Tax United Kingdom

Baser Ahmed v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01475 (TC)

Case Number:TC10063

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Appeal reference: TC/2026/01754

PROCEDURE – application for permission to provide Statement of Case out of time – application for relief from sanctions – rule 5(3)(a), Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 – rule 25(4), Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 – application of Martland principles – serious and significant default – inadequate explanation for non-compliance – all the circumstances – permission for late compliance granted

Heard on: 15 October 2026

Judgment date: 23 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE GERAINT WILLIAMS

Between

BASER AHMED

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

The Tribunal determined the application without a hearing pursuant to Rule 29(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (the “FTT Rules”) having considered HMRC’s application dated 5 August 2026, the Statement of Case served on the same date, the Appellant’s representations dated 28 September 2026 and the authorities relied upon by the parties.

DECISION

Introduction

1. This is an application by HMRC dated 5 August 2026 for permission to file and rely upon a Statement of Case served after the expiry of the time limit specified by direction 12 of the Tribunal’s directions dated 7 May 2026. The application is opposed by the Appellant.

2. By a direction released on 22 July 2026, Judge Michael Blackwell refused HMRC’s application for an extension of time in which to comply with direction 12. HMRC subsequently served a Statement of Case together with the present application seeking permission for late compliance and relief from the consequences of its failure to comply with the Tribunal’s directions.

3. The issue for determination is whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, HMRC should be permitted to rely upon the Statement of Case notwithstanding its failure to comply with the Tribunal’s directions.

Chronology

4. On 7 May 2026 the Tribunal issued directions for the future conduct of the appeal. Direction 12 required HMRC to file and serve a Statement of Case on 6 July 2026.

5. On 6 July 2026 and before expiry of the time limit for compliance, HMRC applied for an extension of time until 5 August 2026 in which to comply with direction 12 and file and serve its Statement of Case. The application was opposed by the Appellant.

6. By a direction released on 22 July 2026, Judge Michael Blackwell refused HMRC's application. The direction provided:

“HMRC apply for an extension of time until 5 August 2026 to comply with direction 12 of the directions dated 7 May 2026 and file and serve their Statement of Case.

The application is refused.

Although the application was made before the expiry of the deadline and therefore technically complies with paragraph 10(3) of the Practice Statement, I am not satisfied that HMRC made any meaningful attempt to obtain the other party's position before making the application. HMRC emailed the appellant's representative on the same day that the Statement of Case was due and lodged the application at 15:58. No response had been received by that time. There is no evidence that HMRC sought to make contact by telephone or otherwise engage with the appellant's representative to ascertain whether the application was opposed. In those circumstances, HMRC cannot realistically have expected to receive a considered response before filing the application.

Nor am I persuaded by the explanation advanced for the extension. HMRC state only that technical advice has been sought from internal stakeholders and subject matter experts. No explanation is provided as to why such advice is being sought only now. Given the age of the underlying dispute and the time that HMRC have already had to investigate and formulate their position, it is unclear why additional technical advice has become necessary at this stage.

In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that HMRC have established a sufficient basis for extending the time for compliance with the Tribunal's directions.

If HMRC file their Statement of Case out of time, it will be open to them to make an application for permission for late compliance and relief from sanctions. Any such application will be considered on its merits in light of the circumstances then prevailing.”

7. On 5 August 2026, HMRC filed a Statement of Case together with an application seeking permission for late compliance and relief from sanctions. In that application HMRC accepted that the Statement of Case had been served approximately 30 days after the expiry of the relevant time limit. HMRC further accepted that contact with the Appellant’s representative should have been made earlier. HMRC submitted that, notwithstanding the delay, it should be permitted to rely upon the Statement of Case.

8. The renewed application advanced a different explanation from that relied upon in support of the earlier extension application. Whilst the earlier application had referred to the need to obtain technical advice from internal stakeholders and subject matter experts, HMRC contended in the renewed application that concerns had arisen regarding the validity of the discovery assessments and that further consideration was required because deliberate behaviour was said to be integral to the validity of those assessments.

9. On 28 September 2026, the Appellant filed representations in opposition to HMRC’s application. The Appellant submitted, amongst other matters, that HMRC had not provided a satisfactory explanation for its failure to comply with direction 12, that the explanation advanced in the renewed application differed from that relied upon in support of the earlier extension application and that important aspects of the chronology leading to the default remained unexplained.

Relevant FTT Rules

10. HMRC’s application is made pursuant to rule 5(3)(a) of the FTT Rules. Rule 5 provides, so far as relevant:

“(1) Subject to the provisions of the 2007 Act and any other enactment, the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure.

