Civil United Kingdom

Treal Care (UK) Limited, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 1420

Case No: CA-2025-001964

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Simon Tinkler (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)

AC-2024-LON-003923

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 5 November 2026

Before :

LORD JUSTICE PETER JACKSON

LORD JUSTICE GREEN

and

LORD JUSTICE FANCOURT

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

THE KING (ON THE APPLICATION
OF TREAL CARE (UK) LIMITED)
Respondent/
Claimant
– and –
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant/
Defendant

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Lord Murray of Blidworth and Tom Tabori (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) for the Appellant

Zane Malik KC and Arif Rehman (instructed by AWS Solicitors) for the Respondent

Hearing date : 6 October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 5 November 2026 by circulation

to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

Lord Justice Peter Jackson:

Overview

1. Treal Care (UK) Limited (‘Treal Care’) supplies care staff to the NHS, local authorities and clinical care groups. The Secretary of State for the Home Department granted it a licence to sponsor skilled migrants to come to the United Kingdom for that purpose. In October 2024, the licence was revoked. Treal Care applied for judicial review and on 16 July 2025 Simon Tinkler, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Administrative Court, quashed the revocation decision. The Secretary of State now appeals, with permission of Elisabeth Laing LJ.

2. The appeal centrally concerns the Secretary of State’s policy, which provides that a sponsor licence will be revoked if a sponsor is paying a migrant worker less than they said they would when they sponsored them. How is that to be interpreted and applied?

3. For the reasons given below, I would dismiss the appeal. My central conclusion is that the question of compliance with an annual salary commitment that has been made to workers who work uneven hours requires a rounded assessment, not a rigid application of a requirement to pay at least one-twelfth of the annual figure every month.

Background

4. Treal Care was established in 2018. In December 2021, it was granted a sponsor licence with an A-rating, which allowed it to sponsor 75 migrant workers by issuing Certificates of Sponsorship (‘CoS’) to them. By 2024, the Judge found that Treal Care had a workforce of some 85 employees, of whom around 75 worked under a CoS.

5. On 21 August 2024, following a visit by the Compliance Team in March 2024, the Secretary of State suspended the licence and requested further information from Treal Care, which it provided.

6. On 1 October 2024, the Secretary of State communicated the decision to revoke the licence (‘the Decision’) on two grounds: that three employees had not been paid the salary set out in their CoS (‘the Salary Issue’), and that Treal Care had no genuine vacancy for those employees (‘the Genuine Vacancy Issue’).

7. On 17 October 2024, Treal Care sent a pre-action protocol letter and, when the Secretary of State maintained the Decision, it served its judicial review claim on 18 December 2024. Permission to apply having been granted, the claim was heard by the Judge on 20 May 2025, with judgment being handed down on 16 July 2025: [2025] EWHC 1797 (Admin).

8. The Judge found for Treal Care in respect of both of the grounds for revocation. The Secretary of State has not sought to challenge his decision on the Genuine Vacancy Issue, and this appeal concerns only the Salary Issue. We were told that Treal Care’s sponsor licence has remained in place pending the appeal.

Sponsor licences

9. The regime governing sponsor licences is contained in the Secretary of State’s published policy: Workers and Temporary Workers: guidance for sponsors (‘the Guidance’).

10. Part 2, concerning the arrangements for sponsoring a worker, includes Section S4, which relates to pay and conditions. As relevant to this appeal, the sponsor must ensure that the worker’s salary meets or exceeds the applicable thresholds under the Immigration Rules, that the worker will be paid in accordance with National Minimum Wage legislation, and that the role will comply with the Working Time Regulations. By S4.14 and S4.16, a CoS must include the gross salary figure, which must represent the total gross amount paid to the worker for any of the following time periods: hour, day, week, month or year.

11. There are then detailed provisions at S4.19 – S4.31 covering absence without pay, permissible absences, and other salary reductions. Broadly, in cases where a sponsored worker is absent without pay or on reduced pay the sponsor is required to stop sponsoring them and/or to make a report via their Sponsorship Management System account.

