Miscellaneous United Kingdom
Park Homes Investments Limited v Avison Young (UK) Limited
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2713 (BP)
Case No: BL 2025 001021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION
BUSINESS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date:
Before :
CHIEF MASTER SHUMAN
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Between :
| PARK HOMES INVESTMENTS LIMITED | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| AVISON YOUNG (UK) LIMITED | Defendant |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Helen Evans KC (instructed by Lewis Silkin LLP) for the Claimant
Thomas Grant KC and James McCreath (instructed by DAC Beachcroft LLP)
for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 7-8 May 2026
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Judgment Approved by the court
for handing down
CHIEF MASTER SHUMAN:
1. This is a professional negligence claim arising out of valuation and stock audit services provided by the defendant, Avison Young (UK) Limited (“AY”), in relation to mobile homes situated at a number of residential parks operated by companies within the Royale group of companies (“the Royale Group”).
2. Between 2020 and 2022 the claimant, Park Homes Investments Limited (“PHIL”), entered into arrangements under which it provided funding to companies within the Royale Group. The arrangements were structured by reference to the transfer to PHIL of the title to identified mobile homes, together with contractual arrangements under which the relevant Royale Group company could, or could be required to, repurchase them. PHIL advanced a total sum of approximately £8 million under two principal transactions entered into in April 2020 and January 2021.
3. AY was instructed on a number of occasions to undertake valuation and stock audit work in relation to the mobile homes. Its work resulted in reports produced in April 2020, September 2020, January 2021, February 2021 and March 2022. The nature and scope of AY’s instructions differed between those engagements. Some of its work was undertaken on a desktop basis; other work involved physical inspections of the mobile homes at the relevant parks.
4. PHIL alleges that AY acted in breach of contract and negligently in carrying out that work. Its case includes allegations that AY overvalued the mobile homes and failed adequately to identify, record or explain matters revealed, or which ought to have been revealed, by the stock audits. Those matters are said to include signs that some mobile homes were occupied, had been sold or were otherwise unavailable to PHIL as security.
5. PHIL says that it relied on AY’s work when entering into and maintaining its arrangements with the Royale Group. It alleges that, had AY discharged its duties, PHIL would either have declined to enter into the relevant transaction or would have taken steps to protect its position. Those steps are said to have included requiring the substitution of other mobile homes, exercising contractual put options, assuming control of sales, preventing further disposals and pursuing the Royale Group companies, associated companies or guarantors while recoveries remained possible.
6. AY denies that the pleaded claims disclose any viable basis for liability or recovery. Its case is that the scope of its duties was defined by its instructions and, where applicable, its written terms of appointment. AY maintains that it was instructed to value identified mobile homes and to audit their physical presence. It was not instructed to investigate title, completed sales, the legal rights of occupiers or the honesty and financial standing of PHIL’s counterparty. AY says that the losses claimed arose from an alleged fraud by the Royale Group and fall outside of the scope of any duty which AY owed.
7. There are two substantive applications before the court.
8. By an application notice dated 15 October 2025, AY applies to strike out the whole or parts of the claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2) and/or for summary judgment pursuant to CPR 24.2. AY also seeks an order requiring PHIL to pay the costs of the pre-action process, relying on what it says were material differences between the case advanced in the pre-action correspondence and the claim subsequently pleaded.
9. By an application notice dated 23 April 2026, PHIL applies for permission to amend its particulars of claim pursuant to CPR 17.1(2)(b). The proposed amendments concern two matters. The first is PHIL’s case that AY was required to identify and communicate “red flags” as part of its reasonably incidental duties. The second concerns the formulation of PHIL’s case that it lost a real and substantial chance of obtaining a better outcome had it taken one or more of the steps said to have been available to it.
10. The applications were heard together on 7 and 8 May 2026. This judgment determines both applications. Where the evidence or the parties’ factual cases are disputed, I refer to those matters only to the extent necessary to determine whether the relevant claim or proposed amendment has a real prospect of success or is otherwise suitable for determination without a trial.
11. The applications concern claims arising from five reports produced by AY: the April 2020 Report, the September 2020 Report, the January 2021 Report, the February 2021 Report and the March 2022 Report. They raise issues concerning the scope of AY’s express and reasonably incidental duties, the adequacy of its valuation and stock-audit work, the losses falling within the scope of the duties alleged, causation, the pleading of a loss of chance and the significance of changes in PHIL’s case during the pre-action process.
12. Although there is a degree of factual overlap between those issues, the nature of AY’s instructions and the alleged breaches are not identical for each report. The individual engagements and reports therefore require separate consideration, while PHIL’s case that AY’s valuation and stock-audit functions formed parts of a connected course of professional work remains relevant throughout.
THE EVIDENCE
13. AY’s application is supported principally by the first witness statement of Charles David Bending, a partner in DAC Beachcroft LLP, dated 15 October 2025. Charles Bending is the solicitor with conduct of the proceedings on behalf of AY. His statement addresses the development of PHIL’s case, the terms upon which AY was instructed, the individual reports and AY’s grounds for seeking strike out and summary judgment. It also addresses AY’s application for the costs of the pre-action process. The statement exhibits a substantial body of contemporaneous documents and pre-action correspondence.
14. PHIL relies upon the first witness statement of Duran Ross, a partner in Lewis Silkin LLP, dated 23 April 2026. Duran Ross has conduct of the proceedings on behalf of PHIL and was also involved in the pre-action process, initially while at Hausfeld & Co LLP and subsequently at Lewis Silkin LLP. His statement responds to the grounds advanced in AY’s application and explains the proposed amendments to the particulars of claim.
15. PHIL also relies upon the first witness statement of Matthew Insley, dated 23 April 2026. Matthew Insley was PHIL’s managing director at the material time and was principally responsible for its dealings with AY. His evidence concerns the instructions given to AY, his understanding of the purpose of AY’s work, the information available to PHIL and the steps which PHIL says it would have taken had AY reported matters differently.
16. In particular, Matthew Insley gives evidence that he made clear to Mark Ebo of AY that PHIL expected AY to alert it to any “red flags”. That evidence provides the factual basis for one of PHIL’s proposed amendments. AY disputes that any such conversation occurred.
17. In reply, AY relies upon the first witness statements of Mark Ebo and Carys Chandler, both dated 30 April 2026. They were the AY surveyors involved in aspects of the relevant work. AY also relies upon the second witness statement of Charles Bending, dated 30 April 2026.
18. I have also been provided with a substantial hearing bundle containing the applications, the existing and proposed amended particulars of claim, the witness statements and exhibits, the relevant engagement documents and reports and the pre-action and inter partes correspondence. The bundle extends to more than 1,400 pages. The parties’ skeleton arguments were also detailed and helpful. In addition, during the hearing PHIL’s counsel handed up a set of enlarged thumbnail photographs. After the short adjournment on 8 May 2026, PHIL’s counsel provided further proposed amendments to paragraphs 34B and 53ab of the draft amended particulars of claim. The oral application to make those additional amendments was dismissed. Any further amendment should be advanced by formal application.
19. The evidence of Matthew Insley, Mark Ebo and Carys Chandler engages directly with disputed matters concerning AY’s instructions and the parties’ understanding of its work. There has been no cross-examination, and the disputed oral evidence cannot properly be resolved on these applications. The evidence nevertheless falls to be evaluated for the purpose of determining whether the claims and proposed amendments have a real prospect of success.
20. Post-issue disclosure has not taken place. PHIL says that it has not received AY's complete inspection photographs and site notes. AY disputes the significance of the further material sought. The significance of that material differs between the individual claims and is considered below.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties and the relevant commercial arrangements
21. PHIL was incorporated on 15 April 2020 and formed part of a group of companies associated with Aldridge Capital Limited. Sir Rodney Aldridge and Ian Stark each held an interest in PHIL. Matthew Insley, who was its managing director at the material time, managed its investments in companies within the Royale Group and was principally responsible for its dealings with AY.
22. AY is a national practice of surveyors and valuers. Before PHIL’s incorporation, AY had undertaken valuation and stock-audit work for other Aldridge-associated companies in connection with funding arrangements involving mobile homes. Mark Ebo was the AY surveyor with whom Matthew Insley principally dealt. Carys Chandler was also involved in the later valuation and inspection work.
23. The relevant Royale Group companies were principally Royale Living Limited and Royale Investments Limited. It is unnecessary for present purposes to distinguish between them on every occasion, and I refer to them collectively as “Royale” unless the identity of the particular company is material.
24. The parties described the transactions as “stocking” arrangements. Under the contractual documentation, PHIL provided funding to Royale and acquired title to specified mobile homes together with associated contractual rights. Royale remained responsible for marketing the homes to prospective purchasers. Sale proceeds were intended to be applied towards the sums due to PHIL, and the documentation provided mechanisms by which Royale might repurchase the homes or PHIL might require it to do so. The agreements also contained provisions for the substitution of other mobile homes where discrepancies emerged.
25. The commercial structure therefore contemplated that sales might take place during the currency of the arrangements. PHIL’s case, however, draws a distinction between a proposed sale which had not completed and a completed transaction under which a third party had acquired the home without the proceeds being accounted for to PHIL. PHIL says that references in contemporaneous schedules to homes being “sold” were understood as referring to anticipated or provisional transactions which might not complete. AY relies upon the same references, and upon PHIL’s responses to them, in support of its case that PHIL knew that sales were being reported and directed the assumptions upon which AY was to proceed.
26. The precise legal characterisation and effect of the arrangements are matters for trial. For the purposes of these applications, it is sufficient to record that PHIL regarded the identified mobile homes and the associated contractual rights as the assets against which its funding had been advanced. Its causation case rests in part upon the rights of substitution, repurchase and control which it says would have enabled it to protect its position had it understood the true circumstances earlier.
27. Mobile homes differ from conventional real property in material respects. The individual unit is a chattel. Its use at a residential park ordinarily depends upon contractual rights relating to the pitch and the facilities provided by the park operator. There is no central public register recording ownership of a mobile home or the associated contractual rights. The parties agree that occupation may affect value, although they disagree about its significance in the present transactions and about the advice which AY was retained or required to provide. PHIL also says that visible occupation was capable of indicating that a home had been made available to, or sold to, a third party. AY disputes that occupation permitted that conclusion and maintains that determining whether title had passed would have required a different inquiry.
The April 2020 engagement and first transaction
28. On 3 April 2020 Starkco Limited, a company within the Aldridge group, which was acting as a placeholder, entered into heads of terms with Royale Living Limited. The proposed transaction involved funding of £5 million in connection with 46 mobile homes situated at nine residential parks. PHIL had not yet been incorporated and was subsequently substituted as the funding entity.
29. On 1 April 2020 Matthew Insley asked Mark Ebo to undertake what he described as “the same task as you performed last time”. The instruction contemplated both a valuation exercise and a later physical inspection, but Matthew Insley said that the inspection was “not so time critical”. These exchanges occurred shortly after the introduction of restrictions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, and the parties understood that AY’s immediate work would be undertaken on a desktop basis.
