Administrative United Kingdom

The Government of Azerbaijan v Elvin Amirkhan Imanli

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2741 (Admin)

Case No: AC-2025-LON-002541

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 28/10/2026

Before :

THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE

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Between :

THE GOVERNMENT OF AZERBAIJAN Appellant
– and –
ELVIN AMIRKHAN IMANLI Respondent

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Thomas Williams (instructed by CPS) for the Appellant

James Stansfeld (instructed by Janes Solicitors) for the Respondent

Hearing dates: 21 October 2026

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Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 28 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

THE HON. MRS JUSTICE STEYN DBE

Mrs Justice Steyn DBE :

1. This is the Government of Azerbaijan’s appeal under s.105 of the Extradition Act 2003 against the decision of District Judge Zani discharging the respondent, Mr Imanli, under s.79(3) of the 2003 Act. The appellant seeks Mr Imanli’s extradition on an accusation request received on 12 January 2024 and certified on behalf of the Home Secretary under s.70 of the 2003 Act on 24 January 2024. Permission to appeal was granted by Collins Rice J.

2. The allegation underlying the extradition request is that the respondent, together with a friend, Suleymanov Ravan Ilham, agreed to burn a Toyota Prado vehicle owned by the respondent’s brother-in-law, as an act of revenge. They are alleged to have paid a third party, Aliyev Gadir Nadir, 2000 manats (approximately £877) to carry out the crime, and to have taken Mr Nadir to show him the yard where the car was located. The substantive offence is said to have been carried out by Mr Nadir, who made an initial attempt in the early hours of 17 March 2016, before returning in the early hours of 23 March 2016 to set the car on fire.

3. The appellant submits that the District Judge ought to have decided differently the question whether the respondent’s extradition is barred, pursuant to s.82 of the 2003 Act, by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed the extradition offence. In particular, he erred in finding that it would be oppressive to extradite the respondent.

4. The respondent contends that properly analysed the grounds that are maintained amount to no more than criticism of the weight to be given to various factors. The decision was one that, having identified and applied the correct legal principles, was perfectly open to the District Judge.

The law

The passage of time bar

5. Section 82 of the 2003 Act provides:

“A person’s extradition to a category 2 territory is barred by reason of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have –

(a) committed the extradition offence (where he is accused of its commission), or

(b) become unlawfully at large (where he is alleged to have been convicted of it).”

6. As this is an accusation request, the relevant passage of time begins with commission of the alleged offence on 23 March 2016.

7. “Unjust” is directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial itself: Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779, Lord Diplock, 782H. The “essential question underlying any application for a section 82 bar on the ground that the passage of time has made it unjust to extradite the accused” (my emphasis) is whether “a fair trial is impossible”: Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21, [2009] 1 WLR 1038, Lord Brown, [33]. “Oppressive” is directed to hardship to the accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration: Kakis, 782H.

8. However, there is some overlap; the words “unjust” and “oppressive” cover all cases where returning the requested person would not be fair: Kakis, 783A. The risk of prejudice in the conduct of the accused’s defence at a trial, even if falling short of satisfying the injustice criterion, may be a factor contributing to a conclusion that a return would be oppressive.

9. The test of oppression “by reason of the passage of time” will not easily be satisfied; hardship, a comparatively commonplace consequence of an order for extradition, is not enough: Gomes, [31]. Nevertheless, the case-law makes clear that a finding of oppression is not excluded “simply because developments in a life are commonplace occurrences in human lives”: Antochi v Germany [2020] EWHC 3092 (Admin), Fordham J, [45].

10. Save in the most exceptional circumstances, a fugitive cannot invoke the passage of time as a bar to his extradition: Gomes, [29].

11. The gravity of the offence is relevant to whether changes in the circumstances of the accused which have occurred during the relevant period are such as would render his return to stand trial oppressive. There is a spectrum of seriousness; the more serious the offence, the less easy it will be to satisfy the test of oppression: Kakis, 784G-H; Gomes, [31]; Koc v Turkish Judicial Authority [2021] EWHC 1234 (Admin), [24]-[25].

12. The length of time may itself be an important consideration in whether a return would be oppressive: Wenting v High Court of Valenciennes [2009] EWHC 3528 (Admin), [22(7)]. Delay (where not brought about by the requested person himself) may engender in him a legitimate sense of security from prosecution or punishment: La Torre v The Republic of Italy [2007] EWHC 1370, Laws LJ, [37]; Gomes, [26].

