Administrative United Kingdom

Wendy Joy Lubell, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2782 (Admin)

Case No: AC-2026-MAN-000083

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Manchester Civil Justice Centre (by videolink)

Date: 29 October 2026

Before :

MR C M G OCKELTON, SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

The King on the application of
Wendy Joy Lubell
Claimant
– and –
The Secretary of State for the Home Department Defendant

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

The Claimant in person

Matthew Howarth (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Defendant

Hearing date: 28 July 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

JUDGMENT

C. M. G. Ockelton :

Introduction

1. This is an application for Judicial Review. The decision under challenge was made by the defendant on 12 November 2025. It was a decision on reconsideration of an earlier decision dated 30 December 2024, refusing to register the claimant as a British Citizen under s 4L of the British nationality Act 1981. The reconsideration maintained that earlier refusal.

2. The claim was brought originally on four grounds. The claimant does not pursue ground 4. I granted permission on ground 1, refusing it on grounds 2 and 3. Those grounds are not renewed, so I am now concerned with the first ground only. That ground argues that in making her decision the defendant erred in law by taking too narrow a view of the ambit of s 4L, which was inserted by s 8 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and reads as follows:

3. 4L Acquisition by registration: special circumstances

(1) If an application is made for a person of full age and capacity (“P”) to be registered as a British citizen, the Secretary of State may cause P to be registered as such a citizen if, in the Secretary of State’s opinion, P would have been, or would have been able to become, a British citizen but for—

(a) historical legislative unfairness,

(b) an act or omission of a public authority, or

(c) exceptional circumstances relating to P.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), “historical legislative unfairness” includes circumstances where P would have become, or would not have ceased to be, a British subject, a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or a British citizen, if an Act of Parliament or subordinate legislation (within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978) had, for the purposes of determining a person’s nationality status—

(a) treated males and females equally,

(b) treated children of unmarried couples in the same way as children of married couples, or

(c) treated children of couples where the mother was married to someone other than the natural father in the same way as children of couples where the mother was married to the natural father.

(3) In subsection (1)(b), “public authority” means any public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, other than a court or tribunal.

(4) In considering whether to grant an application under this section, the Secretary of State may take into account whether the applicant is of good character.

4. There is published Guidance. The Guidance is not itself a source of law. It sets out the process of decision-making and so shows what the Secretary of State thinks that the statute means. A decision not made in accordance with Guidance may be shown to be erroneous for that reason, but a decision made in accordance with Guidance may be erroneous if the Guidance was wrong. In this case the decision was made in accordance with the Guidance.

5. ‘Registration as a British citizen in special circumstances’, of which version 4.0, published for Home Office staff on 24 December 2024, was the applicable version at the time of the original decision. The next version, version 5.0, was introduced on 7 May 2025, and so applied to the reconsideration. I have not been told of any material differences between them. The instructions to caseworkers begin with ‘Checking whether the person would have been, or would have been able to become, a British citizen’:

You must first check whether the person would have been, or would have been able to become, a British citizen but for historical legislative unfairness, an act or omission of a public authority, or exceptional circumstances relating to the applicant.

You must consider whether the person would have otherwise:

• become a British citizen automatically – by birth, descent or adoption

• qualified for registration or naturalisation as a British citizen

To assess whether the person would have become British automatically, you must look at their date and place of birth, and their parents’ status at the time, to see if they could otherwise have become a British citizen under the relevant nationality legislation. Further information on previous nationality laws can be found in the historical background information on nationality.

To assess whether the person could otherwise have qualified for registration or naturalisation you must consider whether they would have been able to meet the statutory requirements at the relevant time.

You must then assess the reasons put forward why the person was not able to acquire that status, to see if they fit within the conditions set out in the legislation:

• historical legislative unfairness

• an act or omission of a public authority

• exceptional circumstances relating to that person

In considering whether one of those 3 criteria prevented a person from being or becoming a British citizen you must make a decision based on their circumstances without relying on hypothetical assumptions about what a person might have done had the law been different. The courts in the case of R (APD) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 246 (Admin) stated that we need to look at “what “would” have occurred if the putative causal event had not taken place, not what “might” have occurred”. The judge recognised that there needs to be “a degree of certainty about what would have happened as opposed to mere speculation about what might have happened.”

6. In relation to ‘Historical legislative unfairness’ the Guidance says this:

If a person is citing historical legislative unfairness, you must check whether their inability to have been, or been able to become, a British citizen was directly related to the provisions of the historical legislation.

