Commercial United Kingdom
THE MASTER AND SCHOLARS OF BALLIOL COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD AND THE CLAIMANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE 1 TO THE CLAIM FORM v AVIVA INSURANCE LIMITED
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2747 (Comm)
Case No: CL-2025-000368
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 30/10/2026
Before :
THE HON. MR JUSTICE MICHAEL GREEN
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Between :
| THE MASTER AND SCHOLARS OF BALLIOL COLLEGE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD AND THE CLAIMANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE 1 TO THE CLAIM FORM | Claimants | |
| – and – | ||
| AVIVA INSURANCE LIMITED | Defendant |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Mr Ben Lynch KC and Ms Nathalie Koh (instructed by Mishcon de Reya LLP) for the Claimants
Mr Gavin Kealey KC and Mr Harry Wright (instructed by Holman Fenwick Willan LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 7 – 8 October 2026
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 30 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
Mr Justice Michael Green:
Introduction
1. This is a trial of preliminary issues in relation to the Claimants’ insurance claims against the Defendant in respect of losses suffered during the Covid-19 pandemic. The claims are made under the Business Interruption section of the Claimants’ Commercial Combined Policies of insurance (the “Policies”). The main preliminary issue concerns the scope of cover for concurrent proximate causes, some of which are insured and the others are not, where the Defendant insurer says that the effect is that there is no cover because the uninsured causes were specifically excluded under the Policies.
2. The scope of business interruption insurance covering losses arising out of the Covid-19 pandemic has been much litigated in recent years and two important cases have reached the Supreme Court: The Financial Conduct Authority v Arch Insurance (UK) Limited and ors [2021] UKSC 1, [2021] AC 649 (“FCA Test Case”); and Gatwick Investment Limited and ors v Liberty Mutual Insurance Europe SE [2026] UKSC 14, [2026] 1 WLR 2006 (“Gatwick”). In particular, the FCA Test Case dealt with concurrent proximate causes and held that the losses suffered by the insureds were proximately caused by cases of Covid-19 both within and outside the scope of the business interruption insurance (by occurring inside or outside the specified radius from the defined premises). It is accepted in this case, and in all other English cases since, that the Claimants’ claimed losses were proximately caused by Covid-19 cases occurring both within and outwith the scope of the insurance. The question is therefore whether the uninsured cases outside the radius deprive the Claimants of cover despite there being cases that were within the scope of the cover. That depends on the proper construction of the relevant clauses of the Policies.
3. The Claimants are colleges and halls of the University of Oxford and various of their subsidiaries. All the colleges are located in central Oxford and all within 5 miles of each other. The Claimants were represented before me by Mr Ben Lynch KC leading Ms Nathalie Koh.
4. The Defendant, Aviva Insurance Limited, is the Claimants’ insurer under the Policies which were all in materially similar terms. The Defendant was represented before me by Mr Gavin Kealey KC leading Mr Harry Wright. The submissions, both oral and written, of both sets of Counsel were of the highest order and I am grateful to them for their assistance in this interesting case.
5. The Claimants say that the “Disease Clause” (which is headed in the Policies: “Specified Diseases, Food Poisoning, Vermin Pests and Defective Sanitation, Murder or Suicide”) covers their business interruption losses so long as there was a case of Covid-19 at or within 5 miles of the specified premises and it is irrelevant if there were also cases outside the 5-mile radius that were proximate causes of the losses. They say that because of the recognised nature of a disease like Covid-19 and other such diseases covered under the Policies such that losses will inevitably be caused by the widespread occurrence of the disease, including outside the radius, and that it would make no sense for cover to be excluded for such a disease which would be a commercially unattractive result.
6. The Defendant says that, because cases occurring outside the 5-mile radius were specifically excluded from cover, the well-known principle of insurance law in relation to concurrent proximate causes means that the excluded causes take precedence and there is no cover. That principle is clearly stated by the Supreme Court in the FCA Test Case, although in that case there was no such exclusion which meant that insured causes within the radius governed the situation and the insurers were therefore liable.
7. The issue is a pure point of construction. The preliminary issue was defined in Annex A to a “Directions Order” dated 28 January 2026 by Jacobs J as follows:
“Scope of Cover
1. Is the Disease Clause to be construed:
1.1 As the Claimant contends, namely providing cover where (1) there has been interruption or interference with The Business during the Period of Insurance; (2) following a Specified Disease (in this case COVID-19) occurring at The Premises or within 5 miles from the boundary of The Premises; but not (3) where the interruption or interference with The Business was solely caused by any occurrence or occurrences of COVID-19 not at The Premises or not within 5 miles from the boundary of The Premises. (POC: [20]-[22]; Reply [2])
Or:
1.2 As the Defendant contends, namely that cover is provided for business interruption loss caused solely by an occurrence or occurrences of COVID-19 at the insured Premises or within the stated radius (5 miles from the boundary of the insured Premises); but not provided for business interruption loss caused by an occurrence or occurrences of COVID-19 outside the stated radius from the insured Premises; and this is the case where such loss is also caused by an occurrence or occurrences of COVID-19 at the insured Premises or within the stated radius from the insured Premises. (Defence: [3], [17]-[18])”
8. The second preliminary issue concerns the construction of the Trends Clause. The parties are agreed that the answer to this issue follows the answer to the main issue set out above as to the scope of cover. It is touched on in the parties’ skeleton arguments but I received no oral submissions on it. The issue is as follows:
“Trends clause
2. On the true construction of the Policy, does the fact (which is assumed for the purposes of this preliminary issues trial) that the Claimants would have suffered all or the majority of the pleaded losses of revenue in any event and regardless of any occurrences of COVID-19 at or within a 5 mile radius of the boundary of their insured Premises because of the occurrences of COVID-19 throughout the United Kingdom and/or the world and/or the UK Government measures in response to such occurrences, mean that Annual Revenue and Standard Revenue of each of the Claimants is to be adjusted downwards in accordance with the trends clause? (Defence: [22]; Reply: [10])”
Agreed Facts
9. The Directions Order also set out the agreed or assumed facts for the purposes of trying the preliminary issues. This was added to by a Consent Order made by Calver J on 17 September 2026. Those facts are as follows:
(1) The background facts set out in paragraphs 14 to 69 of the judgment of Mr Justice Jacobs in London International Exhibition Centre Plc v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Plc [2023] EWHC 1481 (Comm) are agreed or assumed to be correct.
(2) The Policies were each in materially similar terms as set out in the policy documents issued to University College and scheduled to this Order.
(3) The factual background set out in paragraphs 10 to 16 and the last two sentences of paragraph 17 of the Particulars of Claim (dated 10 September 2025) is assumed to be correct.
(4) It is assumed that the losses claimed by the Colleges were proximately caused by cases of Covid-19 occurring at The Premises or within 5 miles from the boundary of The Premises, as well as being proximately caused by cases of Covid-19 occurring outside the 5-mile radius, as set out in paragraphs 5.1, 5.2 (other than 5.2(b)), 5.3 and 5.4 of the Defence (dated 22 October 2025).
