Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

The Florida Bar v. Omar Medina, Jr.

Official source
         Supreme Court of Florida
                            ____________

                         No. SC2024-0922
                           ____________

                       THE FLORIDA BAR,
                         Complainant,

                                vs.

                       OMAR MEDINA, JR.,
                          Respondent.

                         October 29, 2026

PER CURIAM.

     We have for review a report of referee recommending that

Respondent, Omar Medina, Jr., be found not guilty of misconduct. 1

We approve the referee’s findings of fact and recommendations as to

Respondent’s guilt.

                          BACKGROUND

     On June 20, 2024, The Florida Bar filed a formal complaint

against Respondent. The Bar alleged that Respondent failed to

appear at a case management conference, ordered by the U.S.


     1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, resulting in his

client’s suit being dismissed. Respondent then filed a motion to

vacate the dismissal and attached a signed affidavit. The Bar

alleged that the motion and affidavit included statements that were

knowingly false. The Bar argued that this conduct violated Rules

Regulating The Florida Bar 3-4.3 (Misconduct and Minor

Misconduct), 4-3.3(a)(1) (Candor Toward the Tribunal; lawyer shall

not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or

fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously

made to the tribunal by the lawyer), and 4-8.4(a) (Misconduct;

lawyer shall not violate or attempt to violate the Rules of

Professional Conduct).

     After conducting a hearing on guilt, the assigned referee found

that the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

Respondent knowingly made false statements to a tribunal and

recommended that Respondent be found not guilty of the charged

rule violations. The Bar now seeks review of the referee’s report,

asking us to find Respondent guilty of violating the relevant Bar

rules and to remand for a hearing on sanctions. Respondent asks




                                  -2-
us to approve the report of referee in its entirety. We hereby

approve the report.

                        FINDINGS OF FACT

     The referee found that the disciplinary charges in this case

center on statements in the second paragraph of the affidavit

Respondent attached with his motion to vacate:

     The undersigned affiant failed to meet in the case
     management conference because I did not receive the
     appropriate notice of the hearing. Moreover, there was
     no communication received regarding the hearing.
     Counsel investigated why no notice was received and was
     able to determine that despite having notified the court
     and opposing counsel o[f] the appropriate email
     addresses inexplicably the clerk of this court sent notices
     to email addresses that do not exist and have not existed
     as part of the plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm for more than
     10 years.

Respondent made similar statements in the sixth paragraph of his

motion to vacate, writing:

     Additionally undersigned counsel had properly notified
     the court and counsel of the appropriate email addresses
     to use however inexplicably the clerk of this court sent
     notices to email addresses that do not exist and have not
     existed as part of the plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm for
     more than 10 years.

     The Bar alleged that several statements in these passages

violated rule 4-3.3(a)(1). In particular, the Bar objected to



                                 -3-
Respondent asserting that he did not receive appropriate notice of

the conference, that he had notified the court and opposing counsel

of the appropriate email addresses, and that the clerk of court had

“inexplicably” sent notice to email addresses that had not existed

with Respondent’s firm for more than 10 years.

     Notably, Respondent also wrote: “The more significant

importance is the fact that [Respondent] has had difficulty with the

pacer system” (PACER being the federal court public records access

and filing system) and learned after missing the conference that his

PACER account had been deactivated for years. Respondent

suggested that this problem was “one of the possible reasons” he

missed the conference, offering no other possible reasons.

     The referee found that Respondent had mismanaged his

PACER account and did not understand how the federal court filing

system worked under the relevant local rules. Respondent believed

that designations he had made in state court would be used by the

federal court upon removal of the case. In accordance with the

PACER handbook and local rules, the local district court clerk sent

notice of the case management conference to three email addresses

that Respondent listed in his PACER account many years earlier:


                                -4-
[email protected]; [email protected];

and [email protected]. The referee found that the

“omedina” address was still in use by Respondent at the time he

filed his motion to vacate, that the “cgoldthwait” address had been

inactive for more than 10 years, and that it was unclear from the

evidence presented how long the “imorfin” address had been

inactive.

     The referee explained that at the hearing on Respondent’s

motion to vacate, the presiding district judge confronted

Respondent about the fact that he was using one of the email

addresses to which notice had been sent. Respondent said he never

intended to blame the clerk of court and should have been clearer

in his motion that while notice had been sent to the “omedina”

address, neither he nor his staff ever saw any emails relating to the

conference. He posited that the notice might have made it to his

server but not to his inbox. He apologized and took the blame for

mismanaging his emails and PACER account, saying he did not

want to blame his staff because it was his responsibility.

     The referee found that Respondent’s testimony at the

disciplinary hearing showed a lack of understanding as to the


                                -5-
manner in which federal courts notice litigants and counsel. The

referee found that Respondent made appropriate email designations

in state court and genuinely (though mistakenly) assumed the clerk

of court would update its e-filing with the pleadings made in the

state court system—an assumption that was inconsistent with the

PACER handbook and local rules.

