Administrative United Kingdom
BG v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA 60071 2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Newport
On 26th October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Boyes
Between
B G
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss Osei of counsel
For the Respondent: G Dutton, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 10th March 2025.
Anonymity
2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because although the claim, facts, findings and outcome are in the public interest, the identity of the appellant is not.
Background
3. The appellant is a national of Tunisia who was born and raised as a Muslim. Over a period of several years, he became increasingly disillusioned with Islam and states that by 2019 he had adopted atheist beliefs.
4. He claims that he disclosed his loss of faith to his wife, who in turn informed other members of his family. According to his account, tensions with his family subsequently escalated. He states that in May 2022 disagreements arose after he began attending dog competitions, which caused particular anger within his family.
5. The appellant alleges that an uncle attempted to stab him. He reported this incident to the police, and he states that his uncle was detained for a short period following the complaint.
6. He further claims that he was later pursued by a vehicle while riding his motorcycle and believes that a relative was responsible. He maintains that he attempted to relocate on multiple occasions within Tunisia but was located each time by family members.
7. The appellant is a kickboxer. He entered the United Kingdom lawfully using his own passport and a valid visa in order to participate in a boxing tournament.
8. His claim is that, if returned to Tunisia, he would face a real risk of serious harm from family members because of his conversion from Islam to atheism. He fears that he would be subjected to imprisonment, violence, or death at the hands of his relatives.
The Hearing
9. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said.
Issues
10. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:
(a) On the balance of probabilities, does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Refugee Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them by an actor of persecution?
(b) On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?
(c) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?
(d) Is it reasonably likely there would not be sufficient protection available?
(e) Is there a part of the country where the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and to which they could reasonably be expected to relocate?
(f) Does the Appellant face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of return?
(g) Leave to Remain: Does the appellant have a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner who is in the UK and is a British Citizen, settled or has refugee leave, humanitarian protection or limited leave under Appendix EU.
(h) If so, would they face very significant difficulties in continuing their family life outside the UK that could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for the Appellant or his/her partner?
(i) Child: Does the appellant have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child?
(j) Would it be reasonable for the child to leave the UK?
(k) Private Life: Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return?
(l) Would the appellant's removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that it is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Evidence
11. The appellant provided 3 witness statements. In summary his evidence is as follows;
12. The appellant maintains his challenge to the refusal of his protection claim and continues to assert that, if returned to Tunisia, he would face a real risk of serious harm from family members because of his conversion from Islam to atheism.
13. He claims that his family used their influence and connections to arrange an informal travel ban preventing him from leaving Tunisia. He states that he learned of this through an aunt and an acquaintance with access to official databases, who allegedly confirmed that his details had been entered onto a travel-ban system. According to the appellant, he was nevertheless able to depart Tunisia with the assistance of intermediaries and a police officer who facilitated his passage through airport controls in exchange for a bribe.
14. The appellant states that he repeatedly relocated to different cities within Tunisia, including Tunis, Sousse and Hammamet, but that his family continued to locate and threaten him. He attributes this to family networks, personal connections and information being passed to relatives by acquaintances. He claims that complaints made to the authorities and requests for protection were not effectively investigated and that no meaningful protection was provided.
15. He explains that he did not live with his family after becoming an atheist, residing instead with his wife and daughter. He believes that his family became aware of his loss of faith through his wife, public comments he made about his dogs, radio appearances and material he posted on social media. He states that his Facebook account was public and accessible to relatives and members of the wider community.
16. The appellant alleges a sustained campaign of harassment and violence by family members because of his apostasy. He claims that relatives threatened him, pursued him with knives and sent threatening messages through Facebook and WhatsApp. He states that one relative referred to applying the “law of God” against him and that other family members warned him that he remained in danger unless he renounced his beliefs.
17. He further claims that relatives attacked him outside his home and that video footage identifies two cousins among the attackers. He states that his dog was killed by family members, that threats were directed at individuals who assisted him, and that these incidents formed part of a pattern of intimidation linked to his atheism.
18. The appellant also maintains that his home was deliberately set on fire. He relies upon witness statements from neighbours, documentary evidence linking him to the address, and reports prepared by a notary. He believes that the fire was an act of retaliation by individuals hostile to his religious views and was directly connected to the circumstances giving rise to his asylum claim.
19. He states that he sought legal assistance and attempted to resolve matters through the Tunisian authorities before leaving the country. However, he claims that neither lawyers nor the authorities were able or willing to provide effective protection, leading him to conclude that he had no safe option other than seeking asylum abroad.
20. The appellant also relies upon his family and private life in the United Kingdom. He states that he has been in a genuine and subsisting relationship with a Polish national who holds settled status in the UK since 2024. He claims that they have cohabited since June 2024 and are the parents of a British child born in 2025. He additionally states that he suffers from physical and mental health difficulties for which he is receiving treatment.
