Administrative United Kingdom

NM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: PA/50574/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Newport
On 12 October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE L Salkeld

Between

NM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Jowitt, Counsel

For the Respondent: Ms Lewis, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 16 December 2024.

Anonymity

2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of the case outweighs the principles of open justice.

Background

3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained in MyHMCTS.

4. The Appellant is a 56-year-old Pakistani national. She is a widow from Faisalabad, Punjab. She entered the United Kingdom as a visitor in January 2023 and claimed asylum on 13 June 2023. The Respondent refused that claim on 16 December 2024.

5. The Appellant claims that she would be at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Pakistan. She says that, after her husband’s death, her daughter, Daughter A, was compelled to marry K. She says that K later coerced the family into agreeing that another daughter, Daughter B, would marry his son, I. The Appellant says that, after she contacted the police in the United Kingdom when I assaulted Daughter B, I departed or was removed to Pakistan and both men blamed and threatened her.

6. The Appellant relies upon her medical conditions which she says engage Article 3 ECHR. The evidence records poorly controlled Type 2 diabetes requiring insulin, diabetic neuropathic symptoms, significant visual impairment for which she is registered blind, chronic pain, anxiety and depression.

7. The Appellant also relies upon her relationship with Mr A, a British citizen. She says that they underwent an Islamic marriage ceremony on 30 June 2024 and that their relationship engages Article 8.

Preliminary Issues

8. The Appellant’s representative applied to rely upon a 143-page consolidated bundle, an Appellant’s skeleton argument (ASA) dated 9 September 2026 and a letter from Clifton Surgery dated 9 October 2026. The Respondent’s representative applied to rely upon a supplementary review dated 9 October 2026. There was no objection and I admitted those documents.

9. The Appellant is significantly visually impaired and has several physical and mental health conditions. Having regard to the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010 and the Equal Treatment Bench Book, I agreed to treat her as a vulnerable witness for the conduct of the hearing.

10. At Ms Jowitt’s request, I ensured that questions were expressed clearly and sensitively, particularly where they concerned allegations of domestic violence. I was satisfied that Ms Lewis would question the Appellant in that manner, while remaining able to explore the matters relevant to credibility. I offered the Appellant breaks as required. During her evidence, she asked to take medication but did not wish to take a break.

11. I reserved my assessment of whether, and to what extent, the Appellant’s vulnerabilities affected her ability to recall events, give a consistent account or respond to questions. I address that issue as part of my findings below.

12. The Appellant’s most recent witness statement dated 4 September 2026 had been read back to her by Daughter B rather than by an independent interpreter. The Respondent did not object to the statement standing as evidence-in-chief but submitted that the circumstances of its preparation affected weight. I admitted the statement and have considered the weight to be attached to it in the round.

13. The relationship with Mr A had not been considered in the refusal decision and constituted a new matter for the purposes of section 85(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. It had, however, been addressed substantively in the Respondent’s supplementary review. Ms Lewis confirmed that, pursuant to section 85(5) of the 2002 Act, the Respondent consented to the Tribunal considering that new matter.

The Hearing

14. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

Agreed and Disputed Issues

15. The parties agreed the Appellant’s nationality and identity; that women in Pakistan form a particular social group; that the harm feared would, if established, amount to persecution; and that threats had been made by K, I, or both after the Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom.

16. The issues remaining for determination were:

(a) whether the disputed parts of the Appellant’s account were credible;

(b) whether there was a reasonable likelihood that K, I, or both, would seek to harm the Appellant on return to Pakistan;

(c) whether the Appellant would have access to a sufficiency of state protection;

(d) whether she could safely and reasonably relocate to another part of Pakistan;

(e) whether she qualified for humanitarian protection;

(f) whether her removal would breach Article 3 ECHR because of her medical conditions and her ability to obtain appropriate treatment in Pakistan;

(g) whether the Appellant and Mr A had established a genuine and subsisting family life; and

(h) whether the Appellant’s removal would be a disproportionate interference with her rights under Article 8 ECHR, having regard to her family and private life.

Evidence

17. The Appellant, Daughter B and Mr A adopted their respective witness statements and gave oral evidence. Each was cross-examined. A Punjabi interpreter was provided for the hearing. The Appellant gave evidence through the interpreter and no difficulty with interpretation was raised.