…

(3) In particular, and without restricting the general powers in paragraphs (1) and (2), the Tribunal may –

(a) extend or shorten the time for complying with any rule, practice direction or direction, unless such extension or shortening would conflict with a provision of another enactment containing a time limit;

…”

11. Rule 2 of the FTT Rules provides:

“(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.

(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes –

(a) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, the anticipated costs and the resources of the parties;

(b) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings;

(c) ensuring, so far as practicable, that the parties are able to participate fully in the proceedings;

(d) using any special expertise of the Tribunal effectively; and

(e) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues.

…

(4) Parties must –

(a) help the Tribunal to further the overriding objective; and

(b) co-operate with the Tribunal generally.”

12. Rule 25 of the FTT Rules provides, so far as relevant:

“(1) The respondent must send or deliver a statement of case to the Tribunal and to the appellant so that it is received –

(a) within 60 days of the date on which the respondent is sent a copy of the notice of appeal; or

(b) if the Tribunal directs, within such period as the Tribunal may direct.

…

(4) The respondent may apply for permission to provide a statement of case after the end of the period referred to in paragraph (1).”

Applicable legal principles

13. The principles applicable to applications for an extension of time and relief from sanctions in the Tax Chamber are well established.

14. In Data Select Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2012] UKUT 187 (TCC)(“Data Select”), Morgan J summarised the established approach to applications for extensions of time at [34] as follows:

“Applications for extensions of time limits of various kinds are commonplace and the approach to be adopted is well established. As a general rule, when a court or tribunal is asked to extend a relevant time limit, the court or tribunal asks itself the following questions: (1) what is the purpose of the time limit? (2) how long was the delay? (3) is there a good explanation for the delay? (4) what will be the consequences for the parties of an extension of time? and (5) what will be the consequences for the parties of a refusal to extend time. The court or tribunal then makes its decision in the light of the answers to those questions.”

15. In Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC)(“Martland”), the Upper Tribunal considered the exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion in relation to a late appeal. Having reviewed the relevant authorities, including Data Select, the Upper Tribunal held that the First-tier Tribunal could usefully follow the three-stage approach derived from Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] 1 WLR 3926. The Upper Tribunal stated at [44]:

“(1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being ‘neither serious nor significant’), then the FTT ‘is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages’ – though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a consideration of those stages.

(2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established.

(3) The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of ‘all the circumstances of the case’. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.”

16. The Upper Tribunal further stated at [45]:

“That balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.”

17. In HMRC v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) (“Katib”) the Upper Tribunal reiterated that:

“We have, however, concluded that the FTT did make an error of law in failing to acknowledge or give proper force to the position that, as a matter of principle, the need for statutory time limits to be respected was a matter of particular importance to the exercise of its discretion.” [emphasis in original]

18. More recently, the Court of Appeal in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Medpro Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 14 (“Medpro”) confirmed both the validity of the Martland guidance and the entitlement of the Upper Tribunal to provide structured guidance to promote consistency within the tribunal system. Lord Justice Lewison observed that the essence of the Martland guidance is the three-stage approach set out at [44] of that decision and the requirement that particular importance be attached to efficient conduct of litigation and compliance with statutory time limits.

19. The Court of Appeal further endorsed the observations of Ryder LJ in BPP Holdings Ltd v HMRC [2016] EWCA Civ 121 (“BPP Holdings”) at [38] that:

“The correct starting point is compliance unless there is good reason to the contrary which should, where possible, be put in advance to the tribunal. The interests of justice are not just in terms of the effect on the parties in a particular case but also the impact of the non-compliance on the wider system including the time expended by the tribunal in getting HMRC to comply with a procedural obligation. Flexibility of process does not mean a shoddy attitude to delay or compliance by any party.”

20. The Court of Appeal in Medpro further observed at [43]:

“A time limit is not simply a target date; it is there to be respected.”

21. In the context of proceedings before this Tribunal, the Supreme Court in BPP Holdings Ltd v HMRC [2017] UKSC 55 approved the giving of guidance by the Upper Tribunal in relation to procedural defaults and sanctions. As recorded by the Court of Appeal in Medpro at [19], Lord Neuberger stated:

“In a nutshell, the cases on time limits and sanctions in the CPR do not apply directly, but the Tribunals should generally follow a similar approach.”