(5) A number of the Claimants owned a number of properties in addition to the properties covered by the Commercial Combined Policies which are the subject of the Preliminary Issues Hearing. Aviva was aware of this fact at the time of entering into the Commercial Combined Policies. The majority of those Claimants entered into separate insurance policies with the Defendant covering, inter alia, Business Interruption (the “Investment Property Policies”), on materially similar terms. These Investment Property Policies were entered into prior to or at the same time as the relevant Claimants entering into the Commercial Combined Policies. The Investment Property Policies provided cover in respect of premises listed in the relevant Policy Schedules. These premises included, for each relevant Claimant, both:
i. Premises which were not insured "Premises" under the Commercial Combined Policies; and
ii. Premises located within and not within the relevant radius of the "Premises" insured under the Commercial Combined Policies.”
Relevant Policy Terms
(a) Main Business Interruption insuring clauses
10. It is necessary to put the Disease Clause in context by looking at the Policies as a whole to see how the Disease Clause and Business Interruption cover work. Defined terms in the Policies have an upper case first letter(s). One of the Claimants’ arguments depends on the distinction between defined and undefined terms.
11. Each of the Claimants’ Policies was accompanied by a Schedule that set out similar terms albeit with individual Policyholder details, such as their specific Premises.
12. The main Business Interruption insuring clause covers interruption or interference caused by physical damage to property:
“We will cover You for any interruption or interference with The Business resulting from Damage to property used by You at The Premises for the purpose of The Business occurring during the Period of Insurance caused by the Contingencies stated in The Schedule.
The Schedule will state any Clauses and Additional Covers which apply.
The maximum We will pay for any one claim is
(1) for any Item, the Sum Insured stated in The Schedule
(2) in aggregate, the Total Sum Insured unless stated otherwise in the Basis of Settlement.”
13. For University College, one of the Claimants whose policy documents have been used for convenience, the “Business” is defined in broad terms as:
“University College including Administration, Maintenance, Sporting and Recreational Groups, Teams, Clubs or Associations recognized by the College, Charity, Providers of Conference and Accommodation Facilities, Property Owners/ Developers, the Provision of Personnel and Services to other Colleges and all activities associated thereto as detailed in the Policy document.”
14. An important definition for this trial is “The Premises”. For each of the Claimants, it is defined as “The premises specified in the Schedule”. The Schedule is specific to each Claimant. It should be noted that the definition refers to “The premises” with a lower case “p”.
15. The Schedule’s Property Damage Section lists the premises that are “The Premises” and includes individual sums insured for each of the Properties Insured and in relation to each of them the agreed Basis of Claim Settlement (i.e. the agreed measure of indemnity) as “Day One Reinstatement” or “Reinstatement”.
16. The Business Interruption section of the Schedule also lists “The Premises” that are covered, but it does not specify the individual Sums Insured or the Basis of Claim Settlement referable to each of those Premises. Instead, the Business Interruption insuring clause (set out above) refers to “the Sum Insured stated in the Schedule” and the Schedule sets out two “Items” (and their Sums Insured): (i) “Revenue Declaration Linked”; and (ii) “Additional Increased Cost of Working”. These are the agreed measures of indemnity for the Business Interruption cover.
17. In the sample policy for University College, the “Estimated Amount/Sum Insured” for the Revenue Declaration LinkedItem was stated to be £21,230,000. The Sum Insured for this Item is a global figure. It was not broken down for or referable to The Premises or to individual premises among The Premises.
18. The Item “Revenue Declaration Linked” is defined in the Policies to be “the Estimated Revenue stated in The Schedule”. The “Basis of Settlement” for Business Interruption cover was stated to be as follows:
“We will cover You only for loss of Revenue due to (1) reduction in Revenue, and
(2) increase in cost of working.
We will pay, less any savings during the Indemnity Period in business charges or expenses, payable out of Revenue, which reduce or cease due to the Damage,
(1) Revenue, the amount by which, due to the Damage, the Standard Revenue exceeds the Revenue during the Indemnity Period.
(2) increase in cost of working, any additional expenses You necessarily and reasonably incur solely to prevent or limit a reduction in Revenue during the Indemnity Period which but for such additional expenses would have taken place due to the Damage.”
The “Standard Revenue” means: “The Revenue during the 12 months immediately before the date of the Damage which corresponds with the Indemnity Period”.
19. As Mr Kealey KC emphasised, the Policies therefore cover only one specific category of loss under this Item, that is a “reduction in Revenue”. They do not cover a reduction in “Turnover”, “Rentals” or “Fees”. The parties chose not to cover those measures of loss, and Bases of Settlement, but the general wording in the coverage clauses sometimes refers to those other bases. The insured measure of loss is the “reduction in Revenue” earned by the Claimant in the operation and activities of “The Business” resulting from “interruption or interference with The Business.” The reduction is therefore to “The Business”, not “The Premises”. In theory, the loss could be suffered at any premises around the world where “The Business” was being carried on.
20. At the end of the Business Interruption section there is set out a number of exclusions under the heading “Exceptions”. And there are also some general “Policy Exceptions” applicable to all the sections of the Policies. Part of the Claimants’ argument is that these are the only true exclusions to coverage. Similarly, there are “Definitions” within each section and general “Policy Definitions”.
(b) The Additional Covers
21. As well as the main insuring clause, the Business Interruption section provides for Additional Covers in the following way:
“Additional Covers
The Schedule states which Additional Covers apply together with any
(1) Contingencies applicable, if different from the Business Interruption Section
(2) Sum Insured
(3) Excess, consecutive hours or Deductible.
The insurance by each of the Items under the Business Interruption Section is extended to include interruption or interference with The Business resulting from
(1) the Additional Cover… described below.”
22. The “Additional Covers” include the Disease Clause set out below. This general clause explains the type of loss that is covered by the “Additional Covers”. It is the same loss as under the main insuring clause, namely a “reduction of Revenue”. That means that reductions in “Turnover”, “Rentals”, or “Fees” are not covered.
(c) The Disease Clause
23. This is the critical clause for this trial. It is in the following form (underlining added):
“Specified Diseases, Food Poisoning, Vermin Pests and Defective Sanitation, Murder or Suicide
We will provide cover in respect of interruption or interference with The Business during the Period of Insurance following
(1) a Specified Disease occurring at The Premises or within the distance in miles from the boundary of The Premises stated in The Schedule
(2) any person contracting an illness caused by food or drink poisoning, which is directly attributable to food or drink supplied from The Premises
(3) the discovery of an organism at The Premises which is likely to result in any person contracting an illness caused by food or drink poisoning or a Specified Disease
(4) the discovery of vermin or pests, or any accident causing defects in the drains or other sanitary arrangements, at The Premises
(5) any occurrence of murder or suicide at The Premises which restricts the use of or results in closure of The Premises on the order or advice of the competent authority, and directly results in a reduction in the Turnover of The Business or where insured by this Section, a reduction in Revenue, Fees, or Rentals.
The provisions of any Automatic Reinstatement Clause do not apply in respect of this Additional Cover
We will not provide cover
(1) at The Premises, if in relation to any claim arising directly or indirectly from an occurrence of Legionellosis or Legionnaires Disease You have failed to ensure compliance at all times with the Health and Safety Commissions Approved Code of Practice, “The Prevention and Control of Legionellosis (including Legionnaires Disease)” Ref ISBN-0-7176-1772- 6 or any supplementary, replacement or amending Code of Practice.
