Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

United States v. Newton

Official source
United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 25-1101

                         UNITED STATES,

                           Appellee,

                               v.

                        FAITH N. NEWTON,

                     Defendant, Appellant.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

       [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]


                             Before

                   Gelpí, Lynch, and Dunlap,
                        Circuit Judges.


     Dana Goldblatt and Law Office of Dana Goldblatt on brief for
appellant.
     Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, and
Leah B. Foley, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.


                        October 29, 2026
              DUNLAP,    Circuit      Judge.            A     jury          convicted

Defendant-Appellant Faith Newton on one count of conspiracy to

commit health care fraud, one count of health care fraud, and three

counts   of    money    laundering.         The    convictions       stem    from   a

multi-million-dollar home health care fraud scheme.                         Newton's

company,   Arbor    Homecare    Services      LLC    ("Arbor"),      fraudulently

billed MassHealth, Massachusetts' Medicaid program, for over $99

million.       She was sentenced to 144 months' imprisonment.                       On

appeal, Newton argues that her convictions should be reversed

because the district court violated her constitutional rights by

allowing her to proceed pro se at trial and because the court

should have suppressed evidence obtained from a search of her cell

phone at Logan Airport by Customs and Border Protection ("CBP")

agents on her return from Kenya.                  Newton also challenges her

sentence on appeal, arguing that the court erred by not accounting

for the value of services rendered when calculating the amount of

loss and by including an enhancement for sophisticated means.

None of Newton's arguments persuade us.              We affirm.

                                       I.

              On January 28, 2021, a grand jury indicted Newton and a

co-conspirator in the District of Massachusetts.                 The indictment

charged Newton with twelve counts involving health care fraud, a

kickback      scheme,   and   money   laundering.           Before    trial,     the

government voluntarily dismissed six charges.                On June 26, 2023,


                                      - 2 -
Newton proceeded to trial on the others.          An issue arose during

jury deliberations, however, and the court declared a mistrial.

           Newton's retrial commenced a year later, on July 8,

2024.   At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted her of

one count of conspiring to commit health care fraud in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, one count of health care fraud in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, and three counts of money laundering in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.       The court sentenced Newton to a

total term of 144 months' imprisonment to be followed by three

years of supervised release and ordered a $250,000 fine and

restitution of $99,734,517.50.

A.    Newton's Attorneys

           By our count, Newton has been represented or assisted by

thirteen different attorneys since she was charged in January 2021.

Initially, Newton retained Attorneys Sayeg (#1) and Bailey (#2).

In January 2022, they notified the court that the relationship had

deteriorated.    They filed an ex parte motion to withdraw, which

the magistrate judge denied.      A few months later, in March 2022,

they renewed their motion to withdraw.            The magistrate judge

conducted a hearing on the motion, during which Newton expressed

a desire to represent herself.       The next month, Attorneys Sayeg

and   Bailey   renewed   their   motions   once   more,   citing   further

breakdowns in their ability to represent Newton.




                                  - 3 -
           On   May 2,   2022,   the   magistrate   judge   held   another

hearing on the motions to withdraw.           At the hearing, Newton

reiterated her desire to "exercise [her] constitutional right and

proceed pro se."    The magistrate judge initiated a colloquy under

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), to warn Newton of the

risks of that choice.      The magistrate judge advised her how hard

it would be to represent herself, how high the stakes were if she

went to trial, and how much of a disadvantage she would be placing

herself in.     Despite these warnings, Newton was insistent: "I've

made up my mind.       I don't need a lawyer.       I want to represent

myself."    The magistrate judge asked Newton whether she felt

clear-minded, was hearing voices, or had any psychological issues.

Newton affirmatively denied having any such psychological issues.

The magistrate judge concluded that Newton had waived her right to

counsel knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and accordingly

permitted her to proceed pro se, appointing Attorney Kerner (#3)

as standby counsel.

           In August 2022, at Newton's request, the magistrate

judge appointed Attorney McKinnon (#4) as standby counsel instead

of Attorney Kerner.       Then in October, Newton retained Attorney

Vien (#5) along with his team, Attorneys Koslof (#6), Pascucci

(#7), and Kete (#8).     Attorney Vien and his team represented Newton

through her July 2023 trial, which ended in a mistrial.




                                  - 4 -
            In September 2023, Attorney Kete withdrew.   The district

court appointed Attorney Vien under the Criminal Justice Act of

1964 ("CJA").     A week before the retrial was scheduled to begin,

Attorneys Vien, Pascucci, and Koslof moved to withdraw as counsel,

citing     "an   irreparable   breakdown   in   the   attorney-client

relationship."     The district court asked Newton how she wished to

proceed.    She chose to request new appointed counsel, even though

this would delay the retrial.