A piece of legislation will be considered to be ‘unfair’ if it treated one group differently to another, particularly on the basis of a protected characteristic. The legislation states that this might include where:

• men and women were treated differently

• children of unmarried couples were not treated in the same way as children of married couples

• children of couples where the mother was married to someone other than the natural father were not treated in the same way as children of couples where the mother was married to the natural father

This gives an indication of the sorts of situations parliament intended to address but is not exhaustive. Additional examples of legislative unfairness will generally be of a similar nature to those set out above. For example, it may additionally extend to scenarios which suggest inequality of treatment between individuals because of a protected characteristic. You must carefully consider any application where a person claims that their failure to become a British citizen was due to unfairness in the law. Cases that do not fit within the examples above should be referred to Nationality Policy Team.

You must take care not to equate situations where a person feels that their position within the law is unfair with ‘legislative unfairness’. For example, a person born abroad to a parent who was a British citizen by descent might think it is unfair that they do not acquire British citizenship automatically. However, it has been Parliament’s intention for many years that citizenship should normally only be passed on to one generation born overseas. The law itself is not unfair as it does not distinguish between people in the same circumstances on grounds of protected characteristics – age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, or sexual orientation.

Parliament has made conscious decisions about nationality law, and so cases where a person did not become a British citizen because of a legislative change will not normally fall within this provision. For example, some people born in the UK on or after 1 January 1983 to non-settled parents might feel that it is not fair that they did not acquire British citizenship whereas if they had been born before that date they would. Following that change, however, all children born on or after that date were treated the same on that basis.

Most cases involving British mothers and unmarried fathers will be covered by section 4C and 4F-I, and the new section 4K covers those who would have benefitted through a BOTC mother, or father with a connection to an overseas territory. In terms of people with British grandparents, Parliament’s intention was that citizenship will normally only be passed on for one generation born overseas, and section 4L is not intended to change that, although you must consider each case on its merits and assess if there are exceptional circumstances.

The facts, and the effect of the law apart from s 4L

7. The claimant’s claim is now only under s 4L which it is, I think, fair to describe as a recent provision, overlaying the general law relating to citizenship, and applying as an inclusionary exception to it. The general law on the acquisition of British citizenship, particularly citizenship by descent, is complex. Its effect in relation to the claimant and her ancestors is clear, undisputed, and as follows. I do not need to set out all the legislation in detail.

8. The claimant herself was born in the United States of America on 24 October 1972. She seeks to trace her claim to British citizenship through her mother, who was born in the United States of America on 9 March 1945, her mother’s father (the claimant’s maternal grandfather), who was born in British Guiana on 28 September 1921, and his father (the claimant’s great grandfather), who was born in the United Kingdom, presumably about 1900 or before that. No other individuals are claimed to be relevant.

9. Before the coming into force of the British Nationality Act 1948 the claimant’s grandfather was a British subject. He became a Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) by virtue of s 12 (1)(a) of the Act, because of his birth in British Guiana, one of the ‘territories comprised … in the United Kingdom and Colonies’. He was also within s 12(2), and would have become a CUKC by descent because his father was a British subject. The claimant’s mother also became a CUKC under s 12(2); but that was by virtue only of her father’s status: she was not within s 12(1) because of the place of her birth.

10. The claimant herself was born after the commencement of the 1948 Act. Section 5(1) provided that a person born after commencement shall be a CUKC if at the time of his birth his father was a CUKC; unless if the person’s father was a CUKC by descent only. In the latter case, the person would be a CUKC only in certain circumstances, one of which (and the only one relevant to this case) is registration at a United Kingdom consulate within one year of the person’s birth (or, with the permission of the Secretary of State, later).

11. I have added emphasis to the word ‘father’ where it occurs in the previous paragraph in order to emphasise that these provisions of the 1984 Act allowed nationality to descend only through the male line. Thus the claimant, whose claim would have to be by descent from her mother, was excluded. In order to set out the position clearly, however, it is helpful straightaway to posit that that was unfair, and to consider what the position would have been if instead of ‘father’ the Act had said ‘parent’.

12. If s 5 of the 1948 Act is read in that way, the claimant would still not have become a CUKC on her birth, because of the place of her birth; but she could have derived what may be called potential CUKC-ship from her mother, and she could have become a CUKC by registration at a consulate. Because the law said what it did, however, nobody would have thought of doing that (and would no doubt have been rebuffed if they did try).

13. Stating the position so far, the claimant’s great grandfather was (if still alive) a CUKC by his birth in the United Kingdom; her grandfather was a CUKC by his birth in a colony; her mother was a CUKC by descent only; and the claimant was not a CUKC but by unfairness might have missed out on becoming a CUKC by (further) descent from her mother and registration.

