Administrative United Kingdom
T.K v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/67338/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Birmingham
On 19 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE C Taylor
Between
T.K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Rashid, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr M Evans, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 7 December 2023.
Anonymity
2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the discharge of the UK’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principles of open justice in the circumstances of this appeal.
Background
3. The appellant asserts that he is a national of the Ivory Coast. He lived with his uncle from a young age, believing him to be his father. The appellant refused to go to Arabic school and his problems with his uncle started. His uncle used to beat him, threaten him about beatings and force him to work in his shop. The appellant relocated to live with a different uncle for a year and was then returned to the first uncle. If returned the appellant fears that his uncle will beat him.
4. The application was refused because the respondent considered that the appellant provided inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation, that the account lacked detail and there were some elements of the account which were inconsistent with external information. The respondent also relied upon the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in Italy and France before arriving in the UK as damaging credibility.
The Hearing
5. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
6. The appellant’s representative made an application for the appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness. Hearing adjustments of breaks and simple and sensitive cross-examination was sought. In respect of the assessment of the evidence the representative submitted that the medical evidence and trauma should be factored into my decision making. The respondent made no objection. This application was granted.
7. The respondent’s representative confirmed to me that no NRM referral has been made in respect of the appellant. It seemed to me that such a referral may be required and, at least, should be considered given the appellant’s account of events on his journey to the UK. Mr Evans confirmed that he would address this.
Issues
8. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:
(a) Does the Appellant face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of return?
(b) Is it reasonably likely there would be sufficient protection.
(c) Could the appellant reasonably internally relocate?
(d) Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return? It was accepted that this issue stands and falls with the protection claim.
(e) Would the appellant's removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that it is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Evidence
9. I had before me a bundle of 218 pages and a supplementary bundle of 66 pages. The appellant was assisted by a Malinke interpreter. I observed no issues with interpretation and none were raised with me.
Legal Framework
10. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
11. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are: Appendix PL 5.1(b).
12. In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.
13. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.
14. Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.
Discussion and Facts
15. The appellant asserts in his witness statement that he did not claim asylum in Italy because he arrived during the pandemic and was placed in a camp with 1000 people. The conditions were extremely bad and his asylum claim was not recorded. He was in the camp for eight months with no adequate help.
16. The appellant asserts in his witness statement that he did not claim asylum in France because he slept on the streets and his asylum claim was not recorded. He was not questioned by the authorities and was advised by people to go to the UK because it is safer.
17. In ordinary circumstances spending eight months in Italy and one month in France, not under the control of an agent, would mean that there was reasonable opportunity to claim asylum. However, I note that the appellant entered both countries during a global pandemic. Given that circumstance, I accept the appellant’s account that he was unable to claim asylum. As such I add no weight to his failure to claim asylum in Italy and France as damaging to his credibility.
18. The appellant asserts that there were issues with interpretation at his asylum interview. I note that AIR12 records a discussion with the interpreter as the appellant was not understanding certain phrases. AIR31 states that the appellant is putting some words in French but the interpreter is able to understand a little French. AIR39 records that the interpreter is struggling to interpret accurately as the appellant is saying a lot of French words.
19. AIR41 records that the appellant was told his solicitor would receive a copy of the interview transcript and he could make changes if needed. At AIR 41 and 63 the appellant is recorded as stating that he has understood everything so far.
20. The appellant has provided a 2022 US Department of State report which details widespread physical violence towards children in the Ivory Coast. Given this objective evidence, I accept that the appellant’s claim of being beaten by his uncle is plausible.
21. The appellant was 16 when he left the Ivory Coast and I take note that the experiences he describes took place when he was a child which could explain the lack of detail in the account raised by the respondent. The appellant has dealt with a number of the credibility concerns raised in his witness statement. I also note the interpretation difficulties in the substantive asylum interview, although the appellant did confirm on several occasions that he had understood everything and no corrections were made through his solicitors, and the appellant’s medical history.
22. The appellant has remained consistent in the core of his claim of living with his uncle, being beaten by his uncle, his mother not being able to assist him because she is financially dependent upon the uncle and his being returned to the uncle one year after leaving to live with another uncle.
23. The appellant has not been consistent about any power and influence his uncle has. In his asylum interview the appellant stated that some people knew his uncle. In his 2021 witness statement he explains that his uncle controls the household and therefore has authority over him and that he has enough funds to track him down. In his 2024 witness statement the appellant asserts that his uncle knows many politicians and police officers and would be able to track him as soon as he arrives in the Ivory Coast.