30. AY was supplied with a schedule identifying 46 mobile homes at nine parks, together with Rightmove links and other information originating from Royale. Eight of the homes were shown as the subject of agreed sales and were excluded from the valuation exercise. The remaining 38 were treated as available for sale.
31. On 17 April 2020 AY produced a desktop report concerning those 38 homes (“the April 2020 Report”). No physical inspections had then taken place, and the report was not presented as a valuation compliant with the RICS Red Book. AY considered the anticipated proceeds which might be realised by a purchaser of the homes as a single parcel. Its methodology began with the reported asking prices and made deductions for negotiation, sale and marketing costs, finance and a developer’s profit or risk allowance. It valued the parcel at £5.75 million.
32. PHIL alleges that the methodology was inadequate and produced a valuation outside the range open to a reasonably competent valuer. It criticises, among other matters, AY’s treatment of asking prices and comparable evidence, the percentage deductions applied and the allowance made for delay and risk. AY disputes those criticisms. It relies upon the desktop nature of the exercise, the information supplied to it and the limited purpose of the work undertaken.
33. On 20 April 2020 PHIL entered into the first transaction with Royale Living Limited. Under the transaction documents, PHIL acquired title to 46 mobile homes in return for lending approximately £5 million. The agreements contained warranties concerning Royale’s ownership and provided for the substitution of mobile homes and the exercise of a put option requiring Royale to repurchase them. Royale was to continue marketing the homes, with sale proceeds being applied towards the sums due to PHIL.
34. PHIL says that a competent valuation would have resulted in a materially lower figure and that it would then have declined to enter the transaction. AY says that the losses which later materialised arose from the alleged disposal of the homes, the non-payment of sale proceeds and Royale’s default, rather than from any error in the April valuation. That distinction is central to AY’s scope-of-duty case concerning this report.
The September 2020 stock audit
35. The physical inspection contemplated in April was deferred. Instructions for an audit of the 46 mobile homes were formalised in August 2020, when the parties entered into a written letter of appointment dated 25 August 2020. Unlike the April desktop exercise, the September engagement was directed to the physical inspection of the identified homes and did not include a valuation.
36. The letter stated that the purpose of the audit was to confirm that the homes were “in situ”. Under the heading “Purpose of the Instruction”, it provided:
“We will undertake a physical audit against the stock sheets as provided by Royale Parks Ltd to ensure the stock list complies with assets detailed within the finance agreement…”
AY relies upon that language as defining a limited exercise: the physical assets at the parks were to be checked against the supplied stock sheets. It also relies upon standard terms and reservations which, on its case, excluded investigation of the legal position and the status of tenants or occupiers. The agreed fee was £50 per unit, which AY says was consistent with a limited physical audit rather than a broader investigation into ownership or completed sales.
37. PHIL accepts that AY was not instructed to investigate title or determine the legal status of individual occupiers. Its case is that a reasonably competent surveyor carrying out the physical audit was required to observe and report evident signs of occupation and explain their significance. PHIL says that this obligation arose from the audit itself and did not require AY to undertake a separate legal investigation into ownership or completed sales.
38. This engagement occupies an important position in the parties’ cases. PHIL had already advanced the April funding, so the question was no longer whether that transaction should be entered into. PHIL says the audit should have revealed matters which would have caused it to investigate Royale’s conduct and use its contractual rights to protect its existing position. AY says its task was confined to confirming that the identified units were physically present and that the audit imposed no obligation to investigate whether title had passed to third parties.
39. AY carried out the inspections and produced a report dated 8 September 2020 (“the September 2020 Report”). The report summarised, park by park, the homes which had been sited and identified and recorded those which could not be located. An accompanying schedule contained descriptions and thumbnail photographs of the individual homes.
40. PHIL has since undertaken work, including examination of the photographs and enquiries through its mobile-homes agent, Seekers, to identify the position at the time of AY’s inspection. It alleges that at least some of the homes had already been sold and that several displayed signs of occupation. It relies upon features said to be visible in the photographs, including vehicles, plants, bins and washing. PHIL says that occupation was relevant to value and was also capable of raising a concern as to whether the mobile homes remained available to it under the arrangements with Royale. It alleges that AY failed to draw those features to its attention or explain their significance.
41. AY disputes the conclusions which PHIL seeks to draw from the photographs and the scope of any duty arising from the inspection. It says the report performed the agreed task by identifying whether the scheduled homes were physically present. The nature and extent of any signs of occupation, what a reasonably competent surveyor ought to have observed and whether anything more should have been reported are disputed matters.
42. PHIL says that, had occupation or the associated risk been reported, it would have investigated Royale’s conduct and taken steps to protect its position. The measures relied upon include substitution of unaffected homes, exercise of the put option, control of future sales and recovery of sums from Royale, associated entities or guarantors. Its proposed amendments seek to clarify its case that it would have taken one or more of those measures and thereby had a real and substantial chance of achieving a better financial outcome.
The January 2021 engagement and second transaction
43. By about October 2020 PHIL and Royale were discussing a further transaction. The proposal contemplated rolling a number of the original homes into a new arrangement and adding further units. The transaction ultimately concerned 87 mobile homes, including 35 carried over from the 2020 arrangements.
44. On 24 November 2020 Matthew Insley asked AY to undertake “a physical verification” of the homes and to provide a valuation-style report similar to that previously supplied. He also requested advice about the market, the liquidity of parcels of mobile homes and the discount likely to be required to achieve a sale within a restricted period. He asked AY to prepare a letter of engagement recording that scope.
45. AY sent PHIL a letter of appointment dated 26 November 2020. The appointment again stated that the purpose of the physical audit was to confirm that the identified homes were in situ. It separately recorded the instruction to provide sector commentary, review the due diligence and sales data supplied by Royale, consider comparable information and express an opinion on liquidity and anticipated bulk-purchase discounts. Matthew Insley confirmed acceptance of the appointment on 1 December 2020.
46. The physical inspections could not be completed before the proposed transaction. AY therefore prepared a draft valuation report before inspection. During that process, the stock schedule supplied to AY identified 29 homes as “sold”. Carys Chandler initially omitted those units from the sales calculation and raised the matter expressly with Matthew Insley. On 6 January 2021 he asked AY to include them on the assumption that they were not agreed for sale.
47. The parties attach different meanings to that exchange. AY says PHIL knew that the homes were being described as sold and directed the contrary assumption on which they were to be valued. PHIL says the descriptions were understood to concern provisional or anticipated transactions which had not completed and might not do so. It relies upon the history of delayed completions and the contractual ability to substitute other homes. Matthew Insley denies knowingly asking AY to value homes which he understood had already been sold to third parties.
48. PHIL also relies upon discussions in January 2021 concerning second-hand values and the effect of occupation. It says those exchanges support its case that occupation was relevant to the valuation exercise and that both parties understood it could affect the financial position. AY disputes the conclusions which PHIL seeks to draw from that correspondence.
49. On 19 January 2021 AY produced a report marked “Subject to Inspection” (“the January 2021 Report”). The report concerned 87 mobile homes and contained sector and market commentary, comparable evidence, a review of supplied sales data and a valuation. AY used a methodology similar to that adopted in April 2020 and assessed the homes at approximately £14.37 million.
50. PHIL alleges that the figure was outside the range of reasonable values. It also criticises AY’s treatment of occupation, its analysis of the secondary market for individual homes and associated pitch rights, its use of comparable evidence and its deductions for sales and delay. AY disputes those allegations and says the report complied with its instructions, proceeded upon stated assumptions and used the information supplied by PHIL and Royale.
51. On 21 January 2021 PHIL entered into the second principal transaction and advanced approximately £3.2 million. The transaction concerned 87 homes and involved both Royale Living Limited and Royale Investments Limited. The contractual structure broadly followed the earlier arrangements and included mechanisms for correcting discrepancies, substituting assets and requiring Royale to repurchase the homes.
The February 2021 inspections and report
52. AY carried out physical inspections between 15 and 19 February 2021. On 25 February 2021 it issued an updated report (“the February 2021 Report”). The January and February reports are closely connected. The January valuation had expressly been made subject to inspection; the February 2021 report incorporated the results of the later site visits. A central issue is whether the information obtained during those visits required AY to reconsider or qualify the conclusions previously expressed in January.
53. The February 2021 report stated that AY had been asked to confirm that the 87 homes were in situ, corresponded with the stock sheet and were positioned at the locations recorded. Appendix 2 contained details of the individual homes, including addresses or plot numbers, manufacturer, model, dimensions and, where available, serial numbers. It also contained photographs and descriptions including “For Sale”, “Temporary Accommodation”, “Sold”, “SSTC” and “Owner Occupied”.
54. PHIL alleges that the descriptions and photographs disclosed matters concerning occupation and sales which AY did not adequately explain. It says that they appeared in appendices containing small photographs, without any prominent explanation of their significance for value or of the possibility that some homes had already been sold to third parties. PHIL also says that AY had received information from Royale concerning the classifications used in the appendix but had not explained to PHIL its source or significance.
55. PHIL places particular reliance upon the fact that the valuation remained unchanged after the inspections. It says a reasonable reader could understand that as reflecting AY’s professional judgment that the matters recorded in Appendix 2 had no material effect upon value or upon PHIL’s position. AY says it accurately recorded the information supplied to it and the results of its inspections, and that PHIL had the report and its appendices. It disputes any obligation to determine the legal meaning of a “sale”, establish whether title had passed or advise upon the risk of fraud.
56. AY also relies upon PHIL’s earlier knowledge that homes were being described as sold and upon the instruction given in January 2021 to include the 29 units in the valuation on the assumption that they were not agreed for sale. PHIL’s response is that it understood the references to sales as relating to transactions which remained incomplete and that the February inspections produced further information which required professional assessment and explanation.
57. PHIL says that, had the February information been presented and explained competently, it would have used the contractual and commercial protections available to it. It also maintains that it would not have entered into the January transaction had it known the true value and status of the homes.
The March 2022 engagement and later events
58. AY had no further involvement for approximately a year. During that period PHIL and Royale amended and restated aspects of their arrangements and entered into further agreements concerning repayment of the outstanding sums. PHIL says Royale paid £1.5 million in January 2022 in connection with delayed payment.
59. In March 2022 AY was instructed to update its earlier work. The letter of appointment dated 7 March 2022 combined a physical audit with an updated stock valuation. It required AY to confirm that the homes remained in situ and to provide market commentary, review supplied diligence and sales data, consider comparable evidence and advise upon liquidity and bulk-sale discounts.
60. The March engagement therefore brought the valuation and physical-audit functions together within a single exercise. PHIL relies upon that feature and says information obtained through inspection could not sensibly be divorced from the valuation work undertaken in the same report. AY maintains that each part of its work remained governed by its defined purpose and by provisions allowing reliance upon information supplied for the engagement.
