator – director's loan – whether return contained a careless inaccuracy – appeal dismissed

Heard on: 30 September 2026

Judgment date: 26 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE JENNIFER DEAN

MEMBER JANE CUMMINS

Between

SHELLEY FULLERTON

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms A. Sheehan, Counsel

For the Respondents: Mr S. Khan, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office

DECISION

Introduction

1. This appeal concerns an income tax discovery assessment issued by the Respondents to the Appellant, Ms Fullerton, for the tax year 2018/19 under section 29 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 ("TMA 1970") and a penalty imposed under Schedule 24 to the Finance Act 2007 ("FA 2007").

2. The Respondents contend that the Appellant’s liability arises pursuant to the operation of s.415 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (“ITTOIA 2005”) and its interaction with s.455 of the Corporate Tax Act 2010 (“CTA 2010”).

3. The assessment concerns an overdrawn Director’s Loan Account (“DLA”) arising in respect of Equus Human Capital Limited (“the Company”), of which the Appellant was the sole director and shareholder. The Respondents contend that the amount written off was chargeable to income tax under section 415 ITTOIA 2005 and was not declared in the Appellant’s 2018/19 Self-Assessment Tax Return (“SATR”) which resulted in an insufficiency of tax.

4. The Respondents further contend that the inaccuracy on the 2018/19 SATR arose due to careless behaviour on the Appellant’s part such that a penalty was due.

5. The Appellant disputes any liability on the basis that the DLA was dealt with by a Settlement Agreement entered into with the Company’s liquidators on 14 May 2018 and that there is therefore no further basis for an assessment. The Appellant contends that she held the reasonable belief by reference to advice given, the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the involvement of the Respondents as creditors in the settlement process, that this would deal with the entirety of her liabilities arising in connection with the DLA.

6. Furthermore, the Appellant submits that the Respondents have relied upon an incorrect amount for the DLA. The Appellant contends that the relevant amount was £296,509.66, rather than £838,609 and that the assessment was made outside the applicable statutory time limit.

7. In respect of the penalty, the Appellant argues that she did not act carelessly and had relied upon professional advisers in relation to the Company, the liquidation and her tax affairs.

Background

8. The following facts are not in dispute and are taken from parties’ helpful written submissions.

9. The Appellant was the sole director and shareholder of Equus Human Capital Limited which was incorporated on 15 September 2008 as a (non-financial) management consultant business. The Company entered a Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation on 20 March 2015, having initially commenced a Members’ Voluntary Liquidation. The Company subsequently dissolved on 23 January 2019.

10. Prior to the liquidation, the Appellant had an overdrawn DLA with the Company. In the declaration of solvency dated 20 March 2015, the DLA was recorded as £296,509.66

11. In correspondence dated 4 February 2015, the liquidators wrote to HMRC setting out proposals in relation to the Company’s liabilities and the proposed liquidation. That correspondence referred, amongst other matters, to the intended repayment and/or distribution of the DLA and to a consequent reversal of any remaining liability under section 455 CTA 2010. The letter also referred to the company’s estimated final balance sheet showing the company to be solvent with assets of £866,764 and an overdrawn DLA totalling £838, 609.

12. During the course of the liquidation, the liquidators pursued recovery of the DLA from the Appellant. The claim was settled pursuant to a Settlement Agreement dated 14 May 2018 (“the Settlement Agreement”) by which the sum of £96,650.64 was paid to the Company in full and final settlement of any claims arising from or connected with the repayment the DLA.

13. The liquidators’ final account prior to dissolution, dated 8 October 2018, record a DLA of £838,609 and receipts of £96,650.64 in respect of that account. The liquidators’ final report also records that, following conversion of the liquidation to a CVL, the director’s property was marketed, and a settlement was ultimately reached under which £96,650.64 was paid into the liquidation estate. There was no dispute that the Appellant had sold her home in order to raise the monies to finance the Settlement Agreement and pay the Settlement Sum.

14. On 1 March 2023, in response to enquiries from the Respondents, the liquidators confirmed that the accounts to 31 January 2015 recorded the overdrawn DLA at £838,609. They explained that the figure of £296,509.66 in the settlement documentation originated from the declaration of solvency and represented the amount then required to discharge the Company’s liabilities and costs, rather than the balance of the DLA.

15. The Appellant’s SATR for the tax year 2018/19 declared divided income of £150,000, received from a different company. It did not include any amount in respect of the release or write-off of the DLA.

16. The Respondents’ position in summary, is that following payment of £96,650.64 under the Settlement Agreement, the balance of the DLA was released or written off and was therefore chargeable to income tax under section 415 ITTOIA 2005 in the 2018/19 tax year.