(2) for any costs incurred in cleaning, repair, replacement, recall or checking of property
(3) for reduction in the turnover of any premises, or where insured by this Section, a reduction in Revenue, Fees, or Rentals caused by
(a) any occurrence of a Specified Disease not at The Premises or not within the distance in miles from the boundary of The Premises stated in The Schedule
(b) food poisoning, vermin, pest, defective sanitation, murder or suicide, not occurring at The Premises”
24. The structure of the Disease Clause is clear. The first part sets out in (1) to (5) what is insured; the second part sets out in (1) to (3) what is not insured. The Defendant says that clause (3)(a) is an exclusion from clause (1) in the first part and that any causative occurrence outside the radius is specifically excluded. That means the Defendant is not liable even if there were causative occurrences inside the radius. The Claimants say that it is not an exclusion and should be narrowly construed, otherwise there will be no cover at all in respect of a disease like Covid-19. The Claimants also argue that “any premises” in clause (3) was deliberately chosen to distinguish itself from “The Premises” and it means any other premises than “The Premises” as defined in the Schedule. Accordingly, the Claimants say that clause (3)(a) is extremely narrow. The respective arguments are discussed further below.
25. The Schedule provides that the radius from “The Premises” that is covered is 5 miles. And the sum insured under the Disease Clause is £1m. The Specified Diseases are set out in the Additional Cover and include a number of highly infectious diseases. By a Policy Extension, the definition was extended to include any notifiable diseases and Covid-19 was added as a notifiable disease with effect from 5 March 2020.
General principles of construction
26. There is no substantial dispute as to the principles of construction applicable to these sorts of insurance Policies. The parties sought to emphasise particular principles that worked in their respective favour.
27. The first principle is that where the parties have used unambiguous language, the court must apply it: see Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900 per Lord Clarke JSC at [23].
28. Second, the court looks at the question objectively by asking what a reasonable person, put into the relevant factual matrix at the time the Policies were entered into, would have understood the relevant clauses to mean. This was succinctly summarised by Lord Hamblen and Lord Leggatt JJSC delivering the majority judgment in the FCA Test Case at [47] as follows:
“The core principle is that an insurance policy, like any other contract, must be interpreted objectively by asking what a reasonable person, with all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties when they entered the contract, would have understood the language of the contract to mean.”
29. At [77] of the same judgment, their Lordships referred to the “ordinary policyholder” rather than the “reasonable person” in the position of the parties, but it is clear from Gatwick that they did not intend to alter the “core principle” set out in [47]. In [77] of the FCA Test Case, they said as follows:
“the overriding question is how the words of the contract would be understood by a reasonable person. In the case of an insurance policy of the present kind, sold principally to SMEs, the person to whom the document should be taken to be addressed is not a pedantic lawyer who will subject the entire policy wording to a minute textual analysis. It is an ordinary policyholder who, on entering into the contract, is taken to have read through the policy conscientiously in order to understand what cover they were getting.”
And at [40] of Gatwick, the same Justices, together with Lord Burrows JSC, clarified what this paragraph meant:
“The context in which this observation was made was an argument that the cover provided by the disease clause in the business interruption section of the policy in question had been cut down by wording buried away in the middle of a general exclusion of contamination and pollution risks at the back of the policy. The above passage was explaining why such a restriction would need to be expressed transparently. It was not seeking to alter or refine the core principle set out in para 47 of the judgment. In particular, it was not seeking to suggest that the objective approach to construction involves focusing on one party, the ordinary policyholder, rather than the construct of a reasonable person in the position of the parties. That said, it is true that in most cases – including the insurance contracts with which we are concerned – such a person will not be a pedantic lawyer.”
30. Third, the construction should accord with commercial common sense. This was the fifth matter identified by Lord Neuberger PSC in Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 at [15]. This was picked up in the insurance context by Bryan J in Bluebon Ltd v Ageas (UK) Ltd (formerly Fortis Insurance Ltd) [2017] EWHC 3301 (Comm) at [139] where he said that this is “a powerful, and decisive consideration, which is at the heart of the issues of construction”. Bryan J then quoted from Lord Diplock in Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB (The Antaios) (No 2) [1985] AC 191 where he said: “if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business commonsense, it must yield to business commonsense.”
31. Fourth, Mr Lynch KC argued that the Policies should not be interpreted so as to render coverage illusory and/or significantly to reduce the scope of that cover. He referred to the point that was being discussed in [77] of the FCA Test Case (set out above) as to whether a general exclusion for “epidemic and disease” buried away on p.93 of the policy could be reasonably interpreted as removing a substantial part of the business interruption cover on p.38 of the policy. Their Lordships said at [78]:
“The reasonable reader would naturally assume that, if the intention had been to put a further substantive limit on the risk of business interruption specifically insured by the extension for infectious diseases in addition to the geographical and temporal limits stated in the extension itself, this would have been done transparently as part of the wording of the extension and not buried away in the middle of a general exclusion of contamination and pollution risks at the back of the policy. The reference in the exclusion to “disease” would reinforce the understanding that the general exclusion could not have been intended to apply to the cover for business interruption caused by an infectious disease, as it would obliterate that cover. It could not sensibly be thought to make a difference that the word “disease” was part of a composite phrase “disease and epidemic”. No reasonable reader would suppose that, although one part of this phrase was not intended to apply to the business interruption cover, the other part was.”
32. It is fair however to point out that the exclusion in this case, if it is an exclusion, appears next to the coverage clause, and Mr Lynch KC accepted that a reasonable reader would be assumed to have read the clauses together in trying to understand the scope of cover. This was not like the situation in the FCA Test Case, where the general exclusion appeared 55 pages after the coverage clause.
33. The fifth principle concerns the treatment of surplusage in commercial contracts. Mr Lynch KC submitted that the presumption against surplusage carries little weight in the interpretation of commercial contracts, referring to Total Transport Corp v Arcadia Petroleum Ltd [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 351, 357. By contrast, Mr Kealey KC said that, where possible, all parts of a contract should be given effect to and not treated as surplusage. In particular, the redundancy argument cannot be used to give words an unnatural meaning. He went on to submit that if an interpretation renders a whole clause, rather than just one word (say) redundant, then such an interpretation is likely to be wrong. He referred to Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig (Welsh Water) v Corus UK Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 285, per Moore-Bick LJ, and MT Højgaard A/S v E.ON Climate & Renewables UK Robin Rigg East Ltd [2017] UKSC 59, per Lord Neuberger PSC at [50].
34. The sixth and final relevant principle concerns exclusions (as opposed to exemptions from liability) in contracts of insurance. There is no presumption that such an exclusion should be construed narrowly against insurers or reinsurers. As Calver J said in Hamilton Corporate Member Ltd v Afghan Global Insurance Ltd [2024] EWHC 1426 (Comm)
“…an exclusion in a reinsurance policy (such as clause 4.2 in this case) is part of the definition of the scope of the cover, not an exemption from liability for cover which would otherwise have existed: Impact Funding Solutions Ltd v AIG Europe Insurance Ltd [2017] Lloyd’s Rep IR 60; [2017] AC 73 at paras 6 to 7 per Lord Hodge and Brian Leighton(Garages) Ltd at para 26 (ibid). There is, therefore, no room in this case for any presumption that the exclusion in clause 4.2 is to be narrowly construed or construed against Reinsurers.”