13. The accused “gets the benefit of the passage of time (unless he has caused it) irrespective of any blameworthiness on the part of the requesting state”: Gomes, [28]. Culpable delay on the part of the requesting State may contribute to a determination that extradition would be oppressive, and may tip the balance in an otherwise marginal case: Kakis, Lord Edmund-Davies, 785G; R v Governor of Brixton Prison, ex p. Osman (No.4) [1992] 1 All ER 579, Woolf LJ, 587d-g; La Torre, [37]; Gomes, [20], [25], [27]; Obert v Public Prosecutor’s Office of Appeal of Ioannina, Greece [2017] EWHC 303 (Admin), Nicol J, [41]. However, lack of explanation for delay does not necessarily establish that the State is blameworthy: La Torre, [37]; Gomes, [27].

The court’s powers on appeal

14. The court’s powers on an appeal under s.105 are provided in s.106. The material conditions for the purpose of this appeal are specified in s.106(4). The court may allow the appeal if:

“(a) the judge ought to have decided the relevant question differently;

(b) if he had decided the question in the way he ought to have done, he would not have been required to order the person’s discharge.”

15. The question for the appellate court is whether or not the district judge made the wrong decision: Celinski v Polish Judicial Authority [2016] 1 WLR 551, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd CJ, [24]; In re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] UKSC 33, [2013] 1 WLR 1911, Lord Neuberger PSC, [93]. In Love v Government of the United States of America [2018] EWHC 172 (Admin), [2018] 1 WLR 2889 a Divisional Court comprised of Lord Burnett of Maldon CJ and Ouseley J considered the words “ought to have decided a question differently” (in the context of an appeal under s.104 rather than 105, but that is immaterial) and held that those words “give a clear indication of the degree of error which has to be shown”. They held:

“25. … The appeal must focus on error: what the judge ought to have decided differently, so as to mean that the appeal should be allowed. Extradition appeals are not re-hearings of evidence or mere repeats of submissions as to how factors should be weighed; courts normally have to respect the findings of fact made by the district judge, especially if he has heard oral evidence. The true focus is not on establishing a judicial review type of error, as a key to opening up a decision so that the appellate court can undertake the whole evaluation afresh. This can lead to a misplaced focus on omissions from judgments or on points not expressly dealt with in order to invite the court to start afresh, an approach which risks detracting from the proper appellate function. …

26. The true approach is more simply expressed by requiring the appellate court to decide whether the decision of the district judge was wrong. The appellate court is entitled to stand back and say that a question ought to have been decided differently because the overall evaluation was wrong: crucial factors should have been weighed so significantly differently as to make the decision wrong, such that the appeal in consequence should be allowed.”

16. It is common ground that this is the test to be applied. I must decide whether, on the facts found by the District Judge (which are not disputed on this appeal), his decision was wrong.

The facts

17. There is no challenge to the District Judge’s findings of fact which I summarise below. Mr Imanli gave evidence and was cross-examined. The District Judge found that he was a truthful witness.

18. I have described the nature of the offence of which the respondent is accused in paragraph ‎2 above. By article 186.2.2 of the Azerbaijani Criminal Code (‘the Criminal Code’), the offence of deliberate damage or destruction by arson is punishable by a term of three to seven years’ imprisonment. It is classified as a “less serious crime” (article 15.3), which puts it above the lowest category (“crimes which do not represent big public danger”: article 15.2) but below “serious crime” (article 15.4) and “especially serious crime”.

19. In accordance with the Criminal Code, there is a limitation period of “seven years from the date of commitment of less serious crime” (article 75.1.2), whereas the period for “minor serious crime” is 12 years (article 75.1.3) and for “serious crime” it is 20 years (article 75.1.4)[1]. On expiry of the time limit, the person cannot be held criminally liable (article 75.1.1), save that time stops running “if the person, who has committed a crime, disappears from investigation or court” (article 75.3).

