Tax United Kingdom
Matthew James v The Commissioners for HMRC
Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01491 (TC)
Case Number: TC 10072
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
By remote video hearing
Appeal reference: TC/2026/00127
PROCEDURE – late appeal – Martland – Personal Liability Notice – Penalty – VAT
Heard on: 15 October 2026
Judgment date: 27 October 2026
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE MATHEU SMITH
Between
MATTHEW JAMES
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr James represented himself.
For the Respondents: Mr Omar Rashid, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office
DECISION
Introduction
1. Mr James applies for permission to bring a late appeal against a decision set out in HMRC’s review conclusion letter dated 24 July 2025 (the “Review Conclusion Letter”) upholding but amending a Personal Liability Notice (the “PLN”) issued to Mr James under paragraph 19(1) of Schedule 24 of the Finance Act 2007 (“Sch 24 FA 2007”).
2. I have considered a 552-page hearing bundle prepared by HMRC which included:
(1) Mr James’s Notice of Appeal, application for permission to pursue a late appeal, skeleton argument, witness statement and related exhibits.
(2) HMRC’s Notice of Objection; and
(3) The legislation and authorities referred to by the parties.
3. I heard from Mr James who gave a mixture of testimony and submissions when presenting his case. HMRC had the opportunity to ask him questions. Despite the challenge of speaking about difficult personal issues, Mr James presented his case well. I found him to be forthcoming and truthful in his account of the relevant events. He clearly explained the events that led to the appeal to the Tribunal being notified late.
Law
4. Mr James has a right of appeal to this Tribunal arising from paragraphs 15, 16 and 19(5) of Sch 24 FA 2007 (as amended).
5. Under sections 83G(3)(b) and 83G(7) of the Value Added Taxes Act 1994 (as amended), in a case where HMRC is required to undertake a review, as it was in this case, any appeal is to be made within the period of 30 days beginning with the date of the document notifying the conclusions of that review. Under section 83G(6) an appeal may be made after the end of that 30-day period, but only if the Tribunal gives permission to do so.
6. In considering whether to grant permission to pursue a late appeal, in Martland v HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) ("Martland") the Upper Tribunal held:
"44. When the FTT is considering applications for permission to appeal out of time, therefore, it must be remembered that the starting point is that permission should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be. In considering that question, we consider the FTT can usefully follow the three-stage process set out in Denton:
(1) Establish the length of the delay. If it was very short (which would, in the absence of unusual circumstances, equate to the breach being 'neither serious nor significant'), then the FTT 'is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages' – though this should not be taken to mean that applications can be granted for very short delays without even moving on to a consideration of those stages.
(2) The reason (or reasons) why the default occurred should be established.
(3) The FTT can then move onto its evaluation of 'all the circumstances of the case'. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.
45. That balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected…The FTT's role is to exercise judicial discretion taking account of all relevant factors, not to follow a checklist.
46. In doing so, the FTT can have regard to any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant's case; this goes to the question of prejudice – there is obviously much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. It is important however that this should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal. In R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1633; [2015] 1 WLR 2472 ('Hysaj') Moore-Bick LJ said this at [46]:
'If applications for extensions of time are allowed to develop into disputes about the merits of the substantive appeal, they will occupy a great deal of time and lead to the parties' incurring substantial costs. In most cases the merits of the appeal will have little to do with whether it is appropriate to grant an extension of time. Only in those cases where the court can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak will the merits have a significant part to play when it comes to balancing the various factors that have to be considered at stage three of the process. In most cases the court should decline to embark on an investigation of the merits and firmly discourage argument directed to them.
Hysaj was in fact three cases, all concerned with compliance with time limits laid down by rules of the court in the context of existing proceedings. It was therefore different in an important respect from the present appeal, which concerns an application for permission to notify an appeal out of time – permission which, if granted, founds the very jurisdiction of the FTT to consider the appeal (see [18] above). It is clear that if an applicant's appeal is hopeless in any event, then it would not be in the interests of justice for permission to be granted so that the FTT's time is then wasted on an appeal which is doomed to fail. However, that is rarely the case. More often, the appeal will have some merit. Where that is the case, it is important that the FTT at least considers in outline the arguments which the applicant wishes to put forward and the respondents' reply to them. This is not so that it can carry out a detailed evaluation of the case, but so that it can form a general impression of its strength or weakness to weigh in the balance. To that limited extent, an applicant should be afforded the opportunity to persuade the FTT that the merits of the appeal are on the face of it overwhelmingly in his/her favour and the respondents the corresponding opportunity to point out the weakness of the applicant's case. In considering this point, the FTT should be very wary of taking into account evidence which is in dispute and should not do so unless there are exceptional circumstances.