17. In calculating the additional dividend income, the Respondents used the DLA figure of £838,609, less settlement payment of £96,650.64, producing a written-off amount of £741,958.36. Together with the £150,000 already declared by the Appellant, this produced a total dividend income of £891,958.36 for the year and the resulting additional income tax assessed was £282,685.99.

Issues

18. The parties agreed that the issues for us to determine are:

(i) Whether the Respondents made a discovery of an insufficiency to tax within the meaning of s.29 TMA 1970, by reference to whether the amount of the Appellant’s overdrawn DLA released or written off was chargeable to income tax under section 415 ITTOIA 2005, and if so, whether it was correctly calculated.

(ii) If there was any such insufficiency, whether that insufficiency was assessed by the Respondents competently and in time.

(iii) Whether the Respondents have established carelessness on the part of the Appellant for the purposes of s.29(4) TMA 1970, being the condition on which it relies to make the Discovery Assessment.

(iv) Whether the penalty (including its calculation) was validly issued under paragraph 9 of Schedule 24 FA 2007, including whether the Appellant's return contained an inaccuracy, whether that inaccuracy resulted in a loss of tax, whether it was caused by carelessness, and whether HMRC correctly declined special reduction or suspension.

Burden of proof

19. It was common ground that in relation to the discovery assessment under section 29 TMA 1970, the initial burden rests with HMRC who must establish, on the balance of probabilities, that an officer made a "discovery" of an insufficiency of tax and that the statutory conditions for issuing such an assessment were met (per Boulton v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 00583 (TC)).

20. In this case the Respondents rely on s.29(4) and therefore must show that the loss of tax was brought about by the Appellant's careless behaviour. The Respondents must also establish that the discovery assessment was correct, competent and in time.

21. If HMRC discharge this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the Appellant who must demonstrate that the amount assessed is incorrect or excessive.

22. In relation to the penalty imposed under Schedule 24 FA 2007, the burden rests on HMRC, who must prove that the Appellant's return contained an inaccuracy, that the inaccuracy led to a loss of tax, and that it was brought about by the Appellant's failure to take reasonable care.

23. The evidential burden then shifts to the Appellant to demonstrate that the penalty is incorrect or that a reduction or suspension is justified.

Legislation

24. The relevant statutory provisions were not in dispute and are set out below.

25. Section 29 TMA 1970 ‘Assessment where loss of tax discovered’ provides as follows:

"(1) If an officer of the Board or the Board discover, as regards any person [the taxpayer] and a [year of assessment]—

(a) that any [income which ought to have been assessed to income tax, or chargeable gains which ought to have been assessed to capital gains tax,] have not been assessed, or

(b) that an assessment to tax is or has become insufficient, or

(c) that any relief which has been given is or has become excessive, the officer or, as the case may be, the Board may, subject to subsections (2) and (3) below, make an assessment in the amount, or the further amount, which ought in his or their opinion to be charged in order to make good to the Crown the loss of tax.

(2) Where the taxpayer has made and delivered a return under section 8 or 8A of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment, and

(a) in respect of the year of assessment mentioned in that subsection; and

(b) the situation mentioned in subsection (1), above is attributable to an error or mistake in the return as to the basis on which his liability ought to have been computed, the taxpayer shall not be assessed under that subsection in respect of the year of assessment there mentioned if the return was in fact made on the basis or in in accordance with the practice generally prevailing at the time when it was made.

(3) Where the taxpayer has made and delivered a return under section 8 or 8A of this Act in respect of the relevant year of assessment, he shall not be assessed under subsection (1) above –

(a) in respect of the year of assessment mentioned in that subsection; and

(b) in the same capacity as that in which he made and delivered the return, unless one of the two conditions mentioned below is fulfilled.

(4) The first condition is that the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above was brought about carelessly or deliberately by the taxpayer or a person acting on his behalf.

(5) The second condition is that at the time when an officer of the Board—

(a) ceased to be entitled to give notice of his intention to enquire into the taxpayer's return under [section 8 or 8A] of this Act in respect of the relevant [year of assessment]; or

(b) in a case where a notice of enquiry into the return was given—

(i) issued a partial closure notice as regards a matter to which the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above relates, or

(ii) if no such partial closure notice was issued, issued a final closure notice,

the officer could not have been reasonably expected, on the basis of the information made available to him before that time, to be aware of the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5) above, information is made available to an officer of the Board if—

(a) it is contained in the taxpayer's return under [section 8 or 8A] of this Act in respect of the relevant [year of assessment] (the return), or in any accounts, statements or documents accompanying the return;

(b) it is contained in any claim made as regards the relevant [year of assessment] by the taxpayer acting in the same capacity as that in which he made the return, or in any accounts, statements or documents accompanying any such claim;

(c) it is contained in any documents, accounts or particulars which, for the purposes of any enquiries into the return or any such claim by an officer of the Board, are produced or furnished by the taxpayer to the officer … ; or

(d) it is information the existence of which, and the relevance of which as regards the situation mentioned in subsection (1) above—

(i) could reasonably be expected to be inferred by an officer of the Board from information falling within paragraphs (a) to (c) above; or

(ii) are notified in writing by the taxpayer to an officer of the Board.