20. A criminal investigation into the arson was initiated by the police captain of the Investigation Department of Absheron on 3 May 2016. Mr Imanli had moved to the United Kingdom early in 2010, at the age of 17. However, he returned to Azerbaijan on several occasions to visit his mother and siblings who continue to live there. On 7 July 2016, he became aware of the investigation when he was stopped at the border when seeking to enter Azerbaijan. The border official told him a request had been received to detain him in respect of a police investigation in the Absheron District. He was allowed to leave, and he voluntarily reported to the police station in Absheron the same day. The appellant’s further information confirmed that Mr Imanli was “questioned as a witness” on 7 July 2016. During the interview, Mr Imanli acknowledged that he had been in Azerbaijan for the national holidays (Novruz) in March 2016, but he denied the allegations. He told the police that he could produce CCTV footage confirming that he had not left his home during the timeframe of the alleged offences and he subsequently delivered that CCTV footage to the police.

21. The District Judge accepted Mr Imanli’s evidence that the investigating officer told him in a telephone call that the “stop notice” against his name would be removed, that he understood he was no longer a suspect, and that he was free to return to the UK (where he had been living for six years). The appellant’s further information confirmed that “no restrictions were placed on his ability to leave Azerbaijan”. The District Judge observed that the respondent was “free to come and go as he pleased”.

22. On 11 July 2016, the investigation was suspended under article 53.1.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘the CPC’) because it was “impossible to identify” those responsible. The suspension was cancelled by a junior official in the prosecutor’s office on 21 November 2016 and then again on 30 March 2017, and then the suspension was re-imposed about a week later on each occasion.

23. A warrant for Mr Nadir’s arrest in respect of an unrelated burglary had been issued on 15 July 2017. On 10 October 2017, the First Deputy Prosecutor General cancelled the decision to suspend the arson investigation for the third time and the period of investigation was extended by two months. The following day, Mr Nadir was announced as a suspect in respect of the arson offence and arrested. The burglary and arson investigations were joined and referred to the Sumgayit City Police Department (that being the administrative district in which the burglary occurred). However, Mr Nadir denied arson and it could not be proved, so the offences were separated and the arson investigation was returned to the Absheron District Prosecutor’s Office on 9 January 2018.

24. Between 9 January 2018 and 18 November 2019, the investigation was stopped and re-started on around six further occasions. During this period the investigation was sent to the Serious Crimes Investigation Division where it was repeatedly stopped and re-started. The investigation was suspended from 18 November 2019 until 14 December 2022 when it was returned by the Serious Crimes Investigation Division to Absheron District Police Office “for continuation of the preliminary investigation”.

25. The following day, 15 December 2022, Mr Ilham was arrested as a suspect and on 17 December 2022 he was charged. The decision accused the respondent of involvement. On 27 December 2022, the respondent was formally identified as an accused person and as his location was unknown a search was announced. The criminal case was suspended again for nearly a month and then, on 31 May 2023, the Absheron District Court issued a warrant for the respondent’s arrest.

26. The respondent had returned to Azerbaijan on holiday, without ever being stopped by the authorities, on 7-23 March 2019, 12-26 September 2019, 15 January – 5 February 2022 and 18 June – 9 July 2022.

27. On 11 October 2023, the proceedings against Mr Ilham and Mr Nadir were terminated by the Absheron District Court due to the expiration of the limitation period. The decision indicates that Mr Ilham and Mr Nadir pleaded guilty (implicating the respondent), and the court found their guilt proven, but due to the expiry of the limitation period “they must be released from criminal liability”. As the respondent was not in Azerbaijan when he was identified as an accused person in December 2022, it is said that the exception in article 75.3 is engaged, and so the limitation period does not apply to him.

28. The respondent has no convictions in any jurisdiction. He was cautioned for possession of Cannabis on 23 June 2019. Since coming to the UK as a 17-year-old, he has engaged in education, graduating with a BA, and subsequently an MSc, in Accounting and Financial Management in 2014 and 2015, following which he has studied for qualifications in Chartered Accountancy. The District Judge observed that he should be commended on his considerable educational achievements and on his regular employment record. His written references were “impressive”. The respondent was granted British citizenship on 4 December 2023.

29. Prior to his arrest pursuant to the extradition request, the respondent had taken steps to enlist in the British Army in the field of cyber security. He had applied for the roles of Military Intelligence Technical Operator, Operator Military Intelligence and Electronic Warfare and Signals Intelligence. Having passed the entrance examinations and the cognitive test, at the time of the extradition hearing his application had been put on hold pending the outcome of the extradition request.