61. AY produced the March 2022 Report later that month. Its opening paragraph stated that sales had been agreed in respect of 69 units, with anticipated completion dates between February and March 2022. The report was based in part upon a stock schedule supplied to AY which recorded the reported sale status and anticipated completion dates. The appointment permitted AY to rely upon information supplied for the engagement and included reservations making clear that AY was not investigating legal ownership.
62. PHIL says the report repeated the deficiencies alleged in the earlier work. It contends that AY did not adequately explain the significance of the sales and occupation information or respond appropriately to matters which ought to have caused PHIL to question Royale’s conduct. AY says the agreed sales were expressly and prominently recorded, the relevant schedule originated from Royale and its work complied with the terms and limitations of the appointment.
63. In April 2022 PHIL exercised its put options. Between April and June 2022 Royale made aggregate payments of approximately £2 million. PHIL’s case is that earlier and competent advice would have enabled it to seek a larger payment, assume control of sales or prevent further unauthorised disposals while meaningful recoveries remained possible.
Discovery of the alleged sales and subsequent events
64. In March 2023 Royale informed PHIL that licences to occupy had been granted in respect of a substantial number of the homes. By the middle of that year PHIL had instructed Seekers to investigate the position at the parks. PHIL says those enquiries revealed that homes which it understood remained subject to its arrangements had been sold to third-party purchasers and that Royale had received the proceeds without accounting for them to PHIL.
65. PHIL alleges that by the time it discovered the position, meaningful recovery from Royale and the relevant guarantors was no longer possible. A receiver was appointed in respect of Royale Living Limited in September 2023. Royale Investments Limited was dissolved on 16 April 2024. Time GB, another company upon which PHIL relies as a potential route of recovery, entered administration in October 2023 and was later dissolved. Robert Bull was made bankrupt in December 2023.
66. PHIL claims damages reflecting the sums which it says it would have avoided advancing, or would have recovered, had AY performed its work competently. It also claims professional fees and disbursements incurred in investigating what had occurred and assessing possible claims and routes to recovery.
The pre-action process and proceedings
67. A preliminary notice of claim dated 4 September 2023 was sent to AY and copied to a number of other persons. A formal letter of claim under the Professional Negligence Pre-Action Protocol followed on 12 February 2024. Extensive correspondence then passed between the parties. PHIL’s substantive letters extended in aggregate to more than 70 pages, while AY responded in detail and sought further documents and information.
68. AY says the allegations changed materially during that process. It relies upon claims concerning reports which are no longer pursued, changes in the alleged deficiencies in the September 2020 and February 2021 Reports, the later introduction of allegations of negligent valuation and the absence from the pre-action case of the alleged express instruction concerning “red flags”. It says it incurred substantial costs in investigating and responding to allegations which were later abandoned or reformulated.
69. PHIL accepts that its case developed as further information became available but disputes that its conduct was unreasonable. It says the exchange and refinement of information are part of the purpose of the Protocol and relies upon what it describes as continuing gaps in the material supplied by AY, including the complete inspection photographs, metadata and site notes.
70. The claim was issued on 15 August 2025. AY issued its application for strike out and summary judgment on 15 October 2025. No defence has yet been served and post-issue disclosure has not taken place.
71. PHIL served its responsive evidence and application to amend on 23 April 2026. The proposed amendments are confined to two areas. The first is an allegation that Matthew Insley expressly informed Mark Ebo that PHIL expected AY to identify and communicate any “red flags”, as part of PHIL’s case concerning reasonably incidental duties. The second concerns the formulation of its causation and loss-of-chance case, including the steps which it says it would have taken and the better outcomes which it says it had a real and substantial chance of achieving.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Strike out
72. AY applies to strike out the whole or parts of PHIL’s claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2). The court may strike out a statement of case where it appears that:
“(a) the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;
(b) the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings…”
73. The focus of an application under CPR 3.4(2)(a) is on the statement of case. The court proceeds on the basis that the pleaded facts are true and asks whether, on those facts, the claim discloses a legally sustainable cause of action. In King v Stiefel [2021] EWHC 1045 (Comm), relied upon by PHIL, the court emphasised the distinction between strike out and summary judgment. For the purposes of a strike-out application, the pleaded facts are ordinarily assumed to be true and evidence directed to their truth or falsity is generally inadmissible. The question is whether the statement of case, read as a whole, discloses a legally recognisable claim.
74. The statement of case must nevertheless identify the essential facts relied upon with sufficient clarity to enable the opposing party to understand and answer the case. That includes identifying the factual and expert issues relevant to disclosure and evidence.
75. A claim lacking an essential element is liable to strike out. A recognisable cause of action requiring further particularisation may be addressed through amendment or case management. A number of AY’s criticisms concern the latter category, including the particularisation of the duties, the alleged breaches and PHIL’s counterfactual case on causation and loss.
76. The appropriate order remains governed by the overriding objective. Where an inadequacy in the pleading is capable of cure by an amendment having a real prospect of success, the availability and terms of that amendment are relevant to the exercise of the court’s powers.
Summary judgment
77. AY also applies for summary judgment. CPR 24.3 provides, so far as material, that the court may give summary judgment against a claimant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue where:
“(a) it considers that the claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; and
(b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”
78. The familiar principles governing that jurisdiction were summarised by Lewison J, as he then was, in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch). He explained that the court must consider whether the claim or defence has a "realistic" rather than a "fanciful" prospect of success; that a realistic case is one which carries "some degree of conviction"; and that the court should avoid conducting a mini-trial. The court must also consider not only the evidence presently available but the evidence which can reasonably be expected to be available at trial.
79. The restriction on conducting a mini-trial still permits the court to evaluate the evidential foundation of the case. In Giwa v JNFX Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 961, Nugee LJ at paragraph 33 observed:
“I add a few words on the requirement to avoid a mini-trial. It is sometimes deployed as if the Court errs if it embarks on any detailed examination of the evidence before it. That I think overstates matters. …the Court should not seek to resolve, without the usual safeguards of disclosure and cross-examination, which of two versions of the facts is more likely to be true. But this does not mean that the Court is prevented from examining and assessing the evidence before it. … Indeed the Court is not only entitled but obliged to do this, not with a view to resolving disputed versions of events, but with a view to assessing whether there is any real substance in the suggested defence (or claim, as the case may be), or whether on the other hand it is fanciful. For this purpose it is well established that the Court is not obliged to take all factual assertions at face value, as it may be clear, particularly from contemporaneous documents, that there is no real substance in them…”
80. AY relies on Elite Property Holdings Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2019] EWCA Civ 204. The court in considering whether a proposed case has a real prospect of success is entitled to examine whether the factual foundation of the claim possesses sufficient substance. Asplin LJ explained that a claim lacks the necessary prospect of success where the factual basis is entirely without substance or where the pleaded facts do not support the inferences sought to be drawn. She further observed at paragraph 42:
“The court is entitled to reject a version of the facts which is implausible, self-contradictory or not supported by the contemporaneous documents and it is appropriate for the court to consider whether the proposed pleading is coherent and contains the properly particularised elements of the cause of action relied upon.”
81. AY relies upon those principles in relation to the proposed “red flags” amendment and the valuation claims. It submits that the evidential foundation for those aspects of PHIL’s case is insufficient and that the allegations therefore lack a real prospect of success.
82. The assessment extends beyond the evidence presently available to evidence which can reasonably be expected at trial. Where fuller investigation may materially affect the evidential position, that is relevant to whether an issue is suitable for summary determination. Reliance upon future evidence requires a reasonable basis for concluding that material evidence is likely to become available and may affect the outcome.
83. There is accordingly a material difference between strike out and summary judgment. Strike out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) is directed principally to the adequacy and legal viability of the pleaded case. Summary judgment permits the court to evaluate the evidence, without conducting a trial, and to determine whether the claim or issue has a real prospect of success. The fact that both applications are advanced does not remove that distinction.
Amendment
84. PHIL applies for permission to amend its particulars of claim. The statement of case has been served and therefore the amendment requires the permission of the court under CPR 17.1(2)(b).
85. The discretion to permit an amendment is exercised in accordance with the overriding objective. The court considers all the circumstances, including the nature and extent of the proposed amendment, its timing, the explanation for it, the prejudice to the parties and the effect of the amendment upon the efficient conduct of the proceedings.
86. An amendment which has no real prospect of success should not be permitted. The applicable merits threshold is therefore substantially the same as that applied on a summary judgment application. In Elite Property Holdings Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc, the Court of Appeal emphasised that the court is entitled to consider whether the proposed case has a sufficiently substantial factual foundation and whether it has been pleaded with adequate coherence and particularity. AY relies upon those principles in opposing the proposed "red flags" amendment and aspects of PHIL's valuation case.
87. The proposed pleading must be coherent, properly particularised and supported by a sufficient evidential foundation. The court is not required to permit an amendment simply because, taken at face value, the allegations would amount to a cause of action.
88. Timing is also relevant. An amendment which introduces a materially new factual case at a late stage may require a satisfactory explanation, particularly where the relevant facts were known to the applicant earlier. The weight to be attached to lateness depends upon the procedural circumstances of the particular proceedings and the practical consequences of allowing the amendment.
89. In the present case the amendment application was made after AY had issued its application for strike out and summary judgment but before service of a defence or ordinary disclosure.
90. Where an application to amend is before the court at the same time as an application to strike out or for summary judgment, it is artificial to determine whether the existing pleading should survive while disregarding an amendment which the claimant seeks permission to make. PHIL relies upon Mishcon de Reya LLP v RJI (Middle East) Ltd [2020] EWHC 1670 in support of considering the proposed amendment when assessing whether the claim can properly proceed.
91. The amendment application is therefore determined before the applications under CPR 3.4 and CPR 24.2, allowing those applications to then be considered by reference to the relevant pleading.
The scope of the professional’s duty
92. The starting point in identifying the duty of a professional is analysing the task which the professional was retained to undertake. The nature and extent of the duty cannot be considered in the abstract. It must be identified by reference to the terms and circumstances of the particular retainer.
93. Where the retainer defines the relevant task with precision, the professional is required to perform that task with reasonable care and skill. The existence of a duty of care does not ordinarily enlarge the task which the professional agreed to undertake.
94. A professional’s agreed task must be distinguished from advice reasonably incidental to its performance. PHIL accepts that AY was not retained to conduct a legal investigation into title to the mobile homes. It contends that AY’s instructed work brought, or ought to have brought, matters to its attention upon which a reasonably competent surveyor should have advised PHIL.
