Civil United Kingdom
Alfie Collier & Ors v Stellantis Auto SAS & Ors
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2760 (KB)
Case No: KB-2024-004176
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
THE PEUGEOT/CITROËN/DS NOx EMISSIONS GROUP LITIGATION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 28/10/2026
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE CONSTABLE
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Between :
ALFIE COLLIER
AND THE OTHER CLAIMANTS IDENTIFIED IN SCHEDULE ONE TO THE CLAIM FORM
Claimants
-and-
(1) STELLANTIS AUTO SAS
(2) AUTOMOBILES PEUGEOT S.A.
(3) AUTOMOBILES CITROËN S.A.S.
(4) IBC VEHICLES LIMITED
(5) PEUGEOT MOTOR COMPANY PLC
(6) CITROËN UK LIMITED
(7) STELLANTIS & YOU UK LIMITED
(8) STELLANTIS FINANCIAL SERVICES UK LIMITED
(9) STELLANTIS FINANCIAL SERVICES EUROPE
(10) VARIOUS AUTHORISED DEALERSHIPS
(together ‘PCD’)
Defendants
Mr Nazeer Chowdhury (instructed by Bingham Long (‘BL’)) for the BL PCD Claimants
Mr Samuel Ritchie (instructed by Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP) for the PCD Defendants
Mr Gareth Shires (instructed by Leigh Day and PGMBM Law Ltd) for the remaining PCD Claimants
Hearing date: 20 October 2026
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 28 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
Mr Justice Constable:
A. Introduction
1. The PCD Group Litigation Order (‘PCD GLO’) proceedings were established, in parallel with other GLOs relating to claims brought against other manufacturers, to provide a common procedural framework for the determination of claims concerning diesel vehicles and the use of alleged prohibited defeat devices. The PCD GLO established machinery by which claims are brought within the group, pleaded and thereafter managed collectively. As is commonly the case within GLOs, part of that machinery is the Group Register, together with conditions governing entry upon it. The present claims concern a substantial cohort represented by Bingham Long (‘BL’) (‘the BL Claimants’) in respect of which the Claim Form was validly issued, but not served before the cut-off deadline provided for in the PCD GLO, although the claims were served within the four-month deadline generally required pursuant to the CPR.
2. An application was subsequently made before Senior Master Cook, who decided that the effect of late service was that the BL Claimants could not form part of the Group Register and refused relief in that respect. The parties differ as to whether his decision went further. The present applications require the Court to determine whether the BL Claimants remain entitled to any of the procedural benefits of the PCD GLO despite their exclusion from the Group Register, whether they were required to serve separate Particulars of Claim, whether their failure to do so warrants strike out, and, if not, how their claims should be managed going forward.
B. The PCD GLO
3. On 22 January 2024, the Court made the PCD GLO. Relevant paragraphs are as set out in Annex A.
C. The Application Before Senior Master Cook
4. As explained in more detail at paragraphs 12 to 19 of the decision of Senior Master Cook, on 2 December 2024, Mr Twigg, a solicitor advocate at BL who has conduct of these proceedings on behalf of approximately 5,000 clients, wrote to the Defendants’ solicitors (‘Cleary’) asking whether they had authority to accept service, referring to the need for proceedings to be issued and served shortly.
5. Authority to accept service was confirmed the following day.
6. Mr Twigg submitted the Claim Form through CE-File on 11 December 2024. On 13 December he told Cleary that he was awaiting the sealed documents and had been informed by the Court Office that they should be returned within two or three business days. On 16 December 2024, his firm received an automated CE-File notification confirming that the filing had been accepted by the Court. The Claimants’ solicitors did not access CE-File and download the sealed Claim Form until 12 January 2025, when it was immediately served by email. After some back and forth, Mr Twigg then confirmed to Cleary that his firm had been notified on that date that the filing had been accepted, but had not accessed CE-File or downloaded the documents until 12 January. He maintained that service complied with the applicable arrangements, while offering pragmatically to resolve the issue by consent order if the Defendants contended otherwise.
7. The Defendants’ position, set out on 15 January 2025, was that the sealed Claim Form had been available for download, and therefore had been “received from the Court” for the purposes of paragraph 46(b) of the PCD GLO, on 16 December 2024. On that basis, they contended that it had to have been served within seven days, i.e. by 24 December 2024. Since service was not attempted until 12 January 2025, they maintained that the Claim Form had not been served within the PCD GLO deadline and that the BL Claimants were consequently not entitled to entry on the Group Register.
8. On 12 January 2026, the BL Claimants brought an application seeking an Order that “the Amended Cut-Off Date specified in paragraph 46 of the Amended GLO and, insofar as necessary, the Final Date specified in paragraph 46 of the Amended GLO, be extended to 14 January 2025 in order that the Applicants’ claims against the Defendants can properly come within the Amended GLO and be entered on the Group Register, or, alternatively, remain on the Group Register” (‘the January 2026 Application’).It was brought expressly pursuant to CPR 40.9 because the BL Claimants asserted that they were not (yet) part of the PCD GLO but were affected by it. In the further alternative, the BL Claimants sought relief, again pursuant to CPR 40.9, from sanctions for not having served the Claim Form on the Defendants prior to the Amended Cut-Off Date.
9. The January 2026 Application was opposed. The PCD Defendants argued that (a) the claim was not served by the paragraph 46 cut-off date as was required of it, (b) relief from sanctions was required; (c) applying the ordinary test, such relief should be refused. Their position was that while it is possible (subject to limitation periods) for a claimant to bring a claim after the cut-off date, the consequence is that the claim will be ineligible for inclusion in the PCD GLO; but that ineligibility did not prevent claimants from instating separate proceedings after the cut-off date.
10. On 2 June 2026, Senior Master Cook handed down his judgment. The judge decided that the Claim Form was received from the Court on 16 December 2024 when BL were notified that the sealed Claim Form was ready to be downloaded. As such, he decided that service on 12 January 2025 did not comply with paragraph 46 of the PCD GLO, as amended, which required service within 7 days of receipt of the Claim Form from the Court.
11. The judge then considered the alternative application for relief. Senior Master Cook decided that the breach was serious and significant; and that there was no good reason for default. The judge’s conclusions, set out in his judgment at [2026] EWHC 1189 (KB) (‘the Judgment’), were as follows:
“53. I have to conclude that Mr Twigg’s evidence in relation to these highly important issues is at best opaque. In the circumstances I can only conclude that there has been extraordinary delay in bringing this Application. As is clearly provided in PD 23A, para 2.5 provides that every application should be made as soon as it has become clear that it is "necessary or desirable to make it". The existence of without prejudice discussions between the parties should have been explored in the context of an issued application. In any event, even on the Claimant's own case, these discussions had ceased by 10 June 2025, which was 7 months before the Application was issued.
54. Turning then to consider all the circumstances of case, I accept Mr Ritchie's submission that there would be prejudice to the orderly conduct of the proceedings for the reasons he put forward, namely the prejudice that flows in relation to the selection of Sample Claimants given the conclusion of the liability trial and the fact that the Quantum trial has been listed with the Sample Claimant's already chosen from the Group Register.
55. Lastly, I accept Mr Ritchie's submission that if the Application were to be granted there would be the potential risk of other parties who are out of time seeking to join the Group Register long after it has been closed.
56. In the circumstances I conclude there has been a serious and substantial breach for which no good explanation has been provided and where all the circumstances militate against granting relief. The Application will be dismissed.”
12. Although forming no part of his written decision for the determination, Master Cook made the following remarks immediately following oral argument in giving brief ex tempore reasons for his conclusion:
“13. In the circumstances, it seems to me the delay in this case on its own is fatal to the application, in the absence of any good reason or explanation for it. But, in my view, the matter goes far further, and it centres on what Thirlwall J described as “the orderly conduct of group litigation." I have already outlined a little of the history of this litigation. Either those who wish to join group litigation wish to do so, it is important that they do so at the appropriate time. It is no good jumping on the bus once it has reached its destination. You have to jump on a bus before it departs the bus station, to use a rather hackneyed analogy. To halt otherwise would be to drive a coach and horses through the GLO regime.