30. The respondent has acknowledged that there is animosity between himself and his (former) brother-in-law, stating his belief that it is this that has prompted his brother-in-law to accuse him. The respondent has denied the alleged offending.

The District Judge’s conclusions

31. The District Judge concluded that the developments in the respondent’s life render extradition oppressive by reason of the passage of time. He had regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. He considered the respondent’s commendable education and work record. He observed that there was some merit in the submission that there had been culpable delay on the part of the government in pursuing the case, and concluded that the delay had not been adequately explained. The District Judge inferred that if extradited and convicted, it was highly unlikely he would be able to continue with his ambition of joining the British Army. He also noted that the extradition proceedings had adversely impacted the respondent’s mental health.

32. The District Judge found that extradition would not amount to a disproportionate interference with Mr Imanli’s article 8 rights, noting among other matters that he is a single man with no close family members in the UK and so he was relying only on private life not family life.

The fresh evidence

33. On 6 October 2026, the respondent filed an application to adduce updated evidence, in the form of a further witness statement of Mr Imanli and various exhibits. It is common ground that the test, applying FK v Germany [2017] EWHC 2160 (Admin), [38], is whether it is in the interests of justice to admit this updating evidence. The appellant did not object to its admission. I granted the application at the hearing.

34. Following the District Judge’s order discharging the extradition request, the respondent resumed his application to join the British Army. In view of the time that had elapsed, he was required to re-take the cognitive and medical tests. He re-took the cognitive test in August 2025 and “passed with flying colours”. He received a conditional job offer. He underwent the medical assessment in September 2025. For a period of two months at the outset of the extradition proceedings, he had been prescribed medication for anxiety and depression. As a consequence, his application to join the British Army was put on hold for a further 12 months.

35. Following a period of 12 months without taking any such medication, the respondent sought to pursue his application to join the British Army. He was advised that he could continue with his application whilst the appeal against the District Judge’s order is ongoing but that his “application would have to be refused if the lower court’s decision is overturned”. In the meantime, the Army raised an issue regarding his (dual) Azerbaijani citizenship, which has the effect that he is on the reserve list in Azerbaijan. To address this, on 3 December 2025 the respondent applied to the Azerbaijani Embassy seeking to renounce his Azerbaijani citizenship, so that he will be a sole British citizen. That application is pending.

36. The respondent states that if he is extradited, even if he is able to return to the UK, it will then be too late for him to join the British Army, which he remains very determined and eager to do, because there is an age limit of 35 years old for the positions for which he has applied, and he is now 34 years old. Mr Williams queried whether an age limit of 35 means that the respondent has until a day before his 35th or 36th birthday to commence such a role. On instructions from the respondent, Mr Stansfeld informed me the lower of those two ages applies but the difference is not, in any event, decisive.

37. Since the extradition hearing, the respondent, who had been renting a flat, has bought a house in Rugby (subject to a 30-year mortgage), which he moved into on 3 September 2026.

Withdrawal of Ground 1(a)

38. The first ground (1(a)) relied on in the appellant’s Perfected Grounds of Appeal was that the District Judge reached a contradictory conclusion in finding that extradition was oppressive by reason of the passage of time, but not a disproportionate interference with article 8 ECHR. This conclusion was said to follow from the observation of Lord Lloyd-Jones JSC in Konecny v Brno-Venkov, Czech Republic [2019] UKSC 8, at [57] that the threshold test for article 8 “would not be one of injustice or oppression but the lower one of disproportionality”. At the hearing, counsel for the appellant, Mr Williams (who had not settled the Perfected Grounds), withdrew this ground of appeal.

39. This was a sensible concession. The statutory provisions are different. Section 82 requires a focus on the passage of time and the effect of delay on the person’s life. By contrast, the focus of article 8 is on the individual’s family and/or private life and an assessment of whether extradition would be a disproportionate interference with that right. The Supreme Court made clear in Andrysiewicz v Circuit Court in Lodz, Poland [2025] UKSC 23, [2025] 1 WLR 2733 how unlikely it is that extradition will be held to be disproportionate in a case, such as this one, where the requested person relies on interference with his private life. While there will often be a significant overlap between the factors to be assessed, and the outcome in respect of each provision may often be the same, it does not follow, as a matter of law, that oppression can never be established if a violation of article 8 has not been found.

