Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. v. Ruby Medders

Official source
                              THIRD DIVISION
                               DILLARD, P. J.,
                            GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.

                   NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                   received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after
                   the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed.
                             https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules



                                                                October 29, 2026




In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A26A1599. WAL-MART STORES EAST, L.P. v. MEDDERS.

       PIPKIN, Judge.

       Appellant Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.1 appeals the judgment on jury verdict

entered against it in this personal-injury action filed by Appellee Ruby Medders. As

explained below, we agree with Wal-Mart that portions of closing argument made by

Medders’ counsel concerning noneconomic damages were improper and harmful;

consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for

a new trial.




       1
         This Court has been presented with at least two different spellings of
Appellant’s name; the record and transcript reflect a spelling of Wal-Mart, while
Appellant’s brief reflects a spelling of Walmart. Because this Court must be guided
by the record, we use the spelling “Wal-Mart.”
       1. The issue before us is a legal one -- which we review de novo, see Cardinale

v. Keane, 

362 Ga. App. 644

, 646(1) (

869 SE2d 613

) (2022) -- and requires only a brief

exploration of the factual allegations and procedural history underlying this appeal.

       In September 2022, Medders brought this action against Wal-Mart for injuries

she allegedly sustained to her knee and ankle after a slip-and-fall incident during a

November 2020 visit to a Valdosta Wal-Mart store. The record reflects that Medders

had some pre-existing knee issues but that, at a January 2026 jury trial, she asserted

that her knee pain intensified after the fall and eventually required surgical

intervention. Wal-Mart, on the other hand, maintained that Medders’ injury was

pre-existing and that the fall did not necessitate Medders’ subsequent surgeries. Both

parties presented expert testimony at trial; during Medders’ cross-examination of

Wal-Mart’s expert witness, she focused on the expert’s fees, highlighting that the

physician’s rate as an expert witness was $2,000 an hour generally and $8,000 per

trial day.

       During closing argument, when addressing how to formulate a sum for

Medders’ noneconomic damages -- particularly damages for pain and suffering --

Medders argued to the jury as follows: “The defense’s own expert ... if he came to the


                                          2
courtroom like all of us did the last three days, he would have charged $8,000 for a full

day ....” Wal-Mart objected and then argued, pointing at certain statutory revisions

made as part of Georgia’s 2025 tort reform legislation, that Medders’ argument was

improper because it was not rationally related to evidence of her alleged noneconomic

damages. After hearing extensive argument during a bench conference, the trial court,

while concerned,2 concluded that Medders’ closing argument was permissible because

the expert’s rates were part of the evidence presented during trial.

      After the bench conference, Medders continued making argument based on the

expert’s rate -- suggesting that the expert’s per diem fee was the equivalent of

three-million dollars annually -- and Wal-Mart again objected to Medders’ “phantom

numbers,” eventually moving for a mistrial or, in the alternative, “a really good

curative instruction.” Both requests were denied. Medders’ counsel again returned

to his closing, pivoting to a different basis for calculating noneconomic damages --

which, again, Wal-Mart objected to -- and suggested to the jury that it could formulate




      2
        The transcript reflects that the trial court was faced with interpreting novel
statutory authority on the fly during closing argument while an “aggravated” jury
waited for resolution.
                                            3
a damage award at an hourly rate closer to minimum wage, between $7.25 an hour and

$12.15 an hour.

       The case was eventually submitted to the jury, which returned a general verdict

in favor of Medders and awarded her $975,000 in damages; the trial court entered a

judgment on that verdict. Now, on appeal, Wal-Mart asserts that the trial court erred

as a matter of law by denying its motion for mistrial or, “at a minimum, the request

for a curative instruction.” The heart of Wal-Mart’s claim is that the trial court

misconstrued and misapplied statutory authority. We agree.

