Commercial United Kingdom

Star Hydro Power Limited v National Transmission & Despatch Company Limited

Official source

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

COMMERCIAL COURT (KBD)

NCN [2024] EWHC 3258 (Comm)

Case No. CL-2024-000527

Rolls Building

7 Rolls Buildings

Fetter Lane

London

EC4A 1NL

Friday, 29th November 2024

Before:

THE HONOURABLE MRS JUSTICE DIAS

B E T W E E N:

STAR HYDRO POWER LIMITED

and

NATIONAL TRANSMISSION & DESPATCH COMPANY LIMITED

MS S PARUK (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills LLP) appeared on behalf of the Claimant

MR R DIWAN KC & MS C DRUMMOND (instructed by Keidan Harrison LLP) appeared on behalf of the Defendant

JUDGMENT

(Approved)

This Transcript is Crown Copyright. It may not be reproduced in whole or in part, other than in accordance with relevant licence or with the express consent of the Authority. All rights are reserved.

This judgment was delivered in public. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

MRS JUSTICE DIAS:

1. Thank you. I am sorry to have kept you an additional five minutes. As foreshadowed, I am afraid this is brief and not particularly polished. The application is refused, and I give a brief outline of my reasons. The Claimant’s case in a nutshell is that the Pakistani application is a disguised application to challenge the substance of the award and, as such, has been brought in breach of an, at least implicit, ancillary agreement that such challenges should only be brought under English law as the curial law and in the English courts as the courts of the supervisory jurisdiction. The Defendant’s case is that the Defendant is entitled to seek partial recognition or enforcement of the award under the New York Convention, the corollary being that it must likewise be entitled to seek partial non-recognition or non-enforcement.

2. The application in this case has been brought under the Convention for partial recognition of the award and a declaration of non-enforceability of other parts of the award as a consequence of the part that has been recognised. It is, says the Defendant, for the Pakistani court to determine that application and the English court should not intervene. There is no dispute on either side to the basic proposition that if the Claimant can show a high probability that there is a relevant jurisdiction agreement, and that the Pakistani application is in breach of that agreement, then the principles in the Angelic Grace apply. It is also accepted by both sides that even if no such breach of agreement can be shown, it would in theory at least be open to the English court to grant an anti-suit injunction on the basis that the foreign proceedings were vexatious and oppressive.

3. However, the application has not been made on this basis, although Ms Paruk did advance it as an alternative. The Defendant objects to such an argument being raised now but, in any event, the circumstances of this case come nowhere near the threshold for vexation and oppression.

4. It seems to me that there are really three critical questions which fall to be resolved on this application: the first concerns the allocation of jurisdiction under the New York Convention; the second is to look at what in substance the application in Pakistan is seeking to achieve; and the third is the question of whether it is in any event appropriate for the English courts to intervene by way of anti-suit injunction.

5. The case was argued for the Claimant very persuasively by Ms Paruk, but I have ultimately concluded that Mr Diwan’s submissions for the Defendant are correct, and that it is not appropriate to grant relief in this case.

6. Starting with allocation of jurisdiction, I agree with Mr Diwan that the parties to the New York Convention have necessarily agreed that an award made in one contracting state can, and indeed must, be recognised and enforced in any other contracting state, and that those other contracting states have undertaken a binding obligation to recognise and enforce awards made in accordance with the Convention when asked to do so. It seems to me that it must therefore be assumed that the Court which is being asked to recognise or enforce an award, whether in whole or in part, will comply with its international obligations and do so only in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. The English courts have no policing role in this respect.

7. I also accept that, just as the winning party is not bound to seek enforcement or recognition, if it so chooses, so the losing party is not bound to bring any jurisdictional or other challenge in the courts of the seat. It is entitled to wait until the winning party seeks to enforce or seeks recognition, and then resist on any of the grounds set out in Article V of the Convention. That it seems to me is a substantive right accorded under the Convention. However, Ms Paruk argues that that right can only be asserted in response to an application by the winning party for recognition or enforcement. She submits that there is nothing in the Convention itself which mandates a pre-emptive application, such as has been made here, and that there is no authority which establishes or confirms such a right.

8. Mr Diwan on the other hand submits that there is nothing in the Convention to say that this is impermissible. On this point, I prefer the submissions of Mr Diwan. As I have said, it seems to me that there is a substantive right under the Convention for awards not to be recognised or enforced on the grounds set out in Article V. That being the case, I see no reason of principle why that right cannot be asserted pre-emptively in a particular jurisdiction. This may not be commonly done but there may be any number of reasons why a respondent might want to seek a declaration of non-recognition or non-enforceability, for example on public policy grounds, even if the winning party was showing no immediate signs of seeking to bring recognition or enforcement proceedings of its own. There is nothing in the wording of the Convention itself to limit the right to seek recognition and enforcement to one party or another and, of course, it is not possible to analyse the situation simply in terms of a winning or a losing party because both parties might be winners on some issues and losers on others.