Grounds 1(b) and 2

40. The appellant maintains that the District Judge reached a contradictory conclusion by finding, in the context of his article 8 analysis, that extradition would cause hardship, whereas the test for oppression is more than mere hardship (ground 1(b)); and that the District Judge was wrong to conclude that extradition would be oppressive by reason of the passage of time (ground 2).

41. Mr Williams focused primarily on ground 2, and in that regard on four alleged errors. First, he submits that the District Judge erred in his consideration of the seriousness of the alleged offending. The District Judge noted that the alleged offence did not fall at the “extreme” end of the spectrum, neither being “trivial” nor at the level of “the most serious crimes to come before these courts” but he should have gone further and identified with more particularity the gravity of the alleged offending. Mr Williams drew attention to the allegation that this is said to have been a revenge attack, that it was a conspiracy to commit arson, and that it appears that people were sleeping in the house adjoining the yard where the vehicle was set alight.

42. Mr Williams further submits that the District Judge erred in considering how the alleged offending would be viewed in this jurisdiction (noting that it would be likely to attract a sentence of between one and four years and that “his youth at the time, his hitherto good character and promising future prospects mean that a suspended sentence may result”) in circumstances where the minimum term available in Azerbaijan was known.

43. Secondly, Mr Williams contends that the limitation period in respect of the two co-defendants is irrelevant, and the District Judge erred in giving it any weight. If a person for the time being cannot be found, then as a matter of Azerbaijan law the limitation period is paused. That was the position here. The limitation period has not expired in the respondent’s case, and the courts of this jurisdiction should not take an approach to limitation that the courts of Azerbaijan would not take. That said, Mr Williams acknowledged that the length of the limitation period, and the decision in respect of the co-defendants, may tell the court something about the approach of Azerbaijan to delay and the public interest in prosecuting the alleged offending.

44. Thirdly, while acknowledging that the investigation was very protracted and that during the periods when it was suspended there was no active investigation on-going, Mr Williams submits that the lack of explanation for the delay does not necessarily mean it was culpable (La Torre, [37]). The investigation was suspended at times when no suspect had been identified. By the time the limitation decision was given in relation to the two co-defendants, it appears they had pleaded guilty and it is not apparent when they first started giving an account of the respondent’s alleged involvement. Mr Williams cautions against speculating about the reasons for the delay.

45. Fourthly, Mr Williams submits that the District Judge’s reliance on the likelihood that the respondent’s ambition to join the British Army, in sensitive roles, would be thwarted if he were to be extradited “and convicted” is illogical. If the British Army were to refuse to admit him to such sensitive roles because of a conviction, that cannot be said to feed into a conclusion that his extradition would be oppressive.

46. As regards ground 1(b), Mr Williams acknowledged that the assessment of hardship can differ depending on whether it is viewed through the lens of private life under article 8 or passage of time. Nonetheless, he submits that the District Judge’s finding of hardship in article 8 is of some relevance when looking at his overall assessment in the context of s.82. He submits it particularly feeds into his fourth point, as the District Judge did not recognise sufficiently when making his finding of oppression that loss of employment is a routine consequence of extradition.

47. Mr Williams denies that the appellant is simply taking issue with the weight the District Judge gave to these factors. He submits that the points raised amount to errors of analysis. His position in relation to the sentencing range in the UK, the expiry of limitation in respect of the co-defendants, and the loss of opportunity to join the British Army if convicted, is that those are matters that should not have been taken into account at all.

48. Mr Stansfeld contends that the District Judge was entitled to give the weight that he did to the seriousness of the offence. He cautions me against drawing any inference that the safety of any person was at risk in circumstances where there is no allegation to that effect, nor any information regarding the distance between the house and the vehicle. The authorities demonstrate that it was open to the District Judge to consider how the alleged offending would be viewed in this jurisdiction, as a cross-check, even in a case where the sentence in the requesting state was known: Jagiellowicz v Regional Court in Elblag (Poland) [2023] EWHC 2751 (Admin), [1] and [33] (as Mr Williams acknowledged in reply).