12. Part 3, which concerns sponsor duties and compliance, opens with statements of principle:

“C1.4. Participation in the sponsorship scheme is voluntary and sponsors seek membership for their own benefit. Membership is subject to the strict terms contained within this guidance. Sponsors should be aware that a licence is held at the broad discretion of the Home Office and can be terminated at any time. A licence creates no property or other enforceable right. The scheme provides for the Home Office to act decisively – including the ability to revoke or suspend a licence – where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a breach of the sponsor guidance has occurred.

C1.5. Sponsorship is a privilege not a right. The sponsorship scheme reflects that those who benefit directly from migration (employers, education providers or other organisations who bring in overseas nationals) should play their part in ensuring the immigration system is not abused. Significant trust is placed in sponsors and they must ensure they comply with immigration law and wider UK law, and not behave in a manner that is not conducive to the wider public good.

C1.6. To achieve these aims, all licensed sponsors must fulfil certain duties. Some of these duties apply to all sponsors, whilst others are specific to those licensed on certain routes.

C1.7. The objectives of these duties include, but are not limited to:

• preventing abuse of immigration laws and sponsorship scheme

• capturing early any patterns of behaviour that may cause concern

• addressing possible weaknesses in process which can cause those patterns

• monitoring compliance with the Immigration Rules, all parts of the Worker and Temporary Worker sponsor guidance, and wider UK law (such as employment law)

• ensuring sponsors do not behave in a way that is detrimental to the wider public good”

13. Section C9 of Part 3 concerns the suspension of licences. It describes the actions that may be taken following a suspension:

“C9.16. Appropriate action may include one or more [of] the following – we may:

• re-instate your licence with an A-rating

• re-instate your licence with a B-rating (and issue you with an action plan)

• prevent you from assigning any new CoS

• prevent the use of any assigned, but unused, CoS

• revoke your licence”

14. Section C10 concerns the circumstances in which licences will or may be revoked. In this case, the Secretary of State relied on Annex C1:

“C10.5. Annex C1 sets out the circumstances in which we will revoke your licence – these are known as ‘mandatory’ grounds of revocation. If any of these circumstances arise, we can revoke your licence immediately and without warning. If we do not revoke your licence immediately, we will normally suspend your licence pending further investigation.”

15. Annex C1 to Part 3 contains a wide range of mandatory grounds for revocation, which apply in cases where a sponsor is considered to be culpable. Ground (z) arises where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the role for which a CoS has been assigned is not genuine. This appeal concerns the effect of Ground (aa):

“aa. You pay a sponsored worker less than you said you would on the worker’s CoS, and:

• you have not notified us of the change in salary; or

• the reduction is not otherwise permitted by the Immigration Rules or the Workers and Temporary Workers: guidance for sponsors”

16. Since the judicial review in this case, the Secretary of State has revised the Immigration Rules (but not the Guidance) in relation to workers who work different weekly hours, resulting in uneven pay. SW14.3A, inserted into Appendix Skilled Worker with effect from 8 April 2026, reads:

“SW14.3A. If the applicant is being sponsored to work a pattern where the regular hours are not the same each week, resulting in uneven pay:

(a) work in excess of 48 hours in some weeks can be considered towards the salary thresholds, providing the average over a regular cycle (which can be less than, but not more than, 17 weeks) is not more than 48 hours a week; and

(b) any unpaid rest weeks will count towards the average when considering whether the salary thresholds are met; and

(c) any unpaid rest weeks will not count as absences from employment for the purpose of paragraph 9.30.1 in Part 9 of these rules.

For example, an applicant who works a pattern of 60 hours a week for £12 per hour for two weeks, followed by an unpaid rest week, will be considered to work 40 hours a week on average and have a salary of £24,960 (£12 x 40 x 52) per year.”