       2. From 1960 until April 2025, OCGA § 9-10-184 (1960) provided, in whole,

as follows: “In the trial of a civil action for personal injuries, counsel shall be allowed

to argue the worth or monetary value of pain and suffering to the jury; provided,

however, that any such argument shall conform to the evidence or reasonable

deductions from the evidence in the case.” Early on, this Court afforded this statute

a liberal interpretation and application, beginning with Hardwick v. Price, 

114 Ga. App.

817

 (

152 SE2d 905

) (1966). In that case, plaintiff’s counsel asked the jury during

closing argument to calculate damages for pain and suffering by awarding his client “a

dime an hour, the price of a measl[y] bottle of Coca-Cola” for “what she has gone


                                            4
through, from now to the end of her allotted time on this earth .... At ten cents an

hour, that is $2.40 a day, there are 365 days in a year.” 

Id. at 820

(2). On appeal, this

Court affirmed, concluding that OCGA § 9-10-184 (1960) authorized counsel “to

argue to the jury the per diem, monthly or yearly value of a plaintiff’s pain and

suffering provided such argument is within the bounds of reasonable deduction from

the evidence in the case,” and, further, that trial counsel’s suggestion “that the hourly

worth of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering should be as much as the price of a measly

bottle of Coca-Cola was not, under the facts of this case, an unreasonable deduction

from the evidence.” Hardwick, 

114 Ga. App. at 820-21

(2).

      More recent decisions from this Court reflect that these “unit value”

arguments referencing arbitrary sums have continued more than a half-century later.

For instance, in Barker v. Grier, 

380 Ga. App. 157

 (

932 SE2d 436

) (2026), counsel

asked the jury to give the plaintiff “500 dollars for every single day that the defense

has denied taking responsibility,” id. at 159(1); in Southern Clearing & Grinding v.

Garcia, 

375 Ga. App. 62

 (

913 SE2d 732

) (2025), plaintiff’s counsel asked the jury to

calculate “compensatory damages” based on the defendant’s payments to their

expert, id at 68(3)(a)(iii); and, in White v. McGouirk, 

370 Ga. App. 318

 (

897 SE2d 100

)


                                           5
(2024), counsel asked the jury to formulate noneconomic damages based on the salary

of CEOs and professional athletes, id. at 320-21(1).

      However, effective April 21, 2025, OCGA § 9-10-184 was overhauled, see Ga.

L. 2025 p. 19 § 1, and now states, in relevant part, as follows:

      In the trial of any action to recover damages for bodily injury or wrongful
      death, counsel for any party shall be allowed to argue the worth or
      monetary value of noneconomic damages only after the close of evidence
      and at the time of such party’s first opportunity to argue the issue of
      damages, provided that such argument shall be rationally related to the
      evidence of noneconomic damages[3] and shall not make reference to
      objects or values having no rational connection to the facts proved by the
      evidence.


OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1). The statute also reaffirms that “the measure of such

damages being the enlightened conscience of an impartial jury.” Id at (b).

      Looking at this text in accordance with its plain language, see Deal v. Coleman,

294 Ga. 170, 172-73

(1)(a) (

751 SE2d 337

) (2013), the revised statute provides that, in



      3
       The statute defines “[n]oneconomic damages,” in relevant part, to mean “all
damages recoverable in tort for bodily injury ... other than economic damages,
including, but not limited to, damages for physical or emotional pain, discomfort,
anxiety, hardship, distress, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, [and]
mental anguish[.]” OCGA § 9-10-184(a)(2).
                                           6
relevant cases, (1) attorneys are entitled “to argue the worth or monetary value of

noneconomic damages”; (2) such an argument may only be made “after the close of

evidence and at the time of such party’s first opportunity to argue the issue of

damages”; (3) the argument must be “rationally related to the evidence of

noneconomic damages”; and, finally, (4) the attorney must “not make reference to

objects or values having no rational connection to the facts proved by the evidence.”

Id. Having outlined the substance of the new statute, it is apparent that Medders is

mistaken when she asserts that “the core provision concerning closing argument” is

“essentially the same” in both the old and new version of the statute.