49. The fact that the public interest does not require the prosecution of the two co-defendants precisely because of the passage of time since the commission of the alleged offence is material, Mr Stansfeld submits, in considering how the seriousness of the offence and the public interest in pursuing a prosecution in respect of it is viewed in Azerbaijan. That is particularly so given that the respondent is not a fugitive. The only reason limitation has not expired in his case is because he was living lawfully in the UK, as he had been for several years before the alleged offence was committed, and as the authorities of Azerbaijan would have been aware having interviewed him in 2016 and seen his travel documents on his subsequent visits. Indeed, if one of his two visits to Azerbaijan in 2022 had taken place in December, when he was first identified as an accused, it may be that limitation would have expired in his case, too.

50. He submits that the District Judge’s conclusion that the delay appears to be culpable or at least inadequately explained, and the weight the District Judge gave to that extensive delay, involving the investigation being suspended for a period amounting to over six years, cannot be faulted.

51. As regards his application to join the British Army, Mr Stansfeld submits that the focus should be on the impact of extradition. Even if there was an improper focus on the impact of a potential conviction, the relevant point which the District Judge had well in mind was that extradition was oppressive in the case of this young man who had come here when he was 17 years old, commendably educated himself, worked and developed strong community ties, gaining British citizenship and culminating in his application to join the British Army. There was a high prospect that if he were extradited, that would be taken away from him. The respondent has now bought his own home which he would probably lose if he were extradited as he would be unable to pay his mortgage. While the purchase is subsequent to the extradition hearing, it is an indicator of his personal success and communities ties, of which the District Judge was aware. The reality is that if he were to be extradited, whether that results in a conviction or not, it would be likely to destroy his ambition of serving in the British Army, given his age and that he would not simply be able to pick up his life where he left off, but would be picking up the pieces without the benefit of any family in the UK to help him.

Decision

52. Following the withdrawal of ground 1(a) there is no longer any contention that the District Judge erred in directing himself as to the applicable law. On the contrary, he properly directed himself by reference to Kakis and Gomes; and noted the observation of Collins J in Kila v Governor of Brixton Prison [2004] EWHC 2824 (Admin) that:

“the mere fact of delay is unlikely in most cases, indeed the vast majority of cases, to justify a decision that to return would be oppressive. There must be more than mere delay.”

53. I reject the contention that the District Judge made any error in his assessment of the gravity of the alleged offence. In the context of his s.82 assessment, the District Judge did not limit himself to noting that the alleged offence was neither trivial nor the most serious of crimes to come before these courts. He also observed that the minimum sentence was three years[2] and that the alleged crime appeared to have been carefully planned, and involved three people. He was obviously aware that it was a conspiracy allegation. He had already noted that in Azerbaijan it is classified as a “less serious crime” for which the limitation period is seven years.

54. It is also plain from his conclusions in respect of article 8 that he assessed the alleged offence as relatively serious. That is consistent with the cross-check he undertook, and which, as I agree with Mr Stansfeld, he was entitled to undertake (see paragraph ‎48 above), by reference to how the alleged offending would be likely to be viewed in this jurisdiction. In that context, the District Judge observed that it would be regarded as “serious offending in the UK”. The District Judge had ample detail regarding the alleged offence and the respondent on which to found his view that, while serious, in the particular circumstances “a suspended sentence may result” in this jurisdiction. It seems to me that the respondent is right to describe this aspect of the appellant’s case as nothing more than a disagreement with the weight that the District Judge accorded to the seriousness of the alleged offending, in circumstances where that assessment cannot sensibly be faulted.

55. Nor is there any merit in the contention that the District Judge erred in taking into account, when assessing whether extradition would be oppressive by reason of the passage of time, that the courts of Azerbaijan have ruled that the two co-accused cannot be held criminally liable because the applicable limitation period had expired. First, it is of obvious relevance in considering the lengthy delay, comprising long periods during which there was no active investigation ongoing, and whether it is culpable, that it occurred in circumstances where the authorities would have known that a seven-year limitation period applied.

56. Secondly, the fact that the criminal proceedings against the co-accused have been terminated by reason of the expiry of the limitation period can be taken as reflective of how the Azerbaijan legislature and courts view the public interest in prosecution of an offence of this nature at this distance in time from its alleged commission.

57. Thirdly, it is material that the ability of the appellant to seek to hold the respondent criminally liable is entirely fortuitous. The delay in the cases of the co-accused occurred equally in the respondent’s case, and it was in no way caused by his absence from the jurisdiction. He was living lawfully and openly in the UK, as the Azerbaijan authorities would have been aware. He was not a fugitive but was free to come and go, as indeed he did on many occasions.

