Miscellaneous United Kingdom
Beaufort Hall Residential Home Limited v Belize Offshore Services Limited
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2703 (BP)
Case No: PT-2025-000451
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION
PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 28 October 2026
Before :
MASTER BRIGHTWELL
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Between :
| BEAUFORT HALL RESIDENTIAL HOME LIMITED | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| (1) BELIZE OFFSHORE SERVICES LIMITED (2) THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HM REVENUE AND CUSTOMS |
Defendant |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Michael Firth KC (instructed by Morr & Co) for the Claimant
Imran Afzal KC, Nicholas Macklam and Riya Bhatt (instructed by HM Revenue and Customs) for the Second Defendant
Hearing dates: 14 and 15 September 2026
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Approved Judgment
Crown Copyright ©
This judgment will be handed down remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to The National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 2:00pm on Wednesday 28 October 2026.
Master Brightwell:
1. The issues for the court on this Part 8 claim could well form the basis of the problem in an undergraduate equity examination. The claim concerns two principal questions: (a) the construction and effect of the express assignment by the sole legal and beneficial owner of real property of the beneficial interest in that property to a person who is to hold as trustee, and whether it can take effect as a declaration of trust, and (b) whether the discretionary trusts on which that person was to hold that interest are void for uncertainty of objects. If the discretionary trusts are void, a consequential question arises whether the ultimate default gift to charity fails with them, or remains valid.
Factual background
2. The claimant company (“the company”) was as at October 2014 the registered proprietor of the property at 16 Eastbrook Avenue, Edmonton, London N9 8DA (“the Property”), which was and is rented to a partnership which carried on a care home business there. There was no prior trust over the Property, and the only incumbrance was a registered charge in favour of Bank of Scotland plc (“BOS”).
3. Having taken advice and received a report from Baxendale Walker Ltd, well known for specialising in tax-avoidance schemes, the company’s directors resolved on 6 August 2014 to make contributions to a scheme established under an irrevocable trust for the benefit of a class of discretionary beneficiaries. The trustee was to be the first defendant, Belize Offshore Services Ltd (“the trustee”), a services provider in Belize which has taken no part in these proceedings. The Baxendale Walker report on which the directors acted called the “Scheme” the ‘MINERVA Corporate Capital Trust Plan’, said to use ‘Remuneration Trust technology’ [sic].
4. The dispute about the intended tax effect of the Scheme is not before this court, which is concerned with those issues set out at paragraph 1 above. In brief, what was proposed was to donate an asset to the discretionary trust created as part of the Scheme for the trustee to provide benefits to a class of beneficiaries. The Baxendale Walker report stated that employees of the company must be excluded, and that those entitled to benefit must be defined in another way, but that those who were in fact employees may benefit if their entitlement was for some reason other than that they were employees. The Baxendale Walker report asserted that ‘the Asset donation is guaranteed to be free of all capital taxes and stamp duty by express legislation’. The report was supported by a generic opinion of tax counsel, Mr Robert Venables QC.
5. The company and the trustee then executed a discretionary trust deed dated 14 October 2014 creating an English law discretionary trust over the sum of £100, with the Trust Fund conventionally defined so as to include, inter alia, all property added by way of further settlement.
6. By a deed of assignment executed by the company and the trustee also dated 14 October 2014, the company assigned the whole of its beneficial right and interest in the Property to the trustee, and the trustee accepted the assignment and undertook to hold the Property for the purposes of the trust and as capital of the trust. I will comment further on the terms of both the trust instrument and the deed of assignment below.
7. HM Revenue and Customs have issued the company with an assessment to corporation tax on chargeable gains for the period ending 31 October 2014, on the footing that the company disposed of its beneficial interest in 16 Eastbrook Avenue by the deed of assignment, and that no relief was available in respect of that disposal under Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, s.239, concerned with the disposal by a close company of an asset to the trustees of an employee trust complying with the requirements of Inheritance Tax Act 1984, ss.13 and 86. This would provide for a no gain/no loss treatment. HMRC have estimated that the market value of the property as at 14 October 2014 was £2.5 million, and have made an assessment to tax on the basis of a chargeable gain of £1,374,859.
8. There are separate proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal, concerned with the application of the statutory provisions mentioned above, as the company has appealed the HMRC assessment. Those proceedings have been stayed pending the determination of the present claim.
The deed of assignment
9. The first question to arise is the validity and effect of the document described as a deed of assignment. It is common ground that by this deed the company dealt or sought to deal with the property at 16 Eastbrook Avenue and that, immediately before the deed was executed, the company was the sole legal and beneficial owner of that property, subject to a charge in favour of BOS.
10. The recitals to the deed of assignment say the following:
‘1. The Assignor is the owner of the Property.
2. The Assignees are the Trustees of the Beaufort Hall Residential Home Limited Corporate Capital Trust ("the Scheme”) which was established by a Deed dated [sic] 2014.