The three certificates of sponsorship

17. Each CoS contained this description:

“Job title: Care worker: 6145 Care workers and home carers

…

Gross salary in pounds sterling (Skilled Worker only: excluding any allowances and guaranteed bonuses; all other routes: including any allowances and guaranteed bonuses): 22400.00

For: Year”

The Decision

18. In the decision letter, the Secretary of State wrote to Treal Care’s solicitor in relation to the Salary Issue:

“56. Your client has failed to address our original concern that they are [sc. not] offering Ms [A], Ms [O] and Ms [L] the hours and salaries guaranteed on their CoS. Furthermore, the pay evidence confirms that your client is also deducting monies from their sponsored workers salary payments which are not detailed on their payslips.

57. Your client has failed to address this issue.”

19. In relation to the Genuine Vacancy Issue, it was said that:

“59. Considering the above information, we are not satisfied that the role of Care Worker assigned to Ms A, Ms O and Ms L represent genuine vacancies within your client’s organisation and as such we believe the roles have been created to facilitate their entry to the UK.

…

64. As detailed above your client has failed to demonstrate that they are offering all of their sponsored workers the hours and in turn the salary guaranteed on their CoS, as such we continue to have concerns over the genuineness of the Care Worker roles within your client’s organisation.

65. Your client has failed to address this issue.”

20. After several more paragraphs, the Decision concluded in this way (there was a numbering error):

“65. We maintain that the issues described above constitute a failure by your client to comply with their sponsor duties, and as a result, their sponsor licence has been revoked. There is no right of appeal against this decision.

…

67. Your client has acted in contravention of a number of issues contained in the Workers and Temporary Workers: Guidance for Sponsors. We are satisfied that each of the following, individually and cumulatively, are a necessary basis for revocation: General Sponsor Duties 1 (Annex C1 aa), General Sponsor Duties 2, (Annex C1 z).”

The judicial review claim

21. By grounds 1 and 2 of its claim, Treal Care challenged the Secretary of State’s construction of the guidance about the Salary Issue and the Genuine Vacancy Issue, and argued that the Decision was irrational and inadequately reasoned. By ground 3, it argued that the Decision was flawed because it did not take account of its impact on other migrant workers and their families or on recipients of care.

22. By the time the matter came before the Judge, the issues had narrowed. The Secretary of State no longer pursued a number of assertions in the decision letter about the pay calculations:

• the assertion that the workers were not being paid the minimum wage,

• assertions about pay in previous tax years, during which the employees had only been in post for a few weeks, and

• the assertion that there had been unexplained deductions from pay.

Since the conclusion on the Genuine Vacancy Issue was entirely based on the conclusion on the Salary Issue, the Secretary of State ultimately relied solely on the assessment of the hours and pay of the three employees in the period May to August 2024 as being the valid basis for the Decision.

23. For its part, Treal Care no longer pursued ground 3, in the light of the decision of this court in R (Prestwick Care Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] 1 WLR 4671; [2025] EWCA Civ 184 (“Prestwick”), which held that, when considering whether to revoke a sponsor licence for breach of a mandatory ground for revocation, the Secretary of State is not required to assess the potential impact of revocation on the sponsor’s business, its employees, those who received care services and the wider social care industry, although that was a factor to which the Secretary of State might have regard as a matter of judgement and discretion.

The judgment

24. The Judge set out the undisputed facts at [45-58], the arguments at [59-61], and his analysis of the Salary Issue at [62-81]. He found that the salary required by the CoS of the three employees was not less than £22,400 p.a., based on a 40-hour week.

25. In the case of Ms A, he found that her pay over the four months annualised at £22,190, marginally below the required amount. However, she had taken unpaid leave in May and July, a fact known to the Secretary of State but not taken into account in the Decision. June’s pay was accepted as sufficient, and August’s pay annualised above £22,400. It was also unclear why the Secretary of State had calculated that the required monthly pay for August would be £1,982.93, which would lead to an annual figure of £23,795.16. For these reasons, the conclusion that Ms A was underpaid was irrational and inadequately reasoned.