95. In Credit Lyonnais SA v Russell Jones & Walker [2003] PNLR 2, Laddie J explained that a professional may come under a duty to warn about a risk encountered while carrying out the work for which the professional is retained. The familiar illustration is that of a dentist who, while treating one tooth, notices another obvious problem requiring attention. Extending the point to lawyers, Laddie J said:
“if in the course of carrying out his instructions within his area of competence a lawyer notices or ought to notice a problem or risk for the client of which it is reasonable to assume the client may not be aware, the lawyer must warn him.”
96. The significance of this lies in its distinction between the task the professional undertook and a problem or risk encountered while carrying out that task. It is the latter principle upon which PHIL relies in relation to visible occupation and information said to have emerged during the stock audits. AY relies upon the limits of the proposition and submits that the duties alleged by PHIL would extend the stock audit beyond the task which AY agreed to undertake.
97. The same distinction appears in Minkin v Landsberg [2015] EWCA Civ 1152; [2016] 1 WLR 1489. Jackson LJ summarised the relevant principles at paragraph 38:
“(i) A solicitor’s contractual duty is to carry out the tasks which the client has instructed and the solicitor has agreed to undertake.
(ii) It is implicit in the solicitor’s retainer that he or she will proffer advice which is reasonably incidental to the work that he or she is carrying out.
(iii) In determining what advice is reasonably incidental, it is necessary to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the character and experience of the client.”
98. This distinction lies at the centre of the parties' dispute. PHIL says that the audit and valuation work brought matters to AY's attention which required explanation or warning. AY says that PHIL seeks to impose an additional investigatory obligation falling outside the work which AY agreed to perform.
99. An incidental duty concerns advice or warning about a matter encountered, or which ought reasonably to have been encountered, in carrying out the instructed work. Its content remains anchored to the professional task undertaken.
100. The existence and content of an incidental duty depend upon the context of the retainer. The court’s inquiry is directed to what was encountered, or ought reasonably to have been encountered, while carrying out the agreed work. Relevant considerations may include the nature of the task undertaken, the circumstances in which the matter became apparent, its significance to the service which the professional agreed to provide, whether it fell within the professional's expertise, whether the client could reasonably be expected to appreciate the point without advice and whether identifying it required additional work beyond the task already retained.
101. PHIL accepts that AY was not retained to conduct an independent legal investigation into ownership. Its case is that, while physically inspecting the mobile homes and providing valuation and stock-audit services, AY saw or ought to have seen matters concerning occupation and sale status which were sufficiently significant to require advice or warning, so that they were brought to PHIL’s attention. PHIL also relies upon its proposed allegation that Matthew Insley expressly told Mark Ebo that PHIL expected AY to identify “red flags”.
102. The parties differ as to the extent of the professional response required to matters encountered in carrying out the instructed work. PHIL’s pleaded case is that visible signs of occupation were apparent, or ought reasonably to have been apparent, during the physical audits and were sufficiently significant to require advice or warning. It relies upon occupation as relevant to value and as capable of raising a concern as to whether the homes remained available to PHIL under its arrangements with Royale. AY says that this seeks to impose obligations extending beyond the physical audit, particularly insofar as PHIL relies upon occupation as indicating that sales may already have completed.
103. The distinction is between the professional significance of matters encountered in carrying out the agreed work and any additional inquiry required to establish the underlying legal position. An obligation to observe and report visible signs of occupation is capable of arising from the former. Determining whether a particular sale had legally completed or title had passed would involve a different inquiry. The scope of any incidental duty therefore depends upon the work AY undertook, what was or ought reasonably to have been apparent in carrying it out and the professional significance of those matters.
Scope of duty and recoverable loss
104. Recoverable loss is determined by the purpose and scope of the duty which has been breached. The relevant inquiry is whether the particular loss claimed bears the necessary relationship to the risk against which that duty was imposed.
105. The modern approach is set out in Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton UK LLP [2021] UKSC 20. In paragraph 6 Lord Hodge and Lord Sales described the scope-of-duty inquiry through a series of questions. Two are of particular relevance in the present case:
“What are the risks of harm to the claimant against which the law imposes on the defendant a duty to take care?”
and:
“Is there a sufficient nexus between a particular element of the harm for which the claimant seeks damages and the subject matter of the defendant's duty?”
106. The authorities therefore require the court to identify the purpose of the duty before considering whether the loss claimed represents the materialisation of the risk against which that duty was directed. AY says the losses arose from Royale’s alleged dishonesty. PHIL says they arose from risks which AY was required to identify and explain. The purpose of each duty therefore requires identification by reference to the particular report and engagement.
107. The scope-of-duty counterfactual remains a useful cross-check. In Charles B Lawrence & Associates v Intercommercial Bank Ltd [2021] UKPC 30 the Privy Council said at paragraph 18:
“would the claimant still have suffered the same loss if the information or advice had been true?”
A positive answer strongly suggests that the loss lies outside the scope of the duty relied upon. The counterfactual is not a substitute for identifying the purpose of the duty, but it may assist in testing whether the loss claimed represents the materialisation of the relevant risk.
108. In a conventional negligent valuation case involving secured lending, the professional ordinarily protects the lender from the risk that the security has been overvalued, rather than the full range of risks affecting the transaction or the borrower’s performance.
109. The present claim is said by PHIL to differ from the conventional valuation case because AY undertook both valuation and stock audit functions. PHIL submits that those functions cannot be treated as entirely separate where information encountered in carrying out the stock audit was directly relevant to the value and availability of the assets which AY had valued. AY disputes that characterisation and maintains that PHIL seeks to impose liability for losses caused by the dishonesty of Royale, a risk which AY was never engaged to protect against.
110. Identification of the correct scope of duty is a question for the court rather than expert evidence. The underlying professional practice, and what competent performance of a particular aspect of the retainer required, may of course involve questions upon which expert evidence is relevant.
111. It will therefore be necessary, when considering each of PHIL’s claims, to identify the particular duty relied upon, its purpose and the relationship between that purpose and the loss alleged. A global characterisation of the losses as consequences of either AY’s work or Royale’s alleged wrongdoing is inadequate to answer that inquiry.
Causation and loss of chance
112. PHIL advances part of its case on the basis that, had AY performed its duties competently, PHIL would have taken steps to protect its position and would thereby have had a real and substantial chance of securing a better financial outcome.
113. The claimant’s own hypothetical conduct and the subsequent conduct of a third party are treated differently. Where the relevant question concerns the claimant’s own hypothetical conduct, the claimant ordinarily proves on the balance of probabilities what it would have done. Where the financial outcome thereafter depends upon the hypothetical actions of a third party, the court assesses the value of the lost chance, provided that the chance was real and substantial rather than merely speculative.
114. That distinction derives from Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602. PHIL relies upon it in explaining the amendments proposed to its pleading of causation and loss.
115. Thus PHIL must establish, on the balance of probabilities, the counterfactual step or steps which it itself would have taken had the relevant breach not occurred. Where the success of those steps then depended upon the conduct of Royale, associated companies, guarantors, purchasers or other third parties, PHIL must establish that there was a real and substantial chance of securing the better outcome alleged.
116. The assessment of that chance, if liability is established, is ordinarily reflected in the quantification of damages. A claimant is not required to establish on the balance of probabilities that the favourable third-party outcome would in fact have occurred.
117. A loss of chance case nevertheless requires a sufficiently identified counterfactual. The claimant must identify what it says it would have done, the better outcome said to have been available and the relevant third-party contingency upon which that outcome depended. The court cannot value a chance which remains wholly speculative or undefined.
118. PHIL’s proposed amendments are directed in part to that distinction. They seek to clarify both that PHIL would have taken one or more identified protective steps and that those steps gave rise to a real and substantial chance of obtaining one or more identified better outcomes. The merits and sufficiency of those amendments fall to be considered in the context of the individual applications.
Approach to the applications
119. Against those principles, the applications fall to be considered by reference to the individual reports and the duties alleged. AY’s instructions, the work undertaken, the information available to it and the alleged consequences of breach changed over time. The applications also engage distinct jurisdictions. Strike out concerns the legal sufficiency of PHIL’s pleaded case. Summary judgment requires an assessment of the evidence and prospects of success. The amendment application engages both the merits of the proposed case and the court’s discretion as to whether PHIL should now be permitted to advance that amended case.
120. Several matters are relied upon across all three applications, but the applicable tests remain distinct. The existence of a factual dispute forms part of the assessment under CPR 24.2; its nature and evidential significance inform whether summary disposal is appropriate.
THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE POSITIONS
AY’s case
121. AY’s overarching submission is that PHIL seeks to impose upon it responsibility for a risk which it was never retained to guard against. PHIL says that it was the victim of wrongdoing by companies within the Royale Group. AY was retained to value identified mobile homes and, on particular occasions, to confirm their physical presence. It says that its role did not extend to investigating ownership, determining whether individual sales had legally completed, or monitoring the honesty or financial standing of Royale. The eventual inability of PHIL to realise what it regarded as its security therefore does not, without more, bring its losses within the scope of AY’s duties.
122. That submission is founded principally upon the terms and purpose of the individual engagements. In relation to the stock audits, AY relies upon the express statement that their purpose was to confirm that the identified homes were “in situ”. It characterises the exercise as one of physically matching the homes at the parks against the stock schedules supplied to it. The fee of £50 per unit for the September 2020 audit is also relied upon as consistent with a limited inspection exercise rather than an obligation to investigate ownership or completed sales.
123. AY accepts the principle that advice reasonably incidental to the work undertaken may be required. Its case turns upon the boundary of that principle. It distinguishes between reporting something encountered while carrying out the agreed task and undertaking further work to discover information which the retainer did not require AY to obtain. AY says that PHIL’s case concerning completed sales crosses that boundary. PHIL does not allege that AY knew during the September 2020 audit that particular sales had legally completed and withheld that information. The allegation is that AY should have discovered the position. AY submits that determining whether title had passed was a different task from confirming the physical presence of the mobile homes.
124. AY approaches the valuation claims in a similar way. The April 2020 Report was a desktop exercise undertaken without physical inspection, using information supplied by PHIL and Royale. AY says that it cannot properly be criticised for failing at that stage to discover matters requiring physical inspection or investigation of title. In relation to January 2021, it places particular reliance upon the contemporaneous exchange concerning the 29 homes described in the supplied schedule as “sold”. Carys Chandler raised the position and Matthew Insley instructed AY to include the units in the valuation on the assumption that they were not agreed for sale. AY says that the exchange is material both to the valuation allegations and to PHIL’s wider case about its understanding of sales.
125. The February 2021 Report gives rise to a related point. AY says that the inspection results were recorded in the report and Appendix 2, including descriptions of homes as “Sold”, “Temporary Accommodation”, “SSTC” or “Owner Occupied”. On AY’s case, PHIL’s complaint is in substantial part that information which AY supplied was not appreciated or acted upon. It also relies upon PHIL’s earlier knowledge that homes were being described as sold and the instruction given in January concerning the 29 units. AY disputes that reasonable professional care required it to give the occupation or sales information the prominence or significance for which PHIL now contends.