…
15. Does this prejudice the claimants in any way? No. They have issued and served their claim forms. Their claims remain valid. They may be determined outside the GLO structure. In all likelihood they may well be stayed; I do not know; it is not a decision for me at this point, but if an application were made, that may well be the view the court would take. But it seems to me about the consequence of missing the deadline is that although it might be nice and cosy to allow the application, it is simply not in accordance with good practice, sensible case management or any other principle guiding the conduct of litigation of this type to permit these claims to have the benefit of the group litigation order provisions.”
13. Counsel were agreed that these remarks form no part of the ratio of Senior Master’s decisions, which is found in the Judgment. Nevertheless both counsel relied on the ex tempore remarks as relevant material on which the Court could rely when considering the context against which the Judgment can be viewed, insofar as necessary.
D. The Present Applications
14. Within 4 days of the hearing before Senior Master Cook, and before sight of the Judgment albeit in light of the ex tempore remarks, by application dated 18 May 2026 the BL Claimants sought an order staying the proceedings until further order, with liberty to apply, and “consequential directions preserving and regularising the procedural position of the proceedings following the Court’s determination on 14 May 2026 that the Claimants fall outside the Group Register” (‘the May 2026 Application’).
15. The May 2026 Application was supported by the First Witness Statement of Gerard Long, the Managing Director of BL. Mr Long described how:
“1. …At the Hearing, an application to include the BL Claimants in PCD GLO was dismissed
…
4. The present application is not of course intended to revisit or reopen matters determined at the Hearing. The Court has determined that the BL Claimants are not qualified to be on the Group Register in the PCD GLO, and are not therefore part of those group proceedings. The question which now arises is the proper procedural management of the present proceedings following that determination”.
16. On 18 June 2026, the PCD Defendants issued an application for an order that, pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(c) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, the BL Claimants’ claims be struck out for failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order. The accompanying evidence relied upon the failure on the part of the BL Claimants to have served its Particulars of Claim within 14 days of service of the Claim Form or alternatively within 14 days after the BL Claimants’ application to be admitted to the PCD GLO was dismissed (i.e. 28 May 2026).
17. On 5 August 2026, the BL Claimants served an amended application (‘the Amended Application’), seeking to change the way in which it sought directions and/or relief from the Court. The assertion within the initial Order sought, and in the statements of Mr Long, that the BL Claimants fell outside the Group Register and/or were not thereby part of the group proceedings was ‘withdrawn’. The BL Claimants instead sought a direction that they could rely upon the Generic Particulars of Claim made in the PCD GLO proceedings, and/or that their claim could proceed in accordance with the framework of the PCD group litigation and/or they be granted a retrospective extension of time for service of separate Particulars of Claim and/or relief otherwise from sanctions.
18. The Amended Application was supported by the Second Witness Statement of Mr Long. This seeks to ‘update the Court with respect to my firm’s understanding of the PCD GLO and therefore the current procedural position of the Claimants/Applicants’ claims. Mr Long explained, without waiving privilege, that his firm’s interpretation had changed upon review of the Judgment as well as following discussions with counsel and the Lead Solicitors.
19. That evidence makes a number of statements about the undesirability of proceedings existing in parallel to but outside the PCD GLO. Mr Long states:
“23. Mr. Winterburn informs me that a major concern of both the Claimants and the Defendants in the Volkswagen NOx Emissions Group Litigation was the issue of opportunistic litigation tactics. In that case, several tens of thousands of claims proceeded outside of the GLO made in the Volkswagen NOx Emissions Group Litigation, with those claimants refusing to join the GLO. By this action, those claimants sought to benefit from the positive decisions of the Court, such as Mr. Waksman’s finding that the device fitted in the VW subject vehicles was a Cycle Recognition Defeat Device and therefore a Prohibited Defeat Device, but without contributing to the significant costs incurred by the Claimants within the GLO that enabled such a finding to be made (i.e. “to freeload”).
24. That is not the case here, where the Claimants/Applicants want to be included within the GLO, are willing to contribute to the ongoing costs being incurred by the Claimants and indeed have already made significant costs contributions to date. In my view, having claims outside any GLO is highly unattractive to all parties (including the Court in its case management aims and pursuit of the Overriding Objective).
25. It follows that it should not be theoretically possible, under the operation of Paragraph 1 of the PCD GLO, for those claims to exist, extant, outside the Peugeot/Citroen/DS NOx Emissions Group Litigation.”
20. In response to the Amended Application, the PCD Defendants argue that Mr Long should not be permitted to withdraw what constituted an admission in his First Statement that the BL Claimants were not part of the PCD GLO. They continue to contend that the claims should be struck out. As is clear from the foregoing, that argument was advanced on the basis of the failure to have served the Particulars of Claim rather than on the basis of a contention that claims cannot, or at least in the circumstances of this case, should not be permitted by the Court to exist outside the PCD GLO.
E. GLOs: General Principles
21. A growing body of case law provides guidance on the Court’s approach to disputes relating to GLOs. The purpose of a GLO is to provide a case management framework for managing individual claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law. As observed by Hildyard J in the RBS Rights Issue Litigation (Greenwood v Goodwin [2014] EWHC 227) (Ch) at [51], one of the principal objectives of a GLO being to corral all claims with a view to the economic adjudication of common issues and the avoidance of separate trials (and the likelihood of expensive duplication and the risk of inconsistent decisions), directions should be fashioned to encourage all claimants to co-operate together, pool resources and bring forward all their arguments at once.
22. The individual claims remain separate, but are managed collectively. Generally, unless the Court orders otherwise, a judgment or order made in one of the claims within the GLO will be binding on the parties to all the other claims. GLOs are governed by CPR Part 19. Pursuant to CPR 19.22(2)(a), the GLO must contain directions for establishing a group register. The starting point for case management of numerous claimants in such proceedings is to identify the claimants and the capacity in which they bring their claims, and to establish a procedure for adding and discontinuing the claims, so that at any point in time the defendants may know by whom they are being sued (see O’Farrell J in Municipio de Mariana v BHP Group (UK) Ltd [2022] EWHC 330 (TCC) at [38]).
23. CPR 19.24(e) provides that the management court may direct a cut-off date after which claimants may not be entered on the group register without the permission of the court. A cut-off date is different to the date upon which a limitation period expires (although of course the former may be chosen to coincide with the latter in a given case). The cut-off date was intended to indicate the last date at which it was feasible to expect late joiners to catch up with the steps already taken in the proceedings (see Hildyard J in RBS Rights Issue Litigation, above, at [62]).
24. A cut-off date regulates entry onto the group register. It does not, without more, operate as a bar to the commencement or continuation of an otherwise valid individual claim outside the GLO. In Taylor v Nugent Care Society [2004] EWCA Civ 51, a claimant successfully appealed against a decision to strike out his claim as an abuse of process where he had been refused permission to have his claim added to the group register out of time and had therefore brought proceedings which ran parallel to the GLO. At first instance, Moses J had observed, with, it might respectfully be considered, obvious justification:
“15. It is an abuse for this claimant to seek to bring individual proceedings at the time he does, having failed in his application to join the group action? Secondly, even if it is an abuse, is it a proportionate response of this Court to prevent him bringing any action at all, because that would be the result of an order to strike out in pursuing his claim and seeking to vindicate his rights as a result of the treatment he suffered in the care home.
16. The starting point must be that there is no obligation upon a Claimant to
join a group action. There is nothing within the rules that requires a
claimant to do so. However, the overriding objective is the CPR…
…
21. There is, in my judgment however, a more general point. It is true that there is no obligation, as I have said, upon a claimant to join a group action. But if he does not do so, but is aware of it, then he does run the risk of being deprived of the opportunity to bring independent action should it be unjust and unfair if he would be permitted to do so. This claimant, specifically, is seeking to join the group action, accepted that there would be prejudice to that group action, and I refer to the quotation I have already cited at paragraph 12 which was part of the argument in support of his joining the group action. After all, he thought it was to his own benefit that he should join the group action, to the benefit of defendants, and to the benefit of the Court. That is no less true now than it was then.