That case concerned reinsurers, but it applies to insurers as well: see the case referred to: Brian Leighton (Garages) Ltd v Allianz Insurance plc [2023] EWCA Civ 8, [2023] Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 380 (“Brian Leighton”) at [26].
The law on concurrent proximate causation
35. Building on established case law, the Supreme Court in the FCA Test Case has authoritatively stated the law on concurrent proximate causes. At [173] to [174] Lord Hamblen and Lord Leggatt JJSC said:
“173 The leading modern authority which illustrates this possibility in the insurance field is JJ Lloyd Instruments Ltd v Northern Star Insurance Co Ltd (The Miss Jay Jay) [1987] 1 Lloyds Rep 32. This case concerned a yacht insured against loss caused by “external accidental means”. The yacht sank as a result of what was held to be a combination of causes which were “equal, or at least nearly equal, in their efficiency” (per Slade LJ at p 40). They were adverse sea conditions and design defects which rendered the yacht unseaworthy. The first of these causes fell within the scope of the insurance; the other, unseaworthiness, did not but nor was it an excluded peril. The Court of Appeal held that in these circumstances the loss was proximately caused by a peril insured against and was therefore covered. See also ENE Kos 1 Ltd v Petroleo Brasileiro SA (No 2) [2012] 2 AC 164, paras 12 and 74. As Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony JSC stated in para 74: “where there are two effective causes, neither of which is excluded but only one of which is insured, the insurers are liable”.
174 This situation is to be contrasted with one where there are two proximate causes of loss, of which one is an insured peril but the other is expressly excluded from cover under the policy. Here, although it is always a question of interpretation, the exclusion will generally prevail: see Wayne Tank and Pump Co Ltd v Employers Liability Assurance Corpn Ltd [1974] QB 57; Midland Mainline Ltd v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2004] 2 Lloyd s Rep 604; Atlasnavios-Navegação, LDA (formerly Bnavios-Navegação, LDA) v Navigators Insurance Co Ltd (The B Atlantic) [2019] AC 136, para 49.”
36. In the FCA Test Case, the Supreme Court held that the cases of Covid-19 occurring outside the radius, which were concurrent proximate causes of the loss, but were not specifically excluded, did not prevent the insurers being liable. It is therefore of critical importance to see if the Policies excluded cover for loss caused by cases outside the radius. It is an admitted fact for the purposes of this trial that the losses to the Claimants were concurrently caused by cases of Covid-19 both inside the 5-mile radius and outside it.
37. The rationale for these rules is to give proper effect to the exclusion. If there is such an exclusion then, were the rule to be otherwise, the insurer might be liable for the very thing that it has said it will not cover. Whereas if there is no such exclusion, then the insured would reasonably assume that the loss is covered by the insured cause.
38. I will come back to the question of what the reasonable person would know about these legal principles when interpreting the Policies.
Preliminary Issue 1 – The Scope of Cover
39. The Defendant says that clause 3(a) operates to exclude cover where there is any occurrence of Covid-19 outside the 5-mile radius that is a proximate cause of the loss. As there were thousands of such cases, the concurrent proximate cause rule applies and the Defendant is not liable. In short, the Defendant is saying that the wording of the clause is clear and it should be given its natural meaning, which is effectively that it is only liable if the losses were solely caused by occurrences of Covid-19 within the radius. As it has been agreed for the purposes of this trial that there were concurrent proximate causes outside the radius, this construction leads inevitably to a finding that for a disease like Covid-19, there is no cover.
40. The Claimants have three broad arguments as to the way the relevant clauses should be construed:
(1) Their new primary case is that clause (3) only excludes losses at “any premises” that are not defined as “The Premises” (the ““any premises” argument”);
(2) Alternatively, the Claimants say that clause (3) is not a clear and true exclusion, such that it engages the concurrent proximate causes rule explained above (the “non-exclusion argument”);
(3) They also say that clause (3) only applies if the sole cause of the loss is occurrences of the disease outside the radius (the “sole cause argument”).
41. I will deal with each argument in turn.
(1) The “any premises” argument
42. In his skeleton argument, Mr Lynch KC put this argument forward as his “primary case”, with the others seemingly relegated to being alternative cases. In his oral submissions, however, Mr Lynch KC said that this was only done to distinguish the arguments and they were all of equal weight. In fact, we probably spent more time on the other arguments at the hearing.
43. Mr Kealey KC sought to make a play on the Claimants’ change of argument. He rightly questioned how it could be that the “any premises” argument was not raised at all by the Claimants until nearly six years after they first made a claim in March 2020. It did not feature in any of the voluminous correspondence between the parties’ solicitors where the construction issues were debated. Nor did it appear in the Particulars of Claim. The first reference to the “any premises” argument was in the Claimants’ Reply dated 26 November 2025 where at [2(7)] the following was said:
“Further or in the alternative, although a matter of submission in due course, Sub-Clause (3)(a) only applies to “…reduction in the turnover of any premises” and not to “Premises”, meaning it is irrelevant to the issues arising between the parties in this case.”
44. The preliminary issues as agreed and as set out in [7] above assume that the only issue is the sole cause argument and make no mention of the construction advocated for in the “any premises” argument. It was only when the Claimants served their skeleton argument for this hearing on 25 September 2026 that it became apparent that this was their main and “primary” argument.
45. While these have a flavour of forensic rather than substantive points, and I will of course engage thoroughly on the merits of the argument, there is something in Mr Kealey KC’s submission that, if it took experienced, and possibly pedantic, lawyers nearly six years to arrive at the “any premises” argument, the suggestion that this is what clause (3) would be understood to mean by a reasonable person reading it at the time seems rather unlikely.
46. The “any premises” argument turns on what “any premises” means in the stem to clause (3) and whether it also applies to a “reduction in Revenue” (the only measure of loss in the Policies for Business Interruption insurance) or whether it is confined to a “reduction in the turnover of any premises”. At first blush, it seems fairly obvious that, because of the positioning of the words “any premises”, they purely relate to “turnover”, particularly as “Revenue” is a defined term related to the “Business” as a whole and the two parts to the clause are connected by “or”.
47. The first part of the Disease Clause, what Mr Lynch KC called the “Coverage Clause”, begins with the following: “We will provide cover in respect of interruption or interference with The Business during the Period of Insurance following…” The measure of indemnity in the Policies for Business Interruption is largely a reduction in “Revenue” (it is also increase in cost of working). But the stem to clause (3) in the second part of the Disease Clause, what Mr Lynch KC called the “Non-Coverage Clause”, does not repeat that phrasing, as it could have done, and instead resorts to different wording concerning “turnover of any premises”, and “reduction in Revenue, Fees, or Rentals caused by…”. Mr Kealey KC submitted that they were both effectively the same.
48. Mr Lynch KC took me through each of the risks insured. Except for clause (1) which limits coverage to the “Specified Disease occurring at The Premises or within [a 5-mile radius] of the boundary of The Premises”, the other clauses limit occurrence to “The Premises”. That is why clause (3) in the second part separates between: (a), that is linked to (1) and deals with the radius; and (b), that is linked to (2) to (5) and is confined to “The Premises”.