9. None of the authorities referred to Ms Paruk preclude the possibility of a pre-emptive application. Indeed in none of them, so far as I can see, does the question arise. And I can see nothing to suggest as a matter of principle that if there is a right to challenge recognition or enforcement of an award on certain grounds, such as public policy or non- arbitrability, the party wishing to make such a challenge has to wait until such time as recognition or enforcement is sought by the other party, when it may be suffering adverse consequences immediately. I therefore accept that a pre-emptive application is permissible and is not improper in and of itself.

10. I also accept that it is in principle permissible to seek recognition and/or enforcement of part of an award. Indeed Ms Paruk did not dispute this. There may well be arguments as to whether partial recognition or enforcement is appropriate in any particular case but, as a matter of principle, it is permissible. And once an application has been made to the Pakistani court, whether pre-emptively or not, prima facie I agree that it is for that Court to determine that application always, of course, in accordance with the Convention. The Claimant in this case will be at liberty to argue in Pakistan that the Respondent’s application was misconceived, whether because the parts of which it seeks recognition are not truly severable, or whether because the alleged consequences of recognising paragraph 377 of the award do not in truth flow from that paragraph. But that is a matter which it prima facie seems to me is for the Pakistani court to decide in the exercise of its jurisdiction as the court being asked to recognise or enforce the award.

11. Accordingly, I reject the suggestion that it is improper in any way for the Respondent to invoke the jurisdiction of the Pakistani court absent an application for enforcement or recognition by the Claimant.

12. Turning then to the substance of the application, Ms Paruk argued strenuously that in truth the application had nothing whatsoever to do with recognition or enforcement but was rather a root and branch attack on the award seeking to undermine its reasoning. However, it could be said that any party who resists recognition or enforcement on grounds that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction or because the award was contrary to public policy, or raised non-arbitrable issues, is similarly trying to undermine the award. That, it seems to me, is simply the necessary consequence of permitting challenges to be made on the grounds set out in Article V. But in any event, looking at paragraph 377 of the award, which is the lynchpin of the Respondent’s application in Pakistan, it seems to me that this is a determination by the arbitrator of which recognition can properly and legitimately be sought by the Respondent.

13. I can certainly see that there is an argument to be had as to the extent to which recognition of paragraph 377 necessarily entails that paragraph 514(d), in particular, is not enforceable. There are arguments both ways. But it is not for me, at least not on an interlocutory application, to determine the matter unless it is so obviously clear one way or the other. But I do not find that to be the case here. What is true, it seems to me, is that the Respondent is not seeking, in fact, to undermine the award in any truly fundamental way. It remains open to the Claimant to enforce the award in any other jurisdiction they choose. The argument of the Respondents here is that the determination in paragraph 377 has the consequence that other determinations made by the arbitrator are either contrary to Pakistani law and public policy, or were determinations on issues which were, in fact, non-arbitrable. Either way, they say, if they are right about that, then they cannot be recognised and enforced. As I say the Respondent may be right or it may be wrong about that, but that is an argument which to my mind should be played out before the Lahore court, and it is not for the English court to intervene.

14. Turning finally to questions of discretion and comity, it seems to me that in these circumstances it would be wholly wrong for the English court to arrogate to itself the power to determine what issues should and should not be left to the Pakistani courts. As I have already said, comity demands that the English court assumes that the Pakistani courts will abide by their international obligations and determine the Respondent’s application on its merits in accordance with the Convention. The Claimant will no doubt address all the arguments to the Pakistani court that they have raised before me, and the Pakistani court will have to decide whether they have merit. That Court is just as well-placed as the English court to determine whether the Convention is being used abusively. In truth, as Mr Diwan submitted in his skeleton argument, the Claimant’s real complaint is as to the merits of the application and the strength of the arguments made. But as I have said, that seems to me to be pre-eminently a matter for the court in Lahore.

15. The combination of my conclusion on the first two points mean that I am not satisfied to the requisite degree of high probability that the Respondent is in breach of any agreement as to forum, ancillary or otherwise, which would attract the application of Angelic Grace principles. I am also satisfied that this is not a case of vexatious or oppressive behaviour. The Defendant is a Pakistani entity bound by Pakistani law. In so far as the award requires or contemplates a breach of Pakistan law or permits the Claimant to invoice in a way which is contrary to Pakistani law or public policy, it seems to me the Defendant is entitled to have that ventilated. As I say, the Defendant’s arguments may be right or wrong, but they are not vexatious or oppressive to my mind, and I repeat that the Defendant is not seeking to restrain the enforcement or recognition of the award in any other jurisdiction.

16. Ms Paruk’s parting shot was that if I refused relief, it would leave it open to any losing party to invoke the New York Convention improperly by, for example, cherry-picking one line of an award, and that the English court would then be powerless to intervene. I do not accept that the English court would necessarily be powerless in that situation since I have accepted, and indeed both parties have accepted, that in an appropriate case an injunction can be granted on the basis that the foreign proceedings are vexatious and oppressive. However, for the reasons I have already given, I am not satisfied that that is this case.

End of Judgment.

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