14. The Immigration Act 1971, following then-recent previous statutes, codified a deliberate legislative restriction on the rights of CUKCs to live in the United Kingdom. This it did by setting out those who had the right of abode in the United Kingdon, whom it called ‘patrials’. The clear intention of the legislation was to restrict the right to those who themselves had a real link to the United Kingdom itself, or who were CUKCs by descent in not more than two generations from a person who had such a link. Thus, by s 2 of the Act, a CUKC had the right of abode if he was himself a CUKC by birth, adoption, naturalisation or (in some cases) registration in the United Kingdom or its outlying islands; or if he was the child or grandchild of a person who was a CUKC by such birth etc; or if he had as a CUKC been settled in the United Kingdom or its outlying islands for a period of five years. (There were provisions also for those with a different status, ‘Commonwealth citizens’, and for women married to those with the right of abode, but neither concern me.)

15. The effect of those provisions in the present case is that the claimant’s grandfather (if still living) and mother had the right of abode in the United Kingdom. They were the child and grandchild of a person whose citizenship derived from his birth in the United Kingdom. What of the claimant? She was not a CUKC, but if she were treated as being capable of being registered under s 5(1) and had been registered and had become a CUKC, she would not have had the right of abode. She was a generation further still from the last member of her family who had a connection with the United Kingdom itself in the way set out in the 1971 Act; that is to say she had neither a parent nor a grandparent with that connection.

16. The law was reformed in full in the British Nationality Act 1981, which introduced the concept of a ‘British citizen’, and came into force on 1 January 1983. By s 11(1) of that Act, a person became a British citizen on that date if, immediately before it, that person was a CUKC with the right of abode. Thus, on that date, the claimant did not become a British citizen, although the ascendants I have been considering (if still alive) did so.

17. The most obvious reason for that is that she was not a CUKC. But suppose, again, that she had been a CUKC by registration at a consulate, she would still not have become a British citizen, because she would have been, as I have explained, a CUKC without the right of abode. By s 26, as a person who was a CUKC and did not become a British citizen, she would have become a British Overseas citizen.

18. The 1981 Act also amended the Immigration Act 1971 with the result that only British citizens have the right of abode in the United Kingdom: all others (with a few exceptions are subject) to immigration control. At the present time the claimant is in the United Kingdom, with leave. As a British Overseas citizen lawfully in the United Kingdom she would have certain rights including the right to vote and to obtain a British passport (marked with her status), but she would not have the rights of a British citizen.

19. The claimant accepts that that is the position under the relevant legislation as enacted, and as applied to her up to the present time. She claims, however, that she has been excluded from British citizenship by historical legislative unfairness of a type that should be regarded as falling within s 4L of the 1984 Act (as amended) even though it is in part mentioned neither there nor in the guidance. She applied to the Secretary of State on that basis and it is the negative response to that application which is challenged.

The claimant’s argument

20. The claimant has deployed and developed her argument with considerable detail, skill and vigour. I intend no disrespect if I summarise it shortly, but in my judgment the argument is in essence a short one. It is as follows.

21. In trying to derive British citizenship from the facts of her family and the legislation, as set out above, there have been two points where the terms of the legislation have excluded the claimant.

22. The first such point was the provision in the 1948 Act that permitted the status of a CUKC to descend only from father to child, not from mother to child. That provision prevented her from being a CUKC. She would not have been a CUKC automatically (because of the place of her birth, the United States of America), but if allowed to derive the status from her mother could have been registered at a UK consulate and so become a CUKC. Her not being a CUKC means that none of the subsequent provisions I have discussed could apply to her at all.

23. The second point was the provision in the 1971 Act that restricted the right of abode to CUKCs who had an ascendant no more distant than a grandparent who had been born (etc) in the United Kingdom. It is the fact that her grandfather’s birth, from which he derived his status, was in British Guiana, not the United Kingdom itself, that has kept her from being a person who might have the right of abode. But British Guiana was, at the relevant time, British territory as one of the colonies.

24. It is clear that in order to establish her claim to British citizenship, the claimant would need to reverse the effect of both of these provisions. The claimant’s case is that each of them amounts to historical legislative unfairness, and, moreover, that the Secretary of State was wrong to exclude the possibility that the latter, as much as the former, could be so considered.

25. So far as the former is concerned, the unfairness has been recognised by legislation in s 4C of the 1981Act, inserted by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. It sets up a category of individuals who may obtain citizenship by registration, provided they meet three conditions. The first is birth before 1983. The claimant was born before 1983. The second condition has a number of possibilities, but in the present case it is effectively that the person would be a CUKC if that status could have been derived through the female line and if the requirement for registration at a consulate were ignored. The claimant precisely meets that condition. The effect of the second condition in s 3C is therefore to reverse the first point at which she was prevented from deriving British citizenship, as identified above. It puts into effect the hypothetical facts posited in [11]-[13] above. However, the third condition is still a bar: it is that the person would have been a CUKC with the right of abode immediately before the coming into force of the 1981 Act.