(7) In subsection (6) above—

(a) any reference to the taxpayer's return under [section 8 or 8A] of this Act in respect of the relevant [year of assessment] includes—

(i) a reference to any return of his under that section for either of the two immediately preceding chargeable periods; …

(ii) where the return is under section 8 and the taxpayer carries on a trade, profession or business in partnership, a reference to [any partnership return with respect to the partnership] for the relevant [year of assessment] or either of those periods; and

(b) any reference in paragraphs (b) to (d) to the taxpayer includes a reference to a person acting on his behalf."

26. The ordinary time limit for making an assessment is contained in section 34 (1) TMA 1970 which provides:

“Subject to the following provisions of this Act, and to any other provisions of the Taxes Acts allowing a longer period in any particular class of case, an assessment to income tax or capital gains tax may be made at any time not more than 4 years after the end of the year of assessment to which it relates.”

27. Where a loss of tax has been brought about carelessly, the extended time limit contained is in section 36 TMA 1970:

“(1) An assessment on a person in a case involving a loss of income tax or capital gains tax brought about carelessly by the person may be made at any time not more than 6 years after the end of the year of assessment to which it relates (subject to subsection (1A) and any other provision of the Taxes Acts allowing a longer period).”

28. Section 415(1) ITTOIA provides:

“Income tax is charged if–

(a) a company is or was chargeable to tax under section 455 of CTA 2010 (loans to participators in close companies etc.) in respect of a loan or advance, and

(b) the company releases or writes off the whole or part of the debt in respect of the loan or advance.”

29. Section 416 ITTOIA 2005 concerns “Income Charged”:

“(1) Tax is charged under this Chapter on the amount of the debt released or written off in the tax year …

(3) For the purposes of calculating the total income of the person liable for the tax, the amount charged is treated as income.”

30. Section 417(1) ITTOIA 2005 identifies the person liable for tax:

“(1) The person liable for any tax charged under this Chapter is—

(a) in the case of a loan or advance made to a partnership, any partner who is an individual, and

(b) in any other case, the person to whom the loan or advance was made.”

31. Section 19 Income Tax Act 2007 (“ITA 2007”) defines “dividend income” as follows:

“(1) This section applies for the purposes of the Income Tax Acts.

(2) “Dividend income” is income which is—

(a) chargeable under Chapter 3 of Part 4 of ITTOIA 2005 (dividends etc from UK resident companies),

(b) chargeable under Chapter 4 of that Part (dividends from non-UK resident companies),

(c) chargeable under Chapter 5 of that Part (stock dividends from UK resident companies),

(d) chargeable under Chapter 6 of that Part (release of loan to participator in close company), or

(e) a relevant foreign distribution chargeable under Chapter 8 of Part 5 of ITTOIA 2005 (income not otherwise charged)”

32. Section 455 CTA 2010 concerns the charge to tax for loan to participator:

“(1) This section applies if a close company makes a loan or advances money to a relevant person who is a participator in the company or an associate of such a participator.

(2) There is due from the company, as if it were an amount of corporation tax chargeable on the company for the accounting period in which the loan or advance is made, an amount equal to 25% of the amount of the loan or advance.

(3) Tax due under this section in relation to a loan or advance is due and payable in accordance with section 59D of TMA 1970 on the day following the end of the period of 9 months from the end of the accounting period in which the loan or advance was made.”

33. Schedule 24 Finance Act 2007 concerns penalties for errors:

“1 Error in taxpayer's document

(1) A penalty is payable by a person (P) where–

(a) P gives HMRC a document of a kind listed in the Table below, and

(b) Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied.

(2) Condition 1 is that the document contains an inaccuracy which amounts to, or leads to–

(a) an understatement of [a] liability to tax,

(b) a false or inflated statement of a loss […], or

(c) a false or inflated claim to repayment of tax.

(3) Condition 2 is that the inaccuracy was [careless (within the meaning of paragraph 3) or deliberate on P's part].”

34. Paragraph 3 defines the nature of the behaviour giving rise to the inaccuracy. Paragraph 3(1) provides:

“3(1) For the purposes of a penalty under paragraph 1, inaccuracy in a document given by P to HMRC is –

(a) “careless” if the inaccuracy is due to failure by P to take reasonable care,

(b) “deliberate but not concealed” if the inaccuracy is deliberate on P's part but P does not make arrangements to conceal it, and

(c) “deliberate and concealed” if the inaccuracy is deliberate on P's part and P makes arrangements to conceal it (for example, by submitting false evidence in support of an inaccurate figure).”