126. AY separately challenges PHIL’s case on causation. The original pleading identified a series of possible steps, including substitution of other homes, exercise of the put options, taking control of sales and pursuing Royale or others, but alleged only that PHIL had lost the chance of achieving a better outcome by taking “one or more” of them. AY says that PHIL must establish on the balance of probabilities what it itself would have done before any uncertainty concerning the conduct of third parties can be assessed as a loss of chance. It maintains that the original pleading did not do so and that the proposed amendment remains insufficiently definite.
127. Finally, AY relies upon the development of the claim. Its pre-action criticisms are not confined to changes in detail. It points to allegations concerning reports which are no longer pursued, changes in the complaints concerning the September 2020 and February 2021 Reports, the emergence in the pleadings of valuation claims which had not formed part of the Letter of Claim, and the still later allegation of an oral instruction to report “red flags”. AY relies upon that history both in resisting the amendment and in support of its application for the costs of the pre-action process. It accordingly invites the court to refuse the disputed amendments and to strike out or give summary judgment on the claims identified in its application.
PHIL’s case
128. PHIL characterises AY’s role differently. It submits that this was not a conventional case in which a valuer simply placed a figure upon an identified asset. AY performed both valuation and stock-audit functions in relation to the same mobile homes and the same commercial arrangements. By 2021 and 2022 those functions appeared within combined reports. PHIL says that the work must be considered in that commercial and professional context rather than treating each function as wholly separate.
129. PHIL accepts that AY was not retained to investigate legal title or determine the legal status of individual occupiers. Its case is narrower. AY was physically inspecting the mobile homes and PHIL says obvious signs of occupation were matters encountered in carrying out that work. Occupation was capable of affecting value and, on PHIL’s case, of giving rise to concern about the status of the asset. Observing and reporting such features required no separate investigation into title. PHIL therefore treats the case as an application of the principle that reasonable professional care may require advice or warning about a material matter encountered in carrying out the task which the professional has undertaken.
130. PHIL also says that AY’s valuation and stock-audit work cannot invariably be isolated from one another. Information obtained during an inspection could bear upon assumptions or conclusions relevant to valuation. The point is particularly important in relation to February 2021. The January valuation was expressly subject to inspection; the February 2021 report incorporated the subsequent inspection findings; and the valuation figures remained unchanged. PHIL says that the inclusion of photographs and classifications in an appendix did not necessarily discharge AY’s professional obligation to explain their significance. It relies upon the absence of any qualification of the valuation or prominent explanation of the effect of occupation and sales information.
131. PHIL disputes AY’s interpretation of the January 2021 correspondence. Matthew Insley says that he understood references to sold homes to concern anticipated transactions which had not completed and might not do so. He denies knowingly asking AY to value mobile homes which had already been sold to third parties. PHIL says the exchange must be considered in the context of delayed completions, the ability to substitute other homes and contemporaneous discussions concerning second-hand values and occupation. It submits that the parties’ understanding of the correspondence is a factual matter which cannot properly be resolved on a summary judgment application.
132. The proposed “red flags” amendment is put on a similar evidential basis. Matthew Insley says that he told Mark Ebo that PHIL expected AY to report red flags; Mark Ebo denies that account. PHIL relies upon the existence of that direct conflict as demonstrating that the factual issue should be left for trial. The wider incidental-duty case does not, however, depend solely upon the proposed oral instruction. PHIL says it arises from the nature of the work which AY had already agreed to perform and the information encountered while doing so.
133. On causation, PHIL relies upon the contractual and commercial protections contained in its arrangements with Royale. They included substitution of homes, exercise of the put options, control of sales and claims against Royale, associated companies or guarantors. PHIL accepts that it must establish its own hypothetical conduct on the balance of probabilities and that uncertainty concerning the subsequent conduct of third parties falls to be assessed as a loss of chance. Its proposed amendments are intended to state that case expressly and to identify the better outcomes which it says had a real and substantial chance of being achieved.
134. PHIL finally relies upon the procedural stage of the claim. No defence has been served and post-issue disclosure has not taken place. It says that complete inspection photographs, site notes and other internal AY material remain unavailable, and that valuation and professional-standard issues will ultimately require expert evidence. PHIL accepts that its case has developed, but says that this reflects the acquisition of further information and the ordinary operation of the pre-action process rather than any absence of a viable claim. It invites the court to permit the causation amendments, reject AY’s applications for strike out and summary judgment and leave the remaining issues of duty, breach, causation and scope of loss for determination on a fuller evidential basis.
THE AMENDMENT APPLICATION
135. I deal first with PHIL’s application for permission to amend its particulars of claim. The application concerns two distinct aspects of the case. The first is the allegation that Matthew Insley expressly informed Mark Ebo that PHIL expected AY to identify and report “red flags”. PHIL relies upon that allegation as part of its case concerning the scope of AY’s professional duties. The second group of amendments concerns causation and loss. They seek to state more precisely the steps which PHIL says it would have taken had AY performed its duties competently and the better outcomes which it says it thereby had a real and substantial chance of achieving.
136. The two amendments differ materially. The “red flags” amendment introduces an alleged oral communication as an additional factual basis for the duties said to have arisen between the parties. The causation amendments do not alter the duties or breaches alleged and concern the formulation of the consequences which PHIL says followed from them. That difference is relevant both to their merits and to the exercise of the court’s discretion.
137. In considering each amendment I have had regard to whether the proposed case is coherent and properly particularised, whether it has a real prospect of success and a sufficient evidential foundation, the extent to which it changes the existing case, the explanation for its emergence at this stage, the prejudice to the parties and the overriding objective. The amendment application falls to be considered in the procedural circumstances of these proceedings. No defence has been served, post-issue disclosure has not taken place and no trial date has been fixed.
The proposed “red flags” amendment
138. PHIL seeks to plead that, in the course of instructing AY, Matthew Insley made clear to Mark Ebo, at least at a high level, that PHIL expected AY’s due diligence to include identifying and reporting any “red flags”. PHIL says that this supplements its existing case that reasonable professional care required AY to advise about matters reasonably incidental to the valuation and stock-audit work which it had agreed to undertake.
139. AY opposes the amendment on several grounds. It says that the alleged instruction is new; that it first appeared in Matthew Insley’s evidence served in response to the present application; that it had not appeared in the extensive pre-action correspondence or the original particulars of claim; that it sits uneasily with the written appointments; and that the expression “red flags” is too imprecise to define the content of a professional duty. AY also relies upon the entire-agreement and written-variation provisions in the relevant letters of engagement.
140. PHIL’s existing case is founded upon the work which AY agreed to undertake and the circumstances in which that work was performed. PHIL alleges that, in carrying out the valuation and stock-audit work, AY encountered, or ought reasonably to have observed, matters which were material to that work, including signs of occupation. It says that reasonable professional care required AY to identify those matters and explain their significance. That case rests upon the terms of the retainers, the work undertaken by AY and the information available in the course of its performance.
141. The proposed amendment introduces a further basis for the duty. PHIL seeks to rely upon an express communication by Matthew Insley that AY was expected to identify and report “red flags”. The relevance attributed to the conversation is therefore substantive. It is said to add content to the professional obligations which AY assumed. That is more than further detail about the performance of an existing duty; it introduces an additional factual foundation upon which the scope of AY’s responsibilities is said to rest.
142. AY’s application for strike out and summary judgment was issued on 15 October 2025. PHIL served its evidence in response and its application to amend on 23 April 2026. In procedural terms the application was made at an early stage of the proceedings. No defence has been served, disclosure has not taken place and no trial date has been fixed. Permission would therefore cause no loss of a trial date or the repetition of completed procedural steps.
143. The alleged conversation was within PHIL’s knowledge from the outset. It was not mentioned in the extensive pre-action correspondence, although the nature and scope of AY’s duties were addressed there in detail, or when the particulars of claim were settled and served. The allegation first appeared in Matthew Insley’s evidence in response to AY’s application, and no satisfactory explanation has been given for its earlier absence. That history is relevant to the exercise of discretion. The question whether the conversation occurred remains unresolved.
144. The contemporaneous documents are also relevant. In April 2020 Matthew Insley asked Mark Ebo to perform “the same task as you performed last time” and referred separately to a later physical inspection. In November 2020 he requested physical verification of the homes and a valuation-style report and asked AY to prepare an engagement letter recording the scope of the work. Neither exchange records an instruction to identify or report “red flags”. The written appointments subsequently defined AY’s work more formally. The August 2020 appointment stated that the purpose of the physical audit was to confirm that the mobile homes were “in situ”. The later engagement again defined the physical-audit function by reference to the presence of the homes and separately identified the market and valuation services which AY was to provide. The standard terms stated that the appointment “constitutes the entire agreement between the parties” and that “[n]o variation to this appointment will be binding unless agreed in writing by both parties”.
145. A professional duty to advise upon matters reasonably incidental to the proper performance of the agreed work may arise consistently with those provisions. Such a duty concerns the manner in which the retained task is performed. PHIL’s reliance upon an alleged oral communication as an additional source of AY’s obligations raises a different question, to which the written terms are directly relevant.
146. The contractual effect of the entire-agreement and written-variation provisions, and the possible relevance of any conversation to a concurrent duty in tort, do not require determination on this application. The proposed amendment introduces an alleged oral instruction into a relationship whose professional tasks were subsequently recorded in written appointments. The absence of that instruction from the contemporaneous exchanges and the earlier formulation of PHIL’s case forms part of the context in which permission is sought.
147. The December 2020 correspondence provides further context. Carys Chandler raised expressly with Matthew Insley that a substantial number of the homes were described in the supplied schedule as sold. Matthew Insley directed AY to include those units in the valuation on the assumption that they were not agreed for sale. The parties attach different meanings to that exchange. Its proper interpretation remains for trial. For present purposes, it shows that a matter which AY says would fall naturally within an instruction to report “red flags” was expressly raised and addressed between the parties. That is part of the documentary context in which the proposed new case must be considered.
148. Matthew Insley gives evidence that the instruction was communicated. Mark Ebo denies it. There has been no cross-examination, and the conflict of evidence remains unresolved.
149. For present purposes, PHIL has sufficient evidence to demonstrate a real prospect of establishing that some conversation of the kind described by Matthew Insley occurred. The precise terms of any conversation and its legal effect remain undetermined.
150. The proposed allegation crosses the merits threshold. Permission also depends upon the content and utility of the amendment, the extent to which it changes the case, the explanation for its previous absence and the fairness of its introduction at this stage.
151. There is a further difficulty in the formulation of the proposed duty. The expression “red flags” does not define the matters which AY was required to identify or report, or the extent to which the alleged instruction required work beyond that already undertaken under the written appointments.