26. In the case of Ms O, her pay over the relevant period annualised at £22,693.56, above the required salary. Earlier underpayments arose because training hours had not been notified to payroll, but Treal Care corrected this before the Decision by a lump-sum payment. The Secretary of State had identified no particular month or period in which she was underpaid. For these reasons, the conclusion that Ms O had not received the required hours and salary was irrational and inadequately reasoned.

27. In the case of Ms L, she was admittedly paid below the required rate because she had worked reduced hours while caring for her seriously ill son. Treal Care mistakenly believed that compassionate leave permitted a reduction in salary, but after the Decision it paid her an amount equal to the wages she would have received had she not been on leave. The Judge found that the Secretary of State was entitled to find that she had not been paid in accordance with her CoS.

28. The core of the Judge’s reasoning on the Salary Issue appears in this passage:

“64. The Guidance does not set out the period over which the SSHD should review a person’s pay when assessing whether the requirement has been met. The CoS, on the other hand, sets out an annual salary that the employee must earn.

65. The assessment is whether the employee is being paid the required annual rate. Neither the Guidance nor the CoS impose an obligation for the employee to be paid that annualised rate on each day of the year, nor in each week of the year, nor each month of the year. If that were the case, then a person would fall foul of the rules if they were paid for a seven day shift one week and a three day shift the next week, or took two weeks unpaid holiday in a particular month, or did not work five days in one week as it contained a bank holiday. That would be nonsensical.

66. The employees in this case had not worked for a full year when the compliance visit took place. There must therefore be some sort of assessment by the decision maker of pay over a period of time that is less than a year in order to assess whether the required annual salary is being paid.

67. The decision maker has a wide discretion in making their decision in each case, based on the specific facts. There was, in my judgment, nothing inherently unreasonable in the decision maker selecting, in this case, the four month period of May-August 2024 in which to assess compliance with the required annual pay rate. The decision maker, at various points, referred in addition to assessments being made for individual months. I address below the reasonableness of that in relation to each of the three individuals. In this case, it makes no difference to the outcome. I would have some doubt, however, that a decision maker could reasonably conclude that a person who is being paid at least the correct annualised salary when looked at over a four month period but who is below that level for a single month could be said to be paid less than the required annual rate.”

29. The Judge’s conclusion at [79-81] was that the Decision in respect of the Salary Issue was based on the conclusion that all three employees were underpaid and worked fewer hours than required by their CoS. Since the findings concerning Ms A and Ms O were irrational, the stated basis of the decision could not stand.

30. He went on to hold at [81] that if the Secretary of State was intending to make a decision based on Ms L alone, Treal Care needed to be given an opportunity to respond. The fact that this had not happened was another reason why the Decision was flawed.

31. The Judge dealt with the Genuine Vacancy Issue, at [82-89]. He noted that it was entirely dependent on the Salary Issue, and that the Secretary of State had confirmed that the Compliance Officer did not raise any concerns about the duties the sponsored workers were undertaking as care workers.

32. Finally, at [90-98] the Judge rejected the Secretary of State’s submission that, even if the Decision otherwise fell to be quashed, s.31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 required the court to uphold it because it was highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred. That submission was based on the fact that the grounds for revocation were mandatory. The Judge stated:

“94. The claimant argued that the SSHD retained a residual discretion not to revoke the licence even if the grounds were mandatory. That is true, but it seems to me that if revocation is mandatory, it might be highly likely that revocation will occur, even if there is some possibility that a residual discretion will be exercised. The individual facts of each case will of course need to be considered when assessing this.

95. In this case, however, I have determined that the claimant has not committed the acts that bring the situation within the mandatory revocation framework. The SSHD argument on mandatory grounds therefore fails.”

33. The Judge accordingly quashed the Decision and ordered the Secretary of State to pay Treal Care’s costs.

The appeal

34. The Secretary of State’s appeal on the Salary Issue proceeds on these Grounds:

“1. The Judge misconstrued and misapplied the Guidance in relation to the period for measuring pay for purposes of Annex C1(aa) of the Guidance, disregarded relevant considerations and gave inadequate reasoning.

2. The Judge misapplied Annex C1(aa) to the SSHD’s decision, disregarded relevant considerations and gave inadequate reasoning.