22. The whole purpose of group actions is designed to enable resources to be directed where they can best be directed both for the advantage of the parties and of the courts. Were a claimant who had sought, but been disappointed, in his application to join a group action, permitted to bring separate action without any good reason other than a way of overcoming his previous failure to join a group action, the damage. Not only to the particular group action, but to the system of group actions, seems to me to be plain.”
25. In allowing the appeal, Lord Woolf CJ held that the provisions contained in Part 19 of the CPR dealing with group litigation had no requirement which would enable a court to make an order requiring a claimant to join a group action if the claimant chose not to do so. Where a claimant was perfectly entitled to decide to bring an action without taking that step, the decision to pursue parallel proceedings (even if borne out of necessity where an attempt to join a GLO has failed) did not of itself constitute an abuse of process justifying strike out. Lord Woolf nevertheless made clear that a claimant's ability to maintain an individual cause of action outside the GLO remained subject to the Court's case-management powers. Indeed, he considered that those who had joined the group action were entitled to have their interests given higher priority than those of a claimant who had not done so. However, in concluding that Moses J wrongly decided that the claimant's action had to be dismissed, Lord Woolf considered that to dismiss the claimant's case was a disproportionate reaction to the claimant’s failure to take the steps which he should have taken at an earlier date which would have resulted in his becoming part of the group litigation; on the facts of Taylor, delay before commencement did not make the subsequently issued proceedings (within limitation) an abuse of process. Lord Woolf emphasised that the draconian remedy of bringing the proceedings to an end required a clear case. Lord Woolf continued:
“17. It is also necessary to consider whether other action could be taken by the courts to protect the position of the defendant if he was faced with separate and parallel proceedings by the claimant. In my view in this case it is important that the position of the defendant is fully recognised. However, while fully recognising that position, it is my view that the court could take steps which would fairly protect the defendant. In particular the court may make an order staying the claimant's action until after the completion of the group action (or at least until after the completion of part of that action). In addition, if the court were to impose a stay, it may identify conditions upon which it would be prepared to remove the stay. Those conditions might include a requirement that the claimant should be bound by generic decisions in the group action so far as they affect the claimant's case.
18. Finally, the court has very wide powers in regard to costs. It may make an order to protect a defendant (in the event that a costs order was made against the defendant) from having to pay any costs in addition to those which the defendant would have had to pay even if the claimant had been a party to the group action.”
26. As noted, by way of footnote, at [4.36] of Class Actions in England and Wales (Third Edition) there are comments in some cases (where the question has not required determination) which suggest claimants could lose their right of action if they are not permitted to join the GLO. In the Kenyan Emergency Group Litigation, Stewart J considered that if the applicants were not permitted to join the GLO out of time they could well lose their right of action and be left only with their less favourable potential claim against their solicitors: Kimathi v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2017] EWHC 939 (QB) at [50.4]. Similarly, in the British Steel Coke Oven Workers Litigation, Senior Master Fontaine commented that a GLO would also be in the defendant's interest “because there would be a cut-off date in the GLO which would prevent any future claims outside the GLO being made”: Hutson v Tata Steel UK Ltd (Formerly Corus UK Ltd) [2016] EWHC 3031 (QB) at [16]. However, these observations cannot be treated as establishing that expiry of a GLO cut-off date itself extinguishes an otherwise subsisting claim. Such a proposition would be difficult to reconcile with Taylor.
27. Consistent with Taylor, the approach to staying claims which failed properly to have been brought before a GLO cut-off date was considered by Thirlwall J in the PIP Breast Implant Litigation, Holloway and Others v Transform Medical Group and Others [2014] EWHC 1641 (QB)at [17] and [22] (which the Senior Master came to quote at paragraph [37] of his Judgment):
“17. These applications are made in the context of well publicised litigation which has been tightly managed for some eighteen months. The purpose of a GLO is to ensure the orderly and disciplined progress of large numbers of cases. The advantage to the claimants in this GLO is that relatively modest claims are managed together so that costs are not disproportionate to the individual claims. The advantage to the defendants is that they can ascertain the scope of the litigation and organise their affairs accordingly. Some of the case management decisions have been reached after a good deal of argument. Compliance with the orders has required rigour and has from time to time strained the resources of the legal representatives on all sides. The orders have been necessary to further the overriding objective, which I shall not repeat. Tandem Law knew all of that.
…
22. The purpose of a cut-off date is to secure the good management of the claims subject to the GLO.”
28. In Holloway, Thirlwall J concluded (at [27]), having determined that relief should not be granted in respect of a failure to have joined the register before the cut-off date, that, the overwhelming likelihood is that these claims would be stayed to await the outcome of the Group Litigation. That approach illustrates the distinction drawn in Taylor: exclusion from participation in the GLO does not necessarily extinguish the underlying claim, but neither does survival of the claim confer an unrestricted entitlement to pursue it independently and concurrently with the group litigation.
29. A refusal to permit late entry onto the group register may itself have significant procedural consequences for a claimant who wishes to participate in the GLO. In Holloway, the application for permission to join the register after expiry of the cut-off date was approached through the then applicable principles governing relief from sanctions. Exclusion means, for example, those claimants would be unable to influence in any way the shape or progression of litigation which directly affects their rights (where for example, as anticipated by Lord Woolf, their action is stayed and lifting the stay imposed a requirement that the claimants should be bound by generic decisions in the group action so far as they affect the claimant's case). However, it could be said that Taylor does not expressly address a further potential difficulty identified by Mr Long at paragraphs [23]-[24] of his Second Witness Statement, quoted above, namely the position as between participating claimants and a claimant who remains outside the GLO. The concern is that such a claimant might avoid contributing to the costs and risks associated with the determination of generic issues, whilst potentially seeking to take advantage of a favourable outcome. Lord Woolf's discussion at [17]-[18] was principally concerned with protecting the defendant from the consequences of parallel proceedings. He did not expressly consider the extent to which the Court's case-management and costs powers might also be deployed to address any unfairness arising as between participating and non-participating claimants.
30. Notwithstanding those broader observations, the Court is bound by Taylor v Nugent. Its effect is that neither a claimant's election not to join a GLO nor the refusal of permission to join after expiry of the cut-off date, without more, extinguishes an otherwise subsisting claim or renders its pursuit outside the GLO an abuse of process. Such a claim may therefore subsist outside the GLO. That does not mean that the claimant is entitled to pursue it independently of the group litigation without restriction. The Court retains its ordinary case-management powers and may, in order to protect the parties to the GLO and the proper conduct of the group litigation, stay the individual claim, give priority to the GLO proceedings, impose appropriate conditions upon the lifting of any stay, including conditions relating to the effect of generic determinations, and make appropriate costs orders. It was on the basis that the claims still existed that the PCD Defendants advanced their case before Senior Master Cook that claims excluded from the PCD GLO nevertheless remained valid, a position reflected in his ex tempore observation that the claims remained valid and might be determined outside the GLO structure.
F. Should the Amended Application be heard at all?
31. Although Mr Ritchie argued that the Court should not permit Mr Long to resile from the statements made in his First Witness Statement about the status of the BL Claimants, I consider that the BL Claimants should be permitted to advance the application in the way now sought. As Mr Chowdhury points out, the PCD Defendants have had (and taken) the opportunity to respond in full, and the matter can be addressed fairly. Whilst Mr Ritchie may of course make such forensic use of the change of position he wishes to, ultimately the Court will determine (a) what Senior Master Cook decided; (b) what was left to be resolved; and (c) the proper construction of the PCD GLO by way of legal submissions, irrespective of how the change in the way the BL Claimants have sought to put their case.
32. I do not regard the statements by Mr Long in his First Witness Statement, which effectively amounted to an expression of his opinion about what the effect of the decision of Senior Master Cook was, formally to constitute ‘admissions’ to which CPR 14 applies, but even if they were I would, with those factors set out in CPR 14.5 in mind, including in this case the absence of any prejudice to the PCD Defendants, permit the withdrawal of the admission.