21. In summary, the appellant's case is that he faces persecution and serious harm from both state-linked and non-state actors in Tunisia because of his atheism, that the Tunisian authorities cannot provide him with adequate protection, and that internal relocation within Tunisia would not be a viable means of avoiding the risk he claims to face.
22. The appellant has provided a supplementary witness statement intended to clarify aspects of his earlier evidence.
23. He states that his aunt informed him that she had overheard his uncle and cousins discussing that he had been prevented from travelling and would not be able to escape them. He clarifies that his aunt did not see any official documentation and that her information was based on conversations she heard. He also states that the same relatives had previously told him that they possessed influence and would be able to locate him wherever he went.
24. The appellant explains that the former classmate who checked matters on his behalf was a former law-school colleague employed within the police. He states that he does not know the precise nature of his role. He provided this individual with his national identity number and was subsequently informed that he was unable to travel, although he never personally saw any official database, document or record and therefore cannot say how any restriction may have been recorded.
25. He further clarifies that his belief that two cousins were influential arose from his personal knowledge of them, statements made by them, and comments made by his former classmate, who described them as having influence beyond that of ordinary police officers. He does not claim to know their formal ranks or positions.
26. Regarding his departure from Tunisia, the appellant states that his former classmate arranged for him to meet a second individual, whom he understood to be an officer capable of assisting him at the airport. He personally paid a substantial sum of money to his former classmate for the arrangements but did not witness what subsequently happened to the money. At the airport, he met the second individual, was escorted through the process, passed through security and passport control, and departed the country. He emphasises that he does not know what arrangements took place outside his presence or why he was ultimately permitted to leave.
27. The appellant accepts that his asylum interview did not clearly distinguish between the role played by his former classmate and the separate individual who assisted him at the airport. He states that the former arranged the assistance, while the latter accompanied him through the airport.
28. In relation to internal relocation, he clarifies that previous references to identity checks and information being obtained through security systems were possibilities he considered rather than matters he directly witnessed. He confirms that he never personally observed his relatives accessing any official databases. He gives an example of a friend in Hammamet who warned him that his uncle had placed pressure upon him, but he does not know precisely how his family learned of his whereabouts.
29. The appellant also clarifies the basis upon which he identified two individuals involved in an attack outside his home. He states that he recognised one cousin from his voice and eyes during the incident. As for the second individual, he reached that conclusion after later reviewing video footage in which part of the person's face became visible. He emphasises that the identifications are his own and were not independently made by the court bailiff who reviewed the footage.
30. He likewise states that he recognised threatening WhatsApp messages as having come from his cousin and that he identified the same relative by voice during a Facebook call, despite the account being registered under a different name.
31. Concerning the fire at his property, the appellant accepts that he did not witness the fire being started and possesses no direct evidence identifying those responsible. He explains that his belief that family members were responsible is based upon the surrounding circumstances, previous threats and the absence of any other known dispute which might explain the attack.
32. He further clarifies that the WhatsApp evidence was verified by a Tunisian court bailiff, who inspected the messages directly on his mobile telephone and prepared an official report. He explains that his earlier references to a “notary officer” were the result of a translation error and that he was in fact referring to a court bailiff.
33. The appellant explains that, although he returned to Tunisia after travelling to the United Kingdom for a sporting competition in June 2023, he initially believed that his problems could be resolved through legal complaints and relocation. He states that it was only after further incidents, including a later attack and the killing of his dog, that he concluded he could no longer safely remain in Tunisia.
34. Finally, the appellant states that his partner, a Polish national residing in the United Kingdom, has since been awarded Personal Independence Payment. He says that he provides her with significant practical and emotional support and plays an active role in caring for their daughter.
35. In summary, the supplementary statement seeks to clarify the evidential basis of the appellant's account by distinguishing between direct knowledge, information obtained from others and personal beliefs or inferences, whilst maintaining that the core facts of his protection claim and his fear of return to Tunisia remain unchanged.
36. The appellant has provided a further supplementary witness statement addressing developments since his previous evidence and clarifying aspects of his claim.
37. He states that, after leaving Tunisia in August 2023, he became aware of a Tunisian criminal judgment issued in January 2024 sentencing him, in his absence, to eight months’ imprisonment in relation to allegations concerning electronic activity and religious expression. He emphasises that he was already outside Tunisia when the judgment was issued, did not attend the proceedings, and had no knowledge of any conviction when he previously stated that he had no criminal record. He also refers to a separate summons and relies upon the documents themselves, their translations, and any expert evidence as to their significance. He states that the judgment and summons have increased his fear of return to Tunisia.
