Administrative United Kingdom
MO v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/74761/2024 (1)
PA/74763/2024 (2)
PA/74873/2024 (3)
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at The Priory Courts, Birmingham
On 23 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LE GRYS
Between
MO (1)
KO (2)
DO (3)
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs P. Kaur, instructed by Burton & Burton Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs M. Morgan, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
DECISION
1. The appeals are allowed.
REASONS
2. The Appellants, each a citizen of Nigeria, appeal under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decisions dated 18 October 2024 to refuse their protection claims made on 15 February 2024. As such, sections 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply.
ANONYMITY DIRECTION
3. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because this is a protection appeal and the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (“UK”) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice in the particular circumstances of the case.
BACKGROUND
4. The Appellants were obliged to file separate appeals against the refusal of their applications. Their cases are closely related in fact and law and the appeals were therefore heard together. This decision addresses all three appeals in accordance with Rule 4(3)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014.
5. The Second and Third Appellants are the First Appellant’s children. Their claims are advanced on the same factual basis as hers and they do not rely upon any different risk on return. As such, any further references in this decision to the “Appellant” will be to the First Appellant.
6. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS, and includes a stitched bundle on the First Appellant’s digital file (the “SB”) of 401 pages. Any references in this decision to page numbers will be to the PDF page.
7. The Respondent’s decision summarises the Appellant’s immigration history and asylum claim. In short, the Appellant claims to have been a victim of domestic abuse at the hands of her ex-husband in Nigeria and the UK. She states that, as a result of this, she is at risk from both her ex-husband’s family, and her own family, who she says have disowned her for having made a complaint about his behaviour. In the alternative, she states that she is a bisexual woman, and to be at risk on return as a result.
8. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant was a victim of domestic abuse at the hands of her ex-husband, but stated that she could seek the protection of the authorities in Nigeria. The Respondent rejected, largely on credibility grounds, the Appellant’s claim to be a bisexual woman.
HEARING
Preliminary issues
9. Mrs Kaur requested that the Appellant be treated as a vulnerable witness as an accepted victim of domestic abuse, who has a documented history of mental health difficulties. The single proposed adjustment was for breaks to be taken during the hearing if needed. Mrs Morgan objected to a finding of vulnerability, noting that the medical evidence provided related to 2024/2025, but did not object to the proposed adjustment.
10. Having carefully considered the parties’ representations, and applying the Joint Presidential Guidance, I found that the Appellant should be treated as a vulnerable witness. While I acknowledged that the medical evidence is now of some age, it demonstrates that the Appellant has previously been admitted to hospital under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Given this, along with the history of domestic abuse, I was satisfied that the information provided was sufficient for the relatively limited purpose of a finding of vulnerability. I reminded the parties in this respect, however, that the impact of that vulnerability, if any, on my assessment of the evidence would remain a matter for me. I was satisfied that the vulnerable witness direction was observed throughout the hearing and neither party made any contrary submissions.
11. I admitted the three supplementary bundles of evidence provided by the Appellant. While these had been served after the creation of the stitched bundle, they were nevertheless provided in good time before the hearing, and the Respondent had accordingly had a fair opportunity to consider them.
12. The Appellant’s claim to be at risk as a bisexual woman was a new matter. The Respondent granted consent for this to be considered, however, in her review of 16 February 2026. I was accordingly satisfied that I had the jurisdiction to consider this.
13. The Appellant also clarified at the outset that she wished the Tribunal to consider her claimed family life with her new partner. Mrs Morgan confirmed that consent was given for this to also be considered in the current hearing.
Issues in dispute
14. At the outset, I clarified the issues with the representatives. The following was agreed:
(a) The Appellant is a national of Nigeria.
(b) The claim in respect of past domestic abuse is advanced for the Convention reason of membership of a Particular Social Group (“PSG”), namely as a female victim of gender-based violence. The claim that the Appellant would be at risk on return as a bisexual woman is advanced for the Convention reason of membership of a PSG, namely bisexual women in Nigeria. The Appellant confirmed that the references in the Appeal Skeleton Argument to her being a lesbian woman, rather than a bisexual woman, were in error.