35. Paragraph 9 deals with disclosure of an inaccuracy and whether a disclosure is prompted or unprompted. It provides that:

“(1)A person discloses the matter by—

(a) telling HMRC about it,

(b) giving HMRC reasonable help in quantifying the inaccuracy, the inaccuracy attributable to the supply of false information or withholding of information, or the under-assessment, and

(c) allowing HMRC access to records for the purpose of ensuring that the inaccuracy the inaccuracy attributable to the supply of false information or withholding of information, or the under-assessment is fully corrected.

(2) Disclosure—

(a) is “unprompted” if made at a time when the person making it has no reason to believe that HMRC have discovered or are about to discover the inaccuracy, the supply of false information or withholding of information, or the under-assessment, and

(b) otherwise, is “prompted”.

(3) In relation to disclosure “quality” includes timing, nature and extent.”

36. Paragraph 10 provides for a reduction in the penalty to reflect the quality of disclosure and paragraph 11 allows for the reduction of a penalty because of special circumstances. Paragraph 14 allows for the suspension of a penalty for a careless inaccuracy.

Evidence

37. We heard evidence from HMRC officer Ms Rea and the Appellant, Ms Fullerton. The salient points of the evidence are summarised below.

38. Ms Rea was the decision-maker in the compliance check and issued the subsequent assessment and penalty. On 18 July 2022, she issued an opening request to the Appellant seeking information and documentation to check the Appellant’s 2018/19 tax position. On 17 January 2023 Ms Rea wrote to representatives of the liquidators requesting a signed and dated copy of the Settlement Agreement or confirmation of the date the agreement was reached. On 24 January 2023, Laura Pickering, the Insolvency Manager confirmed that the Settlement Agreement was returned to their solicitor on 15 May 2018.

39. On 24 February 2023 Ms Rea queried with the representatives for the liquidators why the Settlement Agreement referred to £296,509.66 whereas the Statement of Affairs at Companies House dated 18 December 2017 showed £838,609.00. They were asked to confirm the correct DLA amount and explain the difference. Ms Pickering subsequently confirmed that the accounts to 31 January 2015 recorded the overdrawn DLA as £838,609 and explained that the figure cited in the Settlement Agreement came from the original declaration of solvency (i.e. the sum required to discharge liabilities and costs), not the DLA balance.

40. Having reviewed the information obtained by the liquidator on 1 March 2023, Ms Rea concluded that the DLA was written off/released in connection with the liquidation and dissolution process, such that income tax was chargeable under s415 ITTOIA 2005 on the amount written off in the hands of the Appellant as dividend income in 2018/19. In parallel, the Company was (or had been) chargeable under s455 CTA 2010 in respect of the loan; the write-off therefore triggered the s415 ITTOIA charge.

41. In respect of the penalty, Ms Rea explained her view that the loss of tax had been brought about by careless behaviour because the Appellant had not declared the dividend income arising on the write-off of the DLA. Ms Rea took in to account the Appellant’s professional background of holding down high-profile senior roles as a professional, director of multiple companies. In concluding that the standard of "reasonable care" for her would include some steps taken to ensure that the advice she received was accurate, Ms Rea did not accept that a person of the Appellant’s attributes can rely solely on the advice of her advisors, noting that despite requests no evidence at all had been provided of advice said to have been received that no further tax would be due. Ms Rea agreed that a significant amount of time has passed but did not accept that this prevented the Appellant from obtaining evidence as they could have been obtained from the liquidator or agent, or the Appellant may have had an email or record.

42. Ms Rea explained that the maximum penalty that can be charged for a careless inaccuracy is 30%. Based on the telling/helping/giving framework she offered a reduction of this penalty to 24.75% as the Appellant had failed to provide some material in a prompt manner and did not provide the correct amount of the loan at the beginning of Ms Rea’s assessment. Ms Rea had offered the greatest reduction she felt able.

43. On review, the decision was upheld and the review officer agreed that suspension of the penalty was not appropriate as no further SATRs were expected. If the Appellant had continued to submit SATRs, Ms Rea would have suspended the penalty.