22. It is therefore clear that, although the Civil Procedure Rules do not apply directly in the Tax Tribunal, the Tribunal should generally adopt a similar approach to that applied by the civil courts when considering procedural defaults, applications for extensions of time and relief from sanctions.

23. Accordingly, in determining HMRC’s application, I apply the three-stage approach identified in Martland. I must consider: (i) the seriousness and significance of the default, (ii) why the default occurred and (iii) all the circumstances of the case, giving particular weight to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and to the need for compliance with rules, practice directions and orders.

Discussion

24. Before turning to the three-stage analysis, there are a number of preliminary matters which arise from the authorities and the particular circumstances of this application.

25. First, although Martland, Katib and Medpro arose in the context of applications for permission to make a late appeal, it is common ground that the same principles are applicable to an application under rule 25(4) of the FTT Rules for permission to serve a Statement of Case out of time. In Sweby v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2022] UKFTT 00122 (“Sweby”), the Tribunal applied the Martland framework to such an application and I respectfully agree with and adopt that approach.

26. Secondly, this is not an application to bar HMRC from further participation in the appeal pursuant to Rule 8 of the FTT Rules. Decisions of the Tribunal such as Galldris LLP v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2021] UKFTT 331 (TC) (“Galldris”) and South Crescent Trustees Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2025] UKFTT 00417 (TC) (“South Crescent Trustees”) were decided in the context of barring applications and must be read accordingly.

27. Thirdly, the present application falls to be considered against the background that HMRC previously sought, but was refused, an extension of time by Judge Michael Blackwell on 22 July 2026. The significance of that direction lies not in the fact of refusal itself but in the criticisms made of HMRC’s application and the extent to which the renewed application addresses those concerns.

Stage 1: Seriousness and significance of the default

28. The first stage of the analysis requires the Tribunal to assess the seriousness and significance of HMRC’s failure to comply with direction 12.

29. HMRC accepts that the breach was serious, although it submits that it was not significant. The Statement of Case was served after expiry of the period prescribed by the Tribunal’s directions and only after HMRC’s application for an extension of time had been refused by Judge Michael Blackwell.

30. The purpose of a Statement of Case is well understood. It constitutes HMRC’s principal pleading and identifies the basis upon which the appeal will be defended. Compliance with the time limit for service of a Statement of Case is therefore an important procedural step in ensuring that parties understand the case they must meet and that appeals progress efficiently and fairly. As Morgan J observed in Data Select, the purpose of a time limit is a relevant consideration when assessing whether an extension should be granted.

31. In assessing seriousness and significance, it is necessary to consider both the length of the delay and the context in which it occurred. The Statement of Case was served on 5 August 2026. HMRC’s application acknowledges that service occurred approximately 30 days after expiry of the relevant time limit.

32. The delay in the present case was materially shorter than the delays considered in a number of the authorities relied upon by the parties. In Sweby, the delay exceeded three years. In Galldris, the Statement of Case was served 133 days late and HMRC had failed to engage with the Tribunal for 149 days.

33. However, the fact that the delay was shorter than in those cases does not mean that it was insignificant. The question is not whether more serious examples can be identified but whether the particular default under consideration amounted to a serious departure from compliance with the Tribunal’s directions.

34. In my judgment, it did. The Tribunal directed HMRC to serve a Statement of Case by a specified date. HMRC did not comply with that direction. The default cannot be characterised as minor or trivial. Nor was it a delay of only a few days. Rather, HMRC failed to comply with the timetable directed by the Tribunal and ultimately served its Statement of Case approximately one month late.

35. That conclusion is reinforced by the procedural history. Prior to expiry of the deadline, HMRC sought an extension of time until 5 August 2026. That application was refused. In refusing it, Judge Michael Blackwell concluded that HMRC had not established a sufficient basis for extending time and identified deficiencies both in HMRC’s attempts to ascertain the Appellant’s position and in the explanation advanced for requiring additional time.

36. Notwithstanding that refusal, HMRC did not comply with the existing direction. Instead, it served its Statement of Case on the very date to which it had sought an extension. Whilst that does not aggravate the default for the purposes of this first stage, it forms part of the context in which the seriousness of the breach falls to be assessed.

37. I also bear in mind the observations of the Court of Appeal at [43] in Medpro that a time limit “is not simply a target date; it is there to be respected” and the observations of Ryder LJ in BPP Holdings at [38] that “The correct starting point is compliance unless there is good reason to the contrary”. Those observations apply equally to HMRC and to taxpayers.