18. Mr A also gave evidence through the interpreter. During his evidence, it emerged that he was born in Afghanistan and that his first language was Pashto. The interpreter explained that he was also registered to interpret in Urdu and had been communicating with Mr A in Urdu. Mr A confirmed that he was able to converse in Urdu and that he also spoke some English. When asked expressly, he confirmed that he had experienced no difficulty understanding the interpreter. I also observed that his command of English was sufficient to enable him to identify and correct any material error in the interpretation. Having regard to those matters and the answers he gave, I was satisfied that no material difficulty with interpretation had arisen.

Legal Framework

19. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applies. Following the guidance in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 413 (IAC), I must first determine, on the balance of probabilities:

(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause her to fear persecution for a Convention reason (or such a characteristic is attributed to her by an actor of persecution); and

(b) whether the Appellant does in fact fear such persecution.

20. If those questions are answered in the affirmative, I must then determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that:

(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;

(b) she would not receive sufficient protection; and

(c) she could not reasonably relocate internally.

21. When answering each of those questions, the evidence must be considered in the round and section 32 does not require the Tribunal to determine whether each alleged material fact is established on the balance of probabilities.

22. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

23. In so far as the Appellant relies on Article 8 outside the Rules it is for the Appellant to show that Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the Respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.

24. The question is whether the refusal breaches the Appellant's Article 3 ECHR right not to be "subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". The Appellant must establish that they are a seriously ill person and adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that as a seriously ill person they would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in their state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy.

25. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean she has lied about another.

26. As per Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439, documentary evidence should be appraised in the light of the evidence about its nature, provenance, timing and background evidence and in the light of all the other evidence in the case.

27. Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.

Findings and Reasons

28. I have considered all the evidence in the round. I refer only to those matters necessary to explain my findings.

Residence and Family Circumstances in Pakistan

29. The Appellant's evidence concerning her residence and family circumstances before leaving Pakistan was not entirely consistent. Her visa application stated that she had lived at the same address for approximately 20 years, owned that property, and lived there with Z, whom she described as her son and dependant. In oral evidence, she initially stated that she had lived with Son A for approximately two years before travelling to the United Kingdom and that he later sold the property. When referred to the further representations, which stated that she had lived with Daughter A and K before leaving Pakistan, she said that she moved there after Son A sold the property. That chronology was difficult to reconcile with her evidence that the property was sold after she left Pakistan.

30. I accept that the Appellant may have lived at more than one address over time. However, I find her evidence concerning her residence immediately before departure, the ownership of the property and the circumstances of its alleged sale to be unreliable. Those matters are relevant to the assessment of what accommodation, property or family support may remain available to her in Pakistan. They do not, without more, undermine the core of her protection claim.

31. The evidence concerning Z also gave rise to some confusion. The visa application described him as the Appellant's son, whereas the later evidence was that he was Daughter A's son from an earlier marriage whom the Appellant had raised as her own. I do not treat that as a material inconsistency. However, there was significant confusion concerning Z's age. The Appellant initially stated that he was 12 and then 14, although his recorded date of birth meant that he was 18 at the date of the hearing. Given her evidence that she had raised him from infancy and assumed responsibility for him as her own child, his approximate age was a matter she could reasonably have been expected to know. I therefore place some weight on that inconsistency.

32. In reaching those conclusions, I have taken account of the Appellant's illiteracy, lack of education, medical conditions, reported memory difficulties and the pressures of giving evidence. Having done so, I nevertheless place weight upon the inconsistencies concerning her residence, the ownership and sale of the property, and Z's age.

Chronology of the Threats and Marriage

33. The Appellant accepted that, when she travelled to the United Kingdom, she intended to return to Pakistan and live with Daughter A. Although she initially stated that the relevant problems began after her arrival in the United Kingdom, her evidence, viewed as a whole, was that threats had occurred both before and after her departure. The earlier threats were said to concern pressure on the family to secure Daughter B's marriage to I. The later threats were said to arise from the belief that the Appellant was responsible for I's arrest and departure from the United Kingdom. I do not regard the evidence as materially inconsistent in that respect. Her intention to return despite the earlier threats remains relevant, but I take account of her explanation that she had nowhere else to live and intended to stay with Daughter A.

34. The Appellant stated that K compelled Daughter B's marriage to I through threats directed at Daughter A. Neither the Appellant nor Daughter B could identify the precise date of the marriage. I do not regard that inability as materially damaging in itself. Whilst aspects of the evidence concerning the subsequent relationship breakdown and any divorce proceedings were unclear, those matters are peripheral to the central protection claim and I attach limited weight to them.