3. The Judge misapplied the Guidance and had regard to irrelevancy in apparently relying on the number of workers found to be paid less than on their CoS.

4. If any of Grounds 1-3 is upheld, then the Judge erred in his application of s 31(2A) SCA 1981.”

35. For the Secretary of State, Lord Murray describes the purpose of paragraph (aa) of the Guidance as being to protect vulnerable migrant workers from abuse by sponsors and to protect the labour market from undercutting. The courts should respect the experience and expertise of the relevant Home Office officials when reaching conclusions as to a sponsor’s compliance with the Guidance, which is vitally necessary to ensure that there is effective immigration control: Prestwick at §21(8). The primary judgment about the appropriate response to breaches by licence holders is that of the Secretary of State, while the role of the court is simply supervisory. The Secretary of State is entitled to maintain a fairly high index of suspicion and a “light trigger” in deciding when and with what level of firmness to act in response to breaches by licence holders: ibid at §21(7).

Ground 1

36. This asserts that the Judge’s approach to the period of measurement was wrong. He wrongly interpreted the sponsor guidance as requiring only payment of the specified annual salary, rather than permitting the Secretary of State to assess compliance by reference to monthly or other periodic payments. That approach allowed the annualised total to mask periods of substantial underpayment and was inconsistent with the wording and purpose of the sponsor regime. Lord Murray argues that, while the Judge was right to accept that an assessment could be made on less than a year’s evidence, it was not for the court to set an assessment period. His decision places in doubt when sponsors must report that workers are not being paid in accordance with their CoS.

37. Lord Murray submits that the Judge mistakenly understood the Secretary of State to have adopted a four-month assessment period, rather than making individual monthly assessments across four months. He accepts that the Guidance does not provide for assessment by reference to a monthly period, but argues that it does not prevent it, and the only workable approach is to take a month-by-month approach to workers who are paid monthly. Where their CoS gives an annual figure, there is an obligation on the sponsor to pay at least one-twelfth of that amount each month. If they do not, they must report it, and if they do not report it, they will be in breach of their licence. That, says Lord Murray, is the ineluctable consequence of the structure of the scheme. However, he also accepts that there must be a fair relationship between the chosen period of assessment (here 4 months) and the annual salary, and also that if there is an explanation for an apparent shortfall, it can be given. He also accepts that the recent amendment to the Immigration Rules (see §16 above) did not sit easily with his submission.

38. Lord Murray further asserted that the Secretary of State had no residual discretion where the conditions for mandatory revocation were met. Where there is an underpayment, and it is not reported, and it does not fall within a permitted exception, the licence must be revoked.

39. In response, Mr Malik KC accepts that Treal Care did not make contemporaneous reports in respect of the three workers. However, this appeal concerns the calculation of salary under mandatory revocation ground (aa), and not revocation for a failure to comply with reporting duties under Part C1, which falls under ground (a) of Annex C2 and will ‘normally’ lead to revocation.

40. Mr Malik submits that the ultimate benchmark for assessing compliance with paragraph (aa) is what appears on the CoS. He argues that a construction of the paragraph that requires one-twelfth of the annual salary to be paid every month is untenable because it is inconsistent with the text of the Guidance, with the Rules and general scheme of sponsorship, and with another policy. It would lead to absurd consequences, and is wrong in principle.

41. Mr Malik relies on the absence of any statement in the Guidance that supports the Secretary of State’s construction. As a matter of principle, it is for the author of policy to state a position clearly where it will have potentially draconian consequences. Here, even if the Guidance was amended to state that full monthly payment had to be made every month, it would be inconsistent with:

• Paragraph SW14.3A of the Immigration Rules (see §16 above), which expressly contemplates the situation of sponsored workers on uneven pay and permits periods of up to 17 weeks to be used as a basis of assessment.

• The Guidance at S4.16, which allows a CoS to state the gross salary in respect of any of the following time periods: hour, day, week, month or year.

• The Guidance at S4.19 onwards, which expressly contemplates unpaid absences.