26. The first point having been disposed of, the claimant sets to work on the second. She poses what she calls a ‘counterfactual’ to oppose the ‘territorial criterion’. It presents in two ways, not always clearly separated in her correspondence with the Secretary of State or in her submissions at the hearing. I will deal with both together.

27. The claimant is not a British citizen because her grandfather was not born in the United Kingdom. She would be a British citizen if her grandfather had been born in the United Kingdom or in a country that counted (or, as the correction of unfairness, ought to count) as though it were the United Kingdom. The ‘territorial criterion’ is thus the requirement to have an ancestor no more distant than a grandfather born on the United Kingdom (to express it simply, without including the various add-ons that do not apply in this case).

28. The first of the two ways in which the claimant makes her case is that it is a matter of historical legislative unfairness that all the descendants of CUKCs were not treated in the same way in attributing the right of abode. The second is that it is a matter of historical legislative unfairness that the descendants of all CUKCs that were born in British territory were not treated in the same way in attributing the right of abode. Confining her argument to the consequences of her grandfather’s birth outside the United Kingdom suggests the second way, but many of the submissions made would also support the first way.

29. The use of the word ‘counterfactual’ is misleading and I suspect the Secretary of State may sometimes have been misled by it. The claimant does not suggest that her grandfather should be treated as born in a place where he was not born. She argues that the differentiation between CUKCs born in different places is a historical legislative unfairness.

30. The defendant responds that it is not and it cannot be regarded in that way. The imposition of a difference between the treatment of those who had, or did not have, a grandparent with a territorial connection to the United Kingdom is a distinction between the two, but it is not within the realm of the circumstances covered by s 4L. To accept the claimant’s argument (in either form) would essentially be to rewrite British citizenship law in a way that Parliament did not and does not intend. It would mean that the introduction of the right of abode and its restriction by the 1971 Act would be of no effect, and in its wider form the argument would necessarily mean that all CUKCs would have become British citizens in 1983. It would mean that the numerous provisions of the 1981 Act relating to CUKCs who did not become British citizens (of which s 26, mentioned above, is an example) would be of no effect. Even in the narrower form of treating the descendants of those born within British territories in the same way, there would be many of the same consequences, and much redrafting, essentially overruling the precise terms of the statute, would be required.

31. The claimant does not resile from that. She points out that any application of s 4L is going to have the effect of ignoring the provisions of a statute or notionally rewriting it: the fact that the section is directed at historical legislative unfairness means just that. She notes also that, as accepted by the defendant, the categories of historical legislative unfairness are not closed and the list in s 4L is not definitive. So, she says, the defendant ought at least to have considered whether s 2 of the 1971 Act amounted to historical legislative unfairness.

What is ‘historical legislative unfairness’?

32. The parties both accept that the interpretation of a statute is for the Court. No authority is really needed for that proposition: the defendant cites R (APD) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 246 (Admin) at [39]. More important is Lord Bingham’s description of the Court’s task in R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13 at [8]:

“The court’s task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament’s purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment.”

33. Section 4L may apply in three circumstances, one of which is ‘historical legislative unfairness’. The three words of that phrase must all have value and the interpretation of the phrase must recognise that it is that phrase, and not some other, which is the gateway to the operation of this aspect of the section.

34. The middle word. ‘legislative’, I briefly considered above in the context of the claimant’s argument. The historical unfairness, whatever it is, must be a consequence of legislation. It follows that a difference in treatment arising solely from a rule of the common law unaffected by legislation, or a difference in treatment arising solely from societal norms of a past time, could not come within the phrase. Here there is no doubt that the rule in question is legislative, deriving from the Immigration Act 1971 and the British Nationality Act 1981.

35. The final word, ‘unfairness’, is of course more difficult to define, because it requires an evaluation of whether a difference in treatment is or is not ‘unfair’. Obviously not every difference in treatment amounts to unfair differentiation. The test cannot be whether the disadvantages person cries ‘unfair’: the question has to be answered by a comprehensive and measured assessment of all relevant factors. In the present context, where the application of the whole phrase is a route to the correction of a past process, it is clear that the time for considering the unfairness is the present. To focus on the present issue: is it ‘unfair’ to restrict the benefits of British citizenship, including being able freely to reside in the United Kingdom, in such a way as not to attribute that status to all former British subjects and all their descendants?