     The referee found that Respondent failed to update the clerk of

court in a way that would ensure he received electronic filings and

was negligent in maintaining his PACER account. However, the

referee also found that Respondent’s negligence did not rise to the

level of misconduct and his lack of comprehension of the federal

filing system did not prove that he knowingly made false statements

to the court.

     Notably, at one point during the disciplinary hearing, Bar

counsel asked questions about when the “imorfin” address had last

been used, and Respondent testified that Ms. Morfin may have

worked for him as recently as 2022. However, later in the hearing,

Respondent stated that he believed the earlier line of questioning

had been about a different assistant, Ms. Bland, who worked for

him more recently. Respondent testified that he did not know the


                                -6-
dates of Ms. Morfin’s employment. The referee found that the most

recent active usage of the “imorfin” address had not been

established.

                              ANALYSIS

     In a Bar discipline case, a “referee’s findings of fact regarding

guilt carry a presumption of correctness that should be upheld

unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.” Fla. Bar

v. Barrett, 

897 So. 2d 1269, 1275

 (Fla. 2005) (citation omitted). If

the referee’s findings are supported by competent, substantial

evidence, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its

own judgment for that of the referee. Fla. Bar v. Schwartz, 

284 So.

3d 393

, 396 (Fla. 2019).

     When reviewing a referee’s recommendations of guilt, the

referee’s factual findings must be sufficient under the applicable

rules to support the recommendations. Fla. Bar v. Shoureas, 

913

So. 2d 554, 557-58

 (Fla. 2005). Ultimately, the party challenging a

referee’s findings of fact or conclusions regarding guilt has the

burden of showing “that there is no evidence in the record to

support those findings or that the record evidence clearly

contradicts the conclusions.” Fla. Bar v. Germain, 

957 So. 2d 613

,


                                 -7-
620 (Fla. 2007). A party cannot meet this high burden “simply by

pointing to contradictory evidence” when there is also competent,

substantial evidence that supports the referee’s findings. Fla. Bar v.

Glick, 

693 So. 2d 550, 552

 (Fla. 1997).

     Here, the Bar argues that the evidence introduced at the

disciplinary hearing shows that Respondent violated rule 4-3.3(a)(1)

and therefore violated rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(a), and it argues that

the referee erred in finding otherwise. We find no clear error in the

referee’s finding that the Bar failed to prove every element of the

charged rule violations, particularly the “knowingly” element, by

clear and convincing evidence. The Bar makes inferences of fact

and points us to contradictory evidence in the record, but the

referee’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence

and will not be reweighed.

     Notably, the referee identified only a single “untrue” statement

in the motion and affidavit: Respondent’s assertion that the local

federal clerk sent notice to email addresses (plural) that did not

exist and had not existed as part of his law firm for more than 10

years. From the evidence and testimony presented at the

disciplinary hearing, the referee found that only the “cgoldthwait”


                                 -8-
address had been inactive for more than 10 years. The “imorfin”

address was found to have been inactive for an unknown period of

time, and the “omedina” address was still being used. However,

while Respondent’s statement was incorrect, the referee found that

the Bar failed to prove that Respondent knew he was making an

untrue statement at the time. We approve this finding.

     The Bar relies on Florida Bar v. Grieco, 

389 So. 3d 1257

, 1262

(Fla. 2024), for the proposition that to prove the knowingly element,

the Bar need only show that the lawyer deliberately engaged in the

activity in question. The Bar argues that Respondent’s “activity”

was knowingly typing words into his motion and affidavit and then

knowingly filing those documents. The Bar contends that it did not

have to prove that Respondent knew his statements were false at

the time he wrote and filed the motion.

     The Bar’s interpretation of this element is contrary to our case

law. In Florida Bar v. Miller, 

863 So. 2d 231, 234

 (Fla. 2003), we

explained that the record evidence showed that “Miller intentionally

deceived the federal court,” and we pointed to evidence in the record

showing that Miller knew his statements were untrue at the time

they were made.


                                -9-
     The Bar’s reliance on Grieco is also misplaced, for in Grieco, we

declared that “competent, substantial evidence in the record

supports the referee’s finding that Grieco deliberately engaged in a

pattern of dishonest conduct by making repeated false or

misleading statements.” 389 So. 3d at 1264. We emphasized that

our holding was based on the referee’s findings about Grieco’s

“shifting narrative” and efforts to deliberately mislead, particularly

the referee’s finding that “on more than one occasion, Grieco

intentionally deceived or misled the public.” Id.

     Here, the referee found the opposite, finding that Respondent

never intended to mislead the federal court. And we reiterate—the

Bar must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the charged

lawyer knew he or she was making false statements at the time the

statements were made.

     However, even if the Bar were operating under the correct

standard, we must still assess whether the referee erred in finding

that the Bar failed to prove that Respondent knew he was making

false statements to the court. The Bar claims Respondent

knowingly made a false statement by stating that the clerk “sent

notices to email addresses that do not exist and have not existed as


                                 - 10 -
part of the plaintiff’s counsel’s law firm for more than 10 years.”