G. Collateral Attack
33. Mr Chowdhury argues that the PCD GLO can, as advanced by Mr Long in his Second Witness Statement, be construed so that there exist two categories of Claimants within the scope of the GLO: those who qualified for registration on the Group Register and those who did not, but who may nevertheless be regarded as falling within the scope of the GLO.
34. The importance of this construction, if the BL Claimants are correct, in the context of the way the strike out application is put is, that if the BL Claimants are part of the PCD GLO, albeit not part of the Group Register, they may still benefit from paragraph 38(b) of the GLO which releases them from the requirement to serve any separate Particulars of Claim; if that is right, then the default relied upon by the PCD Defendants falls away.
35. Mr Ritchie argues that the Amended Application, and the construction now advanced by the BL Claimants, amounts in substance to an attempt to relitigate the very issue that arose before Senior Master Cook i.e. whether the BL Claimants are subject to the PCD GLO.
36. Mr Ritchie relies upon:
(1) the principle stated by Lord Halsbury in Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665 when stating:
“it would be a scandal to the administration of justice if, the same question having been disposed of by one case, the litigant were to be permitted by changing the form of the proceedings to set up the same case again.”
(2) The guidance in Kotonou v National Westminster Bank [2017] 1 All ER (Comm) 350 in which the Court of Appeal, having referred to the decision of the House of Lords in Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands [1982] AC 529, stated at [59] that the enquiry as to whether something amounts to an abuse
“is a general one: namely, whether in the light of all of the circumstances, an attempt to relitigate the deputy judge’s findings would be manifestly unfair and/or bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”
37. Mr Chowdhury did not dispute these legal principles, but argued that whilst dismissing the January 2026 application, Senior Master Cook concluded that the claims were served and remained valid (see paragraph 15 of his ex tempore remarks); and that he did not (amongst other things) set aside service of the Claim Form under the CPR, strike out the claims, or determine whether the claims could rely on the GPOC outside formal registration. Whilst conceding that the BL Claimants cannot and do not seek the very relief previously refused, namely admission to the PCD GLO Group Register, Mr Chowdhury contends that instead it seeks only for the Court to determine the consequential position of proceedings which, he says, indisputably remain validly served.
38. I do not accept this narrow formulation of what the Court, through Senior Master Cook, has already decided. The application considered and dismissed by the Senior Master expressly sought relief, ‘in order that the Applicant’s claims against the Defendants can properly come within the Amended GLO and be entered on the Group Register…’. It also did so pursuant to a rule which explicitly pre-supposed that the BL Claimants were not a party to the order (CPR 40.9).
39. The application advanced before Senior Master Cook took entry on the Group Register as coterminous with substantive entitlement to participate in the PCD GLO. That this was the approach of the Senior Master can be seen, at least indirectly, from paragraph 54 of his Judgment, in which he accepted Mr Ritchie's submission that there would be prejudice to the orderly conduct of the proceedings for the reasons he put forward, namely the prejudice that flows in relation to the selection of Sample Claimants given the conclusion of the liability trial and the fact that the Quantum trial has been listed with the Sample Claimants already chosen from the Group Register. That observation would make no sense if he was proceeding on the basis that, in light of his decision, the BL Claimants nevertheless remained part of the PCD GLO.
40. The same can be seen most clearly from his ex tempore remarks. Immediately after making his observation about the continuing validity of the claim, it is plain that the Senior Master explicitly contemplated validity outside the GLO, when saying, “… it is simply not in accordance with good practice, sensible case management or any other principle guiding the conduct of litigation of this type to permit these claims to have the benefit of the group litigation order provisions.”
41. The question of the BL Claimants’ past or continuing participation within the PCD GLO was determined by Senior Master Cook. This is plainly so given the substance of the Order sought in the application, which the Senior Master dismissed, and both the terms of the Judgment and, insofar as relevant, the Senior Master’s ex tempore remarks. Whilst only a forensic point, this obvious reality is of course that, perhaps unsurprisingly, reflected in Mr Long’s First Witness Statement, and the terms of the relief sought in the May Application.
42. That said, it is important to distinguish the BL Claimants’ case on the proper construction of the GLO (by which it contends it is a participant notwithstanding that it is not on the Group Register), and its more general claim for such case management direction that the BL Claimants nevertheless be managed in parallel with the PCD GLO. The Senior Master explicitly stopped short of considering what should happen following his determination which, as I have found, was to the effect that the BL Claimants were not part of the PCD GLO. In his ex tempore remarks, he anticipated that the proceedings may be stayed, but those remarks were not a determination nor are binding on me. It remains open to the BL Claimants to seek such case management directions as it sees fit; including seeking a direction that the proceedings should be managed in parallel with the PCD GLO, although in considering whether it would be appropriate to do so, the Court will of course consider that submission in the wider context of the default, and failure to obtain relief, which was the subject of the Senior Master’s decision.
43. Logically, the question of strike out comes first; if the claims are struck out there is nothing to manage. The question of how to manage the claims then necessarily merges to some degree in considering what alternatives exist to strike out if that stage of the test is reached, in the overall context of proportionality.
H. The Proper Construction of the PCD GLO
44. Before turning to the strike out application, and in case I am wrong about the foregoing conclusion on collateral attack, I will consider from first principles whether, notwithstanding their exclusion from the Group Register, the BL Claimants remain entitled to participate in and obtain the benefits of the PCD GLO, rather than determining that question by reference to the outcome of the preceding application before Senior Master Cook.
45. The starting point is paragraph 1. This provides that the GLO applies ‘to all Claims’. ‘Claims’ is a defined term, and means the Claims that are subject to ‘this Order’. Paragraph 1 then defines a ‘Claim’ broadly as having certain defining characteristics: brought against one or more of the Defendants; be in respect of the Subject Vehicles (further defined in paragraph 3); where the Claimant (as defined in paragraph 4) claims ownership or a relevant interest; and which raises one or more of the issues identified in the Schedule.
46. ‘The Claimants’ are then expressly defined by paragraph 4 as those whose details are included on the Group Register, in the manner and terms further detailed in paragraphs 21-37. The entitlements are granted to, and the obligations are imposed upon, ‘Claimants’, so defined.
47. Read together, the effect of these provisions is clear. Following establishment of the Group Register, a person is a ‘Claimant’, as defined by the Order, only if that person's details are included on the Group Register. The provisions accordingly distinguish between the characteristics which make a claim eligible for inclusion within the group litigation and the status of a ‘Claimant’ entitled to participate in it.
48. This intention is supported by paragraphs 17-19, which deal with future and existing claims.
49. Pursuant to paragraph 17, all future ‘Claims’ to which the Order applies by virtue of paragraph 1 ‘must’ be issued out of the Management Court. Provided that the Standard Minimum Requirements in paragraph 38 are met, the future Claim ‘must’ be entered onto the Group Register. There is some infelicity in this drafting because paragraph 1 uses the defined term ‘Claimant’, which in paragraph 4 is defined by reference to entry on the Group Register. Read literally, a person bringing a future claim could not satisfy that definition before the very registration contemplated by paragraph 17 had occurred. The provisions cannot sensibly have been intended to operate in that circular manner. Paragraph 17 necessarily proceeds on the basis that a claim may possess the characteristics identified in paragraph 1 before the person bringing it acquires the defined status of ‘Claimant’ through registration.
50. Paragraphs 18 and 19 operate similarly to capture existing claims to which the Order applies by virtue of paragraph 1 which are proceeding other than in the Management Court, and to transfer them to the Management Court and enter them on the Group Register (providing the Standard Minimum Requirements are met). There is a similar degree of infelicity (e.g. use of capitalised ‘Claimant’ in the third line of paragraph 19).