44. In oral evidence Ms Rea confirmed that in making the assessment, she had relied on the liquidators’ confirmation that the overdrawn DLA was £838,609, which was supported by the Company accounts and the liquidators’ final report. She did not use the figure of £296,509.66 contained in the Settlement Agreement as that figure originated from the declaration of solvency and did not represent the DLA balance. Ms Rea noted the Appellant’s belief that HMRC were party to the settlement and that no further tax would be due but explained that despite repeated requests no evidence was provided to demonstrate HMRC’s agreement on the personal tax consequence of the DLA write-off. Ms Rea agreed that the Settlement Agreement was binding on the parties to it and that she had used the settlement payment of £96,650.64 contained therein. However, Ms Rea reiterated, she had not used the £296,509.66 figure as it was not the overdrawn amount of the DLA. In response to an email dated 4 October 2022 from the Appellant which stated:

“…they have asked me to give them the amount that you believe is taxable I have told them £199k ish from our call but they want the exact amount before I meet them…”

Ms Rea explained that she had clearly told the Appellant that she did not have the loan figure at that point as she was waiting to hear back from the liquidators. The Appellant had mistakenly believed the figure was based on the balance of the loan rather than the loan amount, but Ms Rea had explained that she was unable to confirm the figure when she responded as follows:

“As discussed on our call, I haven’t officially provided you with any figures yet, as I am still awaiting some information from you to calculate this. I think we discussed a rough calculation based on the settlement amount you paid and the amount that was left on the loan to pay.”

45. Ms Rea clarified that she reviewed all of the material available to her on 1 March 2023. She could not recall when the accounts referred to by the representatives of the liquidators had been provided to her and agreed that she had not referred in her statement to reviewing those accounts before 1 March 2023. She stated that she reviewed all of the information on the Appellant’s file, the information provided by the Appellant, the Liquidator’s records and then received confirmation about the DLA figure. The assessment was not based on one piece of information; the email confirmation from the liquidators was only one piece in the puzzle of a substantial amount of evidence.

46. Ms Rea also clarified that if the Notice of Assessment was dated 5 April 2023, she would have written it a few days earlier as a taxpayer is given 30 days to respond and so she allowed for postage times and administration delays when dating the Notice which would have been completed earlier than the date it bore.

47. The Appellant confirmed that she had understood the Settlement Agreement to include any and all liabilities arising out of the overdrawn DLA. Ms Fullerton relied on a letter addressed to her from the liquidators dated 20 February 2015 in which they had confirmed, under the heading “Corporation tax returns” that they would “complete and lodge all post liquidation returns” and seek clearance from HMRC in respect of pre and post liquidation tax matters. The stated purpose of that letter, entitled “Equus Human Capital Limited (Proposed Members Voluntary Liquidation) (“The Company”), was to detail the procedure for placing the Company into MVL. The Appellant agreed that this letter predated the Settlement Agreement and did not state that the liquidators assumed responsibility for the Appellant’s personal liabilities.

48. The Appellant explained that she had been hampered by being unable to access records despite an SAR, as she no longer had authority to act on behalf of the Company. She had relied on professional expertise in believing that all personal liabilities were addressed as part of the Settlement Agreement. The Appellant explained that she had not asked about any personal tax implications following the settlement as it had been explicit before the Settlement Agreement and all part of the same thing. She had understood that it covered anything owing to HMRC and “it never came up as an issue as it had been dealt with”. The Appellant explained that if the accountant had thought there was something else, he would have told her. The accountants completed her returns.

49. The Appellant reiterated that every conversation with the liquidator had referred to the £296,509.66 figure and she had no reason to believe that any other higher amount was correct. The Appellant agreed she had received more than £96,000 from the Company but disagreed that she had received in the region of £800,000. The Appellant was adamant that the higher figure could not be arithmetically correct but that she had been denied access to the records to show that. She had trusted the liquidator and solicitors involved and she had agreed the amount in the settlement but could not get to the bottom of the figures and wanted the matter “off my plate” as it was a difficult time.

The Appellant’s Submissions

50. On behalf of the Appellant, Ms Sheehan submitted that HMRC have failed to meet the burden of proof in relation to the discovery assessment.

51. It was clear, Ms Sheehan submitted, that Ms Rea’s evidence was understandably affected by the passage of time and her evidence was unclear as to when the discovery was made, the basis upon which made or when assessment was made. Ms Sheehan noted that Ms Rea could not say whether she had seen the DLA prior to making the assessment and that although she had believed she had taken information from Companies House, those records were not exhibited.

52. As regards the issue of carelessness, it is not credible to suggest that the Appellant was told of a personal liability and disregarded it. Relying on Collis v HM Revenue and Customs [2011] UKFTT 588 (TC) and Gedirv HM Revenue and Customs [2016] UKFTT 0188 (TC), it was submitted that the Appellant had reasonably relied on professional advice that no further tax would be due.

53. Although HMRC contend that the Appellant should have been aware, these matters concern complex legal provisions, and it is not accepted that there was any onus to on the Appellant to make checks.

54. The Appellant was consistent in her evidence that she was advised by her accountant (now deceased) that there were no further liabilities, which she had confirmed to Ms Rea on 26 September 2023.

