Tax United Kingdom

Constantin Surugiu v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01460 (TC)

Case Number: TC10060

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Appeal reference: TC/2025/03634

JURISDICTION – late appeal application allowed – HMRC no longer defending penalty assessments – wider matters raised by appellant not arising from appealable decisions – penalty appeals allowed.

Heard on: 14 October 2026

Judgment date: 19 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE GERAINT WILLIAMS

Between

CONSTANTIN SURUGIU

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

The Tribunal determined the appeal without a hearing under the provisions of Rule 29(3) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 having considered the Notice of Appeal, the parties’ written submissions and the documents contained within the parties’ correspondence.

DECISION

Introduction

1. This appeal concerns eleven penalties identified in HMRC’s Notice dated 28 July 2026 with a total value of £2,796.00.

2. The issues arising for determination are whether permission should be granted for the appeal to proceed out of time and whether any matters remain before the Tribunal beyond the penalty appeals.

Background

3. The appeal was commenced by a Notice of Appeal dated 22 April 2026. In that Notice the Appellant challenged a number of liabilities recorded by HMRC in his name and maintained that those liabilities arose from the fraudulent use of his identity by third parties. The Appellant also appealed against a number of penalties.

4. On 28 July 2026 HMRC filed a Notice to the Tribunal identifying the appealable decisions before the Tribunal as eleven penalties with a total value of £2,796.00. Those penalties are:

Tax year ending 5 April Date of penalty Description Amount
5 April 2017 31 July 2018 30-day late payment penalty £169.00
01/01/2019 6-month late payment penalty £169.00
02/07/2019 12-month late payment penalty £133.00
5 April 2019 12/02/2020 Late filing penalty £100.00
03/11/2020 6-month late payment penalty £300.00
24/05/2022 6-month late payment penalty £145.00
17/02/2021 12-month late payment penalty £300.00
24/05/2022 12-month late payment penalty £145.00
24/05/2022 30-day late payment penalty £445.00
24/05/2022 6-month late payment penalty £445.00
24/05/2022 12-month late payment penalty £445.00
Total £2,796.00

5. HMRC stated that it did not oppose the Appellant’s application for permission to bring the appeal out of time. HMRC further stated that, having reviewed the matter, it would not defend the appeal against the penalty assessments and invited the Tribunal to allow the appeal. HMRC also stated that other liabilities appearing on the Appellant’s statement of account did not form part of the appealable decisions before the Tribunal.

6. In his response dated 29 July 2026, the Appellant agreed that permission should be granted for the late appeal and that the penalties identified by HMRC should be cancelled. However, the Appellant maintained that his appeal was not limited to those penalties and contended that the Tribunal should also determine issues concerning alleged identity fraud, Self Assessment liabilities, CIS-related income, repayments, over-repayment liabilities and associated matters.

7. By directions issued on 20 August 2026, the Tribunal invited HMRC to explain its position concerning jurisdiction. In response, HMRC submitted that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to appealable decisions under section 31 TMA 1970 or another applicable statutory provision, that the only appealable decisions identified in this case are the penalties set out above and that the remaining matters raised by the Appellant do not arise from appealable decisions falling within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Relevant law

8. The jurisdiction of the First-tier Tribunal is wholly statutory. The Tribunal possesses no inherent jurisdiction and may exercise only those powers conferred upon it by Parliament.

9. Rights of appeal in direct tax matters arise only where Parliament has provided a statutory right of appeal in respect of a particular decision. In relation to income tax matters, section 31 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (“TMA”) identifies the decisions against which an appeal may be brought. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is therefore determined by the appealable decision placed before it and not by the wider dispute between the parties.

10. It is equally well established that the Tribunal’s function is to determine the appealable matter entrusted to it by statute. The Tribunal does not possess a general supervisory jurisdiction over HMRC and has no freestanding power to investigate complaints concerning HMRC’s conduct, administration, complaint handling processes or alleged unfairness. Such matters do not become appealable merely because they arise in the context of a tax dispute.