            In January 2024, the court appointed Attorney Miner (#9)

and Attorney Lindberg (#10) as CJA counsel for Newton.         But a

month later, Attorney Miner too moved to withdraw because of

irreconcilable differences.     The court held the motion as pending

until new counsel entered an appearance and set the retrial date

for July 8, 2024.     In May 2024, Attorney Miner renewed her motion

to withdraw.     Newton filed a pro se motion to disqualify Attorneys

Miner and Lindberg.     Newton also sought to proceed pro se "only

until such time as untainted assets are released by the civil court

to hire Counsel of Choice."1     The district court denied Newton's




     1 In 2021, the government brought an action for civil
forfeiture of five real properties and forty financial accounts
and investments held in the name of Newton and her family members,
business entities, and trusts. The government asserted that these
were the proceeds of, or deeply involved in, the charged offenses.
On January 29, 2021, Judge O'Toole found probable cause to believe
the properties were subject to civil forfeiture and froze the
assets. Restraining Order, Dkt. No. 10, United States v. 5 Real
Props., No. 1:21-cv-10156-GAO (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2021).


                                 - 5 -
motion, expressing doubt that the funds would be released and

reiterating that the July trial date was firm.2            The court further

explained that "the Court will not allow her to be pro se until

the Court is satisfied that Defendant is prepared to represent

herself through trial."

            At a June 5, 2024, hearing, the district court explained

to Newton that she had three options: (1) represent herself, with

Attorney Miner or Attorney Vien as standby counsel, (2) go to trial

represented by Attorney Miner or Attorney Vien, or (3) hire a new

lawyer who would be ready in time for trial.               Newton chose the

first    option:   "I   want   to   represent   myself."     She   noted   her

preference for Attorney Vien as standby counsel.

            At this point, the district court issued new Faretta

warnings, concluding with the following statement:

            Representing yourself is fraught with peril,
            right? You're not a lawyer. You don't know
            the rules of evidence.   You don't have any

     2 On March 15, 2024, in the civil forfeiture proceeding,
Newton sought an evidentiary hearing to release the restrained
funds purportedly so that she could hire counsel of her choice.
United States v. 5 Real Props., No. 1:21-cv-10156-GAO, 2024 WL
2127058 at *1 (D. Mass. May 13, 2024). She submitted a bare-bones
and insufficient affidavit. Id. Judge O'Toole noted that Newton
had not accounted for, among other assets, nearly one million
dollars in unrestrained funds which she and her family controlled.
Id. at *2. Judge O'Toole also found that Newton likely had access
to unfrozen funds in almost a dozen domestic bank accounts and had
recently received large checks in the name of multiple corporate
entities she controlled.    Id. at *1.   As a result, on May 13,
2024, Judge O'Toole denied Newton's motions for a rehearing and
for release of funds, noting that Newton was scheduled to stand
trial before Judge Burroughs on July 8, 2024. Id. at *1 n.2, *2.


                                     - 6 -
          experience picking a jury or doing an opening
          statement or cross-examining or doing any of
          those things.   So if you want to represent
          yourself, that is your right, and I will have
          standby counsel here to help you with the
          procedural aspects of it.    But it is very
          risky and generally not a good idea. But in
          fact, I'm going to say not only is it not a
          good idea, it's a terrible idea.
          . . . .
          It's a terrible idea for darn sure.

Newton and the court discussed the chain of events leading up to

her seeking self-representation.    Newton seemed to blame the court

for letting Attorneys Vien and Bailey withdraw.       But the court

explained that the decisions were all Newton's, and reiterated the

inadvisability of representing herself:

          I don't know why you would want to do it
          yourself when you have such excellent counsel
          sitting right beside you who is clearly
          preparing for trial as evidenced by the
          motions that have been filed.     So I don't
          understand why you would want to do that, and
          it seems like an extremely poor choice.

Newton responded, "It's my choice."       The court cautioned her,

stating, "You cannot go -- if you're convicted at this trial, you

cannot go to the Court of Appeals and complain that it was because

you represented yourself because you're choosing to represent

yourself."   Newton suggested that, if her restrained funds were

released, there was an attorney she wished to hire.     But she did

not reveal the attorney's name, so the court could not explore

appointing the attorney under the CJA.    The unnamed attorney never

made an appearance on her behalf.


                              - 7 -
            The day after the second Faretta colloquy, the court

noted in an electronic order that Attorney Vien was unable to

serve.   The court granted Attorney Miner's motion to withdraw and

appointed her as standby counsel instead.         A few days later, Newton

included Attorney Miner on her witness list, forcing the district

court to appoint Attorney Iovieno (#11) as standby counsel in her

place.