55. HMRC have cherry-picked by using the Settlement Agreement in respect of the payment figure of £96,650.64 but then refusing to acknowledge the binding figure of £296,509.66 upon which the settlement was agreed.

56. In relation to the penalty, the same arguments are relied upon. Ms Sheehan invited the Tribunal, if the penalty was upheld, to reconsider the mitigation and the fact that the Appellant had fully co-operated, engaged with HMRC and had provided information promptly.

Submissions on behalf of HMRC

57. Mr Khan highlighted that the discovery assessment was based on the 2018/19 SATR which was submitted without including any income arising from the release or write off of the DLA. HMRC discovered an insufficiency of tax when it became apparent that the Company had an overdrawn DLA of £838,609. Officer Rea formed the requisite view (per Jerome Anderson v HMRC[2018] UKUT 159 (TCC)) and that view was one which a reasonable officer could form on the basis of the information available to her.

58. As the Appellant submitted a return for 2018/19, s29(3) TMA requires one of the conditions in s24 TMA to be satisfied. The Respondents rely on s29(4) and submit that the Appellant was careless in failing to take reasonable care to ensure the SATR was accurate in circumstances where the Appellant was aware of the overdrawn DLA, the settlement reached with liquidators and the sums taken as dividends.

59. The Company was a close company, and the Appellant was its sole director and shareholder. The Appellant was therefore a participator in the Company for the purposes of the close company loan provisions. Following the Settlement Agreement, the balance of the DLA was no longer recoverable by the Company from the Appellant and was treated as released or written off. Consequently, s 415 ITTOIA 2005 was engaged.

60. The figure of £296,509.66 relied upon by the Appellant as the amount of the DLA did not represent the balance standing to the DLA at the relevant time. The evidence of the liquidators is that the figure of £296,509.66 served a different purpose in the declaration of solvency, whereas the Company’s accounts and final liquidation account recorded the overdrawn DLA at £838,609.

61. The Respondents submit that the effect of the Settlement Agreement was to determine the amount which the Appellant was required to pay in satisfaction of the Company’s civil claim against the Appellant in respect of the DLA. It did not determine the separate income tax consequences arising from the release or write-off of the remaining indebtedness.

62. The Respondents were not a party to the Settlement Agreement and there was no agreement by the Respondents as to the Appellant’s separate personal income tax consequences arising from the release or write-off of the DLA under section 415 ITTOIA 2005.

63. The Assessment was calculated by reference to the DLA figure confirmed by the liquidators and recorded in the Company’s final liquidation documents, with credit given for the amount paid under the Settlement Agreement. The charge under section 415 ITTOIA 2005 was correctly calculated and the assessment was made in correct amount.

64. The Respondents accept that reliance upon professional advice is a relevant consideration when determining whether a taxpayer had taken a reasonable care. However, reliance upon an adviser does not, of itself, establish that reasonable care was taken (per Collis). The Respondents submit that a prudent and reasonable taxpayer would have taken steps to establish specifically whether the compromise or release of the remaining DLA balance gave rise to any personal income tax consequences before submitting the 2018/19 return. No contemporaneous evidence has been produced to support the Appellant’s assertion that she was expressly advised that the release or write-off of the DLA gave rise to no personal income tax liability.

65. The applicable penalty range for careless behaviour and disclosure which was prompted was 15% to 30% of the PLR. A reduction of 35% was given for the quality of the disclosure which produced a penalty percentage of 24.75%. Applying this to PLR revenue of £282,685.99 gave a penalty of £69,964.78. The Respondents submit that the penalty was correctly calculated.

66. The Respondents considered special circumstances but did not find that any applied in the Appellant’s case. Furthermore, as the Appellant had retired and was no longer expected to submit further SATRs there were no suitable suspension conditions which could serve the statutory purpose.

67. The time limits for both the assessment and penalty were adhered to and both were therefore valid in law.

Discussion and findings of fact

The Overdrawn Director's Loan Account

68. In order to for there to have been a valid discovery, there must be an insufficiency of tax. The first issues for us to consider, therefore, are the DLA and the effect of the Settlement Agreement on s415 ITTOIA.

69. We consider that the starting point is that, even on the Appellant’s own case, s415 is engaged. One of the principal disputes between the parties lay in the amount of the overdrawn DLA. The Appellant contends that it was £296,509 and HMRC submit that the figure to be assessed is the difference between the balance of the overdrawn DLA of £838,609 minus the amount paid by the Appellant of £96,650. On either case, we are satisfied that the provisions of s415 are engaged because an amount of the debt was released or written off.

70. The Appellant relies on the Settlement Agreement and her oral evidence that the figure of £838,609 could simply not be arithmetically correct. For the reasons set out below, we reject that submission.