35. The evidence concerning police involvement was unclear. The Appellant's case was that references in her asylum interview were to a report made to the police in the United Kingdom concerning I's conduct towards Daughter B. However, the relevant questions appear to have been directed towards events in Pakistan and the availability of protection there. I am therefore not satisfied that the evidence can confidently be treated as relating solely to events in the United Kingdom. Equally, the evidence does not establish whether a report was made to the Pakistani authorities, who made any such report, whether it concerned K's violence towards Daughter A or I's violence towards Daughter B, what conduct was reported, or what response was received. I therefore attach limited weight to this aspect of the evidence.

36. I have also taken account of the Appellant's delay in claiming asylum and the fact that she entered the United Kingdom as a visitor intending to return to Pakistan. I consider those matters in accordance with section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, but not as determinative. Her explanation, namely that the specific retaliatory threats arose following I's arrest and departure from the United Kingdom, is consistent with the chronology advanced in her interview and later representations.

Nature and Consistency of the Threats

37. The Respondent accepts that threats were made to the Appellant after her arrival in the United Kingdom. I also accept that the Appellant genuinely fears K and I and believes that they blame her for I's arrest and departure from the United Kingdom. Although the wording varied across the evidence, the substance was reasonably consistent. The threats included statements that the Appellant would be killed on return, shot, abducted at the airport, or otherwise seriously harmed if she returned to Pakistan.

38. I accept that I assaulted Daughter B in the United Kingdom and that K subjected Daughter A to domestic violence in Pakistan. Those findings provide a credible context for the threats and demonstrate that they cannot be dismissed as mere expressions of anger. They also mean that the threats cannot be treated as inherently incapable of being acted upon.

39. The Appellant's evidence was that she changed her telephone number because of the threats but that K later obtained her replacement number and continued to contact her. She was unable to identify when she last received a direct threat. No messages, screenshots or call records relating to the replacement number were produced. I take account of her explanation that she is illiterate and not computer literate, that Daughter B would read messages to her and that messages were not always retained. The absence of documentary evidence does not cause me to revisit the accepted fact that threats were made. It is relevant, however, when assessing whether direct threats remained current at the date of the hearing.

40. The Appellant also relied upon threats and expressions of hostility conveyed through family members in Pakistan. Daughter B said that she had received no direct contact from I following his departure from the United Kingdom but that relatives had conveyed that K and I continued to blame the Appellant and were waiting for her return. I accept that this evidence provides some support for continuing hostility. However, its weight is limited because the evidence did not clearly identify when the statements were made, their precise terms, the original speaker or the route by which they reached the witnesses. I nevertheless take it into account as part of the cumulative assessment.

K’’s Claimed Influence and Connections

41. The Appellant's evidence was that K was wealthy, associated with political figures and could influence the police. She said that she had seen local councillors visiting his home and identified particular individuals whom she believed to be politically connected. In her witness statement, she also alleged that K was associated with Rana Sanaullah and other politicians. She further relied upon information from neighbours that K associated with influential political figures and had killed two people without facing prosecution.

42. I accept that the Appellant saw local councillors and other politically connected individuals visiting K's home. That evidence provides some support for the claim that K associated with people involved in politics and local public life. However, neither the Appellant nor any other witness identified an occasion on which a councillor, politician, police officer or other public official acted on K's behalf. The allegations that K killed two people and avoided prosecution were not based upon matters witnessed by the Appellant and there was little detail concerning the alleged incidents. Whilst I do not reject those allegations solely because no official records were produced, I attach limited weight to them when assessing the extent of K's influence.

43. The Appellant also relied upon statements from Daughter A, Daughter C, her brothers and N, who is said to work for Daughter A and K. Daughter A described violence and controlling behaviour by K, threats against the Appellant and her inability to protect the Appellant whilst she remained living with him. She further stated that K claimed to possess contacts within government departments and at airports, had provided the Appellant's passport details to those contacts and had spoken to influential associates, including Malik Nawaz and Rana Sanaullah, about dealing with or killing the Appellant. Daughter C stated that K attended the family home armed with a firearm, discharged it and threatened that he would not leave the Appellant alone until she was in her grave. N stated that, whilst working in K's household, she heard threats that the Appellant would be abducted from the airport and shot. The brothers' statements addressed the threats and the extent to which they could provide support for the Appellant in Pakistan.