51. The Standard Minimum Requirements are (a) a Claim Form (in respect of which the issue fee has been paid) has been issued, on which the Claimant is named; (b) the Claim Form on which the Claimant is named must have been served; (c)the Claimant must claim to own/have owned or have/had a relevant interest in the Subject Vehicle, which must have been acquired in the United Kingdom or the Channel Islands; (d) the Claim must raise one or more of the PCD GLO Issues and meet the other requirements at paragraph 1 of this Order; (e)the Claimant is not claiming against any defendant other than the Defendants. Requirements (c) and (d) reflect, in effect, the scope of the PCD GLO as prescribed in paragraph 1(b) to (d). Requirement (a) requires the valid issue of the Claim Form, and Requirement (b) valid service. Service means service in accordance with the CPR (i.e. not later than 4 months after issue if served within the jurisdiction etc). The Standard Minimum Requirements must be read together with paragraph 46. Quite apart from the requirement in paragraph 38(b) that the Claim Form has been served (in accordance with the CPR), paragraph 46 imposes a separate temporal requirement for entitlement to entry on the Group Register. Accordingly, satisfaction of the characteristics identified in paragraph 1, and of such requirements in paragraph 38 as may otherwise have been fulfilled, is not sufficient to confer entitlement to registration where the applicable cut-off requirement in paragraph 46 has not been met.
52. Notwithstanding the identified infelicities, the intention of the drafting of these clauses is abundantly clear. Clause 1 defines broadly the nature of a claim intended to be caught by the group management. Both existing and future claims falling within that description are intended to be brought within the group management machinery and, subject to satisfaction of the Standard Minimum Requirements and any applicable cut-off requirement, entered on the Group Register. Once entered, the persons bringing them are ‘Claimants’ for the purposes of the Order. The intention is plainly that (1) all claims existing and known at the time; (2) all claims existing but yet to be identified; and (3) all future claims are to be issued in or transferred to the Managing Court, and entered into the Group Register providing the Standard Minimum Requirements are met. Successful entry onto the Group Register by meeting the requirements to do so, pursuant to paragraphs 38 and 46, is, as a matter of construction of the Order, a condition of participation in and of obtaining the rights and benefits conferred upon Claimants by the PCD GLO.
53. The difficulty of these provisions for the BL Claimants was, entirely fairly, acknowledged by Mr Chowdhury. The high point of what might be called textual analysis which went to the proper construction of the PCD GLO related to the wording of paragraph 46. The sentence, ‘In order to be entitled to enter on to the Group Register, a claimant whose claim falls within the scope of this GLO must….’, he argued, distinguished between the concept of the scope of the PCD GLO and entitlement to enter the Group Register. There exists, therefore, a claim which may fall within the scope of the PCD GLO (and is therefore part of the PCD GLO) and a claim which is entered on the Group Register. I accept that the language of paragraph 46 recognises a distinction between a claim falling within the scope of the PCD GLO and entitlement to entry on the Group Register. It does not follow, however, that a person whose claim satisfies the former description is thereby a ‘Claimant’ as defined by the Order, or entitled to participate in the PCD GLO notwithstanding failure to satisfy the conditions for registration. The phrase ‘falls within the scope of this GLO’ identifies the class of claims to which the registration machinery applies. It does not confer the status which, under paragraph 4, depends upon inclusion on the Group Register. That conclusion follows from the language of the Order itself. If further support were required, the same conclusion follows from its evident purpose. On the BL Claimants' construction, satisfaction of the characteristics identified in paragraph 1 would confer participation in the PCD GLO notwithstanding failure to satisfy the additional requirements for entry on the Group Register. That would substantially undermine the function of those requirements and, in particular, the cut-off date, the importance of which in a given GLO the authorities have regularly emphasised.
54. I do not consider that paragraph 40 of the PCD GLO, relied upon in writing by Mr Chowdhury, but not developed orally, assists the BL Claimants. The provision that the form, content and timing of future Statements of Case will be considered by the Managing Judge or Master is concerned with the management of claims otherwise properly participating in the PCD GLO. It does not alter the requirements for entry onto the Group Register, nor confer upon a person who has failed to satisfy those requirements the status of a “Claimant” as defined by the Order or entitlement to the procedural benefits afforded to Claimants.
55. Although Mr Chowdhury’s written submissions refer to CPR 3.10, the remedial power therein is plainly not available to cure the BL Claimants’ failure to meet the cut-off date provided in the PCD GLO. Moreover, even if it were arguable, that would have been an argument to raise in the context of seeking relief before Senior Master Cook. It adds nothing to the dispute presently before the Court.
56. I therefore conclude that failure to satisfy the service requirement by the applicable cut-off date is fatal to entitlement to inclusion on the Group Register. Since ‘Claimant’ is defined by reference to inclusion on that register, the consequence is that the BL Claimants are not ‘Claimants’ for the purposes of the PCD GLO and are not entitled to participation in, or obtain the benefits conferred upon Claimants by, the PCD GLO.
57. That conclusion does not mean that their underlying claims cease to exist. Nothing in the PCD GLO, properly construed, purports to produce that consequence and, as explained above, Taylor establishes that exclusion from participation in a GLO does not, without more, extinguish an otherwise subsisting claim. It is unnecessary for present purposes to go further. The consequence is that, if otherwise valid, claims which failed to satisfy the applicable cut-off requirement subsist outside the PCD GLO rather than within it.
58. I should add for completeness in light of the way in which Mr Chowdhury at times advanced his case, that whilst the BL Claimants were in practice treated by some participants as if they were within the PCD GLO machinery, neither administrative treatment nor voluntary participation can alter the legal consequences of failing to satisfy the conditions for registration.
I. The Application to Strike Out
59. In circumstances where, as I have found, the BL Claimants sit firmly outside the PCD GLO following the decision of Senior Master Cook, it follows, as Mr Chowdhury rightly accepted, that presently the BL Claimants are in breach of the obligation to have served Particulars of Claim.
The Principles
60. The principles to apply are not in dispute.
61. In Walsham Chalet Park Ltd (t/a the Dream Lodge Group) v Tallington Lakes Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 1607, Richards LJ (McCombe and Sharpe LJJ agreeing) held at [44] that the factors relevant to whether to grant relief from sanction under CPR 3.9 should also be considered in the exercise of the Court’s power under CPR 3.4, given that:
“[t]he factors referred to in rule 3.9, including in particular the need to enforce
compliance with court orders, are reflected in the overriding objective in rule 1.1 to which the court must seek to give effect in exercising its power in relation to an application under rule 3.4 to strike out for non-compliance with a court order. The Mitchell principles, as now restated in Denton, have a direct bearing on such an issue.”
62. The well-known principles from Denton v TH White [2014] EWCA Civ 906; [2014] 1 WLR 3926 require the Court to:
(1) address whether the breach of the order, rule or practice direction was serious or significant;
(2) consider why the default has occurred; and
(3) evaluate all the circumstances of the case so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application.
63. Mr Ritchie drew the Court’s attention to the fact that, in Walsham Chalet Park, Richards LJ emphasised in the same paragraph that the “ultimate question” for the Court when considering an application under CPR 3.4 is the proportionality of the sanction itself, as distinct from an application for relief from sanction under CPR 3.9 which proceeds on the basis that the sanction was properly imposed. Indeed, as Miles J observed in M/S Unique Part Trading LLC v Regal Lodge Road Ltd [2020] EWHC 3871 (Ch) at [34]:
“The concept of proportionality is indeed a drumbeat that runs through the relevant jurisprudence. It is found in the overriding objective itself. A shorthand for the concept used there is dealing with cases justly. CPR 3.9 requires the court expressly to have regard to this. Moreover, as Brooke LJ explained in Price v Price, CPR 3.9, if properly followed, is likely to be compliant with Article 6, which has proportionality at its core. The third limb of Denton in turn requires the court to consider all the circumstances of the case so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application, including the specific matters referred to in the rule.”