38. In summary, I am satisfied that HMRC’s failure to comply with direction 12 was both serious and significant. Whilst the delay was not especially lengthy, it involved non-compliance with an important procedural direction for a period of approximately one month. The breach cannot properly be characterised as trivial. This is therefore not a case in which the default may be regarded as neither serious nor significant.

Stage 2: Reason for the default

39. The second stage of the analysis requires the Tribunal to consider why the default occurred.

40. HMRC’s explanation is set out in its application dated 5 August 2026. HMRC submits that, during preparation of the Statement of Case, concerns arose regarding the validity of the discovery assessments. HMRC states that further consideration was required because deliberate behaviour was said to be integral to the validity of those assessments. HMRC contends that this necessitated further review and consideration before the Statement of Case could be finalised.

41. I accept that issues concerning the validity of discovery assessments and the applicability of the extended time limits are potentially significant matters. Equally, there would be nothing improper in HMRC seeking technical advice before finalising its pleaded case if it genuinely considered that further consideration of those issues was required.

42. However, the question at this stage is not whether HMRC may have had a legitimate reason for undertaking further work. The question is whether HMRC has provided a satisfactory explanation for its failure to comply with the Tribunal’s directions.

43. In my judgment, the explanation advanced by HMRC is unsatisfactory.

44. The principal difficulty is that the application provides conclusions rather than evidence. Whilst HMRC states that concerns arose regarding the validity of the discovery assessments, the application does not explain when those concerns first arose, what prompted them, or why they emerged at that stage of the proceedings. The application does not identify when any technical advice was sought, from whom it was sought, when it was received or why those matters could not have been addressed before the deadline for service of the Statement of Case.

45. Those omissions are particularly striking given the procedural history of the matter. In refusing HMRC’s earlier application for an extension of time, Judge Michael Blackwell observed:

“HMRC state only that technical advice has been sought from internal stakeholders and subject matter experts. No explanation is provided as to why such advice is being sought only now. Given the age of the underlying dispute and the time that HMRC have already had to investigate and formulate their position, it is unclear why additional technical advice has become necessary at this stage.”

46. The renewed application does not materially address those concerns. It advances a more detailed explanation than that contained in the earlier application but remains silent as to important aspects of the chronology which the Tribunal would reasonably expect to have been explained. In particular, the application does not explain when the relevant issue was identified, why it was not identified earlier or why compliance with direction 12 remained impossible notwithstanding the work already undertaken by HMRC.

47. Similar difficulties arise in relation to HMRC’s engagement with the Appellant. In refusing the earlier application, Judge Michael Blackwell noted that HMRC had emailed the Appellant’s representative on the same day that the Statement of Case was due and had lodged its application before any response had been received. He further noted that there was no evidence that HMRC had sought to make contact by telephone or otherwise engage with the Appellant’s representative to ascertain whether the application was opposed.

48. The renewed application accepts that contact with the Appellant’s representative should have been made earlier. However, it does not explain what, if any, additional attempts were made to engage with the Appellant before the default occurred. Nor does it explain why no earlier contact was made.

49. The Appellant also submits that the explanation advanced in the renewed application differs from that relied upon in support of the earlier extension application. There is some force in that submission. The explanation considered by Judge Michael Blackwell referred to technical advice being sought from internal stakeholders and subject matter experts. The renewed application places emphasis upon concerns regarding the validity of the discovery assessments and the significance of deliberate behaviour.

50. I do not consider it necessary to determine whether those explanations are inconsistent. It is entirely possible that the technical advice referred to in the earlier application related to the issues identified in the renewed application. However, if that is so, HMRC has not said so. The application contains no evidence explaining the relationship between the two explanations or providing the chronology necessary to understand how the issue developed. The Tribunal is therefore left with an incomplete account of the events giving rise to the default.

51. In summary, I accept that HMRC may have considered that further work was required before its Statement of Case could properly be finalised. However, the application provides insufficient detail to explain why that work only became necessary when it did, what steps were taken to undertake it and why compliance with the Tribunal’s directions was not possible. Whilst the explanation cannot be dismissed as wholly lacking in substance, it remains materially incomplete and does not satisfactorily explain the failure to comply with direction 12.

52. That conclusion weighs against HMRC. Whilst I accept that there may have been legitimate reasons for seeking additional time, the absence of any detailed chronology or supporting evidence means that the explanation carries significantly less weight than it might otherwise have done.