44. Taken together, those statements support the claim that K remained hostile towards the Appellant and made serious threats against her. Daughter A's statement supports the account of domestic violence and K's claims to possess influential contacts. N's statement provides some corroboration of airport-related threats. Daughter C's statement, if reliable, suggests conduct extending beyond verbal threats and involving serious intimidation.

45. I have considered the circumstances in which the statements were produced. The evidence concerning their preparation and translation was unclear. Original language versions and formal translation certificates were not provided, not all authors produced identification documents, and none attended to give oral evidence. Applying Tanveer Ahmed, I do not reject the documents for those reasons, but they affect the weight that can safely be attached to their precise contents.

46. I have considered Daughter C's evidence with particular care because of its seriousness. If accurate, it supports the proposition that K's hostility extended beyond verbal threats. However, the statement does not identify when the incident occurred, whether it preceded or followed I's departure from the United Kingdom, whether anyone was injured, whether it was reported to the authorities, or whether similar incidents followed. Those omissions do not cause me to reject the account, but they reduce the weight that can safely be attached to it.

47. I accept that Daughter A's evidence supports the conclusion that K represented himself as a person of influence and that members of the family believed him capable of arranging harm through others. However, the evidence did not establish the nature of K's relationship with the individuals identified, that they occupied the positions alleged, or that any of them agreed or took steps to assist him. Nor was there independent evidence that the Appellant's passport details had been provided to airport or government officials. I therefore attach some weight to the evidence as demonstrating K's claimed influence and threatening conduct, but limited weight to it as proof that he possessed the political, police or airport connections alleged.

48. I have separately considered the article concerning Rana Sanaullah. Whilst it establishes the public position of the person referred to in it, it does not establish that he was the individual referred to by the Appellant or Daughter A, that he knew K, communicated with him, or agreed to assist him. I therefore attach no material weight to the article as evidence that K had a connection to a politically influential person.

49. Drawing the evidence together, I accept that K claimed influence and that family members believed him capable of arranging harm through others. I am not satisfied, however, that the evidence establishes the political, police or airport connections alleged, demonstrates that he could prevent the authorities from acting, or establishes the claimed extent of his influence.

Daughter B's Visit to Pakistan and Daughter C's Continued Residence

50. I have considered the evidence concerning Daughter B's return to Pakistan with her child. The Appellant believed that Daughter B stayed with a friend and with Daughter C, whose homes she described as being relatively close to K. Daughter B's evidence was that she stayed in accommodation some distance away and that Daughter C visited her there. She also stated that K and I were unaware that she was in Pakistan and that she received no direct threats from either of them.

51. Daughter B was giving evidence about her own journey and accommodation and I prefer her account. I therefore find that she stayed some distance from K and I, that Daughter C visited her rather than accommodated her, and that neither K nor I knew she was in Pakistan. The visit was of limited duration and undertaken with precautions. I do not regard it as a direct test of the risk faced by the Appellant. Equally, it provides no support for the proposition that K and I possess the degree of reach, influence or surveillance alleged. It is nevertheless relevant that Daughter B, who was I's former partner and the victim of his violence, felt able to return to Pakistan, albeit briefly and with precautions.

52. I also take account of the fact that Daughter C continues to reside in Pakistan. Limited weight can be attached to that fact because she was not said to be the principal target of K's hostility. Nevertheless, the evidence did not establish any recent physical harm or recent incident involving her.

53. Taken together, the circumstances of the two daughters provide some, but limited, evidence concerning the claimed reach and continuing interest of K and I. They do not determine whether the Appellant herself would be at risk.

Overall Assessment of Risk

54. I accept that the Appellant is a member of a particular social group comprising women in Pakistan and that she genuinely fears K and I. I also accept that serious threats were made against her. Although the language varied across the evidence, the substance of the threats was reasonably consistent. They included threats that she would be killed, abducted or seriously harmed if she returned to Pakistan.

55. I further accept that those threats arose against a background of established violence towards Daughters A and B. I take account of N's evidence concerning airport-related threats and Daughter C's evidence that K attended the family home armed with a firearm and issued further threats. Those matters demonstrate that K was capable of serious intimidation and provide an objective basis for the Appellant's fear. I do not dismiss the threats as conduct which could never be acted upon.