64. Miles J went on to uphold the Deputy Master’s decision to strike out a claim due to the claimants’ failure to file particulars of claim within the time required under CPR 7.4, having regard to the following relevant factors under the Denton test:
(1) Although the Particulars were only one day late when the strike out application was issued, the Deputy Master was entitled to consider the circumstances that obtained when he was deciding the matter. By that time, the particulars had still not been filed and were “well overdue” (being almost three months after the claim form was filed) such that he was entitled to regard the breach as serious and significant (at [45]);
(2) The breach was serious because the failure to provide particulars of claim in a case of some complexity (a dispute concerning a purported termination for breach of a land development contract) is a failure to comply with an important requirement of the rules. It would have been impossible on the basis of the claim form alone for the defendant to understand the case against it (at [46]);
(3) The claimants provided no explanation for the failure to provide the particulars of claim (at [47]);
(4) Since Denton, the absence of prejudice to the Defendant is no longer a requirement for the court to refuse relief from sanctions (at [50]);
(5) The Deputy Master considered the alternatives to strike out which were proposed by the parties, and was aware that striking out the claimants’ claim might result in the claimants being unable to pursue a valid claim, but decided they did not meet the justice of the case. In doing so, he properly turned his mind to proportionality considerations as required by the third limb of Denton (at [40], [41], [52]).
65. Mr Chowdhury referred to Biguzzi v Rank Leisure PLC [1999] 1 WLR 1926 in which the Court of Appeal highlighted the draconian nature of the power of strike-out in a case of non-compliance and the need for the proportionality of the sanction itself to be carefully considered; and that in so doing it emphasised that the CPR supplied alternative powers by which the courts can make it clear that it will not tolerate delays, other than by striking out cases. Whilst it undoubtedly remains the case that the effect of a decision to strike out must always play a material part in the assessment of proportionality, the Court of Appeal’s observations in Biguzzi must also be seen in the context that that decision pre-dated the Denton approach to relief from sanctions.
Serious and Significant Breach
66. Mr Chowdhury accepted that, if the ordinary CPR deadline applied, as it did, failure to serve Particulars of Claim is a serious and significant breach. That is so whether the duration of that failure is calculated from the date which applied – namely 14 days from the service of the Claim Form in January 2025; or 14 days from 14 May 2026 when it became clear on the basis of the determination of Senior Master Cook that the BL Claimants had not served the Claim Form by the PCD GLO’s cut-off date, and his refusal for relief.
Whether there is a good reason
67. The reason for the failure is said to be that the claims were being managed ‘on the understanding’ that they fell within the PCD GLO and that the BL Claimants could therefore rely upon the dispensation from having to serve separate pleadings at paragraph 38(b). However, as Mr Chowdhury accepted, within 3 days of the service of the Claim Forms, the BL Claimants were put on express notice that the PCD Defendants did not accept that the Claim Forms had been served in time, such that the claims would not fall within the PCD GLO. Although Mr Chowdhury pointed to the genuineness of the understanding of the BL Claimants about the scope and content of the PCD GLO, its inclusion on an ‘administrative basis’ in the PCD GLO (albeit always subject to notices of objections from the PCD Defendants), he accepted that what has ultimately been an erroneous understanding on the part of BL, and a prolonged failure to take the initiative to test its understanding and/or seek to regularise the position if it was wrong, could not amount to a good reason. He invited the Court to decide the application principally by reference to the third stage of the Denton test.
All the circumstances/Proportionality
68. The BL Claimants rely upon the following factors which favour relief and/or a determination that striking out would be disproportionate:
(1) the proceedings were validly commenced and served under the CPR;
(2) the PCD Defendants have long known of the existence of the claims by reference to generic pleadings. They had corresponded about the claims, reviewed the Group Register (engaging in the objections process). The inclusion of the BL Claimants in the Group Register may not have any legal effect but reduces the practical informational prejudice;
(3) the BL Claimants were treated as participating in aspects of the PCD GLO, including common-costs and objections processes;
(4) there is no pending PCD trial process, there being a Pan-Nox Stay Order in place, so no steps in the litigation are imperilled by the absence of a Particulars of Claim;
(5) the defect, namely the absence of a Particulars of Claim, can be cured; and secured by peremptory sanction if the Court considered necessary;
(6) Immediate strike-out would terminate the claims of approximately 5,000 individuals. This includes a significant number of claimants who currently have a positive liability finding under the PDD Judgment. Some re-issued claims may face limitation defences. This would also create a windfall for the PCD Defendants. That does not automatically justify relief, but it is a material consequence when assessing proportionality;
(7) Strike out would then create the possibility of re-issue, limitation issues, a parallel structure, disputes about the effect of determinations in the PCD litigation and additional cost and time. Some claims may be out of time and in respect of others, claimants may ‘lose heart’. In this context, Mr Chowdhury relied upon the observations of Bright J in the context of the Ford Claimants application for permission to amend ([2026] EWHC 1531 (KB) at [59] that:
“[…] it is obvious, and Miss Nolten KC came very close to admitting, that Ford’s main interest in arguing for additional procedural delay, complexity and expense is the possibility that this would lead to some individual Claimants losing heart and deciding not to bring fresh claims. This runs entirely counter to the overriding objective, which stresses that the court must endeavour to make litigation simple, efficient and quick. Any course that would deter individual litigants from pursuing what may be valid claims is one that the court should be wary of following […]”
(8) a decision not to grant relief may well have a significant impact on the Claimants in both the PCD GLO (i.e., the non-BL Claimants), as the BL Claimants may not be subject to the costs sharing provisions under the PCD GLO and/or the wider Pan-NOx Litigation. The non-BL Claimants may be required to shoulder a greater proportionate share of the adverse costs ordered by Cockerill LJ than that which they have presently been apportioned. The consequences of this would be significant in respect of the levels of ATE insurance, which was placed in part by reference to claimant numbers, that have been incepted by each of the claimant firms for their clients.
69. Set against this, Mr Ritchie identified the following facts which he contends justify strike out:
(1) the longstanding nature of the breach. It is extremely longstanding in the context of the period since service of the Claim Form; it was put on notice at the earliest opportunity that they were not entitled to participate in the PCD GLO proceedings or rely upon paragraph 38(b);
(2) instead of responding to Senior Master Cook’s decision, which BL plainly understood the consequences of in terms of their inclusion in the PCD GLO as evidenced by Mr Long’s First Statement, the BL Claimants made no efforts to regularise the position by providing a Statement of Claim, nor retrospective relief and/or an extension of time in respect of its ongoing failure to do so. The non-compliance therefore remains longstanding even in the context of the timing of the Senior Master Cook’s determination, following which it was 7 weeks before any relief was sought in the Amended Application. The non-compliance should be regarded as flagrant and sustained;
(3) the Amended Application consisted in effect of further disregard to the Court, launching a collateral attack on the Judgment, and seeking to relitigate the question of BL Claimants’ participation in the PCD GLO;
(4) it is not right that the PCD Defendants know what the claims are against it. The brief details of claim in the Claim Form are generic, and simple adoption of the GPOC is no longer a solution in circumstances where Cockerill LJ has rejected many of the allegations made against the PCD Defendants;
(5) ‘administrative’ inclusion within the Group Register, in the face of the PCD Defendants’ objections, is irrelevant, as are any wider difficulties to the remaining PCD Claimants caused by striking out;
(6) insofar as individual claimants face prejudice where their claims are now statute barred, or their claims are otherwise barred from being re-issued, they are likely to have an avenue against BL; moreover, it is a consequence of the BL Claimants extreme delay in seeking relief when put on notice of their default. On any view, re-issue will not be disruptive to the wider Pan-Nox Litigation in circumstances where, on any view, the claims will not qualify for inclusion in the PCD GLO;
(7) the observations of Bright J are not analogous, insofar as they relate to whether requiring the Ford Claimants to issue separate proceedings to advance what could constitute an amendment was appropriate.
70. The fundamental question in light of these competing submissions which has caused me greater difficulty is whether strike-out should follow immediately, or whether the proportionate response is to require compliance within a short and final period, backed by an unless order. I am certainly not persuaded that some lesser course, without peremptory sanction, as advocated by Mr Chowdhury, would be appropriate. The seriousness and duration of the default, the absence of good reason for it and, particularly, the failure promptly to regularise the position following Senior Master Cook's decision all require a stringent response. But they do not necessarily establish that immediate termination of the claims is proportionate.