49. Mr Lynch KC drew my attention to clause (5) that deals with “murder or suicide at The Premises”. That clause specifies that coverage depends on the occurrence directly resulting “in a reduction in the Turnover of the Business or where insured by this Section, a reduction in Revenue, Fees, or Rentals…” That mirrors the wording in the stem of clause (3), save that it refers to “Turnover of the Business” rather than “turnover of any premises” – note the distinction with clause (3): the upper case “T” in “Turnover” (although it is not a defined term in the Policies); and “the Business” rather than “the premises”. Mr Lynch KC said that this was deliberate by the draftsperson and must therefore have some meaning.
50. Mr Lynch KC made the following submissions:
(1) The deliberate distinction between “any premises” in clause (3) and the use of the defined term “The Premises” elsewhere cannot be ignored. The use of “any” is also important as it indicates an intention to refer to unidentified premises that are not specified as “The Premises” from which the “Business” might be carried on.
(2) The use of “premises” and “The Premises” elsewhere in the Policies shows that, where “premises” is used, it is to distinguish it from the locations identified in the Schedule and defined as “The Premises”.
(3) Any argument that “any premises” means “The Premises” would impermissibly elide the meaning of a defined term with an undefined term. (However, I do not think that that is what the Defendant is doing. It says that “any premises” includes “The Premises”, putting emphasis on the word “any”, and not that they are the same as “The Premises”.)
(4) The use of “any premises” in clause (3) as defined in this way serves a significant commercial purpose.
51. Mr Lynch KC sought to support that commercial purpose argument by positing certain illustrative scenarios.
(1) The first example was where an insured’s Business was a shop open to the public, and the shop was listed in the Schedule as “The Premises”. The insured also had a workshop that was part of the Business but which was not listed in the Schedule. A reduction in Revenue suffered by the workshop would be covered if the loss is caused by an occurrence of Covid-19 at the shop or within the specified radius. But if the loss was caused by occurrences of Covid-19 outside the radius, clause (3)(a) would mean that the insurer was not liable.
(2) Closer to the Claimants’ situation was an example of the insured’s Business being the provision of student accommodation which is one of “The Premises” listed in the Schedule. A separate accommodation office, where the Business was also carried on, was not listed in the Schedule. Losses suffered at the accommodation office will be covered if caused by an occurrence of Covid-19 at the accommodation or within the radius but will not be covered if it is outside the radius.
(3) A more extreme example was given orally by Mr Lynch KC. Say one of the Claimants had premises in Brazil from which the “Business” is carried on. That is obviously well outside the radius and, if the Business in Brazil suffered loss as a result of Covid-19 in Brazil, there would not be cover. It is fairly obvious why the insurer would want to be clear that it was not covering that risk. However, Mr Lynch KC accepted that if it was concurrently caused by occurrences of Covid-19 within the radius of “The Premises”, then that would also be excluded in accordance with the concurrent proximate causes rule explained above.
52. The main problem with these scenarios is that they show that the Claimants’ construction of clause (3)(a) renders it completely otiose. If all it is saying is that there is no coverage for occurrences of Covid-19 outside the radius that are the sole cause of loss suffered by the Business at “any premises”, then that is saying no more than coverage clause (1) which requires there to be an occurrence within the radius. I therefore cannot see that there is any real commercial purpose to clause (3)(a), construed in that way. Furthermore, the scenarios are highly unlikely to arise, and are unrealistic and contrived.
53. More fundamentally, I do not see that clause (3)(a) can properly and reasonably be read in the way Mr Lynch KC invites me to under the “any premises” argument. This is for the two main reasons put forward by Mr Kealey KC:
(1) The natural way to read clause (3) is for “any premises” to apply only to a “reduction in turnover” and not the latter part of the clause, namely a “reduction in Revenue”;
(2) Even if “any premises” does apply to the “reduction in Revenue” part of the clause, I do not think that “any premises” should be construed as excluding the premises listed in the Schedule, i.e. those that are defined as “The Premises”.
54. As to point (1), it seems to me that the stem to clause (3) is looking at the various measures of loss that could be covered by the indemnity. As explained above, these Policies only had “reduction in Revenue” as the measure of loss for the Business Interruption insurance section. The other items in the clause (3) stem were not covered; I assume they were there in case the Schedule had included them in the cover.
55. The first item referred to is “reduction in the turnover of any premises”. Turnover is not defined in the Policies (and the reference to “Turnover” in clause (5) is also not defined, even with the upper case “T”). The clause implies that it is different to “Revenue”. More specifically, it is tied to “any premises”. The most natural way to read it is that it is referring to turnover at particular premises where the “Business” is carried on. That would distinguish it from “Revenue” which is, by definition, tied to the “Business” wherever it is carried on.
56. The stem to clause (3) then continues with an alternative measure of loss – “or” – and qualifies the latter three measures by “where insured by this Section”. It is curious that those words only qualify the latter part of the clause, and not the reference to “turnover”. But it is accepted that both “turnover of any premises”, and “Fees, or Rentals” are not covered by the Policies. “Revenue”, “Fees” and “Rentals” are at least potentially defined terms, or would be if they were covered; whereas “turnover of any premises” is not. As such, it was defined by the words “any premises”. Those were not needed to define “Revenue” because that is linked to the “Business”. I therefore see no basis for reading the words “any premises” in the first part as qualifying or defining the second part of the stem to clause (3); in particular, the words “reduction in Revenue”.
57. The Claimants only wish to apply the words “any premises” to “reduction in Revenue”, so as to limit clause (3) to their narrow definition of “any premises”, namely that it excludes “The Premises” specified in the Schedule. But this would be to rewrite the clause, when its natural meaning is clear and unambiguous.
58. Mr Lynch KC rightly compared the wording in clause (3) with that in the stem to the coverage clause and queried why the same words were not used when they are describing the same thing. Mr Kealey KC accepted that his construction was that they were essentially saying the same thing, that is that they both are describing the loss that is covered by the Business Interruption insurance. I agree that that is an oddity that cannot be explained. But I do not see how it means that an unnatural and strained construction needs to be applied to clause (3). It could also be said that clause (3) is only concerned with the “reduction in Revenue” measure of loss, whereas the coverage clause encompasses all measures of loss and that would include an “increase in cost of working”.
59. Similarly, the fact that different words were used in clause (5) for the murder or suicide cover does not mean that the words in clause (3) should not be given their natural meaning. It took the Claimants nearly six years to come up with this interpretation of the words, and that was only after lawyers will have pored over the clause to try to make it work in their favour. I do not think a reasonable person with all the necessary background knowledge of the parties would read the clause in the way the Claimants are suggesting.
60. Turning to point (2), which is only relevant if I am wrong on point (1) such that “any premises” applies to a “reduction in Revenue”, the Claimants invite me to read or define “any premises” as excluding any of those premises that are specified in the Schedule as “The Premises”. However, I cannot see how “any premises” could be so defined in clause (3).
61. For a start, “any premises” is, on the face of it, wide and inclusive. The definition of “The Premises” is “The premises specified in The Schedule”, with a lower case “p”. The very definition assumes that “The Premises” are “premises”. The former is a subset of the latter. Looked at in that way, there is no ignoring of the distinction between the defined and undefined terms; on the contrary, the definition is being respected and given effect to.