24. The appellant was asked about the escalation in his account of the power and influence of his uncle in cross-examination. The appellant’s repeated answer was, he has power, he has power more than I do. This did not explain the escalation in the account. I do not accept that the age of the appellant nor his traumatic experiences, nor medical history explains this escalation in the account.
25. I accept the appellant’s account of living with his uncle and the treatment he received from him as a child. These elements of his account have remained consistent, are plausible and the credibility issues raised by the respondent have been satisfactorily explained in the appellant’s 2024 witness statement, particularly when taking account his age at the time of the events described.
26. I do not accept the escalating account of the uncle’s power and influence. No adequate reason has been given for the failure to mention, until 2024, that the uncle allegedly knew politicians and police officers or otherwise possessed influence extending beyond his household and local community. This represents a material development in the appellant’s account rather than the provision of additional detail. When this issue was put to the appellant in cross-examination, he did not directly answer the question. Instead, he repeatedly stated only that his uncle had more power than he did. That response did not explain why such significant allegations had not been advanced in the asylum interview or earlier witness evidence. I therefore find that the claim that the uncle possesses sufficient influence through political or police connections to locate the appellant throughout the Ivory Coast has been exaggerated and is not reasonably likely to be true.
27. The appellant will very soon be 25 years old. He would be returning to the Ivory Coast as an adult. The appellant stated in cross-examination that, even though he is an adult, his uncle has more power than him. Returning to the Ivory Coast as a healthy, working-age man, places the appellant in an entirely different position than when he left as a 16 year old boy.
28. I do not find that the uncle has any continuing intention or ability to pursue the appellant now that he is an adult. The evidence establishes past abuse within a household environment but does not establish a real risk of serious harm to the appellant as an independent adult man.
29. Whilst the appellant gave evidence that he would not be able to find work, there is no evidence other than his bare assertion to support this and I do not accept the point. The appellant would, I find, be able to work and support himself financially. I make that finding taking into account the appellant’s medical evidence. He is currently prescribed medication for insomnia. There is no evidence before me that the medication he is prescribed is not available in the Ivory Coast.
30. I do not accept that there is not sufficiency of protection for the appellant upon return. I have not accepted the account of his uncle’s power and influence. The appellant has never been to the authorities about his uncle. Whilst the appellant has provided objective evidence about violence towards children, this does not support that, as an adult, he would not receive protection from the authorities.
31. The appellant is a working-age male who was brought up in the Ivory Coast. He has family in the country and whilst I accept he would not want to resume his relationship with his uncle, he also has siblings and his mother who he may want a relationship with. Even absent those relationships he would only be in the same position he is in in the UK, where he also has no family. There is no evidence before me that the medication the appellant takes for insomnia is not available in the Ivory Coast. The appellant has undertaken talking therapy in the UK and I note he is on a waiting list for further talking therapy. There is no evidence before me of the availability of such therapy in the Ivory Coast. I have not accepted the appellant’s uncle has the power to locate him throughout the Ivory Coast.
32. The appellant asserts that he tried to relocate to Togo to live with his other uncle and he was returned. At that time the appellant was a child. Both uncles were in contact and the appellant remained with the uncle in Togo for a year. The uncle he fears knew where he was, he didn’t turn up and forcibly take him back, he permitted the situation to continue for a year. I do not accept that this experience means that the appellant, as an adult, could not internally relocate. The appellant’s health and personal circumstances do not make internal relocation unduly harsh. I find that the appellant could reasonably internally relocate.
33. It was accepted that the claim in respect of the appellant’s private life stood and fell with the claim for protection. I therefore find that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration.
34. In respect of the proportionality of the decision I adopt a balance sheet approach and bring forward my findings above. The requirements of the Immigration Rules are not met and there is no evidence before me that the appellant speaks English.
35. The appellant entered the UK in 2020. He will have developed a private life in the UK in the last six years. This private life has been established when the appellant’s right to remain was precarious and I therefore afford it little weight. No family life has been raised. The appellant’s circumstances do not outweigh the public interest in effective immigration control. The refusal does not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences and the refusal is proportionate.
Determination of the Issues
36. The appellant has not shown substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of serious harm in the Ivory Coast. There would be sufficient protection and the appellant could reasonably internally relocate.
Notice of Decision
37. The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.
ANONYMITY ORDER
38. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed Date 05 November 2026
Judge C Taylor
First-tier Tribunal Judge C Taylor
If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our immigration lawyer in Paris.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).