The Bar argues that if only a single email address was inactive for

more than 10 years, then Respondent’s statement about multiple

inactive email addresses being noticed was a false statement. The

Bar acknowledges that the “cgoldthwait” email address was inactive

for over 10 years, but it argues that the “omedina” address was

never inactive, and it points to testimony elicited at the disciplinary

hearing in which Respondent suggested that the “imorfin” email

address could have been used by a former assistant, Ms. Morfin,

within the past 10 years.

     As stated above, pointing to contradictory evidence will not

establish clear error when there is also record evidence in support

of the referee’s findings. Here, Respondent testified that he thought

Bar counsel’s questions about Ms. Morfin had been referring to a

different assistant who worked for him more recently. Bar counsel

did not definitively pin down when the “imorfin” address was last

active, and, more importantly, Bar counsel failed to elicit that

Respondent knew, at the time he filed his motion, that the “imorfin”

address had been active more recently than he suggested in his

motion and affidavit.


                                 - 11 -
     The Bar’s next argument concerns Respondent’s remark about

the clerk “inexplicably” sending notice to inactive email addresses.

The Bar contends that this statement can only be interpreted as

Respondent blaming the clerk of court when he knew that his own

negligence was to blame for missing the conference. Notably, the

referee wrestled with this issue, declaring that he considered the

“inexplicably” statement for three days before ultimately finding

that it was just a statement.

     While the clerk’s actions were certainly not “inexplicable” with

an understanding of the PACER system and local rules, given

Respondent’s lack of understanding of the federal system (as found

by the referee), Respondent may well have been sincerely confused

by the clerk’s actions given the information he had at the time.

     Moreover, shortly after stating that the clerk “inexplicably”

sent notice to inactive email addresses, Respondent wrote “[t]he

more significant importance is the fact that [Respondent] has had

difficulty with the pacer system” and stated that he learned after

missing the conference that his PACER account had been

deactivated for years. Respondent suggested that this problem was

“one of the possible reasons” he missed the conference, and he


                                - 12 -
offered no other possible reasons. Thus, while the Bar insists that

the only interpretation of Respondent’s “inexplicably” remark is that

he was blaming the clerk of court for his own failure to appear at

the conference, Respondent immediately offered an explanation for

his failure to attend, and that explanation assigned the blame to

himself. We therefore find no error in the referee’s finding that the

“inexplicably” remark was just a statement—more specifically, an

expression that Respondent could not explain at that time why

outdated email addresses had been used to notice the conference.

     Next, the Bar argues that in his motion to vacate, Respondent

accused opposing counsel of engaging in fraud on the court. The

Bar interprets this as Respondent falsely blaming opposing counsel

for his own failure to attend the case management conference. But

Respondent’s fraud on the court assertion was part of an argument

made early in his motion on why he believed the case should not

have been removed to federal court in the first place. His “fraud on

the court” statement was not even referring to the missed case

management conference, let alone blaming opposing counsel for his

absence at that conference.




                                - 13 -
     The Bar’s next argument is that Respondent knowingly made a

false statement when he said that he “properly notified the court

and counsel of the appropriate email addresses to use.” The referee

found that Respondent “did update the Clerk of Court of his

address; just not in a way that would ensure he would receive

electronic filings.” This finding is supported by Respondent’s

testimony at the disciplinary hearing. When questioned about his

statement on properly notifying the court of the appropriate email

addresses, Respondent answered: “I did. My understanding is, as

[opposing counsel] testified, that the whole file was copied,

including my email designations that were the active emails . . . .”

Thus, though Respondent had not in fact “properly notified the

court” of the correct email addresses, testimony in the record

supports the referee’s finding that Respondent sincerely believed, at

the time he filed his motion to vacate, that the designations he

made in state court had been transmitted with the case upon

removal to the federal system. Therefore, we find no error in the

referee’s finding that the Bar failed to show that Respondent

knowingly made a false statement when he asserted that he had

properly notified the court of the correct email addresses.


                                - 14 -
     Finally, the Bar argues that the referee clearly erred in

concluding that no competent, substantial evidence was presented

showing that Respondent received any PACER filings. Because the

referee was referring to actual notice, we find no clear error in the

referee’s determination.

                            CONCLUSION

     In conclusion, the referee’s findings of fact are supported by

evidence in the record. Because the referee’s findings of fact are

supported by competent, substantial evidence, and because the

referee’s legal conclusions and recommendations drawn from the

findings of fact are not clearly contradicted by the record evidence,

we approve the report of referee and find Respondent not guilty of

violating rules 3-4.3, 4-3.3(a)(1), and 4-8.4(a). Judgment is hereby

entered in favor of Respondent, Omar Medina, Jr.

     It is so ordered.

COURIEL, C.J., and LABARGA, MUÑIZ, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS,
BARRIOS, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar




                                 - 15 -
Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff
Counsel, and Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Complainant

Donald A. Smith, Jr. of Smith, Tozian, Daniel & Davis, P.A., Tampa,
Florida; and David M. Caldevilla of de la Parte, Gilbert, McNamara
& Caldevilla, P.A., Tampa, Florida,

     for Respondent




                               - 16 -

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