11. In Aspin v Estill (Inspector of Taxes) [1987] STC 723 (“Aspin”) the Court of Appeal rejected an attempt to resist a tax liability on grounds unrelated to the correctness of the liability itself. The Court distinguished between a challenge to whether tax is due as a matter of law and a complaint that it would be unfair or oppressive for HMRC to seek to enforce that liability. The former falls within the statutory appeal jurisdiction. The latter does not.

12. The same principle was emphasised by the Upper Tribunal in HM Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Hok Ltd [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) (“Hok”), where it was held that the Tribunal has no general power to override statutory liabilities or supervise HMRC’s conduct on grounds of fairness. The Court of Appeal subsequently endorsed that approach in Trustees of the BT Pension Scheme v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2015] EWCA Civ 713 (“BT Pension Scheme”), observing that the statutory jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not extend to what are in substance public law challenges concerning the fairness of HMRC's treatment of a taxpayer.

13. The authorities also make clear that where a jurisdictional issue arises the Tribunal must identify the true substance of the taxpayer’s case. It is not sufficient merely to consider the label attached to the dispute. The Tribunal must determine whether the matters raised arise from an appealable statutory decision and whether Parliament has conferred jurisdiction upon the Tribunal to determine them.

14. Accordingly, the question in the present appeal is not whether the Appellant’s allegations of identity fraud are well-founded nor whether HMRC has dealt appropriately with those allegations. The question is whether the matters which the Appellant seeks to raise arise from appealable decisions falling within the statutory jurisdiction of this Tribunal.

Discussion

15. I begin with the Appellant’s application for permission to bring the appeal out of time.

16. In his Notice of Appeal, the Appellant explained that the matters giving rise to the appeal arose against a background of what he describes as a long-running identity fraud affecting his HMRC records between 2015 and 2024. He stated that he had repeatedly attempted to raise his concerns with HMRC since 2019, had provided evidence in support of those concerns and had sought reviews and reconsideration of the liabilities recorded in his name. The Appellant further stated that the Adjudicator’s Office had upheld aspects of his complaint, that HMRC had not provided a statutory review or formal appealable decision in relation to the matters he sought to challenge and that he had therefore been prevented from pursuing an appeal within the ordinary statutory time limits.

17. HMRC does not oppose the Appellant’s application for permission to bring the appeal out of time. In its Notice dated 28 July 2026, HMRC expressly stated that it did not object to the application.

18. In light of HMRC’s position and having regard to the explanation advanced by the Appellant, I am satisfied that permission should be granted for the appeal to proceed out of time. No contrary submission has been advanced and there is no apparent prejudice to the fair determination of the appeal arising from the delay.

19. There is no dispute between the parties as to the penalties which are properly before the Tribunal. HMRC has identified the penalties set out at paragraph 4 above as the relevant appealable decisions and has confirmed that it no longer seeks to defend them. HMRC invites the Tribunal to allow the appeal in respect of those penalties and the Appellant agrees that those penalties should be cancelled.

20. The difficulty in this appeal arises not from the penalties themselves but from the broader issues raised by the Appellant. Throughout his Notice of Appeal and subsequent correspondence, the Appellant has consistently maintained that he has been the victim of identity fraud over a number of years and that numerous liabilities recorded by HMRC in his name arose through the actions of third parties. He contends that self-assessment returns were submitted in his name without his authority, that CIS income was attributed to him which he did not receive, that repayments were made into accounts which he did not control and that HMRC has failed properly to address these matters despite the evidence he has provided. The Appellant also relies upon findings made by the Adjudicator’s Office concerning HMRC’s handling of aspects of his case.

21. I do not doubt the sincerity with which those matters are advanced. Nor do I overlook the fact that the Appellant has assembled and referred to a substantial body of material in support of his assertions. However, the issue before the Tribunal is not whether the Appellant’s allegations are correct. Equally, it is not whether HMRC ought to undertake further enquiries into the matters raised by the Appellant. Those questions can only arise if the Tribunal possesses jurisdiction to determine them.