            On July 8, 2024, the morning of the retrial, Newton

objected to proceeding without representation.          The district court

overruled   her   objection     because   she   had   chosen   to    represent

herself.    Attorney Iovieno assisted Newton as standby counsel for

the duration of trial.          After trial, Attorney FitzGerald (#12)

represented   Newton.      He    withdrew    before   sentencing      and   was

appointed as standby counsel.       On appeal, Attorney Goldblatt (#13)

represents Newton.

B.   Motion to Suppress

            The   night   before    Newton's    retrial    commenced,       she

submitted several pro se motions to the court.             Among these was

"Defendant's Motion to Exclude Cell Phone Extraction Data and

Customs Border Protection and Border Crossing Records."               Relevant

to this motion, Newton had been stopped by CBP agents and searched

at Boston Logan International Airport when she returned from a

trip to Kenya on July 30, 2017.           They seized her cell phone and

conducted a forensic search of the phone's contents.                The search


                                    - 8 -
yielded incriminating text messages related to the Arbor scheme.

In her motion, Newton argued that the cell phone data was illegally

obtained because (1) the government did not have a warrant for the

search,     and   (2) the   search   was    requested   by   the   prosecuting

Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA").

             On the third day of the retrial, the district court took

up the motion.      The government argued that warrantless non-routine

searches are permitted at the border if agents have a reasonable

suspicion that the search will yield evidence of a crime enforced

by   CBP.     CBP   agents -- who    have     jurisdiction    to   investigate

international cash money laundering -- suspected that Newton was

transporting ill-gotten cash overseas and that she was using her

phone to facilitate the scheme, based on interviews that law

enforcement agents had conducted.           These interviews revealed that

various former Arbor employees believed or had heard rumors that

large amounts of money were going to Kenya.             Agents also found a

receipt indicating that Newton had deposited $1.7 million into a

Kenyan bank.      The government filed a written opposition outlining

its case, and Newton filed a written response.               In her response,

she reiterated her contentions that the search lacked a warrant

and was requested by an AUSA.              She also seemed to contest the

applicability of the reasonable suspicion standard, but did not

argue that the government lacked reasonable suspicion.




                                     - 9 -
           After considering the parties' submissions, the district

court orally denied Newton's motion to suppress: "[A]lthough it's

a close call, I think the government is correct that there was

reasonable suspicion that there was money laundering activity

going on . . . and that this search and the seizure . . . were

both permissible."      Newton objected to this ruling on limited

grounds, and the district court stated that the objection was

preserved.    The government subsequently introduced into evidence

several text messages obtained from Newton's cell phone.

C.   Sentencing

           The jury convicted Newton on five counts, including

health care fraud, conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, and money

laundering.    Based on the Sentencing Guidelines, the Probation

Office   calculated    her   Total    Offense   Level    to   be    43    in   her

Presentence   Report   ("PSR").        This   total   included      a    24-level

enhancement because the amount of loss was between $65 million and

$150 million, and a two-level enhancement because the offense

involved   sophisticated     means.       The   PSR     explained       that   the

calculation of the amount of loss was based on the approximately

$99,734,000 that MassHealth paid Arbor for fraudulent services.

The sophisticated-means enhancement was included based on evidence

that Newton hid over $10 million in Kenyan financial accounts over

a six-year period.




                                     - 10 -
              Newton submitted numerous objections to the PSR.                        Two

are relevant to Newton's sentencing arguments on appeal.                               In

Objection #31, Newton complained that "there was no source of

information cited to support the amount of loss identified in

paragraph     57,     and    as    cited      in   paragraph    46,    it     could   not

effectively      be     reviewed        for    accuracy,    and       should    not    be

considered."        In Objection #32, she complained that the loss

amount was based on "allegations not proven at trial, and . . .

did not contain any actual evidence, or sufficient information

about   the    source       of    the   numbers    cited   in   said    exhibit,      and

therefore must not be considered."

              The district court held Newton's sentencing hearing on

January 22, 2025.            The court stated that it had "received and

carefully reviewed" the PSR and determined that there were no

sustainable     objections.             The    court   concluded       that    Newton's

objections to the PSR "did not appear to question the application

of the Sentencing Guidelines."                After adopting the guideline range

from the PSR and considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the

district court sentenced Newton to a total term of 144 months'

imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release.

The court also ordered a $250,000 fine and restitution in the

amount of $99,734,517.50.




                                          - 11 -
                                   II.