(c) The treatment the Appellant claims to fear, taken at its highest, would amount to persecution.
(d) The Appellant was a victim of domestic abuse at the hands of her husband, in both Nigeria and the UK. His arrest in the UK caused his family to issue death threats towards the Appellant.
(e) The Appellant does not advance her claim under Article 3 on a medical basis.
15. The following issues are in dispute:
(a) Whether the Appellant is credible in her claim to be a bisexual woman.
(b) Whether there would be sufficiency of protection on return, in relation to both the claimed risk from the ex-husband, and the claimed risk on account of the Appellant’s sexual orientation. Mrs Morgan stated that the Respondent does not concede, if the Appellant is found to be credible in her claim to be bisexual, that this would be sufficient to establish a risk on return.
(c) In respect of any risk arising from the ex-husband, whether the Appellant could internally relocate. The Respondent states that the Appellant could relocate to Abuja or Lagos.
(d) Outside the immigration rules, whether the refusal would amount to a disproportionate interference with any Article 8 rights found to be engaged, taking into account the best interests of the children.
Evidence
16. I heard evidence from the Appellant, who adopted her witness statement as her evidence‑in‑chief and was cross‑examined. I heard closing submissions from both parties. I reserved my decision.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
17. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to section 32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Does the Appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?
(b) Does the Appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
18. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and
(b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the Appellant.
19. I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the Appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the Appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.
20. A person may be granted humanitarian protection where they do not qualify as a refugee but substantial grounds exist for believing that, if returned to their country of origin, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm; that they are unable, or owing to that risk unwilling, to avail themselves of the protection of that country; that they cannot reasonably relocate internally; and that they are not excluded from humanitarian protection.
21. In respect of Article 3, the burden of proof is on the Appellant to show a breach to the lower standard of proof, that is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ or ‘real risk.’ Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3; in accordance with Bouyid v Belgium (Application no. 23380/09) and AA (Morocco) [2025] EWCA Civ 144, this will depend on all the circumstances of the case. If the Appellant establishes substantial grounds for believing that expulsion would violate Article 3, then the burden shifts to the Respondent to dispel any serious doubts.
22. In MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 it was restated that there is no requirement for an Appellant to adduce corroborative evidence. However, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value. Supporting documentary evidence is not required where the requirements of paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules are met. Where those requirements are not met, a judge may take into account the absence of supporting documentary evidence which might reasonably be expected.
23. As per Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439, documentary evidence should be appraised in the light of the evidence about its nature, provenance, timing and background evidence and all the other evidence in the case.
24. In respect of Article 8, the Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the relevant requirements are met. In accordance with TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1109, satisfaction of the relevant Rule is ordinarily determinative of proportionality, because the Secretary of State has already struck the balance between individual rights and the public interest when formulating the Rules.
25. If the Appellant does not meet the Rules, the public interest normally lies in refusing leave. The exception is where refusal would produce consequences of such gravity for the Appellant or a family member as to render the decision disproportionate. In assessing proportionality I have regard to section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and balance the public interest against the matters relied upon by the Appellant.
26. Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 requires decision makers to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom. The statutory guidance states that in accordance with the UN Convention on the Rights of a Child the best interests of the child will be a primary consideration (although not necessarily the only consideration) when making decisions affecting children.
FINDINGS
27. I have taken account of everything I have heard and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round. I shall refer to the evidence and submissions so far as necessary to explain my findings and reasons.
Appeal on asylum grounds
28. I begin by considering the Appellant’s claim to be at risk on return as a bisexual woman on the basis that, if such risk is established, this may be sufficient in itself to determine the appeal in the Appellant’s favour. Conversely, if it is not established, then my findings of fact on the subject will need to be considered when looking at the issues of state protection in Nigeria, and the reasonableness of internal relocation.