71. Whilst we were sympathetic to the Appellant’s assertion that she had been unable to access any documents in support following the involvement of the liquidator, we found that the Appellant’s own accounts did not support her assertion. The Appellant relied on a letter dated 4 February 2015 which formed part of the documentary evidence. That letter from Moore Stephens the liquidators, to HMRC set out “the company’s proposals in settling the debt due to HM Revenue and Customs” and referred to the company’s estimated final balance sheet showing the company to be solvent with assets of £866,764 and the director's loan was £838,609.

72. The documentary evidence also contained draft accounts for the period ended 31 January 2015, which although not signed by the Appellant, were prepared by the same accountants who dealt with her tax return, as confirmed by the liquidator in an email to HMRC on 22 May 2025. We are satisfied that the draft accounts would have used comparative figures which Mrs Fullerton would have agreed and showed as “Advances to director” in the period to 30 September 2013 a director's loan account balance of £492,880 and at 31 January 2015 a director's loan account balance of £838,609.

73. The liquidators also confirmed that the Appellant’s accountants prepared a P11d return in respect of the overdrawn loan account on 10 September 2014, which showed a balance brought forward at 30 September 2013 of £492,880, and the closing balance on the movement on the DLA after taking account of movements between 30 September 2013 and 5 April 2014 was £611,670, as per the comparative figures on the draft accounts. Both of these figures are in excess of the balance Mrs Fullerton asserts was owed and in the absence of any cogent or accounting evidence to support her claim that the DLA figure was £296,509, we accepted the documentary evidence as reliable evidence of the Company’s accounting position which showed that the figure of the overdrawn DLA was increasing, and we found the claim of £296,509 was unreliable and we did not accept it.

The Settlement Agreement

74. We considered the Appellant’s reliance on the Settlement Agreement as full and final settlement of any claims in respect of the DLA. The agreement dated 14 May 2018 expressly discharged the Appellant from any claims for repayment of the loan or sum due in respect of the DLA (clause 3). The agreement was made without admission of liability (clause 7) and the Appellant’s payment settled all claims the liquidator might have and brought the liquidation process to an end.

75. We were satisfied that the agreement was a settlement of the civil liability between the liquidators, the Company and the Appellant and did not reflect the true balance as shown in the records. Our finding in this regard was supported by the accounting evidence and the email from the liquidators dated 1 March 2023 which stated:

“The figure detailed in the settlement agreement came from the original declaration of solvency which recorded the sum required to be paid into the solvent liquidation to discharge the Company’s liabilities, and the liquidation costs. The accounts to 31 January 2015 detailed the overdrawn Directors Loan Account as £838,609”

76. We concluded that the figure of £296,509 represented the declaration of insolvency necessary to discharge the liability and did not represent the accounting balance of the DLA. We further concluded that the agreement did not settle the personal statutory income tax liability of the Appellant nor did it, in binding the company, liquidators and Appellant, prevent a statutory charge to tax from arising.

Discovery Assessment

77. The Appellant’s 2018/19 SATR did not include any entry or disclosure relating to a release or write-off of a director's loan. We were satisfied that upon reviewing the Appellant’s SATR and information subsequently obtained from the liquidator, Ms Rea concluded that the DLA was written off/released in connection with the liquidation and formed the view that tax had been understated in the return as the write-off triggered the s415 ITTOIA charge. We consider her belief was one that a reasonable officer could form in light of the information before her (see Jerome Anderson v HMRC[2018] UKUT 159 (TCC) at [30]).

78. We were satisfied that Ms Rea made a discovery of the under-assessment to tax and the discovery occurred only when the officer compared the 2018/19 return with the information communicated by the liquidator. We accepted officer Rea’s evidence that the making of the assessment was part of a process during which information was gathered and reviewed until such time as Ms Rea was able to reach a conclusion. We also accepted Ms Rea’s evidence that the assessment was made on 31 March 2023 and that the date on the Notice of Assessment of 5 April 2023 (the last date to fall within the four year statutory limitation period) would have been a few days after the making of the assessment to allow for administrative/postal delays and ensure the Appellant was not prejudiced in respect of the time limit for making an appeal.

79. Accordingly, we find that a valid discovery was made for the purposes of section 29(1) TMA 1970.

Carelessness

80. The next issue to consider whether the insufficiency was brought about by the Appellant's careless behaviour as required by s29(4) TMA 1970. Whether acts or omissions are careless involves a factual assessment having regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case and the conduct of the individual taxpayer is to be assessed by reference to a prudent and reasonable taxpayer in his position (per HMRC v Collis [2011] UKFTT 588 (TC) at [29]and HMRC v Hicks[2020] UKUT 12 (TCC) at [120]).