47. Shortage of funds (and consequent inability to instruct a professional adviser) should not, of itself, generally carry any weight in the FTT's consideration of the reasonableness of the applicant's explanation of the delay: see the comments of Moore-Bick LJ in Hysaj referred to at [15(2)] above. Nor should the fact that the applicant is self-represented – Moore-Bick LJ went on to say (at [44]) that 'being a litigant in person with no previous experience of legal proceedings is not a good reason for failing to comply with the rules'; HMRC's appealable decisions generally include a statement of the relevant appeal rights in reasonably plain English and it is not a complicated process to notify an appeal to the FTT, even for a litigant in person."
7. This was confirmed to be the correct test in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 14; [2026] STC 253.
8. Paragraph 19(1) of Sch 24 FA 2007 states:
“Where a penalty under paragraph 1 is payable by a company for a deliberate inaccuracy which was attributable to an officer of the company—
(a) the officer as well as the company shall be liable to pay the penalty, and
(b) HMRC may pursue the officer for such portion of the penalty (which may be 100%) as they may specify by written notice to the officer.”
Findings
9. I make my findings by applying the three-stage test in Martland.
Stage 1 – The length of the delay and whether it is serious and significant
10. The parties agreed that this appeal was notified to the Tribunal 139 days late.
11. HMRC rely on the decision in Romasave (Property Services) Ltd v HMRC [2015] UKUT 254 (TCC); [2016] STC 1 at [96], where it was held “In the context of an appeal right which must be exercised within 30 days from the date of the document notifying the decision, a delay of more than three months cannot be described as anything but serious and significant.”
12. Mr James did not seek to argue that the delay of 139 days was not serious and significant. Plainly it is in the context of the 30 day deadline which was missed in this case.
Stage 2 – Reasons for the late notification of the appeal
13. Through his written witness statement, his skeleton argument, and what he said during the hearing, Mr James gave a detailed account of the circumstances which led to the PLN being issued and the steps he took to contest it, up to notifying this appeal to the Tribunal. Much of his representations and evidence concerned the merits of the appeal and is considered below at stage 3 of the Marland test.
14. For stage 2 of the Martland test it is necessary to determine the reasons why the appeal was not notified to the Tribunal until 09 January 2026, 139 days late.
15. The Review Conclusion Letter is dated 24 July 2025 and under the heading “What happens next” it contained detailed explanations in plain English of how Mr James could appeal to the Tribunal if he disagreed with the decision and of the 30-day time limit for doing so.
16. I have no doubt that Mr James understood what he needed to do to appeal that decision to the Tribunal. In an email to the Reviewing Officer sent on 14 August 2025 by Rebecca Warren on behalf of herself and Mr James in reply to the Review Conclusion Letter she states:
“I tried to call you this morning to discuss the review conclusion on Arthur Skips. I don’t think we have the education or energy to continue the fight so wanted to discuss what payment options might be available to us?
Please let me know what the next steps are, we are not in a position that we could clear this by 5th September or by year end in reality it’s going to take some time”.
17. That email is shown in a chain as a direct reply to the email from the Reviewing Officer’s email sending the Review Conclusion Letter to Mr James, and it appears a copy of the Review Conclusion Letter was attached to Ms Warren’s email
18. The obvious inferences from the email of 14 August 2025 are that Mr James had received the Review Conclusion Letter and he understood that the decision it contained could be appealed, but he decided not to pursue an appeal. Mr James was asked about this, and he put the matter beyond doubt, acknowledging that he understood the decision in the Review Conclusion Letter could be appealed, but he chose not to do so. He explained how he felt mentally and physically unable to fight on with disputing liability having battled successfully to convince HMRC to reduce the amount of the PLN from the original figure of £89,340 to the figure of £11,137 shown in the Review Conclusion Letter whilst fulfilling a demanding full-time job and coping with the breakdown of his marriage. Instead, he chose to seek to agree a time to pay arrangement with HMRC.
19. I was shown a number of email exchanges with HMRC which followed the email of 14 August 2025 as Mr James sought to persuade HMRC to agree a time to pay arrangement.
20. On 15 December 2025 the efforts to agree a time to pay arrangement came to an end with an email from a member of HMRC’s Targeted Enforcement Recovery Unit to Mr James which said:
“Dear Matthew,
Thank you for your response.
Unfortunately, I am unable to accept your current payment proposal.
HMRC is not a financial lending institution, and we have a duty to be fair to those customers who pay their tax on time, often under challenging circumstances. The debt for which you are being pursued arose due to your actions as a director, which resulted in a Personal Liability Notice being issued against you.