71. Each case necessarily turns on its own facts, and Mr Ritchie relied on M/S Unique Part Trading primarily for the applicable principles. To the extent that the facts of that case are relevant, however, they were materially different. There, no explanation had been given for the failure to serve Particulars of Claim and, on the material contained in the claim form, it was impossible for the defendant to understand the case it was required to meet. Here, although I have concluded that the BL Claimants have no good reason for their failure, the default is not unexplained. Further, whilst Mr Ritchie is right that, following the PDD Liability Judgment, mechanistic adoption of the existing PCD GPOC would now be inadequate, the need for a more particularised approach has assumed significance as a result of that Judgment. Miles J also emphasised that the Deputy Master had considered alternatives to strike-out, and the possibility that strike-out might result in the loss of an otherwise valid claim, before concluding that those alternatives did not meet the justice of the case. The decision therefore demonstrates that the absence of a prior unless order does not preclude immediate strike-out for failure to serve Particulars of Claim. It does not establish that immediate strike-out is the proportionate response to every serious failure to serve Particulars of Claim within the prescribed time.
72. As Walsham makes clear, the ultimate question is therefore the proportionality of the sanction imposed. I conclude that it would not be proportionate to strike out the claims immediately for the following reasons:
(1) This is not a case in which a previously imposed sanction of strike-out has taken effect following breach of an unless order and the Court is considering whether relief should be granted from that sanction. The Court is selecting the proportionate sanction for the existing default in the first instance;
(2) On the facts of this case, significant weight can be attached to the availability of an order requiring the default to be remedied within a short period, failing which the claims will stand struck out without further order. Such an order would not excuse or diminish the previous failures. It would impose a final and peremptory requirement for compliance, backed by the very sanction which the PCD Defendants now seek;
(3) There is nothing in the history of this case to suggest that a final peremptory order would be ineffective in securing compliance. In particular, there has been no previous failure to comply with an order requiring service of Particulars of Claim on pain of strike-out;
(4) It has not been demonstrated that the existing default has caused prejudice to the PCD Defendants which cannot now be adequately remedied by service of proper Particulars of Claim within a short period. Whilst the existence or absence of prejudice is not determinative, it is plainly relevant;
(5) There is presently no trial process which would be disrupted by allowing a short period for compliance, following which the BL Claims would be stayed, consistent with the approach in Taylor;
(6) Against that, immediate strike-out may finally determine otherwise subsisting claims, including claims which may now face limitation difficulties if re-issued; and potential re-issue of claims within limitation may give rise to further satellite litigation in the Courts (related to albeit not within the Pan-Nox Proceedings);
(7) The fact that the BL Claimants have brought themselves to this position through their own failures weighs heavily against them. Their conduct justifies making any further opportunity both short and final. It does not, in my judgment, make it proportionate to dispense with that opportunity altogether.
J. Conclusion on the Applications
73. I therefore order that, unless compliant, BL Claimant specific Generic Particulars of Claim are served within 21 days, the claims will stand struck out without further order. For the avoidance of doubt, they will be premised on the existing state of affairs in the Pan-Nox Litigation. If compliant Particulars of Claim are served within that period, the BL Claimants' claims will then be stayed generally, with liberty to apply. That reflects the distinction identified earlier in this judgment: the claims may subsist outside the PCD GLO, but the BL Claimants are not thereby entitled to prosecute them independently in a manner which cuts across the orderly conduct of the group litigation. It is neither necessary nor presently possible to identify the point at which it may become appropriate to lift that stay. Upon any application to do so, the Court will determine when, and upon what conditions, the stay should be lifted, including what effect should be given to relevant generic determinations in the PCD GLO.
K. The existing Adverse Cost Order in the PDD Liability Trial
74. Mr Shires attended the hearing representing the remaining PCD Claimants. At the PDD Liability trial consequentials hearing, Cockerill LJ ordered that the PCD Claimants were to pay £22,936,174.75 to the PCD Defendants by way of interim payment on account of the costs order made against them. By letter dated 16 October 2026, Pogust Goodhead provided to Cleary a schedule of ‘Expected payments to PCD Defendants’ allocated across the various PCD Claimant solicitors. Bingham Long was shown as being expected to contribute £971,970.32, as a result of the fact that the BL Claimants had constituted about 5% of the PCD Claimants.
75. It was submitted the effect of determining that the BL Claimants sat outside the PCD GLO and/or was struck out or stayed, to the extent that the Court did not order otherwise, the BL Claimants’ share of the adverse costs order would effectively fall on the rest of the cohort. Mr Shires therefore sought an order that any stay or other order ought operate in a manner that treats the BL Claimants as if they were subject to the PCD GLO, at least until the decision of Senior Master Cook. He pointed to the effect that such an outcome would reflect the reality, which was irrespective of the true legal position, the BL Claimants themselves, and the remaining PCD Claimant cohort acted as though they were part of the PCD GLO. Mr Shires put his ultimate submission bluntly: the BL Claimants should not be off the hook in respect of the adverse costs orders made in respect of the PDD Liability Trial.
76. That the BL Claimants acted as though they were in the PCD GLO is obviously not disputed; indeed it was a positive averment in the Applications, based upon the evidence given by Mr Long at paragraph 27 of his Second Witness Statement. He explains that the BL Claimants contributed hundreds of thousands of pounds to the costs of the KBA Trial, PDD Trial and preparations for the Quantum Trial (such costs being well over £1m in 2026 alone); that they have been liable for and have paid adverse costs to the PCD Defendants in the context of a failed interlocutory application; that BL has spent significant time and resources over many months receiving, investigating and issuing informed responses to the Notices of Objections raised by the PCD Defendants, which has resulted in the production of several new iterations of the Group Register and a reduction in the number of Claimants on the Group Register (and therefore their prospective liability) by over 30% prior to the PDD Liability Judgment; and that BL has assisted the Lead Solicitors in all work pursuant to the PCD Group Litigation wherever requested, and has been a regular contributor to the very many conferences on which matters such as case strategy are concerned.
77. It is clear that these steps have all been taken with an expectation that the BL Claimants would make a substantial recovery, and an understanding that the BL Claimants would contribute to such adverse costs orders as may be made.
78. In brief reply submissions, Mr Chowdhury contended that the BL Claimants actively wanted to be part of the PCD GLO, and to have all the consequences of that included. However, he submitted that if the Court determined that the BL Claimants were out of the PCD GLO, then they were out and the cost consequences the BL Claimants would face were they part of the PCD GLO would not flow. He contended that in circumstances where the BL Claimants were outside the PCD GLO, they were not a ‘Claimant’ and the cost provisions of the PCD GLO would not apply.