56. However, the assessment is prospective. The Appellant was unable to identify when she last received a direct threat. The evidence did not establish any recent escalation or recent attempt by K or I to locate or harm her. Whilst I accept that hostility continued after I's departure from the United Kingdom, I have attached limited weight to much of the evidence concerning more recent indirect threats because the timing, source and circumstances of those reports were unclear.

57. I have also taken account of my findings that the evidence does not establish the claimed extent of K's political, police or airport connections. Further, whilst neither matter is determinative, I take account of Daughter B's return to Pakistan and Daughter C's continued residence there as part of the overall assessment.

58. Drawing the evidence together and applying the lower standard of proof, I accept that serious threats were made, that K engaged in serious intimidation and that hostility towards the Appellant persisted for some time. However, I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would face persecution or serious harm from K or I on return to Pakistan. She has therefore not established a well-founded fear of persecution.

Sufficiency of Protection

59. As I have found that the Appellant has not established a present real risk of persecution or serious harm, it is not strictly necessary to determine whether sufficient state protection would be available. I nevertheless address the issue in the alternative.

60. I remind myself of the principles in Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37. The question is whether Pakistan has a system of protection which the authorities are generally willing and able to operate and whether, having regard to this Appellant’s particular circumstances, the reasonable level of protection required would be available to her in practice.I also take account of AH (Sufficiency of Protection, Sunni Extremists) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 05862 and AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31 (IAC).

61. I have also considered the CPINs Pakistan: Actors of protection, version 4.0, July 2024, and Pakistan: Women fearing gender-based violence, version 6.0, October 2025. The refusal decision relied upon the November 2022 version of the gender-based violence CPIN. I have considered the more recent October 2025 version relied upon by the Appellant. The material records barriers to reporting, entrenched patriarchal norms, police insensitivity, weaknesses in investigation and enforcement, low reporting, prosecution and conviction rates, corruption and political influence within the criminal justice system. It also records that victims may face stigma, victim-blaming and pressure not to pursue complaints.

62. I accept that those matters are capable of affecting the availability of effective protection in individual cases and are potentially relevant to the Appellant as an illiterate woman with significant visual impairment and other health problems. However, the evidence does not establish a general absence of protection for women in Pakistan and the issue remains whether, having regard to the Appellant's individual circumstances, a reasonable level of protection would be available to her.

63. The Appellant also relied upon an alleged previous failure of police protection. However, for the reasons already given, the evidence did not clearly establish whether any report was made to the Pakistani authorities, who made it, what conduct was reported, or what response was received. I am therefore unable to find that there was a previous failure of protection capable of supporting her case.

64. I have further taken account of the evidence concerning K's claimed influence. I accept that K presented himself as a person of influence. However, for the reasons already given, I am not satisfied that the evidence establishes that he possesses the political, police or airport connections alleged, or that he could prevent the wider protective mechanisms of the state from operating.

65. The country evidence identifies a range of protective mechanisms available to women, including women's police stations and helpdesks, complaint mechanisms, protection and crisis centres, specialist courts and legal assistance. The evidence also refers to women-focused policing and protective mechanisms operating within Punjab, including in Faisalabad. I recognise that the effectiveness of those measures varies and that an effective response cannot be guaranteed. Their existence nevertheless demonstrates that avenues of assistance exist beyond an initial approach to an individual local police officer.

66. I accept that the Appellant's illiteracy, blindness and wider health problems would make it more difficult for her to seek and pursue protection. I also accept that any response might be delayed or imperfect. However, the relevant question is not whether protection would be guaranteed or whether a successful prosecution would result, but whether the authorities would be willing and able to provide a reasonable level of protection.

67. Taking the country evidence and the Appellant's individual circumstances together, I accept that she would face practical difficulties in seeking protection. However, I am not satisfied that she has displaced the general position identified in the country guidance authorities and the background evidence. If she were at risk from K or I, I am not satisfied that the authorities would be unwilling or unable to provide the reasonable level of protection required. The protection claim would therefore also fail on this alternative basis.

68. In light of my findings on risk and sufficiency of protection, internal relocation is not determinative of the appeal and I make no finding on that issue.

Article 3 Medical Claim

69. The Appellant relies upon her physical and mental health conditions as giving rise to a separate claim under Article 3 ECHR. I have considered the medical evidence cumulatively.