42. Finally, in the context of workers with uneven hours, it would be absurd for a sponsor to be under an obligation to pay one-twelfth of the annual salary every month, whether or not they had worked the hours. That would also lead to unlawful discrimination against workers who were not on a CoS.

Ground 2

43. This ground asserts that the Judge’s incorrect approach to the Guidance led him to make incorrect assessments in relation to each worker. The explanation that Ms A had been on unpaid leave did not justify non-compliance and did not require a response in the decision letter. Similarly, the decision letter did not need to deal with the fact that Ms O’s pay had been made up by a lump-sum payment.

Ground 3

44. It is said that at [81] the Judge appeared to find an additional flaw in the decision letter on the basis that the revocation was based on just three employees out of a CoS workforce of 75. I do not read the judgment to be making that point and this ground was not developed during the hearing.

Ground 4

45. Section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 obliges the High Court to refuse to grant relief on an application if it appears to the court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred. The provision is mandatory and is intended to have meaningful consequences in appropriate cases: R (Gathercole) v Suffolk County Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1179; [2021] PTSR 359; [2020] WLR(D) 509.

46. Mr Tabori argues that, as revocation was based on a mandatory ground, the Judge should have upheld the Decision even if it was based on the Salary Issue in Ms L’s case alone. The decision letter (see §20 above) made clear that revocation was necessary because of contravention of paragraphs (aa) and (z) “individually and cumulatively”. Further, the Judge was wrong to say that Treal Care should have been given a further opportunity to respond before a decision was made on that lesser basis.

47. Mr Malik responds that the Decision relied on the assertion that the three individuals were not occupying genuine roles and on the level of pay of three individuals, not one. As to Ms L, there was strong mitigation in relation to her personal situation. It is therefore unreal to suppose that the outcome would be highly likely to be the same if the errors had not occurred. He further points to the consequences for Treal Care of a decision to revoke on the Genuine Vacancy Issue (ground (z)). That raised an issue of dishonesty: see Prestwick at §139. Accordingly, the outcome would have been different for Treal Care, as C10.18 of the Guidance provides that it would have to provide compelling evidence when reapplying for a licence after revocation on that ground.

Analysis

48. It is for the court, not the Secretary of State, to decide what a policy means: Mandalia v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 59; [2016] 4 All ER 189 at §31.

49. In agreement with the Judge, I reject the Secretary of State’s submission that paragraph (aa) of the Guidance means that if an employer does not pay a sponsored worker at least one-twelfth of their annual salary in each and every month it is paying the worker less than it said it would on the worker’s CoS. That is not what the Guidance says and it is not an inexorable consequence of the sponsorship scheme in the case of a worker who works uneven hours. It cannot sensibly be said that a worker who works ten hours less than normal hours in Month 1 and ten hours more in Month 2, and is paid accordingly, is not being paid the annual figure on their CoS. On the contrary, the Immigration Rules and the Guidance expressly recognise the need for a wider focus in the case of such individuals.

50. If every single monthly underpayment, however small, gave rise to a reporting requirement, that would of course provide clarity. But that is not what the Guidance requires, and it would in any case be for the Secretary of State to decide whether such an extensive level of reporting was desirable in any different scheme.

51. As to what the current Guidance does mean, paragraph (aa) of Annex C1 (“You pay a sponsored worker less than you said you would…”) calls for assessment over a period of time. The period selected must, as the Secretary of State accepts, bear a fair relationship to the period on the CoS. The Secretary of State has a broad discretion, subject only to normal public law considerations, to select an appropriate period, particularly for individuals working uneven hours who have not worked for a full year. It is entirely appropriate to look at the figures for individual months, month by month, but a conclusion must be based on all the available information. It cannot fairly be based on a single month if the wider context paints a different picture.

52. I do not accept the submission that the Secretary of State has no residual discretion when considering the mandatory grounds for revocation in Annex C1 of the Guidance. That would be contrary to principle and to common sense. It is a well-established principle of public law that a policy should not be so rigid as to amount to a fetter on the discretion of decision-makers: R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12; [2012] 1 AC 245 at §21.