29. I remind myself that the Respondent has accepted the Appellant’s credibility in respect of the history of domestic abuse. Indeed, the refusal letter unambiguously stated that all such matters were accepted (SB179 – "material facts I do not accept: None"). While the Respondent’s review appears to seek to resile somewhat from that position by challenging the details on the Appellant’s visa application (SB399), something which was likewise pursued in cross-examination and submissions, there was no application to withdraw the earlier concession.
30. That visa application was made on 29 December 2022 and accordingly pre-dated the refusal decision by nearly two years. As such, there is no reason to believe that it was not before the decision-maker, or at least available to them, at the time of that refusal; indeed, the letter records a visa application as having been considered (SB179). In this respect no explanation was provided as to why it was not previously thought to undermine credibility, but is now said to do so. Furthermore, if the Appellant is otherwise credible in her account of the nature of the relationship with her ex-husband, there is no reasonable basis on which to reject her explanation that he largely completed that application without her input. I accordingly find the submission that this visa application is undermining to be somewhat misconceived, in circumstances where the Appellant’s credibility was already accepted.
31. Similarly, I do not accept the submission that the Appellant's credibility is positively undermined by the lack of evidence showing the provenance of the claimed police report (SB109). The Appellant does not claim to have sought to obtain this document but instead states that it was unsolicited and sent to her anonymously. If correct, her account of having no further details as to its origin would not be inherently implausible. Likewise, noting that the document essentially accuses the Appellant of criminal conduct relating to the ex-husband’s inability to contact his children, and reminding myself that her account of having previously received adverse attention from her ex-husband's family has already been accepted, it is similarly plausible that she might have been the subject of such a complaint. The absence of evidence as to provenance may accordingly affect the weight that can properly be attached to the document, but I do not consider it to actively undermine the Appellant's credibility.
32. I accordingly find that the Appellant has provided a truthful account of her history of domestic abuse, which resulted in threats being made by members of her ex-husband’s family.
33. I do not treat such findings as determinative of the separate question of whether she is also credible in respect of an entirely different issue. Nor does it remove the obligation on the Appellant to demonstrate the reliability of any documentary evidence on which she relies. Nevertheless, it is reasonable, when considering the matters said to be undermining of her claim to be a bisexual woman, to view these within a context in which the witness has already provided a detailed and truthful account of the original basis of her claim.
34. I do not find that the Appellant’s claim to be a bisexual woman is undermined by reason of its late disclosure. She does not claim to have been in a same-sex relationship at the time of her asylum application; that relationship was instead said to have commenced around eight months later. While she does not suggest that she only became bisexual when that relationship started, the focus of her asylum claim concerned the issues said to arise from an abusive long-term relationship with her ex-husband. It is accordingly plausible, in circumstances where the Appellant was not in, or pursuing, a same-sex relationship, and was instead focused on explaining the past domestic abuse, that her failure to disclose her bisexuality when she claimed asylum reflected no more than a failure to recognise its potential relevance, rather than either an effort to deceive or a late fabrication. This is particularly so given her mental health difficulties at the time, and the trauma arising from the previous serious domestic abuse.
35. I note in this respect that the Respondent does not point to any aspect of the earlier account in which the Appellant is said to have provided inconsistent evidence on the point; it is instead, at its highest, something that was omitted.
36. I do not find the Appellant’s account to be undermined by the references within the child protection material to her remaining in contact with her family (for example, SB66). The Appellant gave evidence that she did not claim to be in contact with her parents at the time that these documents were drafted, and suggested that the report writers might have been summarising much earlier conversations. In the absence of clearer evidence as to when these comments were said to have been made, or of their wider context, and noting the absence of any challenge to the Appellant on this issue, I accept that explanation.
37. I do not attach weight to the absence of any reference to the Appellant's sexual orientation within the social services and mental health records. Those records were prepared for entirely different purposes and there is no obvious reason why the Appellant would necessarily have disclosed her sexual orientation to the professionals involved in her care.