Stage 3: All the circumstances of the case

53. The third stage of the analysis requires the Tribunal to consider all the circumstances of the case. This involves a balancing exercise which requires consideration of all the circumstances of the case whilst giving particular weight to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and to the need for compliance with rules, practice directions and orders

54. I begin with the factors weighing against HMRC.

55. HMRC failed to comply with direction 12. For the reasons already given, I have concluded that the default was both serious and significant. Whilst HMRC’s application advances an explanation for the default, that explanation remains materially incomplete. In particular, the application does not explain when the concerns regarding the discovery assessments first arose, why they arose at that stage of the proceedings or why compliance with the Tribunal’s directions was not possible notwithstanding the further work said to have been required. The explanation therefore does not satisfactorily explain the failure to comply with direction 12.

56. I also attach weight to the fact that the renewed application was made against the background of Judge Michael Blackwell’s direction of 22 July 2026. HMRC was therefore aware that the Tribunal had already identified deficiencies in the explanation advanced in support of its earlier application and had expressly noted the absence of any meaningful attempt to ascertain the Appellant’s position before seeking an extension of time.

57. Whilst the renewed application provides more information than the earlier application, it does not fully address the concerns identified by Judge Michael Blackwell. Nor does it provide the chronology or evidential detail that the Tribunal would ordinarily expect from a party seeking relief from sanctions. That is a matter to which I attach significant weight.

58. I have also borne in mind the importance of ensuring compliance with Tribunal directions. As the Court of Appeal observed in Medpro, a time limit is not simply a target date but is there to be respected. Likewise, the correct starting point remains compliance unless there is good reason to the contrary. Those observations are of general application and apply equally to HMRC and to taxpayers.

59. There are, however, a number of factors pointing in the opposite direction.

60. First, whilst serious and significant, the delay was relatively modest. HMRC’s application acknowledges a delay of approximately 30 days. This is not a case involving delay measured in many months or years.

61. Secondly, HMRC ultimately served its Statement of Case. The principal purpose of the time limit imposed by direction 12 was to ensure the timely progression of the appeal and to require HMRC to articulate the basis upon which it intended to defend the appeal. That objective has now been achieved. The Appellant is in possession of the Statement of Case and is able to understand the case he is required to meet. The litigation is therefore capable of progressing in the ordinary way.

62. Thirdly, there is no evidence before me of any material prejudice arising from the delay itself. The Appellant has opposed the application and properly drawn attention to deficiencies in HMRC’s explanation. However, the Appellant does not contend that relevant evidence has been lost, that witnesses are no longer available or that the delay has impaired his ability fairly to advance his appeal. In those circumstances, I do not regard the delay as having caused any material prejudice to the Appellant’s conduct of the appeal.

63. Fourthly, refusal of the application would have significant consequences. Whilst this is not an application to debar HMRC under Rule 8 of the FTT Rules, the practical effect of refusing permission to rely upon the Statement of Case would be a serious one. It would substantially affect HMRC’s ability properly to defend the appeal notwithstanding that a Statement of Case has now been prepared and served.

64. I have considered the authorities relied upon by the parties. They illustrate the importance of compliance with Tribunal directions and make clear that procedural defaults should not be disregarded simply because substantive issues are said to arise. Equally, they demonstrate a reluctance to impose the most severe procedural consequences where the defaulting party has ultimately complied, the delay is relatively limited and the dispute remains capable of being determined fairly and justly.

65. Having considered all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the balance weighs in favour of granting the application.

66. I reach that conclusion with some hesitation. HMRC’s explanation for the default falls considerably short of what the Tribunal was entitled to expect, particularly given the matters identified by Judge Michael Blackwell when refusing the earlier application. HMRC is well accustomed to both making and opposing applications for relief from sanctions. In those circumstances, the Tribunal was entitled to expect a full and candid explanation of the circumstances giving rise to the default. HMRC failed to provide one.

67. However, those deficiencies must be weighed alongside the relatively limited period of delay and the fact that HMRC has now served its Statement of Case. Refusing the application would not advance the efficient conduct of these proceedings and would do little to further the overriding objective. By contrast, permitting HMRC to rely upon the Statement of Case will allow the appeal to be determined fairly and justly on the issues in dispute whilst marking, through this decision, the Tribunal’s clear disapproval of HMRC’s failure properly to explain its non-compliance.

68. Standing back and considering all the circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the application. HMRC is therefore granted permission for late compliance and may rely upon the Statement of Case served on 5 August 2026.

Decision

69. For the reasons given above, HMRC’s application for permission for late compliance and relief from sanctions is granted and HMRC may rely upon the Statement of Case served on 5 August 2026.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

70. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date: 23rd OCTOBER 2026


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