              Newton contends that her convictions and her sentence

must be overturned.       As for her convictions, she argues that the

district court violated her rights to counsel and due process by

permitting her to represent herself.            She also argues that the

court erred by admitting evidence obtained from her cell phone.

As for her sentence, Newton contends that the court miscalculated

the amount of loss when determining her offense level and that the

court improperly applied the sophisticated-means enhancement to

her offense level.       None of her arguments are availing.

A.    Right to Counsel

              Newton argues that her convictions should be overturned

because the district court violated her constitutional rights by

allowing her to represent herself at trial.             She advances four

reasons: (1) the Faretta warnings she received about the dangers

of self-representation were inadequate to make her waiver knowing;

(2) her waiver was not unequivocal; (3) she was wrongfully forced

to   choose    between   representation    by   her   prior   attorneys   and

representing herself; and (4) she was not competent to represent

herself.3




      3In her reply brief, Newton adds a new (and so waived)
argument that she received ineffective assistance of counsel
because her counsel did not comprehend her psychological
difficulties.   See Aldea-Tirado v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP,
101 F.4th 99, 105 n.3 (1st Cir. 2024).


                                  - 12 -
              The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence."                  U.S. Const. amend. VI.

By implication, the Constitution also guarantees the right of

criminal defendants to represent themselves.                    Faretta, 422 U.S.

at 820.       The government may not "hale a person into its criminal

courts and there force a lawyer upon him."                   Id. at 807.    "When an

accused manages his own defense," however, "he relinquishes, as a

purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated

with the right to counsel."                Id. at 835.        Accordingly, as the

Supreme Court held in Faretta v. California, every court must

ensure that the waiver of the right to assistance of counsel is

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.                 Id.; see also United States

v. Belin, 868 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2017).                    A defendant "should

be   made       aware    of     the        dangers     and     disadvantages      of

self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he

knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'"

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.

McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)); see also Belin, 868 F.3d at 53.

              On appeal, our review of the record is "effectively de

novo."    Belin, 868 F.3d at 54.             "We will uphold a waiver of the

right    to    counsel   as   long    as    the   record     supports   a   reasoned

conclusion that the defendant was fully apprised of his right to

counsel and of the disadvantages he would encounter should he elect


                                       - 13 -
to proceed pro se."     Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).     Further, the defendant's waiver must be stated in

"unequivocal language."    United States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95,

109 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835).

            With these standards in mind, we take Newton's arguments

in turn and reject each of them.         We recognize that choosing

self-representation may in many -- if not most -- cases be unwise.

See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting

an old proverb about self-representation).     But the Constitution

guarantees criminal defendants the right to choose.      Newton made

her choice knowingly, voluntarily, and unequivocally.     She cycled

through attorneys regularly, of her own choice; and she ultimately

chose to go without an attorney at all when the district court

properly insisted that her retrial proceed without further delay.

We decline to overturn her convictions based on that choice.

     1.     Knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver

            We consider first Newton's argument that the district

court's warnings were inadequate and that she did not knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waive her right to counsel.    Newton

does not claim that the wording of the district court's Faretta

warning was per se insufficient.        Rather, she claims that her

particular mental difficulties prevented her from understanding

the warning, so that she did not "know what she was doing."      Cf.

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (citation modified) (citing Adams, 317


                               - 14 -
U.S.   at    279)   (determining     that     the    defendant     was   "literate,

competent, and understanding").             We consider the entire record to

assess whether Newton's waiver was made knowingly.

              As our recitation of the facts has already established,

Newton received two sets of Faretta warnings; one set administered

by the magistrate judge before her first trial, and another set

administered by the district court before her retrial.                     Both are

relevant to understanding what Newton knew.

              At the first colloquy, in 2022, the magistrate judge

warned Newton about the severe disadvantage she would be at if she

proceeded     without   counsel.       The     magistrate     judge      highlighted

Newton's inexperience with the law, the complexity of procedural

rules,      the   benefits   of    counsel,    and    the   high    sentences    her

conviction on these charges could carry.               As the magistrate judge

stated, "I think it's unwise for you to try to represent yourself

because you're not trained in the law, and these rules are very,

very   technical.       And    I   strongly     urge    you   not   to    represent

yourself."        The magistrate judge warned her that she would be

"shooting [herself] in the foot" by representing herself.                       When

the magistrate judge asked her if she still wanted to waive her

right in light of the serious downsides, Newton responded with an

unequivocal, "Yes."          As she said, "It's my choice to represent

myself."