38. I do not find that the Appellant’s credibility is undermined by her decision to join the Persian LGBT group. The Respondent stated that this was a group that would accept anyone regardless of nationality, sexual orientation, or gender identity, and sought to suggest that the organisation had therefore been specifically chosen because it did not require the Appellant to be LGBT. It was accordingly submitted that this was positively undermining of her credibility. I do not agree. The fact that a group is inclusive does not, in itself, lead to the inference that I am invited to draw. At its highest, it goes no further than suggest that membership is a relatively neutral factor, in that it does not automatically follow that a member or participant would necessarily be LGBT.
39. I instead accept the Appellant’s clear evidence that her decision to join the organisation was based on the support it offered her at a time when she had been struggling with her mental health, and draw no adverse inference against her from the inclusive nature of the group.
40. I do not find that the Appellant’s credibility is undermined because her purported membership card of Persian LGBT, contained within a supplementary bundle, shows a joining date in April 2026 when the Appellant claims to have joined before then. Again, she gave clear evidence that such cards had not previously been issued and that, when introduced, they recorded the date of issue rather than the date on which a member first joined. Given that this explanation is consistent with other evidence showing her participation prior to the date shown on the card, I accept it.
41. I do reduce the weight I attach to the statements from the claimed current partner (SB110) and a former partner (SB130), on the basis that neither attended to give evidence. While I have no reason to disbelieve the Appellant’s explanation that her current partner was needed at home to look after the children, I note that no application to adjourn the hearing was made, nor were any alternative arrangements sought, such as a CVP link or a transfer to a hearing centre closer to home, that might have allowed her to nevertheless give evidence. Likewise, while the former partner is said to have been in Italy, no explanation was given as to any efforts to secure her attendance, whether in person or by video link. There was accordingly no oral evidence from either witness, in circumstances where the Respondent wished to cross-examine them.
42. While I do reduce the weight that I attach to these statements on the basis that the witnesses could not be challenged, however, I do not go so far as to find that the statements are without any value whatsoever. They instead remain part of the overall body of evidence that I take into account when considering matters in the round.
43. I make similar observations in respect of the non-attendance of any witnesses from Persian LGBT, which the Appellant suggested arose from confusion between the group and her representatives as to what was required to secure their attendance. While that is a matter which plainly reduces the weight to be attached to the evidence from the organisation, I do not treat it as positively undermining of the Appellant’s credibility.
44. I place little weight on the Respondent’s submission that the signature on the statement of "EB" (SB130) and the signature on her ID card (SB131) appear different. Aside from the scope for natural variation in any signature, the Appellant gave clear evidence that EB had told her that she had begun signing her name differently, the Appellant herself having queried the apparent difference. In the absence of any further feature tending to suggest that such differences as can be seen are of any greater relevance, I do not regard this as undermining. Indeed, beyond highlighting the signatures and suggesting that the difference made it unclear as to whether the documents were genuinely sent by a person in Italy, the Respondent did not develop the point further.
45. I place little weight on the Respondent’s submission that the current partner’s driving licence (SB112) shows an address in Coventry, whereas the Appellant’s evidence was that the partner now lives in Doncaster. While the DVLA should of course be updated following any change of address, the fact that this has not occurred does not render the explanation that the partner has simply moved in the interim implausible. Furthermore, beyond highlighting the discrepancy, the Respondent again did not develop the point further.
46. Taking everything together, I find that the Appellant has provided a truthful account of her past domestic abuse. I have not found real force in any of the Respondent’s submissions said to show, notwithstanding her earlier truthfulness in respect of the original basis of claim, that she is nevertheless not a witness of truth in respect of her claim to be a bisexual woman. Furthermore, while I do not place significant weight on the Appellant’s supporting statements, documents, and photographs, I do not find them to be entirely devoid of value.