3. The Scheme is intended by the Company and the Trustees thereof to constitute a trust falling within Section 13 Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (as specified under Section 86(1) Inheritance Tax Act 1984) and Section 239 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992.
4. The Assignor wishes to assign the whole of its beneficial right and interest in the Property to the Assignees by way of gift to be held for the purposes of the Scheme.’
11. Clause 1 of the deed defines the company and then defines the subject matter of the assignment in this way:
‘“the Property” means the whole of the beneficial right and interest presently owned by the Company in the Assets held on the Company’s balance sheet as stated in the last financial statements of the Company, a copy of which is attached as Schedule 1 hereto and as further specified in the schedule attached as Schedule 2 hereto;’
12. The operative provisions, which were the subject of debate at the hearing, are as follows:
‘2. Assignment
2.1 The Assignor hereby assigns the whole of its beneficial right and interest in the Property by way of gift for no consideration to the Assignees free of all liens and charges.
2.2 The Assignor hereby agrees to do all such things (including the execution of any document) which are necessary to perfect such assignment.
3. Acceptance
3.1 The Assignees hereby accept the assignment to them of the Property and hereby undertake to hold the Property for the purposes of the Scheme and as capital of the Scheme.’
13. Schedule 2 to the deed of assignment initially contained reference to 24 Abbey Road, Enfield, EN1 2QL, a property not owned by the claimant. The first defendant prepared an amended schedule on the date of the deed of assignment, with the intended address of 16 Eastbrook Avenue. It is common ground that the deed was executed with reference to 16 Eastbrook Avenue, and no point on that initial error was taken during the hearing.
14. The company also executed a series of resolutions on 14 October 2014, executed as part of a single suite of documents created for the purposes of implementing the scheme. These provided as follows:
‘1. It is confirmed that on 14 October 2014 transfers by way of gift of the whole of the beneficial right and interest in certain assets belonging to the Company were made by the Company to the Trustees of the Beaufort Hall Residential Care Ltd Corporate Capital Trust, which was established by a Deed dated 14 October 2014.
2. It is noted that the Company and the Trustees have executed the relevant Deed of Assignment.
3. It is noted that a copy of the said Deed of Assignment has been provided to the Directors, which provides details of the assets so assigned.
4. It is resolved that Belize Offshore Services Limited be herewith confirmed as the sole beneficial owner of the said Assets.’.
Discussion
15. HMRC contends that the deed of assignment took effect to transfer the beneficial interest in the Property to the trustee. If so, this will have had the result that after it had been executed the legal title was held by the company as nominee for the trustee, which held the beneficial interest in the Property on the trusts of the trust instrument which was separately declared (and which is considered in the next section of this judgment).
16. The company contends that the deed is void. Its case is that the deed was intended to transfer the legal and beneficial ownership of the Property, that such a transfer required further steps to be taken which were never taken, and that a failed transfer cannot take effect as a declaration of trust.
17. Both counsel agreed that the deed falls to be construed according to well-established principles of interpretation, which apply to trust instruments just as they do to written contracts. These have been summarised by Lord Burrows JSC in the following way, in Providence Building Services Ltd v Hexagon Housing Association Ltd [2026] UKSC 1 at [21]-[24]:
‘21. The modern approach in English law to contractual interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of the words used by applying an objective and contextual approach. As was said by Lord Hoffmann in his seminal speech in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (“ICS”), at p 912, the aim of contractual interpretation is to ascertain “the meaning which [the contract] would convey to a reasonable person having all the [relevant] background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.” His Lordship also explained that business (or commercial) common sense may be relevant. In contrast, declarations of the subjective intentions of the parties and, for reasons of practical policy, previous negotiations cannot be used in determining what the contractual language means.
22. In Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; [2015] AC 1619, the Supreme Court clarified that the words used by the parties are of primary importance so that one must be careful to avoid placing too much weight on business common sense (or purpose) at the expense of the words used; and one must be astute not to rewrite the contract so as to protect one of the parties from having entered into a bad bargain.
23. In Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24; [2017] AC 1173, Lord Hodge, with whom the other Supreme Court Justices agreed, pointed out, at para 12, that contractual interpretation “involves an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences are investigated…”.
24. It is also clear law that explanatory notes to a contract may be admissible evidence as an aid to interpretation: see Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 8th ed (2024), paras 3.38 – 3.42, citing, inter alia, the reliance on the explanatory notes that accompanied the contract in ICS. ….’
18. Where a number of contracts are entered into together, the existence of the others is part of the factual background to be taken into account on the question of construction, i.e. as part of the factual matrix. It is also relevant where they cross-refer or are intended to operate as a package: see Ingenious Games LLP v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2019] UKUT 226 (TCC) at [108]. See too Shah v Shah [2010] EWCA Civ 1408 at [21].