70. Following Paposhvili v Belgium (Application no. 41738/10) [2017] Imm AR 867, AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17, AM (Article 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC) and THTN v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1222, the following three-stage approach applies:

(a) Stage 1: The Appellant must adduce evidence capable of establishing a prima facie case that:

i. she is seriously ill and requires treatment which she is currently receiving;

ii. there are substantial grounds for believing that, on return, she would face a real risk of either an absence of appropriate treatment or an inability to access that treatment in practice; and

iii. without appropriate treatment, she would face a real risk of a significant reduction in life expectancy or a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering.

(b) Stage 2: If the Appellant establishes a prima facie case, the Respondent must dispel the serious doubts raised by establishing the foreseeable consequences of removal in light of:

i. the general situation in the receiving state; and

ii. the Appellant’s individual circumstances.

(c) Stage 3: If serious doubts remain, it may be necessary for the Respondent to obtain adequate assurances concerning the availability and accessibility of care, or to identify measures capable of overcoming the established barriers to access.

71. The Appellant must therefore first adduce evidence capable of establishing a prima facie case. It is not sufficient to show that she has serious medical conditions, that treatment in Pakistan would be inferior to that available in the United Kingdom, or that obtaining treatment would involve difficulty and expense. The evidence must be capable of demonstrating the particular grave consequences identified in the authorities.

72. I accept that the Appellant is seriously ill and requires continuing treatment. The evidence records poorly controlled Type 2 diabetes requiring insulin, diabetic neuropathic symptoms, significant visual impairment for which she is registered blind, chronic pain, anxiety and depression. It also refers to hypothyroidism and possible rheumatoid arthritis. She is prescribed several medications and requires continuing monitoring.

73. I also accept that those conditions materially affect the Appellant’s daily functioning and quality of life. Her blindness, illiteracy and dependence upon others would make it difficult for her to arrange appointments, understand written instructions, obtain medication and manage her treatment without assistance. I have considered the cumulative effect of her conditions rather than assessing each diagnosis separately.

74. The Appellant relies upon evidence that, before coming to the United Kingdom, she could not afford insulin and managed her diabetes with oral medication alone. She says that inadequate management of her diabetes contributed to the deterioration in her eyesight. She also relies upon the complexity of her current medication, including insulin which requires appropriate storage, and her need for continuing monitoring.

75. I accept that interruption of insulin or other essential treatment could have serious consequences. The difficulty is that there is no medical evidence identifying the likely consequences if the Appellant's present treatment were interrupted, altered or unavailable in practice. The available medical evidence does not identify the nature, severity or timescale of any deterioration, or whether alternative treatment could safely be provided.

76. The Clifton Surgery letter dated 22 July 2026 confirms the Appellant’s diagnoses, medication and functional difficulties. It does not provide a reasoned prognosis addressing the likely consequences of removal to Pakistan. In particular, it does not address whether interruption or alteration of treatment would expose the Appellant to a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy, as required by the authorities.

77. The primary care records refer to anxiety, depression, poor sleep and impaired concentration. A clinical entry dated 22 January 2025 records that her worsening depression was associated with the refusal of her claim and the continuing appeal. I take that evidence into account. There is, however, no psychiatric report addressing the severity or prognosis of her mental illness, the likely effect of removal or any present risk of suicide or serious self-harm.

78. I am therefore not satisfied that the Appellant has discharged the first-stage evidential burden. The evidence establishes serious and continuing medical needs, but it does not establish substantial grounds for believing that, in the event of removal, she would face a real risk of a significant reduction in life expectancy or a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her state of health resulting in intense suffering. As the Appellant has not established a prima facie case at stage 1, the Respondent is not required to dispel serious doubts at stage 2 or provide assurances or other measures at stage 3. The Article 3 medical claim therefore fails.

Article 8 ECHR: Family and Private Life

Family Life

79. The Appellant relies upon her relationship with Mr A, a British citizen. She says that they underwent an Islamic marriage ceremony on 30 June 2024 and relies upon the certificate contained in the bundle. I accept that the ceremony took place. I also accept as reasonable the explanation that the parties were unable to register the marriage civilly because the Appellant’s passport was held by the Home Office. I draw no adverse inference from the absence of civil registration. The certificate and the occurrence of the ceremony provide evidence in support of the asserted relationship, but they are not determinative of whether family life exists for the purposes of Article 8. The remaining question is whether the evidence as a whole establishes that the relationship gives rise to family life for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.