47. I am accordingly left with a clear and generally consistent account from the Appellant which has not been significantly undermined and which is supported, at least to a limited extent, by her further evidence. When such matters are balanced together, I am satisfied that the Appellant has adduced sufficient evidence to show that she is a bisexual woman.
48. I therefore accept this fact, as well as her claim to have engaged in same-sex relationships in the past, and to currently be in a same-sex relationship. I also accept that this is a genuine part of her identity that she would wish to continue to express and that, to the extent she might conceal it on return, this would be due to a fear of persecution rather than personal preference.
49. I turn to the question of whether the Appellant would face a real risk on return as a bisexual woman. I note that the Respondent’s own Country Policy and Information Note (“CPIN”) Nigeria: Sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics (version 4.0, June 2025) expressly records widespread discrimination against LGBT+ persons, as well as the criminalisation of certain same-sex activity, including marriage and public displays of affection. The CPIN concludes that “LGBT+ people are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from state and/or non-state actors. Protection is not likely to be available. Internal relocation is not likely to be viable.”
50. I also note that, while the issue was expressly not conceded by the Respondent, Mrs Morgan made no substantive submissions on the point. I have nevertheless considered the Appellant’s individual circumstances. She is a bisexual woman who has previously engaged in same-sex relationships, is currently in a same-sex relationship, and regards the expression of her sexual orientation as a genuine and important part of her identity. I have found that she would not conceal that identity as a matter of personal preference and that any concealment would result from fear. The country evidence identifies lesbians and bisexual women as exposed to violence, family abuse, forced conversion practices and serious obstacles in obtaining state protection. In all the circumstances, I give significant weight to the Respondent’s own published assessment of country conditions and am satisfied that the Appellant has established that she would face a real risk of persecution on return to Nigeria.
51. I accordingly find that the Appellant has shown, on the balance of probabilities, that she both has a Convention characteristic and has a genuine fear of return on account of that characteristic. I further find, to the lower standard, that her fear is objectively well-founded, that sufficient protection would not be available, and that she could not reasonably relocate internally to avoid that risk.
52. Her asylum appeal accordingly succeeds on this basis. In such circumstances, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the question whether she would additionally face a risk on account of her ex-husband or his family. Given that her risk profile as a bisexual woman would be substantially different from that which would arise if I were wrong in those primary findings, I decline to make alternative findings on those issues.
53. The Second and Third Appellants are the First Appellant’s minor children. They would return to Nigeria as a family unit. Given their ages and dependence upon their mother, I find that any treatment directed towards her would also expose them to serious harm. I am also satisfied that they would be perceived as members of her immediate family and that any such harm would arise by reason of that association. Their relevant Convention characteristic would therefore be attributed to them.
54. I accordingly find, to the applicable standards, that each child has a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of an imputed Convention characteristic arising from association with the First Appellant, that sufficient protection would not be available, and that internal relocation would not avoid the risk presented to the family unit. Their appeals therefore also succeed on asylum grounds.
Appeal on humanitarian protection grounds
55. As I have found each Appellant to qualify as a refugee, their appeals on humanitarian protection grounds cannot also succeed and are accordingly dismissed.
Appeal on human rights grounds
56. For the same reasons, I accept that there are substantial grounds for believing that the Appellants would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on return.
57. Given my conclusion under Article 3, it is unnecessary to determine separately whether removal would also be disproportionate under Article 8. I therefore make no findings concerning the claimed family life with the Appellant’s current partner or the proportionality of removal.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeals are allowed on asylum grounds.
The appeals are dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
The appeals are allowed on human rights grounds.
ANONYMITY DIRECTION
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellants are granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
As I have allowed the appeal I have considered whether or not to make a fee award. I have decided to make no fee award because the appeal has largely succeeded on the basis of material which was not before the Respondent at the time of the decision.
Signed: J Le Grys
First-tier Tribunal Judge Le Grys Date: 28 October 2026
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