79. I accept Mr Chowdhury's submission that, as a matter of construction, the express costs-sharing provisions of the PCD GLO do not apply to the BL Claimants if, as I have found, they are not Claimants for the purposes of that Order. The question is instead whether, in determining the future management of claims which have proceeded in parallel with the PCD GLO and have sought the benefit of its determination of generic issues, the Court may make an appropriate costs order as part of its general case management power over the BL Claimants’ claims, and pursuant to its wide discretion as to costs. Mr Chowdhury did not submit that the making of an order in respect of a contribution to be paid to the costs incurred would be outwith the Court’s discretion in relation to costs. As Lord Woolf CJ stated at paragraph [18] of Taylor, the Court has very wide powers in regard to costs. As considered at paragraph 29 above, Lord Woolf’s observation was made in the context of protecting a defendant, but there is no basis upon which to consider those wide powers could not equally protect other claimants in a GLO from being required to bear all the consequences of pursuing the GLO, the outcome of which other claimants outside the GLO nevertheless seek the benefit of to the extent successful. This is also reflected in the remarks of Hildyard J in the RBS Rights Issue Litigation at [51]:
“…(2) although the court cannot order a Claimant to join one or other group, and cannot prevent Claimants seeking to litigate outside the GLO framework after the cut off date imposed by the GLO but before the expiry of any applicable limitation period (see Taylor v Nugent Care Society [2004] 1 WLR 1129 at paras 15 and 16), the court should minimise any comparative advantage of doing so;
(3) it is not consistent with these objectives, nor is it fair, to provide for privileged 'observer status' without risk in respect of adverse costs nor contribution to claimants' common costs: and, furthermore, to provide for such status would tend (a) to subvert the public policy behind limitations periods (since it might encourage claimants to issue to avoid any bar, and then sit on their hands) and (b) to destabilise the orderly assembly of groups (since it could lead to everyone jockeying to let someone else take the costs risk);
(4) costs-sharing is a fundamental feature and advantage of a GLO: subject to special circumstances, or any special arrangements agreed between group members inter se as to sharing within that group: all claimants (whether active or passive, stayed or not) should be subject to the same regime of common costs liability as regards both adverse and own costs, including those incurred prior to issue of their own proceedings;…”
80. This is not a case in which claimants deliberately stood aside from the group litigation and sought to reserve to themselves the possibility of taking advantage of favourable findings without exposure to the corresponding burdens. Rather, as evidenced by Mr Long, throughout the relevant period the BL Claimants, the Lead Solicitors and the remaining claimant cohort all proceeded on the basis that the BL Claimants would participate in the costs consequences of the PCD litigation. The evidence demonstrates substantial contributions by the BL Claimants to common costs and common work undertaken for the benefit of the wider claimant group. In those circumstances, it would be artificial to treat the BL Claimants as complete strangers to the costs consequences of the proceedings.
81. Moreover, the BL Claimants, whose claim is now stayed, may in due course seek to lift the stay at an appropriate point for the purposes of obtaining any benefit from the work done so far by the PCD Claimants within the PCD GLO and such further work as may be required of them in the future.
82. To permit the BL Claimants to retain the benefit of the work undertaken on behalf of the PCD Claimant group, whilst requiring the remaining PCD Claimants alone to shoulder the adverse costs consequences of that work, would produce a result which is neither fair nor consistent with the overriding objective. The Court is entitled, when managing the continuing position of the BL Claimants' proceedings, to have regard not only to the interests of the PCD Defendants but also to the legitimate interests of those claimants who have participated in and funded the conduct of the group litigation.
83. In the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate that the BL Claimants are required to pay their share of the adverse costs order imposed on the remaining PCD Claimants, notwithstanding the fact that they have, in law, stood outside the PCD GLO. The Court therefore so orders. A draft order was not provided by Mr Shires. The parties are to seek to agree the wording of the necessary wording. In the absence of agreement, the Court will determine the matter along with other consequential matters.
ANNEX A
(1) Paragraph 1 (under ‘Scope of the Group Litigation Order’) states:
“This Group Litigation Order ("GLO" or "Order") applies to all Claims:
(a) brought against one or more of the Defendants;
(b) in respect of Subject Vehicles (as defined in paragraph 3, below);
(c) where the Claimant (as defined in paragraph 4 below) claims to be, or have been the owner (including a joint owner) of a Subject Vehicle, or to have, or have had, an interest in a Subject Vehicle whether by purchase, hire purchase, lease, personal contract plan or other finance terms; and
(d) which raise one or more of the GLO Issues identified, for the purposes of CPR 19.11 (2)(b), in Schedule 1 to this Order.”
(2) Paragraph 2 (under ‘Scope of the Group Litigation Order’) states:
“The Claims which are the subject of this Order shall constitute and shall be known as the "Peugeot/Citroen/DS NOx Emissions Group Litigation" and are to be conducted in accordance with the terms of this GLO and any subsequent orders. The parties to these Claims are bound by the orders or judgments of the Court made in relation to the Peugeot/Citroen/DS NOx Emissions Group Litigation.”
(3) The definition of “Claimants” at paragraph 4 states:
“The Claimants” are those claimants whose details are included on the Group Register in the manner and under the terms set out in paragraphs 21-37 and following below. Pending the establishment of the Group Register, the Claimants are those Claimants listed on the Claim Forms listed at Schedule 4. This is subject to change as claims are still being issued.”
(4) The definition of “Claim(s)” at paragraph 15 is as follows:
“15. “Claim(s)” and “Claim Form(s)” mean claims and claim forms that are subject to this Order and subsequent orders in the Peugeot/Citroen/DS NOx Emissions Group Litigation and shall be read throughout as excluding counterclaims.”
(5) Paragraph 17 (under ‘Future Claims’) states:
“17. All future Claims to which this Order applies by virtue of paragraph 1 must be issued out of the Management Court, and provided that the Standard Minimum Requirements (as set out at paragraph 38 below) are met, be entered onto the Group Register.”
(6) Paragraph 18 (under ‘Transfer of Existing Proceedings’) provides:
“18. Any existing Claim to which this Order applies by virtue of paragraph 1 above, and which is proceeding other than in the Management Court, is to be:
(a) transferred forthwith to the Management Court. Solicitors for the parties are to co-operate in identifying such Claims, including in accordance with paragraph 19 below. On identification of such Claims, the Lead Solicitors are to send a copy of this Order to each transferring County Court. Notices of Transfer in accordance with paragraph 4.1 of Practice Direction 30 are hereby dispensed with; and
(b) provided that each such Claim meets the Standard Minimum Requirements as set out in paragraph 38 below, entered forthwith on to the Group Register in accordance with the terms of this Order and CPR 19.22(3)(a)(i) and (iii).”
(7) Paragraph 24 (under ‘The Group Register’) states:
“The French Defendants shall file an Acknowledgment of Service within 21 days of the service of any Claim Form.”
(8) Paragraph 32 (under ‘The Group Register’) states:
“Any party shall be permitted to apply to the Management Court to remove a Claimant’s Claim from the Group Register where there are appropriate grounds for doing so.”
(9) Paragraph 33 (under ‘The Group Register’) states:
“A Claimant’s Claim shall remain on the Group Register until such time as they serve a notice of discontinuance or, if required, obtain permission to discontinue, or if the Claim is otherwise disposed of prior to trial, or if the Court orders its removal. In any such event, the Claimant’s Claim shall be removed from the Group Register on the expiration of the last day of the three-month period in which the Group Register is being reviewed and updated as required by paragraph 29 above during which notice of discontinuance or permission to discontinue is given or the effective date of disposal occurred.”
(10) Paragraph 38 (‘Standard Minimum Requirements’) provides:
“The Standard Minimum Requirements for entry of a Claim onto the Group Register in accordance with paragraph 21 above are as follows:
(a) a Claim Form (in respect of which the issue fee has been paid) has been issued, on which the Claimant is named;
(b) the Claim Form on which the Claimant is named must have been served. The requirement to serve separate Particulars of Claim in any separate document is hereby dispensed with, subject to further order;
(c) the Claimant must claim to be, or to have been, the owner (including a joint owner) of a Subject Vehicle, or to have, or have had, an interest in a Subject Vehicle whether by purchase, hire purchase, lease, personal contract plan or other finance terms. The Subject Vehicle must have been acquired in the United Kingdom or the Channel Islands;
(d) the Claim must raise one or more of the GLO Issues and meet the other requirements at paragraph 1 of this Order;
(e) the Claimant is not claiming against any defendant other than the Defendants.”
(11) Paragraph 46 (as amended by consent pursuant to a further order dated 11 December 2024) (‘Cut-off Date’) provides:
“In order to be entitled to enter on to the Group Register, a Claimant whose claim falls within the scope of this GLO must have: (i) issued and served a Claim Form by 4 p.m. on 15 December 2024; and (ii) served a Claim Form in one of the following ways:
(a) Claim Forms sealed prior to 8 December 2024 must be served by 4 p.m. on 15 December 2024; and
(b) Where the sealed Claim Form issued in compliance with (i) is received from the Court on or after 8 December 2024, it must be served within 7 days of the Claimant receiving the sealed Claim Form from the Court.
The final date on which such claims must be entered on to the Group Register will be 4 p.m. on 1415 February 2025. Both cut-off dates shall be subject to review by the Court at the hearing listed on 11 to 15 March 2024 or other subsequent hearing.”
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).