152. PHIL’s existing case is that signs of occupation were apparent, or ought reasonably to have been apparent, during the physical audits and required explanation because of their potential significance for value and the availability of the homes under its arrangements with Royale. AY disputes the professional significance of those matters and the response required as part of its instructed work. The proposed amendment adds an alleged oral instruction but does not define with sufficient precision the additional obligation said to arise from it.
153. PHIL’s existing incidental-duty case already permits it to contend that reasonable professional care required AY to identify and explain material matters encountered in carrying out the valuation and stock-audit work. The proposed oral case would add a separate and insufficiently defined basis for the duty. Taken together with the absence of the allegation from the extensive pre-action correspondence and original pleading, and the absence of a satisfactory explanation for its emergence at this stage, those considerations weigh against permission.
154. The application for permission to introduce the proposed “red flags” amendment is dismissed. The factual dispute as to whether the conversation occurred remains unresolved, as does the existence and scope of any duty arising from AY’s agreed work.
The causation and loss-of-chance amendments
155. The second group of amendments concerns a different matter. PHIL’s existing pleading identifies a number of protective measures which it says were available had AY reported the matters relied upon. They include substitution of unaffected mobile homes, exercise of the put options, control of sales, prevention of further disposals and claims against Royale, associated companies or guarantors. The pleading then alleges that PHIL lost the opportunity of achieving a better outcome by taking “one or more” of those steps. AY says that formulation does not identify what PHIL itself would have done and impermissibly treats PHIL’s own conduct as a loss-of-chance question. AY’s criticism of the existing pleading is expressly set out in its application and skeleton.
156. The distinction is established by Allied Maples. PHIL must prove its own hypothetical conduct on the balance of probabilities. Uncertainty concerning the subsequent conduct of third parties is treated differently and may be reflected in the assessment of a real and substantial chance. The original pleading did not express that distinction with sufficient clarity.
157. The proposed amendments seek to cure that deficiency. They plead that PHIL would have taken one or more of the identified protective steps and that, had it done so, it had a real and substantial chance of achieving specified better outcomes, including substituting homes which remained available for sale, making recoveries through the put arrangements, controlling or preventing further sales and obtaining payment from Royale, associated companies or Mr Bull.
158. AY accepts the underlying legal distinction but submits the amendment remains defective because PHIL still pleads that it would have taken “one or more” of a number of courses. AY submits that PHIL must identify the particular course, or combination of courses, which it says it would in fact have pursued.
159. There is force in that criticism. PHIL cannot ultimately establish causation merely by proving that it would have done something. Its own hypothetical conduct forms part of the causal chain and must be established on the balance of probabilities. The court will therefore require a sufficiently clear counterfactual to determine whether the alleged breach caused the loss claimed.
160. At the present stage it is open to PHIL to plead more than one identified protective measure. The courses relied upon are finite, arise from the contractual and commercial arrangements already pleaded and are capable of being pursued cumulatively. PHIL might, for example, have required substitution of particular homes while also exercising contractual rights, controlling future sales or seeking payment from Royale or a guarantor. Its eventual response may also have depended upon what was discovered once PHIL began to investigate the position.
161. The proposed pleading remains confined to a defined group of measures arising from the transaction documents and PHIL’s dealings with Royale. PHIL will be required at trial to establish, on the balance of probabilities, the action or combination of actions which it would have taken.
162. There is an evidential basis for that case. Matthew Insley gives evidence concerning the steps which PHIL says would have been taken had it understood the position earlier. The reliability of that evidence and the probability of the individual courses remain matters for trial. At this stage it provides a sufficient foundation for the proposed pleading.
163. The subsequent question concerns the outcome of those steps. Where success depended upon the response of Royale, associated companies, guarantors or other third parties, PHIL must establish that the favourable outcome represented a real and substantial chance rather than a speculative possibility. The value of any recoverable chance will depend upon the probability of the relevant outcome. AY remains entitled to dispute whether the contractual remedies were practically available, whether the relevant counterparties had the means or obligation to perform and whether the steps alleged would in fact have improved PHIL’s financial position. Those are questions going to the merits and quantification rather than the adequacy of the proposed amendment.
164. The discretionary considerations also differ materially from those concerning the “red flags” amendment. The causation amendments introduce no new duty or breach and no new factual event. The protective measures on which PHIL relies already appear in the particulars of claim. The amendments respond directly to AY’s criticism by stating more clearly PHIL’s case as to its own conduct and separating that question from the subsequent actions of third parties.
165. The procedural stage permits AY to meet the clarified case without disruption to completed steps. No defence has been served and post-issue disclosure has not taken place. AY has already addressed causation in its application and evidence and will be able to plead and give disclosure and evidence in response.
166. The amended case is therefore coherent, has a sufficient evidential foundation and carries a real prospect of success. The amended pleading expresses the recognised distinction between PHIL’s own hypothetical conduct and the subsequent actions of third parties. Determination of the claim on that pleaded basis accords with the overriding objective.
167. The application for permission to make the causation and loss-of-chance amendments, including proposed paragraphs 33A, 34A, 65A and 66A, is allowed. PHIL will have to establish at trial, on the balance of probabilities, the action or combination of actions which it would have taken and, where the better outcome depended upon third-party conduct, the existence and value of a real and substantial chance of that outcome.
168. The amendment application is allowed in part. The application concerning the alleged oral “red flags” instruction is dismissed. The application concerning PHIL’s own counterfactual conduct and the alleged better outcomes is allowed.
STRIKE OUT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
169. The operative pleading for the remaining applications therefore includes the permitted amendments to causation and loss but excludes the proposed oral “red flags” allegation. PHIL’s incidental-duty case remains founded upon the written retainers, the work undertaken and the matters said to have been encountered in its performance. AY’s applications under CPR 3.4 and CPR 24.2 are determined on that basis.
THE APPLICATION TO STRIKE OUT UNDER CPR 3.4
170. AY seeks to strike out the whole or parts of PHIL’s claim under CPR 3.4. I have set out the applicable principles above. The exercise at this stage is directed to the legal sufficiency of the pleaded case. The application concerns claims arising from five reports, produced in April 2020, September 2020, January 2021, February 2021 and March 2022. AY’s criticisms do not apply in the same way to each report. In particular, the valuation claims raise questions of particularisation which differ from the issues arising from the stock-audit work. I consider them separately.
The valuation claims
171. PHIL advances claims in negligent valuation in relation to the April 2020, January 2021 and March 2022 Reports. AY submits that those claims are inadequately pleaded. Its principal criticism is that PHIL does not identify the valuation, or range of valuations, which a reasonably competent valuer would have reached. AY also says that a number of the pleaded criticisms of methodology identify what PHIL says was wrong without identifying with sufficient precision what AY should have done instead. AY says that this leaves it unable properly to understand or answer the professional case advanced against it.
172. There is force in that criticism. An allegation that a professional valuation fell outside the range open to a reasonably competent valuer must identify with sufficient clarity the case which the valuer is required to meet. PHIL must identify before trial the competing valuation case and the professional basis upon which AY’s methodology is challenged.
173. The pleaded valuation claims nevertheless contain the essential factual and legal foundation of a professional-negligence claim. PHIL identifies the reports and figures complained of, alleges that they fell outside the permissible range, specifies aspects of AY’s methodology said to have been deficient and pleads reliance, causation and loss. The essential elements of the cause of action are pleaded. The valuation case requires further particularisation.
174. That distinction is relevant under CPR 3.4. Further particulars may be required before the valuation claims can be tried or expert evidence properly prepared, but the present deficiencies are capable of being addressed through ordinary case management.
175. AY also relies upon scope of duty. It submits that PHIL’s ultimate losses resulted from Royale’s alleged disposal of the mobile homes and failure to account for the proceeds, and therefore fall outside a valuer’s duty to protect against overvaluation. That argument assumes particular importance in the application for summary judgment, where the court may examine the evidence and the nature of the losses claimed. PHIL pleads negligent overvaluation, reliance and resulting loss. The extent to which the individual losses fall within the purpose of the valuation duty is addressed under CPR 24.2, rather than the legal sufficiency of the cause of action.
176. The application to strike out the valuation claims arising from the April 2020, January 2021 and March 2022 Reports is dismissed.
The stock audit claims
177. The stock-audit claims principally concern the September 2020, February 2021 and March 2022 Reports. AY’s case starts with the terms of the relevant instructions. The August 2020 appointment described the purpose of the physical audit as confirming that the mobile homes were “in situ”, and materially similar language appeared in the later engagements. AY submits that the work involved identifying the mobile homes and matching the physical assets at the parks against the stock schedules supplied to it. It says that those instructions imposed no obligation to investigate legal ownership, determine whether individual sales had completed or establish the status of occupiers. That submission is central to its application.
178. I accept that an instruction to undertake a physical audit cannot of itself give rise to a free-standing obligation to investigate title. PHIL’s pleaded case is, however, narrower. It alleges that AY was physically inspecting the identified homes and that visible signs of occupation were apparent during those inspections. PHIL says that occupation was relevant to value and to the status of the assets and that reasonable professional care required AY to identify and explain the significance of matters which it encountered, or ought reasonably to have encountered, while carrying out the agreed work.
179. That pleading raises the distinction considered in the authorities between an additional task which the professional never undertook and advice about a material matter encountered in the performance of the retained task. The latter is capable, as a matter of law, of constituting advice reasonably incidental to the professional work which was undertaken. Whether such a duty arose on the facts, what reasonable professional care required and what significance a competent surveyor should have attached to visible occupation are questions going to the merits.
180. The surviving September claim concerns a physical audit against the supplied stock sheets. PHIL may seek to establish that reasonable professional care required AY to observe and report material signs of occupation encountered during that exercise and to explain their significance within the scope of its professional expertise. That allegation is conceptually different from a duty to investigate whether a sale had legally completed, whether title had passed or whether Royale was acting dishonestly. The pleaded case does not support a free-standing obligation to discover completed sales or fraud.
181. The February 2021 and March 2022 claims add another dimension because the information obtained through inspection appeared within reports which also contained valuation work. PHIL alleges that AY recorded information concerning occupation and sales but did not adequately explain its significance or reflect the relevant information in the valuations. The February 2021 report followed physical inspection and classified individual homes in terms including “Sold”, “Temporary Accommodation”, “SSTC” and “Owner Occupied”. By March 2022 AY was again carrying out valuation and physical-audit work within the same engagement.
182. Those allegations disclose an arguable professional-negligence case. The question whether reasonable professional care required more than the accurate recording of information in schedules or appendices depends upon the nature of the professional work and the significance of the information obtained. The content of any resulting duty and the professional response required are matters for trial.
183. The application to strike out the stock-audit claims is dismissed.
Causation and loss
184. AY also challenges the adequacy of PHIL’s pleaded causal case. That criticism must now be considered in light of my decision on the amendment application. PHIL is permitted to plead the identified protective measures which it says it would have taken and the better outcomes which it says thereby presented a real and substantial chance.