22. The starting point is that the jurisdiction of this Tribunal derives wholly from statute. The Tribunal does not possess a general supervisory jurisdiction over HMRC. Nor does it possess a free-standing power to investigate alleged administrative failings, determine complaints or make findings on matters which do not arise from an appealable statutory decision. The Tribunal’s role is confined to determining matters which Parliament has entrusted to it.

23. The Appellant submits that his appeal is not confined to the penalties and that the Tribunal should determine the wider liabilities which he says arose through the fraudulent use of his identity. Whether the Tribunal is able to do so depends upon whether those matters arise from appealable decisions within its statutory jurisdiction.

24. HMRC has consistently maintained that the only appealable decisions before the Tribunal are the penalties identified in its Notice. HMRC further submits that the remaining liabilities to which the Appellant refers are self-assessed amounts and do not arise from assessments or other appealable decisions falling within section 31 TMA 1970. HMRC also submits that complaints concerning its handling of the Appellant’s affairs do not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

25. Having reviewed the Notice of Appeal, the subsequent correspondence and the parties’ submissions, I accept HMRC’s jurisdictional analysis.

26. The Appellant has repeatedly referred to disputed liabilities, CIS income, repayments, over-repayment charges and other amounts recorded by HMRC. However, neither the Notice of Appeal nor the subsequent material identifies any assessment, amendment, closure notice, discovery assessment or other appealable decision in relation to those matters which has been notified to the Tribunal as part of these proceedings. The Appellant’s case is therefore materially different from a case in which a taxpayer disputes the correctness of an identified assessment or challenges a specific statutory decision. Instead, the Appellant seeks a wider examination of liabilities appearing on HMRC’s records and of the circumstances in which those liabilities arose.

27. I have considered whether those wider matters can properly be treated as falling within the appeal presently before it. In my judgment they cannot. The existence of a dispute concerning liabilities recorded by HMRC does not itself create a right of appeal. Nor can jurisdiction be conferred by the seriousness of the allegations advanced. The Tribunal must identify an appealable statutory decision and determine the appeal arising from that decision. In the present case, no such decision has been identified in relation to the wider matters relied upon by the Appellant.

28. I have also considered the Appellant’s reliance upon alleged failures by HMRC to investigate the fraud allegations adequately, to respond to correspondence or to explain the position of his tax affairs. Even if those matters were established, they would not confer jurisdiction upon the Tribunal. The authorities make clear that complaints concerning HMRC’s administration, conduct, fairness or complaint handling do not fall within the statutory jurisdiction of this Tribunal.

29. It follows that there is an important distinction between the matters which the Tribunal is able to determine and those which it is not. The Tribunal is able to determine the appeal against the penalties identified at paragraph 4 above because those penalties are appealable decisions. The Tribunal is not able, within these proceedings, to determine whether the Appellant has been the victim of identity fraud, whether HMRC’s records accurately reflect his tax affairs, whether repayments were made to third parties or whether HMRC has handled the Appellant’s case appropriately. Whatever the merits of those matters may ultimately prove to be, they do not arise from any appealable decision identified in these proceedings.

30. I therefore conclude that the only matters properly before the Tribunal are the penalties identified in paragraph 4 above. HMRC no longer seeks to uphold those penalties and invites the Tribunal to allow the appeal. In those circumstances, and in the absence of any dispute between the parties in relation to those penalties, the appeal against them is allowed. No issue remains before the Tribunal for determination.

31. For completeness, I emphasise that nothing in this decision should be taken as a finding, either positive or negative, regarding the Appellant’s allegations of identity fraud or the wider matters raised in his correspondence. Those matters have not been determined by the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s conclusion is limited to the scope of its statutory jurisdiction and to the penalty appeals which are properly before it.

Decision

32. For the reasons set out above, permission for the appeal to proceed out of time is granted.

33. The appeal against the penalties identified at paragraph 4 above is allowed.

34. For the reasons set out above, I make no determination in relation to the wider matters raised by the Appellant because no appealable decision conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal has been identified in relation to those matters.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

35. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date: 19th OCTOBER 2026

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our tax lawyer.


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