I have made every effort to provide an opportunity to resolve this matter without resorting to enforcement. However, despite these efforts, we have not been able to reach an acceptable payment agreement.
Given the payment position outlined in your email below, I will now proceed with recovery action for the outstanding amount.”
21. Mr James replied on 09 January 2026 in these terms:
“I write to confirm that I have today lodged an appeal with the First-tier Tax Tribunal against the review conclusion dated 24 July 2025 in respect of the Personal Liability Notice.
I intend to apply for Alternative Dispute Resolution and remain willing to engage constructively to resolve matters.
As the matter is now before the Tribunal, I respectfully request that enforcement action is paused pending the outcome of the appeal and ADR process.”
22. Mr James explained that over the Christmas and New Year period he had thought about the 15 December 2025 rejection of his efforts to agree a time to pay arrangement. He realised that he could not afford to pay at a faster rate than HMRC had rejected and feared that he faced bankruptcy and the loss of his home. He came to the view that he needed to reverse the decision he had made back in August 2025 not to dispute the decision set out in the Review Conclusion Letter to avoid that fate.
23. I asked Mr James whether he would have notified this appeal to the Tribunal on 09 January 2026 if he had been able to agree a time to pay arrangement with HMRC and he said he would not have sought to appeal. This accords with the content of the email exchanges before 15 December 2025 which are concerned with seeking time to pay, and do not challenge liability for the sum due as per the Review Conclusion Letter.
24. Taking account of the documents I was shown, and what I was told by Mr James, I find that the reasons for the late notification of this appeal are:
(1) In August 2025 Mr James could have notified an in-time appeal to the Tribunal of the decision set out in the Review Conclusion Letter which he had received. He decided not to appeal as he was mentally and physically exhausted and just wanted instead to make arrangements to pay the reduced amount of the PLN;
(2) On 14 August 2025 an email was sent to HMRC informing it of Mr James’s decision not to appeal and that began the process of seeking to agree a time to pay arrangement with HMRC;
(3) Over the Christmas and New Year period from late December 2025 into early January 2026 Mr James came to the view that he could not agree with HMRC a time to pay arrangement which he felt able to afford, and he feared bankruptcy and the loss of his home. This led him to change his mind and decide that he would notify an appeal to the Tribunal, which he did on 09 January 2026.
Stage 3 – Evaluate all the circumstances
25. The evaluation of all the circumstances of the case requires a balancing exercise. In carrying out that exercise I shall consider the apparent merits of the appeal, so far as they can be assessed at this stage, and the prejudice to both parties if permission is granted or refused, the reasons for the delay, and the particular importance of litigation being conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and of statutory time limits being respected.
The merits of the appeal/prejudice to the parties
26. The PLN Mr James is seeking to appeal arises from a VAT assessment HMRC made in respect of a company called Arthur Skip Limited (the “Company”) of which Mr James was the sole director. HMRC first issued a notice of assessment dated 17 May 2024 in the sum of £137,979 in relation to the VAT periods ended 10/22, 01/23, 04/23, 07/23. HMRC then issued a penalty assessment to the Company dated 30 August 2024 in the sum of £91,620.49. HMRC considered that the behaviour which led to the inaccuracies in the Company’s VAT returns were deliberate which, in turn, led it to decide to issue the original PLN to Mr James on 06 September 2024 in the sum of £89,340.
27. Mr James’s efforts to contest those decisions led to an amended VAT assessment to be made on 27 June 2025, reducing the value of the input tax denied to £50,354. An amended penalty assessment was issued to the Company, reducing the penalty to £25,454.00. In turn an amended PLN was issued on 10 July 2025 reducing Mr James’s liability to £23,791. Mr James asked for that to be reviewed, and this led to the Review Conclusion Letter he is seeking to appeal, which upheld the PLN but further reduced it to £11,137.
28. The Review Conclusion Letter records:
“When considering the amount of the PLN you have been charged I have looked at the reasons given for the deliberate behaviour, these were:
1. You knew you had made a false claim for input tax.
2. You under-declared output tax and must have known the returns were inaccurate.
Since the initial PLN was issued, you have provided a substantial amount of input tax evidence. I therefore believe that this shows you did not deliberately make an inaccurate claim for input tax. These amounts have been cancelled from the PLN.
You have not provided any explanations regarding the under-declarations that were made on the VAT returns. I have looked at the under-declarations made and have concluded that it would not have been obvious for you to have been aware that you had under-declared on all the periods, I have cancelled these periods from the PLN. However, the first period had been considerably under-declared, and I believe it is more than likely that you would have known this return was inaccurate. I therefore agree that your behaviour for this period was “deliberate”.
The PLN will be amended further.”