185. The resulting pleading identifies PHIL’s own counterfactual conduct separately from the subsequent contingencies dependent upon third parties. AY remains entitled to dispute whether PHIL would have acted in the manner alleged, whether the contractual measures relied upon were available or effective, whether Royale or the guarantors could have met any resulting demand and whether the losses claimed bear the necessary relationship to the duties ultimately established. Rather than the legal sufficiency of the amended causal case.
186. PHIL’s particulars therefore identify the professional work undertaken by AY, the duties alleged, the respects in which the work is said to have fallen below the required standard and the causal consequences relied upon. The valuation allegations require additional particularisation and the existence and scope of the alleged incidental duties remain disputed. The existing need for further particulars and the disputed scope of the incidental duties leave legally recognisable claims for determination.
187. The development of PHIL’s case during the pre-action process is relevant to costs rather than to the legal viability of the claims now pleaded. The extent to which allegations were altered, reformulated or abandoned is addressed in AY’s separate application concerning pre-action costs below.
188. AY’s application under CPR 3.4 is dismissed. I will hear the parties as to an appropriate direction for further particulars of the valuation claims, including the valuation or valuation range for which PHIL contends and the principal respects in which AY’s methodology is said to have fallen below the required professional standard.
THE APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER CPR 24.2
189. I turn to AY’s application for summary judgment. The applicable principles have already been set out. The question is whether, on the evidence presently available together with the evidence which may reasonably be expected at trial, PHIL has a real prospect of succeeding on the relevant claim or issue and whether there is any other compelling reason for trial.
190. The answer depends upon the individual reports. AY’s instructions, the work undertaken and the information available to it changed materially between April 2020 and March 2022. The duties alleged by PHIL also differ between the valuation and stock-audit work. I therefore consider the reports in turn.
The April 2020 Report
191. The April 2020 Report was a desktop valuation. No physical inspection had taken place. PHIL’s case is that AY negligently overvalued the 38 mobile homes. AY seeks summary judgment principally on two grounds. It relies upon the absence of formal expert evidence supporting the alleged overvaluation and submits that the losses ultimately suffered by PHIL arose from Royale’s disposal of assets and failure to account for the proceeds, rather than from any error in valuation.
192. The first argument concerns breach. PHIL accepts that expert valuation evidence will be required at trial. Its evidence is that preliminary expert input was obtained before the particulars of claim were served and that formal expert evidence will be obtained in the proceedings. PHIL relies upon ACD (Landscape Architects) Ltd v Overall [2012] PNLR 19 and Crest Nicholson Operations Ltd v Grafik Architects [2021] EWHC 2948 in answer to AY’s submission that the absence of a presently served expert report is fatal.
193. The proceedings have not reached the stage for expert evidence. The reasonableness of AY’s methodology, the appropriate approach to valuation and the permissible range are matters upon which expert evidence will be required. PHIL must particularise its valuation case more fully, as I have already explained. The material presently available leaves the allegation of negligent overvaluation with a real prospect of success notwithstanding the absence of a formal expert report at this stage.
194. AY’s scope-of-duty argument concerns the purpose of the April valuation and the losses falling within that purpose. The April engagement concerned a desktop valuation of 38 mobile homes which were treated as available for sale. AY had not been instructed to investigate ownership, determine whether sales had completed or assess the honesty or financial standing of Royale. Its valuation duty was directed to the value of the assets which it had been asked to value.
195. The losses claimed by PHIL arose in different ways. PHIL says that AY materially overvalued the homes and that the April transaction was entered into in reliance upon that valuation. It also seeks losses arising from the subsequent unavailability of homes, Royale’s retention of sale proceeds and its eventual inability to perform its obligations.
196. The financial consequences of valuing the mobile homes at more than their true value fall naturally within the purpose of a valuation duty. Losses caused by Royale’s disposal of assets, retention of proceeds, default or inability to perform arose from the subsequent treatment and availability of the assets and proceeds. They represent a risk distinct from overvaluation.
197. The scope-of-duty counterfactual provides a useful cross-check. Taking AY’s valuation of £5.75 million as correct leaves unchanged the consequences of Royale disposing of the homes or retaining the proceeds. The same losses arising from those events would have occurred notwithstanding the accuracy of the valuation. They therefore represent the materialisation of a risk different from the risk addressed by the April valuation.
198. PHIL relies upon its case that a competent valuation would have led it to decline the transaction altogether. That addresses factual causation. The scope-of-duty inquiry concerns the losses for which the April valuation duty imposed responsibility upon AY, which remain confined to losses falling within the purpose of that duty.
199. I therefore accept AY’s scope-of-duty submission in relation to the losses arising from Royale’s disposal of the homes, retention of sale proceeds, default and inability to perform its obligations. AY is entitled to summary judgment in respect of those losses under the April 2020 valuation.
200. PHIL may continue to pursue its claim based upon negligent overvaluation. It alleges that the £5.75 million figure fell outside the range open to a reasonably competent valuer. Any financial loss attributable to a proven overvaluation is capable of falling within the purpose of AY’s valuation duty. That claim will require further particularisation of the valuation or range for which PHIL contends, the principal respects in which AY’s methodology is said to have fallen below the required professional standard and the resulting valuation loss.
201. AY’s application for summary judgment in relation to the April 2020 Report therefore succeeds in part. PHIL may pursue its claim for loss attributable to negligent overvaluation. Summary judgment is granted to AY in respect of the wider losses attributable to Royale’s disposal of assets, retention of proceeds, default or inability to meet its obligations.
The September 2020 Report
202. The September claim arises from a different professional task. AY physically inspected and photographed the mobile homes as part of the stock audit. PHIL says that some homes displayed visible signs of occupation and that a reasonably competent surveyor should have observed and reported those features and explained their significance. AY disputes both the existence of that duty and the professional significance which PHIL attributes to occupation.
203. The surviving case concerns information encountered in performing the physical audit. The material presently available is capable of showing that signs of occupation were visible during the inspections. The significance of those features depends upon what a reasonably competent surveyor carrying out this particular audit should have observed and understood and what the circumstances required AY to communicate to PHIL. Those are factual and professional questions which require a fuller evidential basis.
204. Investigation of completed sales involved a different exercise. Determining whether a particular sale had legally completed or title had passed to a third party required an inquiry beyond observation of the physical condition of the home. PHIL’s case which survives this application is concerned with the signs of occupation said to have been observable during the inspections and the significance which a reasonably competent surveyor should have attached to them.
205. The issue for trial is therefore whether the inspections revealed signs of occupation which AY should have observed and reported and whether those signs were sufficiently significant to require explanation or warning to PHIL. PHIL says that they were capable of affecting value and raising concerns about the status of the assets. The answer will depend upon the circumstances of the audit, the professional standard applicable to the work and the evidence of what AY in fact encountered.
206. The evidential record is also incomplete in respects which bear directly upon that question. PHIL seeks the underlying inspection photographs and site notes. These are records generated in the course of the inspections upon which its pleaded case is based. Those records are capable of showing what was visible to AY and the information available during the audit.
207. Causation and scope of loss will depend upon the duty ultimately established. PHIL identifies contractual and commercial protections which it says it would have exercised once alerted to material occupation. Whether it would have taken those steps, what response they would have produced and which losses fall within the purpose of any duty established are substantial questions for trial.
208. AY has not established that PHIL has no real prospect of succeeding on the September 2020 claim. The application for summary judgment in relation to that report is dismissed.
The January 2021 Report
209. The January 2021 Report was produced before the physical inspections and was expressly marked “Subject to Inspection”. It valued 87 mobile homes at approximately £14.37 million. AY places considerable reliance upon the correspondence concerning the 29 homes described in the schedule supplied to it as “sold”.
210. During preparation of the report, Carys Chandler raised the position with Matthew Insley after those units had initially been omitted from the valuation exercise. Matthew Insley instructed AY to include them on the assumption that they were not agreed for sale. AY says that the exchange shows both PHIL’s knowledge of the descriptions in the schedule and its responsibility for the assumption upon which those homes were valued.
211. PHIL gives the exchange a different meaning. Matthew Insley says that references to sales were understood as relating to anticipated transactions which had not completed and might not do so. He denies knowingly asking AY to value mobile homes which had already been sold to third parties. PHIL relies upon the history of delayed completions and substitution of homes and also upon contemporaneous discussions concerning second-hand values and occupation.
212. The parties give the exchange different meanings, reflecting their different accounts of the commercial context and their understanding of the terminology used. The contemporaneous correspondence provides substantial support for AY’s case, but the dispute also engages the parties’ understanding of the arrangements and the circumstances in which the instructions were given. Those factual issues require determination at trial.
213. PHIL’s allegation of negligent valuation also requires expert evidence for the reasons already given in relation to April 2020 Report. PHIL must ultimately establish that AY’s valuation fell outside the permissible range or was reached without reasonable professional skill and care. The professional valuation issue will require expert evidence in due course.
214. AY has not established that PHIL has no real prospect of succeeding on the January 2021 valuation claim. Its application for summary judgment on that report is dismissed.
The February 2021 Report
215. The February 2021 Report followed the physical inspections. Appendix 2 contained photographs and classifications including “For Sale”, “Temporary Accommodation”, “Sold”, “SSTC” and “Owner Occupied”. AY relies upon the fact that the information upon which PHIL now bases substantial parts of its claim appeared in the report itself. PHIL had the report and the consequences of the information which it contained will therefore require consideration at trial.
216. PHIL’s complaint concerns AY’s professional treatment of that information. The January valuation had been expressly subject to inspection. AY subsequently inspected the homes and recorded information concerning occupation and sales, yet the valuation remained unchanged and the report contained no warning that the earlier figures required qualification. PHIL says that a reasonable reader could understand that presentation as reflecting AY’s professional judgment that the inspection findings had no material effect upon value.
217. The issue is whether reasonable professional care in those circumstances required more than recording the information in Appendix 2. That involves consideration of the prominence which should have been given to the information, whether its significance for value should have been explained and whether the valuation required reconsideration or qualification. Those are professional questions upon which expert evidence is likely to be important.
218. There are also factual questions concerning what AY observed at the parks and the information supplied to it by Royale. The January correspondence concerning the 29 homes remains relevant and may furnish AY with a substantial answer to parts of PHIL’s case. The subsequent inspections introduced further information which falls to be considered in its own context.
219. The application for summary judgment concerning the February 2021 Report is dismissed.
The March 2022 Report
220. By March 2022 AY’s engagement again combined valuation and physical-audit work. The report expressly recorded that sales had been agreed in respect of 69 units, with anticipated completion dates between February and March 2022. AY also relies upon the stock schedule supplied by Royale, the terms permitting reliance upon information supplied for the engagement and the reservations making clear that legal ownership was outside its investigation. Those matters provide substantial support for AY’s defence.