62. It is unnecessary to apply “any premises” to a “reduction in Revenue” because it is accepted that a “reduction in Revenue” is not confined to “The Premises”, as the Business could be carried on from any premises. That is encapsulated in the notion of the “Revenue”. But it does not make sense to go a step further and say that “any premises” must be construed as not including “The Premises”.
63. Mr Lynch KC referred to certain other appearances of the word “premises” in the Policies to support his argument that it must exclude “The Premises”. However, none of the references were to “any premises” and it can be seen from the specific context of the clause whether it included “The Premises” or not. For example, under the Property Damage cover for Subsidence, the Policies provided that: “We will not provide cover for…Damage caused by…any demolition, construction, erection, ground or excavation works, carried out at the site of The Premises or the site of any adjoining premises, unless we have agreed otherwise.” There “The Premises” appears in the same clause alongside “adjoining premises”, so the distinction is expressly made. Having said that, it is not necessary to exclude “The Premises” from the definition of “premises”, because the clause is trying to capture both “The Premises” and those adjoining them. It does not help on the meaning of “any premises” in clause (3).
64. Mr Kealey KC referred to some other examples in which the word “premises” would probably, from the context, include “The Premises” – see for example the Frozen Food cover for fridges “at premises owned, hired, leased by You…” which he submitted must have been intended to cover fridges at “The Premises”.
65. I accept Mr Kealey KC’s broader point that a reasonable reader of the Policies would not scour them to find references to “premises” to try and understand what is meant by the reference to “any premises” in clause (3). In reading that clause in the context of the Business Interruption section, the reasonable reader would see the words “any premises” as having the widest possible meaning and certainly would not assume that it excluded “The Premises” listed in the Schedule. In fact, I do not think the reasonable person would think that the words “any premises” affected the meaning of clause (3)(a) in any way, so as to cut down or emasculate the effect of the clause.
66. Mr Lynch KC had sought to add to the factual matrix relevant to this construction the Investment Property Policies referred to in the agreed/assumed facts (set out in [9] above). He said that it was relevant that some of the Claimants owned investment properties that were not “The Premises” and were separately insured under the Investment Property Policies for losses suffered at those investment properties. I fail to understand how this helps in construing the words “any premises” in the Policies and whether they include or exclude the premises listed in the Schedule as “The Premises”. The fact that some of those premises may be covered under the Investment Property Policies is neither here nor there. Mr Lynch KC was right not to pursue this argument at the hearing.
67. In conclusion on the “any premises” argument, I do not consider that “any premises” in clause (3) governs or qualifies “reduction in Revenue” which is the only measure of loss applicable to the Business Interruption insurance. And even if I am wrong about that, “any premises” in clause (3) includes any of the premises that are listed in the Schedule and defined as “The Premises”.
(2) The non-exclusion argument
68. Mr Lynch KC’s broad overarching point on the construction of clause (3)(a) is that, if the Defendant wished to exclude cover in relation to diseases such as Covid-19, which the parties would have appreciated would spread far and wide and Business Interruption losses would likely be concurrently caused by cases both inside and outside the radius, it would have to have done so with very clear language. Any reasonable policyholder entering into this type of insurance in relation to specified diseases would assume that they would be covered for any outbreak of those diseases where there had been at least some occurrences within the radius. Mr Lynch KC submitted that the effect of clause (3)(a) being an exclusion clause within the meaning of the concurrent proximate causes rule as explained by the Supreme Court in the FCA Test Case, is that there is no cover for a disease such as Covid-19, rendering the insurance illusory. It is as though the word “solely” had been written into coverage clause (1) so that there is cover only where the occurrences within the radius are the sole cause of the losses.
69. Mr Lynch KC referred to findings as to the relevant factual matrix and context in relation to a disease such as Covid-19 in the FCA Test Case. In [316] of Lord Briggs JSC’s judgment, he stated as follows:
“The consequence therefore is that, on the insurers’ case, the cover apparently provided for business interruption caused by the effects of a national pandemic type of notifiable disease was in reality illusory, just when it might have been supposed to have been most needed by policyholders. That outcome seemed to me to be clearly contrary to the spirit and intent of the relevant provisions of the policies in issue. It therefore comes as no surprise to me that all the judges who have considered these issues have been unanimous in rejecting that outcome, albeit that this court has done so, rightly in my view, more comprehensively than did the court below. This is not to mis-use the dubious benefit of hindsight when applying an insuring clause to events which could not have been contemplated by the parties at the time of their bargain. As the majority show, there were a number of well-known notifiable diseases (such as cholera, plague, typhus, yellow fever and SARS) to which the relevant clauses clearly applied, all of which were capable of spreading rapidly and widely, so as potentially to cause a threat to health on a national scale, and to threaten a national reaction by the responsible authorities, leading to business disruption on a national scale.”
70. The majority judgment also dealt with this, albeit in the context of considering the insurers’ arguments about “but for” causation, in [194] to [196]:
“194 In deciding between these competing interpretations, we consider that the matters of background knowledge to which the court below attached weight in interpreting the policy wordings are important. The parties to the insurance contracts may be presumed to have known that some infectious diseases including, potentially, a new disease (like SARS) can spread rapidly, widely and unpredictably. It is obvious that an outbreak of an infectious disease may not be confined to a specific locality or to a circular area delineated by a radius of 25 miles around a policyholder’s premises. Hence no reasonable person would suppose that, if an outbreak of an infectious disease occurred which included cases within such a radius and was sufficiently serious to interrupt the policyholder’s business, all the cases of disease would necessarily occur within the radius. It is highly likely that such an outbreak would comprise cases both inside and outside the radius and that measures taken by a public authority which affected the business would be taken in response to the outbreak as a whole and not just to those cases of disease which happened to fall within the circumference of the circle described by the radius provision.
195 We do not consider it reasonable to attribute to the parties an intention that in such circumstances the question whether business interruption losses were caused by cases of a notifiable disease occurring within the radius is to be answered by asking whether or to what extent, but for those cases of disease, business interruption loss would have been suffered as a result of cases of disease occurring outside the radius. Not only would this potentially give rise to intractable counterfactual questions but, more fundamentally, it seems to us contrary to the commercial intent of the clause to treat uninsured cases of a notifiable disease occurring outside the territorial scope of the cover as depriving the policyholder of an indemnity in respect of interruption also caused by cases of disease which the policy is expressed to cover. We agree with the FCA’s central argument in relation to the radius provisions that the parties could not reasonably be supposed to have intended that cases of disease outside the radius could be set up as a countervailing cause which displaces the causal impact of the disease inside the radius.
196 This conclusion is reinforced by the other matter to which the court below attached particular importance in interpreting the disease clauses. This is the fact that the relevant wordings do not confine cover to a situation where the interruption of the business has resulted only from cases of a notifiable disease within the radius, as opposed to other cases elsewhere. As leading counsel for the FCA, Mr Edelman, pointed out, to apply a “but for” test in a situation where cases of disease inside and outside the radius are concurrent causes of business interruption loss would give the insurer similar protection to that which it would have had if loss caused by any occurrence of a notifiable disease outside the specified radius had been expressly excluded from cover. If the insurers had wished to impose such an exclusion, it was incumbent on them to include it in the terms of the policy.”