38. The appellant explains that his involvement with the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain began in 2024 and reflects his genuinely held atheist beliefs rather than an attempt to strengthen his asylum claim. He relies upon letters of support previously provided by the organisation and clarifies that any suggestion that he left Tunisia because of the later criminal conviction is inaccurate, as the conviction post-dated his departure.
39. He states that, when interviewed in February 2025, he had not yet engaged in public-facing atheist activities in the United Kingdom, although he had already been in contact with the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain. Since then, his activities have become more public, including participation in the “Free Betty” project, during which he appeared on camera. He explains that his involvement arose from his support for freedom of belief and non-belief rather than any desire to persuade others to become atheists. He has requested updated confirmation of his participation from the organisation.
40. The appellant notes that he appears, at least partially, in publicly available online material connected to the “Free Betty” campaign. However, he cannot confirm whether the film in which he participated has been publicly released or whether family members or individuals in Tunisia have seen it.
41. He maintains that his atheism is genuine, forms part of his identity, and pre-dates his asylum claim. He states that he would not be willing to conceal his lack of religious belief or falsely present himself as a practising Muslim in order to avoid adverse treatment upon return.
42. The appellant also clarifies a large cash withdrawal made shortly before his departure from Tunisia. He states that, from approximately 186,000 Tunisian dinars withdrawn from his savings account, he paid 100,000 dinars to his former law-school classmate in connection with arrangements that enabled him to leave the country. He says that the remaining funds were handed to his sister to manage ongoing financial commitments in Tunisia, including loan repayments and maintenance obligations. He accepts that there is no independent documentary evidence confirming the subsequent transfer of cash to his sister.
43. He explains that, at the time of departure, he believed he could not safely remain in Tunisia, although he still hoped circumstances might improve and had not yet made a final decision to claim asylum in the United Kingdom.
44. Finally, the appellant states that he is continuing his education in the United Kingdom and is currently studying towards GCSE qualifications and a Level 2 qualification in Cyber Security.
45. In summary, the appellant relies on the existence of a criminal conviction and summons issued after his departure from Tunisia, his ongoing and increasingly public involvement with ex-Muslim organisations in the United Kingdom, clarification of his financial arrangements before departure, and his continued assertion that his atheism is genuine and that he remains at risk if returned to Tunisia.
Legal Framework
46. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine both the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?
(b) Does the appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
47. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and
(b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the appellant.
48. I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.
49. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
50. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are: [Insert relevant paragraphs, usually no need to cite the full provisions unless they are in dispute]
51. In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.
52. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.
53. Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.
Facts
54. The appellant is a Tunisian national who was born and raised as a Muslim but became an atheist.
55. The appellant’s family became aware of his atheism and reacted with hostility towards him because of his abandonment of Islam.
56. The appellant was subjected to threats, intimidation and harassment from members of his family on account of his atheist beliefs.
57. The appellant attempted to avoid the difficulties he faced by relocating to different locations within Tunisia but remained fearful of being located by family members.
58. The appellant's evidence was consistent in its core elements and his supplementary statements clarified, rather than undermined, matters which had previously been unclear.
59. The documentary evidence, including social media material, messages, witness evidence and supporting documents, is broadly consistent with the appellant’s account and provides support when considered in the round.
60. The appellant's atheism is genuine, forms an important part of his identity, and is not a belief adopted to strengthen his asylum claim.
61. The appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Tunisia because of his atheism, and neither sufficient state protection nor internal relocation would provide a reasonable means of avoiding that risk.
Determination of the Issues
62. I find the appellant to be a credible witness. Having considered his oral evidence, witness statements, supplementary statements and the documentary evidence in the round, I am satisfied that the core elements of his account are reliable and have been established to the lower standard of proof applicable in protection claims.
63. I accept that the appellant is a national of Tunisia who was born and raised as a Muslim. I accept that, over time, he became disillusioned with Islam and now genuinely identifies as an atheist. His evidence on this issue has remained consistent throughout the proceedings. I further accept that he attended dog shows and competitions in Tunisia and that this activity contributed to tensions within his family. I also accept that he is a kickboxer and travelled to the United Kingdom to participate in a sporting competition.
64. I accept that members of the appellant's family became aware of his abandonment of Islam and reacted adversely to it. I find that the appellant was subjected to threats, intimidation and harassment because of his atheism. I further accept that he relocated on a number of occasions within Tunisia in an attempt to avoid his family and that, despite those efforts, he continued to fear their ability to locate him.