80. The relationship was not disclosed during the Appellant’s asylum interview. When asked whether she was in a relationship in the United Kingdom, she answered “No”. Her evidence was that she misunderstood the question and believed that the interview concerned only her protection claim. I take account of her illiteracy, vulnerability and lack of familiarity with legal processes. I do not treat that answer as determinative, but it remains relevant because the religious ceremony was said to have taken place before the interview.

81. There was some lack of clarity concerning the circumstances in which the relationship began. The Appellant stated that she met Mr A through Facebook and thereafter communicated with him by telephone and voice messages because she could not read or write. Daughter B's evidence was that a telephone number was exchanged through Facebook following which contact progressed by telephone. Mr A stated that he received a social-media message indicating that a woman wished to marry and providing a telephone number, after which the parties began speaking. Whilst the precise sequence of events was not entirely clear, the accounts were not necessarily inconsistent and I do not attach significant weight to this issue in isolation. I nevertheless take it into account as part of the overall assessment of the relationship evidence.

82. There was also a difference concerning when Mr A became aware of the Appellant’s unresolved immigration position. The Appellant thought that she had told him before the ceremony, although she could not remember with certainty. Mr A said that he learned of it only afterwards.

83. The witnesses gave materially different accounts of the frequency of contact. The Appellant said that Mr A travelled from Glasgow to Cardiff approximately twice each week. Daughter B said that he visited about two or three times each month. Mr A said that he visited every two or three weeks, sometimes after ten days. I take account of the distance between Glasgow and Cardiff, but the difference between two visits each week and one visit every two or three weeks is substantial.

84. Mr A initially said that the Appellant had visited him in Glasgow twice but then said that she might have visited only once. He said that she travelled by air with assistance from somebody known to the family. No booking confirmation or travel record was produced, although he said that records were available.

85. Nor were messages, call records, photographs, financial records or other evidence of regular contact produced. There is no requirement for a relationship to be corroborated by any particular form of documentary evidence. Its absence is nevertheless relevant where the parties live a considerable distance apart, their oral accounts differed materially and readily available evidence might have clarified the nature and frequency of their contact.

86. The ASA asserted that the parties had cohabited at various addresses in Cardiff and Glasgow. That was not the account given in oral evidence. The evidence at the hearing was that Mr A lived in Glasgow and the Appellant lived in Cardiff and that they maintained their relationship through visits and remote communication. I am therefore not satisfied that the parties established a shared household.

87. Taking the evidence in the round, I accept that the Appellant and Mr A underwent a Nikah ceremony, have maintained contact and have met on a number of occasions. However, the relationship was not disclosed during the asylum interview notwithstanding that the ceremony had already taken place. I also identified differences in the evidence concerning the frequency of contact and visits between the parties and whether and when Mr A became aware of the Appellant's immigration position. Further, whilst it is not a requirement of Article 8, I was not satisfied that the evidence established cohabitation or a shared household. Nor was readily available documentary evidence produced which might have clarified the nature and extent of the relationship, notwithstanding Mr A's evidence that messages and travel records existed. Considering the evidence cumulatively, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant has established that the relationship gives rise to family life for the purposes of Article 8.

88. In the alternative, if I am wrong and the relationship with Mr A does constitute family life for the purposes of Article 8, I am satisfied that its weight in the proportionality assessment would be limited. The parties have never established a shared household, do not live together, and the evidence concerning the nature and frequency of contact was inconsistent. The relationship has largely been maintained through visits and remote communication whilst the parties have lived separately. Whilst removal would interfere with that relationship, the evidence does not establish obstacles preventing the parties from maintaining contact in the manner they have done previously. Taking those matters into account, together with the public interest considerations set out below, the outcome of the appeal under Article 8 would remain the same.

89. Although the Appellant relied upon her practical dependence on Daughter B, no separately reasoned case was advanced that their relationship, as that between an adult parent and adult child, constituted family life for the purposes of Article 8. I have therefore considered the assistance and support provided by Daughter B as part of the Appellant’s private life and the proportionality assessment.

Private Life and Proportionality

90. I accept that the Appellant has established private life in the United Kingdom. Removal would interfere with that private life and the consequences would be of sufficient gravity to engage Article 8 ECHR. I therefore proceed to consider proportionality in accordance with Razgar v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27.