71. Mr Lynch KC says that these passages are important as showing the relevant context and background knowledge that the reasonable person would possess in working out the meaning of clause (3)(a). That is not disputed by Mr Kealey KC although he said that, even though it might affect coverage for highly infectious diseases such as Covid-19, SARS, typhoid etc., it does not render the coverage illusory because there are plenty of diseases that will not likely spread outside the radius and so there is no risk of concurrent proximate causes.
72. There was a debate over what the reasonable person would be assumed to know about the concurrent proximate causes rule. In such respect, reference was made to Popplewell LJ’s judgment in Brian Leighton. At [40] he said as follows:
“For these reasons I would regard the presumption that the exclusionary wording is concerned only with proximate causes to be a strong one. It is reasonable to attribute this presumed intention to these parties. Assureds such as BLG have brokers who can advise them, and brokers are to be taken to be familiar with the basic insurance principle of proximate causation, and language which reflects it or, by contrast, modifies it. Both assured and broker have access to legal advice which would involve no pedantry in advising on the presumptions involved in the use of such language. This is part of “the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties”. I do not take what was said in para 77 of FCA v Arch as suggesting that the reasonable person in an SME’s shoes should not be taken to be familiar with the basic principles of insurance law and the meaning which has been put on phrases used in insurance contracts by consistent judicial authority. Many policies of insurance in many fields contain terms of art which have acquired their meaning by consistent use and judicial interpretation, which it is the duty of brokers to understand and, if necessary, advise on.”
And at [44] Popplewell LJ referred to the fact that concurrent causes are not often encountered in practice. He said:
“Instances in reported cases of concurrent proximate causes are not common, but are not as rare as might at first be supposed. MacGillivray on Insurance Law, 15th Edition, goes as far as to say at para 19-005 that it “often happens that the insured’s loss is attributable to at least two proximate causes acting concurrently”. The Atlasnavios case is a recent example, in which smugglers affixing cocaine to a ship, and consequent detention by the port authorities upon its discovery, were treated as concurrent proximate causes. Lord Mance DPSC said at para 43 in that case that while the general aim in insurance law is to identify a single real, effective or proximate cause of any loss, the correct analysis is in some cases that there are two concurrent causes and this is particularly so where an exceptions clause takes certain perils out of the prima facie cover. Another recent example, and a striking one, is FCA v Arch, in which it was held that each and every case of Covid-19 in the United Kingdom, approaching or even exceeding a million in number, was to be treated as a concurrent proximate cause of the national response to the pandemic; and that it was not necessary for such a proximate cause to satisfy a but for test of causation. It is not, therefore, fanciful to suppose that the drafter of Exclusion 9 had concurrent proximate causes in mind, consistently with the language used elsewhere in the Exclusion.”
73. From both Brian Leighton and the FCA Test Case, I think it can reasonably be said that the parties, whether through themselves, their brokers, or their lawyers, should be taken to be aware of the broad concepts of insurance law around proximate causation and concurrent causes. They should also be taken to be aware that some of the diseases covered by the Disease Clause would be very likely to spread far and wide, and that any Business Interruption losses would be likely to be caused by the response to cases of the disease arising both inside and outside the prescribed radius.
74. But the last two sentences of [196] of the FCA Test Case are important. They emphasise the fact that, if there is an express exclusion for losses caused by occurrences of the disease outside the radius, then the insurers will not be liable, even if there are concurrent causes inside the radius. That is the operation of the rule explained in [173] and [174] of the FCA Test Case. And that is why the Claimants are saying that clause (3)(a) is not an express exclusion that brings into play that rule resulting in there being no cover at all. Mr Kealey KC, by contrast, submitted that the Defendant in this case did precisely what the Supreme Court said it should do in the FCA Test Case and obtained an express exclusion for occurrences of the specified diseases outside the radius. It would be odd, he said, if that left the Defendant in the same position as the insurers in the FCA Test Case who did not have an express exclusion in their policies.
75. Mr Lynch KC submitted that clause (3)(a) is not a “true” exclusion clause. He said that its positioning within the main coverage clause and not within the dedicated “Exceptions” sections is significant, with the headings and overall structure of the Policies clearly indicating what are, and what are not, exclusions. Rather than being an exclusion, he suggested that it merely clarified the scope of cover and could not have been intended to have the dramatic effect of excluding liability for a number of specified diseases. He also said that the introductory words “We will not provide cover…” are inapt to create a true exclusion; rather they indicate a limited carve-out from the losses that would otherwise be covered.
76. I am afraid that I cannot accept these submissions, however attractively made, as they put form over substance and ignore the clear words of clause 3(a) and indeed the whole of the Disease Clause. I agree with Mr Lynch KC that it is significant that the specific exclusions for the Disease Clause appear immediately after the coverage clauses. But that is not so as to indicate that they are not true exclusions. It is because they deal with the specific coverage clauses and any reasonable person reading the Disease Clause will see that the cover is narrowed by what is excluded in clauses (1) to (3). This can be compared to the position in the FCA Test Case where the “epidemic and disease” exclusion was buried away at the back of the policy (see [78] of the FCA Test Case and [31] above). This also explains why the specific exclusions were not in the “Exceptions” sections of the Policies.
77. Perhaps more importantly, if clause (3)(a) is not an exclusion clause, then it seems to me it is not doing anything at all. The insuring clause covering Business Interruption losses caused by occurrences of the disease at “The Premises” or within the radius is clear. It does not need clarifying or supplementing. The only point of clause (3)(a) would be to exclude something that was otherwise covered. On the Claimants’ construction, it is completely redundant. I have dealt above in [33] with the arguments as to redundancy and it does seem to me that clause (3)(a) must have been included to have some effect.
78. As Mr Kealey KC submitted, clause (3)(a) has to be looked at in context. It is immediately preceded by clauses (1) and (2) which exclude from cover certain cases of Legionnaires Disease if regulations had not been complied with and the costs of cleaning, repair etc. of property. Mr Lynch KC dismissed these exclusions on the basis that they are very narrow, and so they are. But they are still exclusions from the main cover.
79. Clause (3)(a) relates to the Specified Disease cover in coverage clause (1). Clause (3)(b) relates to the other perils insured by coverage clauses (2) to (5) which do not have a radius for occurrence outside “The Premises”. Clause (3)(b) therefore looks like it was intended to operate in the same way as clause (3)(a), excluding cover for occurrences away from “The Premises”. There was a lively debate at the hearing about what would be the effect of finding a rat at “The Premises”, but also discovering rats in the drains of a neighbouring college and whether that would exclude cover. Similarly, it was questioned whether a case of food poisoning arising out of food purchased from “The Premises”, but taken away and eaten away from “The Premises”, would prevent there being any coverage at all.
80. However, these examples overlook the fact that an insurer would have to prove that the stray rat or the case of offsite food poisoning was a proximate cause of the Business Interruption loss, and that seems unlikely. In our case, as a result of the FCA Test Case, it is an agreed fact that the losses were proximately caused by cases of Covid-19 outside the radius, as well as inside.