                                      - 15 -
           At   the    2024    colloquy    before     Newton's      retrial,   the

district    court       similarly         recounted     the      reasons       why

self-representation      was    inadvisable.          Given   the    motions    to

withdraw pending before the court, the court gave Newton three

options: represent herself with standby counsel, go to trial with

her current attorney, or hire a new lawyer who would be ready in

time for trial.       When Newton said, "I want to represent myself,"

the district court explained the dangers of doing so, including

Newton's inexperience with the rules of evidence, jury selection,

witness examination, and opening statements.              The court's caution

was grave: "[I]t is very risky and generally not a good idea.                  But

in fact, I'm going to say not only is it not a good idea, it's a

terrible idea."       Again, Newton stated bluntly: "It's my choice."

           Newton received an adequate Faretta warning to fully

apprise her of the risks under the circumstances.                   The warnings

Newton   received     were    extensive    and   strongly     worded    in   plain

English.   She was informed of the dangers of self-representation

and even informed that it would be a terrible choice.                  See United

States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375, 389 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that

a Faretta warning was sufficient where the court "warned the

defendant of the general dangers of self-representation" and "went

so far as to tell the defendant that it was 'a terrible idea' for

him to represent himself").         In addition to receiving two sets of

Faretta warnings, moreover, Newton had the benefit of observing an


                                    - 16 -
entire criminal trial between the two warnings.                       "Absent unusual

circumstances, a defendant who has previously sat through criminal

trials of his own has to know that trying a case involves examining

witnesses, making objections, and observing rules of procedure and

evidence . . . ."            United States v. LaBare, 191 F.3d 60, 68 (1st

Cir. 1999).      The perils she faced were made clear.

            In    her    sealed     and       unsealed    briefs,    however,     Newton

points to several places in the record that she argues should call

into question her ability to comprehend these warnings.                                She

highlights       her     former      attorneys'          characterization        of    her

accusations against them, letters she wrote to a judge about her

case,   and      several       "non-responsive           answers    to    the    court's

questions."            She    asserts     that     she     suffers       from   language

difficulties and "distorted perceptions of reality" that impaired

her ability to understand the disadvantages.                   The record, however,

does not sustain a colorable claim that Newton lacked understanding

of her choices.         Newton appears to have been a sophisticated actor,

able to manage complex financial arrangements.                     We find it notable

that neither the government nor any of the myriad attorneys

assisting     Newton         requested    a    psychological        examination.       The

district    court      had     numerous       opportunities    to    closely     observe

Newton's    behavior         and   competence      over    a   period     of    time   and

concluded Newton was capable of making a voluntary choice.                             See

United States v. Agramonte-Quezada, 30 F.4th 1, 22–24 (1st Cir.


                                          - 17 -
2022) (holding that, in the competency context, a district court

does not abuse its discretion by not ordering a competency hearing

where, inter alia, neither defense counsel nor the government

sought such a hearing and the presiding judge had been able to

observe the defendant).      We are satisfied that Newton voluntarily

waived her right to counsel with knowledge of the disadvantages

her choice entailed.

       2.    Unequivocal waiver

             We turn next to Newton's argument that her waiver was

equivocal, contrary to this court's requirement.             See Woodard, 291

F.3d at 109.    There is no real question that her statements -- "I

want    to   represent    myself"     and    "[i]t's    my   choice" -- were

unequivocal.    See United States v. Kar, 851 F.3d 59, 67 (1st Cir.

2017) (concluding that similar statements by defendant confirming

choice to represent himself "could not have been stated more

unequivocally").         Newton     now   argues,   however,     that   these

statements were ambiguous taken in context.            Below, she repeatedly

expressed hope that some of her seized funds would be released so

she could hire an attorney.          For example, Newton told the court

in a motion that she desired to "proceed Pro Se only until such

time as untainted assets are released by the civil court to hire

Counsel of Choice."        During the June 5, 2024, hearing, Newton

stated, "I'm waiting for my motion to hire an attorney," and, "I

have a lawyer of my choice waiting to get paid."             These statements


                                    - 18 -
created "tension" with her request for self-representation, Newton

claims, thus making the request equivocal.    A desire to represent

oneself in the present, however, is not incompatible with a desire

to obtain an attorney in the future.   See United States v. Proctor,

166 F.3d 396, 405–06 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that a defendant may

"retract a waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel").   Both

the magistrate judge and the district court advised Newton that,

if she no longer desired to proceed pro se, she could hire an

attorney of her choice.4   In fact, after electing to proceed pro

se the first time, Newton did hire counsel.     And, even if going

pro se was not her first choice, her final decision to do so was

clear.   See United States v. Gonzalez-Arias, 946 F.3d 17, 38 (1st

Cir. 2019) (concluding that even where a defendant "disliked his

options" and had "asked several times . . . for another lawyer,"

