Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Reynolds

Official source
[Cite as Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Reynolds, 

2026-Ohio-4288

.]


                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,                               :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :
                                                                No. 116181
                v.                                    :

DAVID A. REYNOLDS JR., ET AL.,                        :

                Defendants-Appellants.                :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 29, 2026


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-24-998018


                                           Appearances:

                Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, James W. Sandy, and
                Stefanie J. Deka; Sikora Law LLC and Alexander E.
                Goetsch, for appellee.

                David A. Reynolds Jr., pro se.


KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

                  Defendant-appellant David A. Reynolds, Jr. (“Reynolds”) brings this

appeal related to the foreclosure of the property located at 437 Rushmore Drive in

Richmond Heights, Ohio (“the property”). After a thorough review of the facts and
law, this court does not find merit in any of Reynolds’s assigned errors and affirms

the judgment of the trial court.

              In May 2024, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) filed a

foreclosure complaint for the property alleging that Reynolds, the borrower, owed

“$127,708.62, plus interest on the outstanding principal amount at the rate of

5.125% per annum from October 1, 2023, plus late charges and advances and all

costs and expenses incurred for the enforcement of the Note . . . .” In June 2024,

Reynolds filed an answer denying the validity of the signatures on the mortgage and

note. Wells Fargo filed a motion for summary judgment in August 2024. In

September 2024, Reynolds filed a counterclaim against Wells Fargo and the law

firm representing Wells Fargo, asserting claims for libel, civil conspiracy, and abuse

of process. The court set a new briefing schedule to allow Wells Fargo to file a

supplemental motion for summary judgment based on Reynolds’s counterclaim.

After a discovery dispute where Reynolds repeatedly refused to appear for

deposition or did appear but did not go forward with the deposition, the trial court

sanctioned Reynold’s noncompliance by dismissing his counterclaim in its entirety,

finding that Reynolds was not allowing Wells Fargo to fairly investigate those claims.

              A magistrate subsequently issued a decision granting Wells Fargo’s

motion for summary judgment to which Reynolds timely filed objections. His

objections were overruled, and the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision.

Reynolds appealed, assigning the following errors for our review:
      I.     The Trial Court abused its discretion by granting Wells Fargo’s
             Deposition Motion and issuing the resulting Deposition Order.
             Wells Fargo manufactured the underlying discovery dispute
             through deliberate misrepresentations and material omissions
             constituting fraud on the court; failed to satisfy the mandatory
             good faith prerequisites of Civ.R. 37(A)(1); and secured relief on
             a false record.

      II.    The Trial Court violated [Reynolds’s] substantive rights—
             including my right to due process of law—by entering a punitive
             Sanction Order that unjustly struck my Counterclaim,
             eliminated my defenses, and precluded all evidence in support
             thereof. The Sanction Order is not narrowly tailored to any
             legitimate remedial purpose; it is outcome-determinative,
             constitutionally repugnant, and irreconcilable with Article IV,
             Section 5(B) of the Constitution.

      III.   The Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment to Wells
             Fargo because Wells Fargo failed to establish entitlement to
             judgment as a matter of law, and because the record on which
             the court acted was artificially emptied by the unconstitutional
             Sanction Order. That order nullified my ability to present
             evidence to oppose Wells Fargo’s Summary Motion on the
             merits.

      IV.    The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by adopting the
             Magistrate’s Decision and overruling my timely objections
             without conducting the independent review mandated by Civ. R.
             53(D)(4)(d). The Trial Court examined neither the constitutional
             validity of the Sanction Order on which the Magistrate’s Decision
             entirely depended nor the mandatory vacatur grounds under
             Civ.R. 60(B)(3) and (5) that my objections placed squarely
             before it.

              Reynolds’s first assignment of error contests the court’s decision

compelling him to submit to a deposition with Wells Fargo.           This order was

necessitated after Wells Fargo filed many motions detailing their repeated efforts to

depose Reynolds, and Reynolds either did not appear for the deposition or when he
did appear, did not ultimately participate in a deposition for reasons disputed by the

parties.

              A trial court has broad discretion in controlling the discovery process

and absent an abuse of this discretion, appellate courts may not overturn the trial

court’s ruling on discovery matters. Feichtner v. Cleveland, 

95 Ohio App.3d 388,

397

 (8th Dist. 1994).

              Here, Wells Fargo noticed its first request to depose Reynolds in

November 2024. Reynolds filed objections to this notice that were overruled by the

court. Reynolds did not appear for this deposition. After conferring with Reynolds

about a mutually agreeable date in January 2025, Wells Fargo issued another notice

of deposition for the January date; the trial court also issued an order requiring

Reynolds to appear for this deposition. According to the record, Reynolds appeared

for his deposition but was not deposed. Wells Fargo subsequently filed a motion to

compel Reynolds’s appearance for deposition; the trial court granted it on February

4, 2025, and ordered Reynolds to appear for deposition on February 13, 2025.

Reynolds did not appear for this deposition, and Wells Fargo filed a motion for

sanctions.

              Reynolds argues that the order requiring him to sit for his deposition

was obtained by fraud and is therefore a nullity.        He disputes Wells Fargo’s

statement that he did not participate in the deposition that he appeared for, stating

that it “deliberately omitted the absence of a court reporter, concealed its own

counsel’s role in cancelling the deposition, and presented a false, one-sided account
designed to manufacture the appearance of obstruction.” We disagree and find that

the record supports the trial court’s decision to order Reynolds’s appearance for

deposition.

              Reynolds’s deposition was first noticed in November 2024. The trial

court was still considering motions pertaining to this issue until February 2025.