36. That is a question quite different from those specified as examples in s 4(2). It is different because those examples relate to differences which at the present time British society as a whole regards as unfair. There is, in other words, a consensus on the question of fairness. There is no such consensus on the question posed at the end of the previous paragraph.

37. In order to reach a view, it would be necessary to consider an enormous variety of factors, none of which form part of the claimant’s arguments. Among those factors are the needs of those who do have a closer connection to the United Kingdom itself, the limitation of resources, and the need to ensure that new nations emerging by independence from the British Empire and the British Commonwealth can rely on retention of their population in order to flourish. Against those factors one that might clearly be seen as relevant is any need to recognise a power-difference in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries between the United Kingdom itself and those of its subjects with an origin elsewhere in the Empire or Commonwealth.

38. In other words, the question whether the difference identified by the claimant is ‘unfair’, is a political question. Although it is for the Court to interpret the word, and the phrase, that does not mean that it is for the Court to enter into the political arena and make political assessments – especially when it would be doing so on hopelessly incomplete information. The fact that legislation is for the Court to interpret essentially means that the interpretation is confined to one that the Court could offer: the Court cannot stray beyond the ‘permissible bounds of interpretation’.. For present purposes, in my judgment, that is the interpretation to which I have alluded at [36] above. Unfairness in this context is to be determined by the general clear attitudes of British society, and does not include matters which demand a contested political judgment.

39. For this reason the claimant fails to show that the differentiation of which she complains is, within the meaning of s 4L, ‘unfair’.

40. The remaining word in the phrase, the first, is ‘historical’. Again, of course, the word has to be considered in its context (‘the context of the statute as a whole … in the historical context which led to its enactment’) as well as for its own meaning. ‘Historical’ is a backward-looking word: it means, at its simplest, ‘pertaining to the past’. In its present context, of a section of a statute designed to ameliorate unfairness in past statutes, it necessarily means ‘pertaining to the past as distinct from the present’. ‘Historical legislative unfairness’ is not the same as ‘legislative unfairness’.

41. The feature of the legislation identified by the claimant as potentially unfair is the differentiation in the acquisition of British citizenship between those with a close ancestor who had a territorial relationship to the United Kingdom itself and those without. As the defendant points out, that differentiation is it is at the heart of British nationality law. It does not only relate to the transmission from the status of CUKC to that of British citizen (or not) on 1 January 1983 under the 1981 Act. It applies at the present time, and there is no sign of any intention to change it. By s 1 of the 1981 Act, British citizenship is acquired by birth in the United Kingdom if at the time of the birth one of the parents is either a British citizen or settled in the United Kingdom. But by section 2, British citizenship is acquired by birth outside the United Kingdom in (in the usual case) if at the time of the birth one of the parents is a British citizen other than by descent. British citizenship is thus obtainable by descent, but not indefinitely: a territorial link with the United Kingdom by birth there or being there is necessary in alternate generations. In fact the rules of acquisition by descent are less generous than those applicable to existing CUKCs in under the 1981 Act; but the point is that the differentiation, in the case of those born outside the United Kingdom, between those with a close ancestor who had a territorial link with the United Kingdom and those without is still there. That is not a historical differentiation within the meaning of s 4L: it is a current and present one.

42. Accordingly, in my judgment, and informed by the interpretation of the statutory phrase, the different treatment of which the claimant complains is , according to the true construction of s 4L, legislative, but not unfair nor historical. The provisions are not, therefore, capable of being an example of historical legislative unfairness.

43. That conclusion determines these proceedings. Although the claimant perfectly properly put her case on the basis that the defendant as decision-maker failed to look outside the express terms of s 4L and so impermissibly restricted the ambit of the section, for the reasons given above the claimant’s identified second claimed unfairness, the ‘territorial connection’ criterion, does not fall within s 4L and the defendant was not therefore obliged to consider it. The defendant was entitled to determine the claimant’s application for citizenship in accordance with the terms of the Guidance, because in this respect at least it does not conflict with the law.

Conclusion

44. The claimant’s position is therefore that although she might have been unfairly prevented from becoming a CUKC by the confining of descent to the male line, that was immaterial to her claim to British citizenship. If she had been a CUKC she would have been a CUKC without the right of abode, and so would not have become a British citizen on 1 January 1983. The legislative provisions that did not attribute the right of abode, and British citizenship to a CUKC in the position she would have been if she had inherited that status from her mother are not provisions that could amount to ‘historical legislative unfairness’. He application for citizenship was correctly rejected.

45. This claim is therefore dismissed.

46. I hope the consequent Order may be agreed, but if not, I will hear the parties in due course.

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