his "express agreement to go pro se, combined with his unflinching

follow-through, made his final choice unambiguous").        We thus




     4 The magistrate judge informed Newton as follows: "[I]f you
change your mind in the future, I want you to know that you can
hire a lawyer if you want to and you have your funds. Or if you
don't have funds, as I have just said, down the road you can ask
for a court-appointed lawyer."     The district court judge told
Newton at the June 2024 hearing, "You are either here with standby
counsel, . . . or you will be here [with] the lawyer of your
choice, but we're going forward on July 8." It is noteworthy that
Judge O'Toole found, in the related civil forfeiture action, that
Newton likely had access to funds distributed throughout a complex
network of bank accounts and corporate entities. 5 Real Props.,
2024 WL 2127058 at *1-2.


                              - 19 -
conclude that Newton's unequivocal waiver was not undermined by

her other statements.

       3.   Compelled choice

            Relatedly, we reject Newton's argument that the district

court erred by forcing a choice between unwanted counsel and

self-representation on the eve of trial.                  "District courts, in

some   circumstances,        may    force   criminal     defendants   to    choose

between     effective       representation        by    unwanted    counsel    and

proceeding pro se."          Kar, 851 F.3d at 65; see also Proctor, 166

F.3d at 402.       This is one such case.

            As an initial matter, Newton has not established that

the    assistance     she    had     been    provided    was   constitutionally

insufficient.       Newton points primarily to the asserted breakdown

in communication between herself and Attorney Miner as of the time

the court presented her with the choice between representing

herself with standby counsel, proceeding with Attorney Miner, or

hiring counsel of her choice.              But we are not persuaded that the

breakdown    was     of     constitutional        magnitude -- Attorney       Miner

remained willing to represent Newton and the record before us

suggests    that    counsel        had   performed     admirably.     The     court

reasonably concluded that Newton's desire for an earlier trial

date was the crux of her conflict with Attorney Miner and resolved

that conflict by helping Attorney Miner clear her schedule for an




                                         - 20 -
earlier     date. 5       The   problem       here     was     that   Newton    was   an

extraordinarily difficult and manipulative client, not that she

had constitutionally ineffective counsel.                    See Morris v. Slappy,

461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) ("[W]e reject the claim that the Sixth

Amendment     guarantees        a    'meaningful       relationship'      between     an

accused and his counsel.").

             Further, by the time the court presented her with the

choice, Newton had cycled through attorneys with regularity, and

the matter was on the verge of trial.                  "A court need not tolerate

unwarranted delays, and may at some point require the defendant to

go   to   trial    even    if   he    is    not     entirely    satisfied      with   his

attorney."        Gonzalez-Arias, 946 F.3d at 35 (quoting Maynard v.

Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976)); see also Woodard, 291

F.3d at 106-07 (noting that a court may consider the possibility

of undue delay and the effect on orderly court procedure in forcing

a choice between self-representation and proceeding to trial with

an unwanted attorney).          In light of Newton's extraordinary conduct




      5The record shows that the conflict between Newton and her
counsel was not "so great that it resulted in a total lack of
communication." United States v. Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th 1, 13 (1st
Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Reyes, 352 F.3d 511, 515 (1st
Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 93 (1st
Cir. 1986) (concluding that "good cause did not exist for
assignment of new counsel" where "[a]ll that exist[ed] on the
record [wa]s [the defendant's] own loss of confidence in his
attorney").


                                           - 21 -
with her attorneys, we conclude that the district court did not

err.

       4.   Competency

            Newton's argument that the court violated her rights to

due process and assistance of counsel by allowing her to represent

herself because she was not competent to do so fares no better.

She    interprets   Indiana   v.    Edwards,    554   U.S.   164   (2008),   as

establishing two tiers of competency: one tier for competency to

stand trial, and another, higher tier for competency to represent

oneself.     Newton's reliance on this case is misplaced.6             As the

Supreme Court explained in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993),

"the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive

his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the

competence to represent himself," id. at 399.           On the record before

us, and for the same reasons that we conclude her waiver was

voluntary,    informed,   and      knowing,    we   conclude -- as   did     the

district court in this proceeding -- that Newton was able to

"competently and intelligently" choose to represent herself.                 Id.



       Edwards does not establish a second, higher tier of
       6

competency for self-representation. As an overwhelming majority
of our sister circuits have observed, Edwards merely permits states
to condition self-representation on a higher showing of
competency. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) ("[T]he
Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by
counsel for those competent enough to stand trial . . . but who
still suffer from severe mental illness."); see also United States
v. Garrett, 42 F.4th 114, 119 (2nd Cir. 2022) (collecting cases
from seven circuits).