      Under the old provision, any argument concerning noneconomic damages was

permissible so long as it “conform[ed] to the evidence or reasonable deductions from

the evidence in the case,” whereas the new provision restricts, at the very least, such

argument to that which is rationally related specifically to evidence of noneconomic

damages and, further, prohibits references to “objects and values” unrelated to the

evidence of the case. In light of these changes, we agree with Wal-Mart that OCGA

9-10-184(c)(1) now “precludes arguments that compare noneconomic damages to

unrelated values like Plaintiff advanced in this case.” Indeed, Wal-Mart is correct in


                                          7
asserting that Medders’ counsel violated the statute because “references to [the

expert’s] hourly rate and to $7.25 ... had no rational connection to Plaintiff’s

noneconomic damages[.]”4

      Medders disagrees, asserting that “the real jist of Wal-Mart’s argument” is

related to OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”),5 namely, “that a reference to an expert’s

rate has low probative value or a weak connection to the value of pain and suffering,

and is out-weighed by some risk of unfair prejudice.” This argument misses the mark.

Rule 403 concerns whether evidence is admissible in the first instance, while OCGA

§ 9-10-184(c)(1) concerns how the evidence adduced at trial may be presented to the

jury in a closing argument; Rule 403 requires weighing the value of potential evidence

for admissibility, while OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1) demands an evaluation of the

relationship between admitted evidence and closing argument. Thus, on appeal, we

are tasked with evaluating whether the arguments in question were rationally related



      4
         We also agree with Wal-Mart that the minimum-wage argument had no
rational connection to the facts proved by the evidence.
      5
       Rule 403 states: “Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”
                                          8
to evidence of noneconomic damages that was admitted at trial -- independent of any

questions of admissibility or probative value -- and we agree with Wal-Mart that,

under the evidence presented at trial, the arguments concerning minimum wage and

the expert’s fee were improper under the new statute.

      That said, we disagree with Wal-Mart that OCGA § 9-10-184(c)(1) prohibits

“unit value” and so-called “per diem” arguments like the one used by Medders’

counsel during closing in this case. Although Wal-mart contends that such arguments

“are impermissible because, as a matter of logic, an hourly rate paid twenty-four hours

per day for the rest of an individual’s life has no rational connection to noneconomic

damages,” these “unit value” or “per diem” arguments concern the manner of

formulating or calculating damages, and, under the plain language of OCGA § 9-10-

184(c)(1), counsel is expressly entitled to make argument concerning “the worth or

value of noneconomic damages.” Id.

      3. Had the trial court recognized that Medders’ argument ran afoul of OCGA

§ 9-10-184(c), remedial action would have been required. Subsection (d) explains, in

relevant part, that “[i]f counsel ... makes any argument or reference, prohibited by this

Code section in the hearing of the jury ... the court shall take remedial measures as


                                           9
provided in Code Section 9-10-185.” (Emphasis supplied.) Turning to OCGA § 9-10-

185, that statute provides as follows:

      Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial
      matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose
      and prevent the same. On objection made, the court shall also rebuke
      counsel and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury endeavor
      to remove the improper impression from their minds. In its discretion,
      the court may order a mistrial if the plaintiff’s attorney is the offender.


In this case, as explained above, Wal-Mart asked the trial court for both a curative

instruction and a mistrial; however, both were denied. In such circumstances,

      when a litigant’s closing argument is improper under the law, and the
      trial court overrules his opponent’s objection on that basis and fails to
      take corrective action, an appellate court will reverse a judgment if it
      finds that the uncorrected improper argument could have affected the
      jury’s verdict.


White, 370 Ga. App. at 322-23(1)(a). See also Stolte v. Fagan, 

291 Ga. 477, 482

(2)(a)

(

731 SE2d 653

) (2012), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. Harvey, 

311 Ga. 439,

447-51

(1)(b) (

585 SE2d 479

) (2021).

      Here, there is no dispute that Medders was seeking only $186,000 in medical

bills, but then, on the back of her improper argument, she asked the jury for

                                          10
approximately $950,000 in noneconomic damages and asserted that an “appropriate

award could be $1,136,000.” The jury subsequently returned a verdict for $975,000,

and we have little trouble concluding that the uncorrected improper argument of

counsel could have affected the jury’s verdict. Cf. Myrick v. Stephanos, 

220 Ga. App.

520, 520

(1) (

472 SE2d 431

) (1996) (reversing jury verdict as a result of an improper

closing that included, among other things, an argument that amounted to a plea for

punitive damages where only compensatory damages were sought).

      For theses reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter

is remanded for a new trial.

      Judgment reversed and case remanded. Dillard, P. J., and Gobeil, J., concur.




                                         11

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