53. The existence of discretion is inherent in a process that allows for explanations to be given by sponsors before decisions are taken. To take just one example, the Explanatory Memorandum to the Rule change (see §16 above) states at 5.33 that:

“… where underpayment is highlighted, the sponsor is notified and has an opportunity to explain or remedy the issue at an early opportunity…”

That is as it should be, but if in fact the Secretary of State has no discretion whenever there is a single mathematical underpayment (a) it is hard to see the purpose of giving the opportunity for explanation or remedial action, and (b) it will be compulsory to revoke sponsor licences, even on trivial grounds or where the Secretary of State considers that it would be unfair to the sponsor or contrary to the public good. That is not a sensible interpretation of the Guidance. Further as to situation (b), this court held in Prestwick at §101 that the Secretary of State had a residual discretion (but not an obligation) to take account of the effect of revocation on a company, its employees and the wider community. There is no reason why the position should be different if such a situation arose in the present context.

54. This analysis does not cut across the Secretary of State’s broad discretion in the management of the sponsorship scheme, or the importance of effective immigration control, but a broad discretion is not the same thing as a free hand. Decisions to revoke sponsor licences are consequential in a number of ways and, as with all exercises of power by a public authority, they have to be fairly made and adequately reasoned.

55. The consequence of all this is that if, having examined the payment data, the Secretary of State considers there to be a shortfall, the normal course will be to seek an explanation and, if it is thought appropriate, to give an opportunity for remedial action. Any explanation and remedial action will then be considered alongside the data, and a decision will be reached, based on a rounded assessment. In that way, the Guidance can be applied in a manner that is structured and proportionate, and not mechanistic.

56. For these reasons, Ground 1 fails.

57. As to Ground 2, in the present case, a period of four months is accepted as a valid sample on which to base the assessment of whether the individuals were not being paid the annual sum promised by their CoS. The decision letter in this case surveyed each month in the four-month period, and an attempt was appropriately made to see whether, in the round, the CoS salary had been maintained.

58. Applying what I consider to be the correct interpretation of the Guidance, the Judge gave detailed consideration to the evidence about each of the workers’ payment histories at [47-58]. He was entitled to find that the Secretary of State was obliged to take the remedial payment made to Ms O into account. There was (and continues to be) no explanation of the miscalculation of Ms A’s monthly salary entitlement in the decision letter,or of why the short periods of unpaid leave permitted by the Guidance led to a material underpayment in Ms A’s case. Overall, the conclusions about Ms A and Ms O were plainly open to the Judge.

59. I do not think that the Judge was right to say at [95] (see §32 above) that Treal Care had not committed acts to bring the situation within the mandatory revocation framework, since it was common ground that, as he noted at [57] and [78], as at the date of the Decision Ms L had been underpaid in each of the four months examined, albeit this was subsequently remedied. However, the reason why she had been underpaid was something to be taken into account; but that was not addressed. It was on that basis that the Judge found that the decision about Ms L was flawed.

60. I also would not join the Judge in saying (at [81], see §30 above) that the Secretary of State was bound to give Treal Care a further opportunity to respond if the only basis for revocation was the underpayment of Ms L. But again that was not essential to his decision.

61. Grounds 2 and 3 therefore fail.

62. Finally, as to Ground 4, I do not accept that the Decision can be rescued on the basis of the admitted underpayment of Ms L. To recap, it was based on two mandatory grounds concerning three individuals, not one ground concerning one individual. In the Decision, dishonesty was implied, but that is no longer the case. Further, a number of specific assertions in the decision letter were dropped in the High Court (see §22 above). As Green LJ said in argument, we simply do not know what the Secretary of State would have decided if the only established ground had related to Ms L in respect of a period when she had been unable to work for strong compassionate reasons.

63. Ground 4 also fails. I would dismiss the appeal.

Lord Justice Green:

64. I agree.

Lord Justice Fancourt:

65. I also agree.

_______________

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Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

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All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

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IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.