                                    - 22 -
at   400    (quoting    Faretta,     422     U.S.   at   835);     see    also

Agramonte-Quezada, 30 F.4th at 22–24.

B.   Suppression of Evidence

            Turning    to   her   Fourth     Amendment   arguments,      Newton

asserts on appeal that the cell phone evidence obtained by CBP

should have been suppressed because the government did not have a

reasonable suspicion that it would contain evidence of criminal

activity.    We have held that the Fourth Amendment requires that

any non-routine search at our nation's borders be supported by a

reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover "evidence of

activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered by CBP

or ICE."    Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 18–21 (1st Cir. 2021).

Newton now contends that the specific and articulable facts known

to the government at the time of the search were not legally

sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion justifying the search

and seizure.     The government responds that this argument fails at

the threshold because it was not raised before trial as required

by Rule 12(c).

            To   preserve   an    argument    for   appeal,   a   party   must

"squarely" raise it before the district court.            United States v.

Lindsey, 3 F.4th 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2021).             Under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 12(c), a motion to suppress evidence that is

not asserted before trial can only be considered upon a showing of

"good cause."     Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3); see Lindsey, 3 F.4th at


                                   - 23 -
41 ("Unpreserved legal arguments as to motions to suppress are

unreviewable except upon a showing of good cause."); see also

United States v. Torres, 162 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1998).

                In    her   one-page    pretrial   motion,     Newton   raised   two

grounds for suppressing the cell phone data: (1) CBP did not have

a warrant, and (2) an AUSA requested the search.                  Newton did not,

by herself or through counsel, suggest that the CBP agents lacked

reasonable suspicion.              Failing to even reference an argument is

not raising it squarely.               We cannot overlook the failure simply

because Newton proceeded pro se.                  See Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118

F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[P]ro se status does not insulate

a party from complying with procedural and substantive law.").

Nor can the discussion of reasonable suspicion by the government

and the district court excuse Newton's omission.                    "[W]e enforce

Rule 12(f)7 waivers even though the district court ultimately did

address the waived issue on the merits, unless the appellant can

show 'cause' for failing to raise it in a pretrial motion."                 United

States v. Bashorun, 225 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2000) (emphasis

omitted); accord United States v. Galindo-Serrano, 925 F.3d 40,

47-48 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Walker-Couvertier, 860

F.3d       1,   9    (1st   Cir.   2017).    Although    the    district   court's




       The language of Rule 12(f) has been moved to Rule 12(c)(3),
       7

but the standard remains the same. United States v. Arias, 848
F.3d 504, 513 n.3 (1st Cir. 2017).


                                         - 24 -
discussion of reasonable suspicion may assist in creating a record

for review, see Walker-Couvertier, 860 F.3d at 9, the discussion

is ultimately irrelevant here; we conclude that the Rule 12(c)

waiver still applies because the motion to suppress did not mention

reasonable suspicion,8 id.

           Accordingly, Newton's current suppression argument is

unreviewable.      Newton waived the argument she now asserts, has not

attempted to show "good cause" under Rule 12 to justify appellate

review, and is not entitled to plain error review.           See Lindsey,

3 F.4th at 41-42.      We therefore leave the district court's ruling

undisturbed.

C.   Offense Level Calculation

           Newton also contests her sentence, maintaining that the

district   court    committed   procedural   error   in   calculating   her

offense level under the guidelines.          She claims that the amount

of loss would have been lower had the district court properly

accounted for the value of the services Arbor provided.                 She

further claims that the sophisticated-means enhancement does not

apply because -- since she was born in Kenya -- depositing money

in a Kenyan bank is not an "offshore" transaction.




     8 Newton complains that the district court said her
suppression objection was preserved.    But the district court's
statement, which can only address preservation of objections she
actually articulated, does not give Newton a license to raise new
arguments on appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3).


                                  - 25 -
            This court applies a "multifaceted abuse-of-discretion"

standard    to   claims   of    guideline       errors.        United   States    v.

Guía-Sendeme, 134 F.4th 611, 616 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting United

States v. Mendoza-Maisonet, 962 F.3d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 2020)).                  "[W]e

review the sentencing court's interpretation and application of

the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, its factfinding for clear error,

and its exercise of judgment for abuse of discretion."                           Id.

Unpreserved challenges to sentencing, however, we review only for

plain error.      United States v. Leach, 89 F.4th 189, 195 (1st Cir.

2023).     We    uphold   the    district      court's    application       of   the

guidelines here.