221. PHIL places emphasis upon the combined nature of the work. Its case is that AY was undertaking valuation and inspection functions as part of the same exercise and that information obtained through its own inspection work therefore required consideration in the valuation. The relevant professional question concerns the significance of the information available to AY, including the distinction between anticipated and completed sales, the evidence of occupation and the extent to which reliance upon Royale’s information remained reasonable in the light of AY’s own work.
222. The express reference to 69 anticipated sales and the contractual provisions upon which AY relies form an important part of that assessment. So too does the information obtained through AY’s inspections. The professional standard applicable to that combination of information and instructed work requires factual findings and expert evidence at trial.
223. The application for summary judgment concerning the March 2022 Report is dismissed.
Scope of duty, causation and conclusion
224. AY’s broader submission is that PHIL’s losses resulted from Royale’s alleged fraud and fall outside the scope of the duties which AY undertook. That submission has succeeded in part in relation to the April 2020 Report. The April engagement was confined to a desktop valuation, and losses arising from Royale’s subsequent disposal of the mobile homes, retention of sale proceeds, default or inability to meet its obligations were not losses against which that valuation duty was directed. PHIL’s conventional claim for loss attributable to negligent overvaluation remains.
225. The position under the later reports requires a different analysis because the duties alleged are different. From September 2020 AY was physically inspecting the mobile homes. PHIL’s surviving case concerns the professional significance of matters said to have been encountered during those inspections, particularly visible occupation. In February 2021 and March 2022 a further issue arises from the relationship between the inspection findings and AY’s valuation work. The content and purpose of those duties require findings on the factual and professional evidence at trial.
226. Causation raises related factual questions. PHIL must establish on the balance of probabilities the action which it would have taken had AY performed the relevant duty competently. Its amended case identifies the contractual and commercial measures upon which it relies. The availability of those measures, the course which PHIL would in fact have pursued and the financial position in which that would have placed it all require evidence. Where the outcome depended upon the response of Royale, a guarantor or another third party, PHIL must establish a real and substantial chance of obtaining the better outcome alleged.
227. There are therefore significant issues remaining for trial in relation to the September 2020, January 2021, February 2021 and March 2022 Reports. They include the professional standard applicable to the work undertaken, what AY observed or ought reasonably to have observed during the inspections, the significance of occupation, the relationship between the valuation and stock-audit functions, the parties’ understanding of the January 2021 correspondence, PHIL’s counterfactual conduct and the losses falling within the scope of the duties ultimately established. Some of those matters will require expert evidence; others depend upon factual findings. The inspection photographs and site material identified by PHIL may also bear directly upon issues which remain in dispute.
228. The result is that AY’s application under CPR 24.2 succeeds in part in relation to the April 2020 Report. PHIL may continue to pursue a properly particularised claim for loss attributable to negligent overvaluation. Summary judgment is granted to AY in respect of the losses claimed under the April valuation arising from Royale’s disposal of mobile homes, retention of sale proceeds, default or inability to meet its obligations. AY has not established that the claims concerning the September 2020, January 2021, February 2021 or March 2022 Reports have no real prospect of success. The application for summary judgment in respect of those reports is dismissed. AY’s application under CPR 24.2 is otherwise dismissed.
AY'S APPLICATION FOR THE COSTS OF THE PRE-ACTION PROCESS
229. AY seeks an order that PHIL pay its costs of the pre-action process in any event. The application concerns costs incurred before proceedings and is separate from the costs of the applications.
230. The starting point is the Pre-Action Protocol for Professional Negligence. Paragraph 2 identifies the purposes of the Protocol. They include enabling the parties to understand and properly identify the issues in dispute and exchange relevant information and documents; enabling informed decisions about whether and how to proceed; facilitating settlement or the narrowing of issues; avoiding unnecessary expense; and supporting the efficient management of proceedings which cannot be avoided. Those purposes are directly relevant to AY’s application because its case is that the development of PHIL’s allegations prevented the pre-action process from performing those functions.
231. Paragraph 6.3 of the Protocol deals expressly with the relationship between the case advanced before proceedings and the case subsequently pleaded:
“The Letter of Claim is not intended to have the same formal status as a Statement of Case. If, however, the Letter of Claim differs materially from the Statement of Case in subsequent proceedings, the court may decide, in its discretion, to impose sanctions.”
232. Paragraph 3.1 refers to the Practice Direction on Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols for the court’s approach to sanctions. AY relies upon the provisions which permit a costs order where material non-compliance has caused expense. Its case is therefore that paragraph 6.3 is engaged by the difference between PHIL’s pre-action case and the pleaded case, and that the costs generated by that difference should be dealt with now.
233. In Ian McGlinn v Waltham Contractors Ltd [2006] 1 Costs LR 27 Coulson J, as he then was, said at paragraph 14:
“From a wider perspective, I should add that, in my judgment, it would be contrary to the whole purpose of the Pre-Action Protocols, which are themselves such an integral part of the CPR, if claiming parties were routinely penalised if they decided not to pursue claims in court which they had originally included in their Protocol claim letters. The whole purpose of a Pre-Action Protocol procedure is to narrow issues and to allow a prospective Defendant, wherever possible, to demonstrate to a prospective Claimant that a particular claim is doomed to failure.”
234. Coulson J regarded an adverse costs consequence in those circumstances as penalising the claimant for achieving the narrowing of issues which the Protocol was intended to promote. PHIL relies upon that reasoning and says that the development and narrowing of its allegations should be viewed in the same way. It also relies upon continuing gaps in the information available to it during the pre-action process, particularly the underlying photographs and AY’s internal inspection material.
235. The present application therefore requires consideration of the character of the changes in PHIL’s case. Abandonment or narrowing resulting from the pre-action exchange may reflect the successful operation of the Protocol. A material change which generated unnecessary expenditure or deprived AY of a proper opportunity to address the case ultimately brought may carry a different costs consequence. Paragraph 6.3 preserves the court’s discretion to respond to the latter situation.
236. AY says that this case falls within the latter category. Its complaint concerns the course of the pre-action process as a whole and the work which it says that process caused it unnecessarily to undertake.
237. The correspondence was extensive. AY points out that PHIL’s substantive correspondence alone exceeded 70 pages. The volume of correspondence is relevant in the present case because AY says abandoned allegations were pursued at length while important parts of the pleaded case were absent.
238. AY gives a number of examples. Claims were advanced concerning the reports dated January and March 2020 which are no longer pursued. Those reports pre-dated PHIL’s incorporation. The April 2020 Report was criticised for failing to identify that homes had been sold or did not exist when both parties knew that it was a desktop exercise produced without inspection. The January 2021 Report was criticised in similar terms although it too preceded physical inspection. PHIL subsequently abandoned the allegation that AY was negligent in failing to identify homes which did not exist.
239. AY also relies upon changes in the legal and factual basis of the allegations which remained. The Letter of Claim relied upon the instruction concerning “liquidity” as supporting a wider obligation concerning saleability and title. During the subsequent correspondence the case developed to include criticism that AY should have interviewed occupants to discover information about sales. The valuation allegations which now constitute the sole claim concerning the April and January valuation reports, and part of the March 2022 claim, did not appear in the Letter of Claim. AY says that this omission was material because it deprived it of the opportunity to understand and respond pre-action to the professional valuation case which it now faces.
240. The September 2020 and February 2021 Reports also assumed substantially greater significance as the dispute developed. AY says that their treatment changed both during the pre-action correspondence and again when the claim was pleaded. The alleged express instruction to identify “red flags” appeared later still and formed no part of the pre-action correspondence. The application to introduce that allegation was dismissed for the reasons already given.
241. AY says those matters had practical consequences. It was required to investigate and answer allegations which disappeared, while some important elements of the proceedings now brought were never ventilated before issue. Its submission is that it was thereby deprived of the opportunity which the Protocol is intended to give a prospective defendant to understand the case, make informed decisions about its response and possible settlement, and avoid unnecessary expense.
242. There is substance in those criticisms. The history shows more than the ordinary development of detail. Some allegations were pursued and abandoned. Others changed materially. The negligent-valuation case which now plays an important role in the proceedings was absent from the Letter of Claim. AY has therefore identified matters capable of supporting a distinct costs consequence.
243. In response PHIL submits that the history must be viewed in the context of a developing professional-negligence dispute in which relevant information remained unavailable to it. It relies upon requests for the underlying photographs, metadata and inspection material and says that information obtained through the pre-action exchange contributed to the eventual formulation of its case.
244. The principle in McGlinn v Waltham Contractors Ltd is material when considering AY’s criticisms. The abandonment of an allegation after the prospective defendant has demonstrated its weakness may represent the successful operation of the Protocol. Costs sanctions cannot sensibly follow routinely from the mere fact that the eventual pleading is narrower than the Letter of Claim.
245. The present history extends beyond the abandonment of allegations. AY also relies upon important allegations first advanced after the Letter of Claim and substantial changes to allegations which were maintained. Those matters fall naturally within the language of paragraph 6.3 and require consideration of their actual costs consequences rather than treatment under a general rule either for or against sanctions.
246. The outcome of the applications before me forms part of that assessment. AY has succeeded on part of the April 2020 claim and has successfully resisted the proposed “red flags” amendment. Its application to strike out has been dismissed. PHIL’s conventional April overvaluation claim remains, the causation amendments have been permitted and the claims arising from the September 2020, January 2021, February 2021 and March 2022 Reports will proceed.
247. The pre-action history therefore intersects with both matters which have fallen away and matters which remain live. Some work was directed to allegations which PHIL no longer pursues. Other parts of the correspondence concerned the same reports, transactions, inspections and professional obligations which will have to be determined at trial. The present material does not enable those strands of work to be separated reliably for costs purposes.
248. The valuation allegations illustrate the point. Their absence from the Letter of Claim is potentially material when costs are considered. The extent of any costs consequence will be informed by the ultimate determination of those allegations, the work AY would in any event have been required to undertake in relation to the same transactions and reports, and any identifiable additional expense caused by the absence of the valuation case from the pre-action process.
249. Similar considerations apply to the changing treatment of the September and February 2021 Reports. AY may ultimately establish that it incurred identifiable costs responding to allegations which were abandoned or substantially altered. The surviving claims nevertheless concern the same inspections and reports, and some of the factual material generated during the pre-action exchanges remains relevant to those claims.
250. AY seeks an order for its pre-action costs in any event. The order would allocate liability for those costs now and independently of the final outcome. On the material presently available, the more appropriate course is to preserve the costs consequences of the pre-action history for determination when the outcome and significance of the surviving claims are known.
251. The final costs determination can take account of genuine narrowing achieved through the Protocol, material changes in the case, allegations pursued unnecessarily, matters omitted from the pre-action case and any resulting expenditure.
252. AY’s application for an immediate order that PHIL pay its costs of the pre-action process in any event is dismissed. The pre-action costs, including any identifiable costs attributable to allegations subsequently abandoned or materially reformulated, remain available for consideration when the overall costs of the proceedings are determined.
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