81. In my view, the fact that clause (3)(a) appears amongst other exclusions, all governed by the opening words “We will not provide cover…”, is a strong indicator that it was intended to operate as an exclusion. Most of the sections of the Policies are structured in this way, with specific exclusions immediately following the coverage clause, such as the Disease Clause, then more general exclusions at the end of the section, such as the Business Interruption section, under the heading “Exceptions”. There is also a general “Policy Exceptions” section, applying to all sections of the Policies. They all start with the words: “We will not provide cover for…”
82. Therefore, my conclusion is that clause (3)(a) is a “true” exclusion within the meaning envisaged by the Supreme Court in the FCA Test Case. Mr Lynch KC’s description of the clause as merely clarifying the scope of cover does not help, because an exclusion in an insurance contract necessarily defines the scope of cover – see Lord Hodge JSC at [7], [18] and [32] of Impact Funding Solutions Ltd v AIG Europe Insurance Ltd [2017] Lloyd’s Rep IR 60; [2017] AC 73, referred to in [34] above.
(3) The sole cause argument
83. The Claimants’ final argument is that, assuming clause (3)(a) is an exclusion, on its proper construction, it is only excluding cases of Covid-19 outside the radius where they are the sole cause of the loss. They therefore submit that the word “solely” should be read into clause (3) before “caused by”. But the effect of doing so is that clause (3)(a) is rendered completely pointless, because there is no cover under clause (1) for Covid-19 cases occurring outside the radius. It is difficult to see that it would be appropriate to read in a word that has the effect of depriving the clause of any relevance or use.
84. Mr Lynch KC sought to persuade me that this flowed from the fact that clause (3) adopted the much stricter causal requirement by using the words “caused by”; whereas the coverage clause used the word “following” which imports a looser causal requirement. He said that this must have been deliberate within the same Disease Clause and so should be given effect to. He also said that insofar as the Defendant has criticised the Claimants for reading in the word “solely”, then he could similarly criticise the Defendant for reading in the word “solely” to coverage clause (1).
85. As to the latter point, I do not think it is a fair riposte. Mr Kealey KC did not ask for the word “solely” to be written into the coverage clause, although he fairly accepted that his construction of the Disease Clause, including the exclusion in clause (3)(a), had the effect of reading in the word “solely”. That was because of the operation of the concurrent proximate causes rule. By contrast, the Claimants do have to rewrite clause (3) to add the word “solely” to get home on the sole cause argument.
86. Insofar as the Claimants rely on the words “caused by” as meaning a stricter causal connection than the normal proximate cause test, then that seems to me untenable. There is a strong presumption in insurance contracts that “caused by” means “proximately caused by” – see Coxe v Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp Ltd [1916] 2 KB 629, per Scrutton J. This is based on the presumed intention of the parties and it can be displaced if the policy provides otherwise – see: the FCA Test Case at [163]; Brian Leighton at [29] and [40]; and AerCap Ireland Ltd v AIG Europe SA and ors [2025] EWHC 1430 (Comm) per Butcher J, as he then was, at [592(2)].
87. Different language was used in the Policies when the presumption of proximate causation was displaced – see the Terrorism exclusion in the Business Interruption section that stated as follows:
“We will not provide cover for
…(13) any Damage to the Property Insured resulting directly or indirectly from or in connection with any of the following regardless of any other cause or event contributing concurrently or other sequence to the loss
(a) Terrorism [etc.]”
This shows that the draftsperson appreciated the proximate cause presumption and changed it. It also shows an awareness of the concurrent proximate causes rule. It appears to have been accepted in this case that proximate causation was the relevant test as the agreed facts as to concurrent proximate causes assume that.
88. I also think that the difference in wording between the coverage clause’s use of “following” and the exclusion clause’s use of “caused by” does not lead to the conclusion that “caused by” means “solely caused by”. Mr Kealey KC submitted that this “search for shades of semantic difference” between the different forms of causation language was precisely what was cautioned against by the Supreme Court in the FCA Test Case (see [162]). The Supreme Court was comparing the language in the different policies under consideration but there is no indication in this case that the parties intended anything other than proximate causation to apply to both formulations in the Disease Clause.
89. In any event, I do not see how clause (3)(a) can sensibly be read as including the word “solely” so as to make it have no effect or purpose. The Claimants understandably suggest that the Defendant’s construction of clause (3)(a) makes the cover for a disease like Covid-19 illusory and worthless. If it was intended to exclude cover for such a disease, this should have been very transparently stated and flagged up so that the Claimants knew that that was the effect of the Policies’ wording. That is particularly so bearing in mind what the Supreme Court said in [194] and [316] of the FCA Test Case.
90. But it is understandable that insurers might want to protect themselves from liability for a pandemic that spreads over a very wide area leading to a national response and lockdown. As Mr Kealey KC demonstrated by flourishing some maps showing how wide a 5-mile radius from certain of the Premises listed in the Schedule for University College would be, it takes one way outside Oxford. A 5-mile radius from the centre of Oxford is an area of over 78 square miles. That provides meaningful and quite extensive cover for most of the diseases specified in the Disease Clause. It is not unreasonable of the Defendant to seek to limit the cover to occurrences within that radius causing loss. The Defendant was only doing what the Supreme Court said it should do in the FCA Test Case if it wished not to be liable for widespread disease.
91. In conclusion, I consider that the wording of clause (3)(a) is clear and unambiguous. There is no basis for inserting the word “solely” into the clause, which would render it otiose. I think a reasonable person with all the background knowledge reasonably available to the parties, including that identified by the Supreme Court in the FCA Test Case, would understand that clause (3)(a) was limiting the Defendant’s liability in some way or other. The words would be read as having their ordinary and natural meaning, without the addition of any words or any convoluted interpretation. Clause (3)(a) operates as an exclusion clause that relieved the Defendant of liability if there were occurrences of the disease outside the radius that were concurrent proximate causes of the loss.
92. I therefore answer the first preliminary issue in favour of the Defendant with the construction set out in para. 1.2 of Annex A to the Directions Order.
Preliminary Issue 2 – The Trends Clause
93. As noted above, the parties are agreed that this is not really an issue, because it follows the result of the scope of cover preliminary issue. This sort of Trends Clause was materially similar to those considered in the FCA Test Case. The Supreme Court made clear (see particularly [260] to [264], [268] and [287]) that trends clauses are part of the quantification of loss machinery and should not affect the scope of indemnity under the cover. I have decided that clause (3)(a) means that there is no cover for losses caused by Covid-19 occurrences even inside the radius by operation of the concurrent proximate causes rule. Therefore, the Trends Clause is now irrelevant.
94. If I had found for the Claimants on the scope of cover, the situation would be the same as was considered in the FCA Test Case, and the occurrences of Covid-19 outside the radius could not have been used to reduce the Claimants’ loss under the Trends Clause because that would be using the clause to remove cover that had been found to exist. In other words, I would have been with the Claimants and answered preliminary issue 2 “No”, if I had been with them on preliminary issue 1. But as I was against them, the issue does not really arise.
Disposition
95. In respect of preliminary issue 1 and the scope of cover, I answer it in favour of the Defendant and in accordance with the construction set out in paragraph 1.2 of Annex A to the Directions Order.
96. In relation to preliminary issue 2, I would have answered it “No” if I had found in favour of the Claimants on preliminary issue 1. As I found against the Claimants, the issue does not arise.
97. I would hope that the parties could agree an Order incorporating my findings and any consequential matters. If they are unable to agree any consequential matters, I can either deal with them in writing, or, if necessary, at a further short hearing.
For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our business lawyer in Paris.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).