91. I have considered the public-interest considerations in sections 117A and 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. No substantive case was advanced concerning the matters identified in sections 117B(2) and (3), and I attach no material weight to them in either direction.

92. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom as a visitor and her private life was established when her immigration status was precarious. By operation of section 117B(5), little weight attaches to private life established whilst her immigration status was precarious. That does not mean that no weight can be attached to it, and I have considered the Appellant's individual circumstances in the round.

93. The Appellant is 56 years old and has lived the majority of her life in Pakistan. She speaks the language and is familiar with its customs and traditions.

94. I attach weight to the Appellant’s blindness, illiteracy and physical and mental health conditions. Removal would disrupt her established support arrangements and require alternative arrangements to be made. Although she previously undertook sewing and domestic work in Pakistan, having regard to her current visual impairment and medical conditions, I place no material weight on that previous employment when assessing her present ability to support herself.

95. The Appellant has family members remaining in Pakistan, including Son A, Daughter A and Daughter C. The evidence concerning their present circumstances and ability to assist was unclear. In particular, I did not find the Appellant’s evidence concerning Son A, her previous residence and the ownership and alleged sale of the property to be reliable. Whilst the evidence does not establish that any of those family members is willing and able to provide the level of support currently available in the United Kingdom, neither does it establish that such support would be unavailable.

96. I am therefore unable to find that the Appellant would return to Pakistan wholly without family contact, accommodation or assistance. The evidence on those matters was incomplete and uncertain.

97. I have also considered the country evidence concerning healthcare provision in Pakistan, including the CPIN Pakistan: Medical and healthcare provisions, July 2024. Whilst the evidence identifies significant shortcomings, including underfunding, uneven provision, shortages and financial barriers to treatment, it also records the availability of treatment for diabetes and mental-health conditions, together with ophthalmology services and treatment for eye conditions in Pakistan. The evidence refers to the availability of insulin, diabetic monitoring, psychiatric treatment, psychiatric medication and ophthalmological care, albeit with varying levels of accessibility and quality.

98. I also take account of the Appellant’s evidence that obtaining and maintaining treatment may be difficult in practice, particularly given her blindness, illiteracy and dependence upon assistance from others. I accept that those matters are capable of creating real practical obstacles. However, the evidence before me does not establish that the treatment required by the Appellant would be unavailable in Pakistan or that she would be unable to access treatment altogether. The country material indicates that treatment for the conditions from which she suffers is available, albeit potentially at greater cost and inconvenience than in the United Kingdom.

99. I accept that Daughter B provides important practical assistance to the Appellant, particularly given her visual impairment and illiteracy. The evidence demonstrates assistance with appointments, communication, and correspondence. I have taken that support into account. However, the evidence did not clearly establish the precise extent of that assistance or that the Appellant is wholly dependent upon Daughter B for every aspect of daily living.

100. The Appellant’s medical conditions add weight to her Article 8 claim because they increase both her need for support and the hardship associated with removal. However, the evidence does not establish that appropriate treatment would be unavailable or inaccessible to her in Pakistan.

101. I have considered cumulatively the Appellant’s age, blindness, illiteracy, physical and mental health, dependence upon assistance from others, disruption to her existing support arrangements and the practical difficulties she would face on return.

102. Whilst I accept that removal would result in hardship, disruption and a reduction in the level of support presently available to the Appellant, the country evidence does not establish that she would be unable to obtain medical treatment in Pakistan, nor does the evidence establish that she would be wholly without practical or emotional support.

103. Weighing all of the circumstances in the round, I am satisfied that the interference with the Appellant’s private life would be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The appeal therefore fails under Article 8 ECHR.

Determination of the Issues

104. For the reasons given above, the Appellant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution.

105. The humanitarian protection claim relies upon the same asserted risk from K and I. For the reasons already given, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has shown substantial grounds for believing that she would face a real risk of serious harm on return. She therefore does not qualify for humanitarian protection.

106. Her removal would not breach Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR.

Notice of Decision

107. The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds, on humanitarian protection grounds and on human rights grounds.

ANONYMITY ORDER

108. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant and any member of her family is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

To the Respondent – Fee Award

109. I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signature

Signed Date 26 October 2026

L Salkeld

First-tier Tribunal Judge L Salkeld

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our immigration lawyer in Paris.


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