81. We should note that we did not understand the Respondent’s case to be, as raised on behalf of the Appellant, that the Appellant had received advice but chosen to ignore it. Rather, that there was no evidence of any advice received and no evidence that the Appellant had made the checks expected of a reasonable and prudent taxpayer.

82. The Appellant argued that she reasonably believed all liabilities were settled via the Settlement Agreement and that she had relied upon discussions with the liquidators, solicitor and advice from her accountant. However, no record of this advice was produced to Ms Rea despite her requests, nor did the Appellant adduce any such evidence before the Tribunal.

83. We found the Appellant’s evidence on this issue vague and unpersuasive. No details of any conversations were given, such as whether the conversation was with the person responsible for completing her SATR, when any such conversation took place, in what context or what the Appellant had specifically asked or been told. We found the Appellant’s claim that if the accountant had believed there were further liabilities, he would have told her was vague and did not support the claim that she had relied on specific advice in this regard (see [48] above).

84. In the absence of contemporaneous written advice, we consider that the Appellant's reliance on what appeared to us to be informal conversations could not lead us to conclude that she had reasonably relied on competent professional advice. We consider a reasonable taxpayer in the Appellant’s position would have obtained clear and documented advice or disclosed the information in the return being fully aware that she had received loans from the company and that she had not discharged the full amount in the settlement, whether that be the lower figure relied on by the Appellant or the higher figure of £838,609. The Appellant made no disclosure in the return and there was no cogent evidence she had raised any query in this regard with her accountant when approving the return prepared on her behalf and we consider that omission was caused by a failure to take reasonable care.

85. We agree with the quantification used by the Respondents, being the amount released or written off from the DLA balance of £838,609, minus the £96,650.64 paid under the Settlement Agreement which resulted in a balance of £741,958.36 treated as released or written off. As the Appellant had returned dividend income of £150,000 in her 2018/19 SATR, the total dividend income for 2018/19 was £891,958.36 (comprising the £741,958.36 arising from the DLA together with the £150,000 already returned) resulting in an additional income tax liability of £282,685.99, being the amount assessed on 5 April 2023.

86. We therefore conclude that section 29(4) is satisfied.

Conclusion on Discovery Assessment

87. For the reasons set out above, we have concluded that a discovery was made for the purposes of section 29(1) TMA 1970 and that section 29(4) is satisfied because the omission resulted at least from carelessness.

88. Accordingly, we find the discovery assessment was validly made under section 29 TMA 1970 and was in time.

Penalty

89. Turning to the penalty, the parties relied on the same arguments advanced in respect of the s29(4) condition above and there was no dispute that the standard to apply is that of a prudent and reasonable taxpayer in the Appellant's position (per Collis).

90. We agreed with the submission on behalf of the Appellant that reliance on advisers may negate carelessness if the taxpayer has reasonably sought and acted in reliance on competent advice. However, for the same reasons set out at [84] and [85] above, the Appellant having accepted there was no record or documentary evidence of any such advice, taken together with our finding that the Appellant’s evidence in this regard was unpersuasive, we were satisfied that the inaccuracy was brought about by a failure to take reasonable care, and that this failure caused the understatement of tax.

91. We have also considered whether the penalty should be suspended or reduced for special circumstances. We accepted Ms Rea’s evidence that she had given the maximum reduction she felt able and which reflected the engagement and co-operation of the Appellant whilst taking into account that not all documents requested were provided or provided timeously. We found no other circumstances which would justify a reduction.

92. In relation to suspension, we noted Ms Rea’s evidence that she would have suspended the penalty however the Respondents were advised by the Appellant in a telephone call on 27 March 2023 that she had retired and would not be completing future Self-Assessment Tax Returns and, in those circumstances, Ms Rea was unable to suspend the penalty.

93. However, the Appellant continued to file SATRs and we had regard to the material before us which indicated that on 23 October 2024, the Respondents wrote to the Appellant providing her with the opportunity to put forward an appropriate suspension condition that would help her avoid making future inaccuracies.

94. A letter dated 14 April 2025 from the Respondents to the Appellant’s representative records that “Your firm then confirmed on 20 January 2025 that Mrs Fullerton did not wish to accept the penalty suspension offer.” No representations were made to us at the hearing regarding suspension and in those circumstances we concluded that there were no grounds upon which we could interfere with the Respondent’s decision not to suspend the penalty following the Appellant’s rejection of the offer.

Decision

95. For the reasons set out above, we find that HMRC validly made a discovery assessment under section 29 TMA 1970 and that the Appellant's return contained a careless inaccuracy giving rise to the penalty charged under Schedule 24 FA 2007.

96. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

97. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date: 26th OCTOBER 2026

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