     1.     Amount of Loss

            For crimes involving fraud, the guidelines require an

offense-level     enhancement     for    the    amount    of    loss.      U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b).      "Loss" here means "actual loss" -- "the reasonably

foreseeable      pecuniary     harm   that     resulted   from    the     offense."

U.S.S.G.   § 2B1.1(b)(1)       n.(A),    (b)(1)    n.(C)(i).        The    evidence

showed that Newton was responsible for $99,734,000 in losses, an

amount more than $65 million and less than $150 million.                         The

district court therefore applied a 24-level enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(M).            Newton now argues that the district

court should have reduced the amount of loss by "the fair market

value    of . . .   the   services      rendered"    to    the    victim    before

detection.       U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(i).               She claims that


                                      - 26 -
Arbor    provided    services    worth,   "at    a    minimum,"   $38,012,000.

Factoring in that discount, the offense level would be two points

lower.

              Newton did not raise this challenge below, so it is not

preserved.      In her objection to the PSR below, she complained that

because "there was no source of information cited to support the

amount of loss identified . . . , it could not effectively be

reviewed for accuracy, and should not be considered."                       That

complaint is materially different from Newton's argument on appeal

that the court should have accounted for the value of services

Arbor provided.      New challenges to sentencing raised on appeal are

not preserved.       See United States v. Hassan-Saleh-Mohamad, 930

F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2019) ("To preserve a claim of error for

appellate review, an objection must be sufficiently specific to

call    the   district   court's   attention     to    the   asserted    error."

(quoting United States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448 n.1 (1st

Cir. 2017))).

              We review unpreserved claims only for plain error.             See

Leach, 89 F.4th at 195.          To prevail, the party claiming plain

error must make a four-part showing: "(1) that an error occurred

(2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the

defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired

the     fairness,   integrity,     or   public       reputation   of    judicial

proceedings."       Id. at 201 (quoting United States v. Duarte, 246


                                    - 27 -
F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)).            We need not, however, delve into

the plain error analysis in this case.              Because Newton's principal

brief "'fails to even mention plain error, let alone argue for its

application    here,'      the   argument      is    waived   and    will    not   be

considered."      Schuster v. Wynn Ma, LLC, 118 F.4th 30, 39 n.10 (1st

Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Benjamin-Hernandez, 49 F.4th

580, 585 (1st Cir. 2022)).9

      2.    Sophisticated-Means Enhancement

            The   guidelines       require   a      two-level   enhancement        for

crimes of fraud that "involved sophisticated means."                        U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).         The commentary accompanying the guidelines,

which the parties agree should guide the analysis, explains that

sophisticated      means     are     "especially      complex       or   especially

intricate     offense      conduct    pertaining       to     the    execution     or

concealment of an offense."           U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B).                One

example of sophisticated means is "hiding assets or transactions,

or both, through the use of . . . offshore financial accounts."

Id.




      9Even if we did review for plain error, we perceive none.
Newton does not point to any record support for the assertion that,
even if Arbor's patients did not qualify for the services billed
to MassHealth, they nevertheless qualified for lesser services
actually provided.    Nor is it clear that such lesser services
would have been covered. Thus, there is no patent error in the
court's determination.


                                      - 28 -
            The government argues that Newton's objection to the

sophisticated-means enhancement is reviewable only for plain error

because it was not raised below.    We agree.    The PSR submitted to

the court included the relevant information, and Newton did not

object to it at the sentencing hearing.10       Accordingly, we agree

with the government that this argument is waived and reviewable

only for plain error -- a standard which, once again, Newton does

not discuss.    She has therefore waived her arguments, leading us

to reject them.   See Schuster, 118 F.4th at 39 n.10.11

                                III.

            For these reasons, we affirm Newton's convictions and

sentence.




     10 Newton argues that the initial version of the PSR did not
include the proper factual basis for the sophisticated-means
enhancement. But this is ultimately irrelevant, given that the
final PSR included the correct factual basis.
     11 Even if she had not waived her argument, the district

court's application of the sophisticated-means enhancement is far
from "clear or obvious" error.    See United States v. Leach, 89
F.4th 189, 201 (1st Cir. 2023). Evidence showed that Newton hid
assets in Kenyan financial accounts beyond the reach of American
authorities.    Over a six-year period, she sent a substantial
amount to Kenya -- over $10 million.     She used those funds to
acquire local property and businesses. Additionally, Newton was
careful to cover her tracks to avoid detection, creating false
patient files, training records, and billing documents. Newton's
scheme also involved coordinating multiple corporate entities and
overseeing hundreds of employees.     The district court did not
clearly err by finding that Newton met the criteria for the
sophisticated-means enhancement.


                               - 29 -

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our criminal law attorney in Paris.


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