Reynolds did not appear for the first noticed deposition, appeared but ultimately did

not sit for the second noticed deposition, and once again failed to appear for the

third noticed deposition. All notices were thoroughly litigated in the trial court and

still the deposition did not go forward. Wells Fargo was forced to file numerous

motions seeking Reynolds’s submission to a deposition, and the court oversaw this

discovery dispute for over four months. We do not agree that the order compelling

Reynolds to submit to a deposition was obtained under fraud, especially where the

docket is consistent with the narrative presented by Wells Fargo in attempting to

obtain the deposition.

              The record indicates that Wells Fargo was unable to depose Reynolds

without the court’s involvement and remained unable to depose him even after the

trial court became closely involved with this dispute. Under these facts, we do not

find that the trial court abused its discretion in compelling Reynolds to submit to a

deposition. Accordingly, Reynolds’s first assignment of error is overruled.

              Wells Fargo sought sanctions against Reynolds pursuant to Civ.R.

37(D) following his failure to appear for his deposition in violation of the court’s

order. In the trial court, Reynolds never opposed the motion for sanctions but now
on appeal, his second assignment of error, he contests the trial court’s chosen

sanction for his conduct which was to dismiss his counterclaim in its entirety.

               Civ.R. 37(B) authorizes a court to issue sanctions when a party does

not comply with an order. Under Civ.R. 37(B)(1)(e), these sanctions may include

“[d]ismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.” (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, the court’s chosen sanction was explicitly authorized by Civ.R. 37.

               Nonetheless, Reynolds’s sole argument for this assigned error is that

because the deposition order described in assignment of error No. 1 was procured

by fraud, any ruling made by the court as a result therefrom is void. Having found

that the deposition order was not procured via fraud, we reject this argument.

Reynolds also advances several arguments related to the second noticed deposition

where he appeared but ultimately, the deposition did not go forward. Reynolds,

however, did not identify any reasons for not appearing for the first or third noticed

depositions. Despite bringing claims against Wells Fargo, Reynolds was unwilling

to allow Wells Fargo to investigate these claims through a deposition. Indeed, the

trial court gave Reynolds three different opportunities to appear for deposition and

he did not. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

ordering sanctions against Reynolds for his failure to appear for depositions, some

of which were memorialized into written court orders. His second assignment of

error is overruled.

               We address assignments of error Nos. 3 and 4 out of order and review

them temporally. Reynolds takes issue with the trial court’s alleged failure to
independently review the magistrate’s decision and with the trial court’s decision

adopting the magistrate’s decision.

              Reynolds’s fourth assignment of error argues that the trial court did

not perform an independent review of his timely filed objections. Civ.R. 53 requires

the trial court to independently review the objected matters. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d). We

must “‘presume that a trial court has performed an independent review of the

magistrate’s recommendation unless the appellant affirmatively demonstrates the

contrary.’”   Walpole v. Walpole, 

2015-Ohio-3238

, ¶ 63 (8th Dist.), quoting

Barrientos v. Barrientos, 

2011-Ohio-5734, ¶ 5

 (3d Dist.). “Simply because a trial

court adopted the magistrate’s decision does not mean that it did not exercise its

independent judgment.” Van Dress Law Offices Co. v. Dawson, 

2017-Ohio-8062,

¶ 17

 (8th Dist.). We have stated that the trial court is not required to comment or

reference the record in undertaking this independent review.         Ernsberger v.

Ernsberger, 

2014-Ohio-4470, ¶ 21

 (8th Dist.).

              We cannot find that Reynolds has rebutted the presumption that the

trial court conducted an independent review. Reynolds’s only support for this

argument is to once again cite the allegedly corrupt causal chain of events and argue

that the court could not have independently reviewed the claims and signed off on

them because it should have been apparent that they were part of the alleged

fraudulent scheme. Having overruled the prior assignments of error and finding

that the deposition order was not fraudulently obtained, we cannot find merit in

Reynolds’s argument.
              Similarly, in his third assignment of error, Reynolds argues that

summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of Wells Fargo for the

same reasoning already discussed herein relating to the alleged fraud.

              Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there

is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law, and (3) after construing the evidence most favorably to the party

against whom the motion is made, reasonable minds can only reach a conclusion

that is adverse to the nonmoving party. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 

82 Ohio

St.3d 367, 369-370

 (1998); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 

50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327


(1977).

              The moving party bears the initial burden of setting forth specific

facts that demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 

75

Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293

 (1996). If the moving party fails to meet this burden,

summary judgment is not appropriate. 

Id. at 293

. If the moving party meets this

burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden of setting forth specific facts

using evidence permitted by Civ.R. 56(C) to show that there is a genuine issue for

trial. 

Id.

 Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to meet

this burden. 

Id.


              Reynolds argues that the sanctions ordered “established the absence

of any genuine issue of material fact” and that he should be entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Reynolds again argues that the sanction for his failure to sit for a

deposition unfairly prohibited him from introducing evidence. He also specifically
notes that “Wells Fargo’s own interrogatory responses [would have] established the

absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” (Emphasis sic.) First, we have already

found that the sanctions order was a valid use of judicial discretion. Second, aside

from affirmatively asserting as much, Reynolds does not articulate the specific

evidence that these interrogatories may show, does not provide further arguments,

and asks us to consider his self-serving statements that he is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law and that he has pointed out an issue of fact. Accordingly, we cannot

say that Reynolds has met his reciprocal burden of demonstrating that Wells Fargo

was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

              Assignments of error Nos. 3 and 4 are without merit and overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR

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