29. Plainly Mr James’s efforts to challenge the various assessments, penalties and the PLN prior to making this appeal have been very successful. The original PLN has been reduced by 87.5% to the level Mr James is now seeking to appeal.
30. The PLN that remains arises solely from a penalty imposed on the company in relation to the under declaration of VAT for the period ended 10/22. The Reviewing Officer concluded that the inaccuracies in relation to other VAT periods were not the result of deliberate inaccuracies and so a PLN could not be issued to Mr James in respect of those, however the inaccuracies in relation to the VAT return for the period ended 10/22 were deliberate inaccuracies which are attributable to Mr James.
31. It is HMRC’s position that the penalty was issued to the Company because it inaccurately reported sales totalling £134,600 in its VAT return for the period ended 10/22 and that was £141,423.04 less than the actual value of the sales in that period which are apparent from the Company’s bank statements. It is HMRC’s position that as the sole director of the Company it must have been obvious to Mr James that the VAT return massively underdeclared the sales and related output VAT, accordingly, the inaccuracies in the VAT return were deliberate and attributable to Mr James.
32. For his part, Mr James says the inaccuracies arose because of a number of factors outside his control including, errors by the accountants which prepared the VAT return, his reliance on others to run the Company day to day, the breakdown of his marriage, that he was employed in a demanding full-time job by another business and so was unable to devote more time to his role as the director of the Company, a cyber incident which disrupted the business of the Company and the eventual insolvency of the Company.
33. The evidence before me, much of which is disputed, and submissions made, do not allow me to conclude that the appeal is obviously very strong or very weak. However, I consider that the appeal has reasonable prospects of success. I am fortified in that conclusion by the success Mr James achieved when challenging the original PLN and convincing HMRC to concede that the extent of the inaccuracies in the various VAT returns was less than originally assessed, and that many were not deliberate inaccuracies as HMRC had originally thought.
34. Furthermore, I accept that the sum in dispute is significant for Mr James, and he may suffer serious consequences if he is required to pay it but is unable to do so. That said, refusing Mr James permission to pursue a late appeal would not preventing from making further efforts to agree a time to pay arrangement with HMRC.
35. Considering those factors, I find that Mr James will suffer material prejudice if he is refused permission to appeal.
36. Plainly, HMRC will suffer prejudice if I allow Mr James to pursue the late appeal as it will have to use resources to oppose an appeal of a matter which it could consider to be closed. However, the original assessments, penalties and PLN were issued in May, August and September 2024 respectively and were in disputed, eventually leading to the amount of them being materially reduced. In those circumstances it would have been unsurprising if Mr James had made an in-time appeal of the Review Conclusion Letter. As such, I do not consider the prejudice to HMRC arising from the 139-day delay in notifying this appeal to the Tribunal should be given much weight.
37. For these reasons my conclusion in respect of the merits of the appeal and the prejudice to the parties of granting or refusing permission is that these are factors which carry some weight in favour of granting permission and I must weight them in the balance together with all the other relevant factors.
The reasons for the delay
38. In light of what I have found to be the reasons for the delay in notifying the appeal it is apparent that Mr James understood he could appeal the decision set out in the Review Conclusion Letter, but he chose not to do so. Later he changed his mind and sought to appeal when he realised that he could not reach a time to pay agreement with HMRC on terms which he felt able to meet.
39. This is not a situation where Mr James was prevented from appealing in-time by some factor outside his control or such like. Insofar as Mr James chose not to appeal in-time because was physically and mentally exhausted, the reasons for that included his efforts to battle HMRC up to the issue of the Review Conclusion Letter, the great demands of his full-time job, the breakdown of his marriage and the stress of the failure of the Company. Whilst I accept these factors influenced his decision, as Mr James acknowledged, it was still his choice not to notify an in-time appeal to the Tribunal.
40. Having considered all the reasons why this appeal was notified 139 days late, I have concluded that those reasons weigh against granting permission to pursue a late appeal.
The need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected
41. Martland requires that when undertaking this balancing exercise I should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.
42. Before Mr James decided not to appeal the decision set out in the Review Conclusion Letter, there is no real reason to criticise his conduct of the dispute regarding the assessments, penalties and the PLN which led to them being materially reduced. However, the particular importance of respecting statutory time limits leads me to take a critical view of Mr James’s decision to choose not to pursue an in-time appeal only to change his mind around 4 months later and seek permission to notify a late appeal. Accordingly, this factor weighs against granting permission to appeal.
Stage 3 – Conclusion
43. Weighing all those matters together I conclude that the balance comes down against granting Mr James permission to pursue his late appeal.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
44. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Release date:
27 October 2026
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