58. I am also wholly unpersuaded that the District Judge erred in his assessment that the lengthy delay was inadequately explained, or his observation that there was “some merit” in the submission that there had been culpable delay on the part of the government in pursuing the case. I accept that it will not necessarily follow from a lack of explanation that there has been fault on the part of the requesting State. But, here, the District Judge was entitled to infer from the way in which the investigation was stopped and started on numerous occasions, often rapidly, resulting in there being no active investigation for the vast majority of the time prior to the expiry of the ordinary seven-year limitation period, that the delay was culpable. This is not a case where the respondent’s identity was unknown. Due to the family connection, his identity was known from the outset. He was questioned as a witness about the incident less than four months after it occurred and thereafter it appears very little was done to progress the investigation for many years.

59. On the face of it, there is more to be said for the appellant’s contention that loss of the opportunity to join the British Army in sensitive roles would not be oppressive if that were to flow from a conviction for the alleged offence. It is apparent that the way in which it is put in the judgment reflects the fact that the respondent was cross-examined regarding his ability to join the British Army, including by reference to the fact that a conviction is not an automatic bar, and the District Judge is, here, recording his acceptance of the respondent’s evidence that it is highly unlikely he would be able to join in such circumstances.

60. However, the experienced District Judge was clearly aware – as he directed himself – that the focus was on whether it would be oppressive to extradite the respondent by reason of the passage of time. In that context, he was entitled to give weight, as I consider that he did, to the likely impact of extradition on the respondent’s ambition (which he had taken concrete steps to fulfil) to serve in the British Army in the field of cyber security. In any event, I am satisfied having regard to the fresh evidence, in addition to that which was before the District Judge, that the extradition proceedings have already significantly delayed the respondent’s ability to take up the conditional offer he received, and there is a high risk that if he were extradited, irrespective of the outcome, by the time he returns to the UK he may exceed the age limit for the roles for which he has applied. For these reasons, I do not consider that the District Judge gave excessive weight to the risk that the respondent will lose his chance to fulfil his ambition of serving if he were to be extradited.

61. The District Judge expressly directed himself that “hardship … is not enough” to establish oppression, and that the test will not easily be satisfied. In my judgement, his recognition, in the context of his article 8 analysis, that extradition would amount to an interference with the respondent’s private life which would cause “hardship”, does not contradict his conclusion, when addressing s.82, that the impact of extraditing him would be oppressive by reason of the passage of time.

62. Stepping back and considering the District Judge’s assessment as a whole, I conclude that the appeal must be dismissed. The decade since the alleged commission of the offence represents most of the respondent’s adult life. In that time, he has built his life in the UK. He has taken commendable steps since arriving here alone at the age of 17 to educate himself to postgraduate level, to work and volunteer, and to integrate into the community. He has become a British citizen and invested much time and effort seeking to fulfil his ambition of serving in the British Army. There is no satisfactory explanation for the delay, which the District Judge was entitled to find was culpable, and it has had the effect that criminal proceedings against both co-accused had to be ended after the expiry of the seven-year limitation period. The passage of time since the respondent was questioned about the incident more than 10 years ago, together with his ability regularly to travel to Azerbaijan unhindered, is bound to have engendered in him a sense of security. In all the circumstances, I conclude that the District Judge was not wrong to find that extraditing the respondent for an offence of conspiring with others to burn a vehicle, which he is alleged to have committed more than 10 years ago, when he was 23 years old, would be oppressive having regard to the passage of time.

Conclusion

63. The appeal is dismissed.

Notes

[1] In the translation, the terms used differ from the classification given in article 15 but it may well be that these terms are intended to reflect the first and second most serious categories of offences.

[2] I note that the decision relieving the two co-accused of any criminal liability suggests that Mr Nadir had been “sentenced only to a fine for the present crime”, which appears inconsistent with the suggestion that there is a minimum term of three years. However, this may, as Mr Williams suggested, reflect an inaccuracy in the translation and so I have addressed the appeal on the assumption that there is a three-year minimum term. That is the basis on which the District Judge proceeded and it cannot be said to underestimate the seriousness of the alleged offence.


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