65. The respondent places significant reliance upon alleged inconsistencies concerning the travel ban and the circumstances of the appellant's departure from Tunisia. I do not consider those matters materially undermine his credibility. In his supplementary evidence, the appellant carefully distinguished between matters within his personal knowledge, matters reported to him by others, and assumptions he made at the time. In my judgment, those clarifications enhanced rather than damaged his credibility. He did not seek to embellish his account and candidly acknowledged matters that he could not personally verify.
66. Similarly, I do not regard the appellant's evidence concerning internal relocation as implausible. The respondent's criticism proceeds on the basis that the appellant was required to explain precisely how his family were able to discover his whereabouts. However, the appellant repeatedly accepted that he did not know the precise mechanism by which this occurred. He acknowledged that some explanations he had previously offered were speculative. I regard those concessions as consistent with a witness attempting to give truthful evidence rather than one seeking to exaggerate his claim.
67. I have considered the documentary evidence with the caution required by Tanveer Ahmed. Whilst none of the documents is determinative in isolation, I find that they provide support for the appellant's overall account. The WhatsApp messages, Facebook communications, witness statements, bailiff's reports, photographs and video evidence are broadly consistent with a history of hostility from family members arising from his abandonment of Islam. Taken together and viewed against the background of the appellant's oral evidence, they lend support to the essential elements of his account.
68. The respondent also relies upon the appellant's decision to return to Tunisia after attending a sporting event in the United Kingdom in 2023. I accept the appellant's explanation that, at that time, he still believed matters could be resolved through complaints, legal action and further relocation within Tunisia. It was only after subsequent incidents, which he perceived as demonstrating an escalation in the level of hostility towards him, that he concluded he could no longer remain safely in Tunisia. I do not find his return visit inconsistent with a genuinely held fear.
69. I have also considered the criminal judgment issued against the appellant in Tunisia after his departure. Whilst I make no definitive finding as to the legal validity of those proceedings, I accept that the judgment was issued in his absence and after he had left Tunisia. I am satisfied that the existence of the judgment and accompanying summons contributes to his fear of return.
70. I further accept that the appellant's atheism is genuine. His involvement with the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain and his participation in public activities after arriving in the United Kingdom are consistent with genuinely held beliefs. I do not accept that these activities were undertaken opportunistically to strengthen an asylum claim.
71. Taking the evidence as a whole, I find that the appellant has established that members of his family became aware of his atheism, reacted with hostility to it, and subjected him to threats and intimidation as a consequence. I am satisfied that these matters are established to the lower standard of proof.
72. I find that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason, namely his lack of religious belief and his identity as an atheist.
73. Although the country material demonstrates that Tunisia contains constitutional protections for freedom of belief and conscience, the issue in this appeal is whether this particular appellant faces a real risk of serious harm. I find that he does. The evidence demonstrates that his family became aware of his atheism and reacted in a manner that went beyond mere social disapproval. I accept that the hostility directed towards him escalated over time and included threats and intimidation which the appellant reasonably understood as placing his safety at risk.
74. I am satisfied that the treatment feared by the appellant amounts to persecution rather than mere discrimination. His fear is not limited to social exclusion or criticism, but extends to serious violence from family members because of his abandonment of Islam.
75. I do not find that the appellant would be able to obtain sufficient protection from the Tunisian authorities.
76. Whilst Tunisia possesses functioning police and judicial institutions, the relevant question is whether effective protection would be reasonably available to this appellant in practice. I accept his evidence that he made complaints and sought assistance but did not obtain protection that addressed the risks he perceived. Having considered the evidence as a whole, I am not satisfied that adequate protection would be reasonably forthcoming in his particular circumstances.
77. I am not satisfied that internal relocation would be a reasonable or effective option.
78. I accept that the appellant resided in and moved between different locations within Tunisia in an effort to distance himself from family members whom he feared. Whilst there remains uncertainty as to how his whereabouts became known, I accept his evidence that repeated attempts at relocation did not alleviate his fears and that he continued to believe himself vulnerable to further threats.
79. Given the nature of the feared actors and the persistence of the difficulties described by the appellant, I find that it would be unduly harsh to expect him to relocate elsewhere in Tunisia and conceal or suppress a genuinely held aspect of his identity in order to avoid harm.
80. Drawing all matters together, I am satisfied that the appellant has established, to the lower standard of proof, that he is genuinely an atheist, that members of his family became aware of this fact, and that he faces a real risk of persecution on that basis if returned to Tunisia.
81. I am further satisfied that sufficient state protection would not be available to him and that internal relocation would not provide a reasonable alternative.
82. Accordingly, I find that the appellant is a credible witness and has established a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. The appeal is therefore allowed on asylum grounds. In light of that conclusion, it is unnecessary to reach separate findings under Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
83. The appeal is allowed
ANONYMITY ORDER
84. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
No fee is paid or payable and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed IB Date 27.10.26
First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes
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