19. The parties are agreed that the Baxendale Walker report is admissible and can be taken into account in ascertaining the matrix of fact, or the background knowledge reasonably available to the parties when the deed of assignment (and associated documents) was executed. The Details of Claim filed with the claim form, albeit not in the form of a witness statement, do state that the report was before the company’s board when it resolved to enter into the Scheme. Mr Macklam (who made the principal oral submissions on behalf of HMRC) pointed out, however, that the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the objective meaning of a document and that, as the highest courts have repeatedly confirmed, the subjective intentions and beliefs of parties are not admissible.
20. A key part of the company’s case on this point, from which its arguments are derived, is that the company was up until 14 October 2014 the sole legal owner of the Property. Mr Firth’s argument is predicated on the submission that the company intended by the deed to transfer the legal title in the Property, being the only interest it had, to the trustee. The argument then proceeds by asserting that the company, acting by its directors, was mistaken in believing that it currently held a separate equitable interest in the Property, when there was none. The intention was to assign the entirety of the company’s interest in the Property, which as it included the freehold, could only be completed by registration, and the company did not do all that it needed to do to transfer title. There is accordingly an incomplete gift of the freehold, which equity will not perfect or treat as a valid declaration of trust.
21. I consider that it would be to put the cart before the horse to proceed either on the assumption that the company made a mistake when executing the deed, or as to what any such mistake was. The process of interpreting a trust or other document does not assume that any mistake was made. The possibility that a word or expression might as a matter of objective interpretation have a meaning other than its general meaning (and the inherent likelihood of such an interpretation) is something which must be borne in mind when carrying out the exercise of construction in accordance with the authorities. There does not seem to me either as a general proposition or when considering the terms of the deed in this case any reason to assume that there is a mistake.
22. Both the recitals and the definition of the Property in clause 1.1 refer to the Property as ‘the whole of [the/its] beneficial right and interest’ presently owned in assets which are subsequently defined as the property at 16 Eastbrook Avenue. That presently owned interest, being the beneficial right and interest in that property, is then by clause 2.1 ‘hereby assign[ed]’ to the trustee.
23. The written resolutions of the company made on the same day and prepared as part of the documentation for the same Scheme, confirmed that the company had made transfers to the trustee by way of gift of the whole of the beneficial right and interest in certain assets by ‘the relevant Deed of Assignment’, and resolved to confirm the trustee ‘as the sole beneficial owner of the said assets’.
24. Mr Macklam submitted that the intention of the document was clear; the company intended to give the trustee an immediate beneficial interest in the Property. The effect of this is that the company retained the legal title, i.e. that whilst in form the document was an assignment it falls to be construed as to the same effect as a declaration of trust.
25. I have reached the clear conclusion that HMRC’s construction of the deed is correct. The deed assigned or purported to assign the beneficial interest in the Property, in circumstances where the legal and beneficial ownership were previously united in the company. As I will come on to explain, the two forms of ownership are conceptually distinct and capable of separation. There is no dispute that this result could have been achieved by the use of an express declaration of trust. I consider that the objective effect of the deed was immediately to vest the beneficial interest in the Property in the trustee while leaving the legal title where it was.
26. It is correct to say that there was no separate equitable estate in the Property before the execution of the deed. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson said in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 at 706:
‘A person solely entitled to the full beneficial ownership of money or property, both at law and in equity, does not enjoy an equitable interest in that property. The legal title carries with it all rights. Unless and until there is a separation of the legal and equitable estates, there is no separate equitable title. Therefore to talk about the bank “retaining” its equitable interest is meaningless.’
So, on facts very different from those of the present case, where the bank wanted to show that the local authority recipient of moneys was constituted as a trustee, ‘the bank must demonstrate circumstances which raised a trust for the first time’ (at 707).
27. If a legal owner holds a 100% beneficial interest in an asset, the legal title carries with it and confers full beneficial ownership of that asset: LA Micro Group (UK) Ltd v LA Micro Group Inc [2024] UKSC 42 at [20] (Lord Briggs JSC). But this does not mean that the beneficial ownership is the same thing as the legal ownership. Lord Briggs distinguished ‘full beneficial ownership’ from the state of being the legal owner. Each has distinct incidents. The expression ‘legal and beneficial owner’, when used, signifies possession of the incidents of both forms of ownership. As Baroness Hale said in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [58], ‘in the domestic consumer context, a conveyance into joint names indicates both legal and beneficial joint tenancy’. Legal joint tenancy and beneficial joint tenancy are distinct forms of ownership (as are legal and beneficial sole ownership); for instance, a beneficial joint tenancy can be severed but a legal joint tenancy, at least since 1926, cannot.
28. I do not consider that it would be a coherent interpretation of the deed of assignment that the property sought to be assigned by it is the legal title to the Property. It is part of the background knowledge assumed to be held by the makers of the document that the Property was owned by the company legally and beneficially. The ‘whole of the beneficial right…presently held’ by the company is conceptually distinct from the legal title. By referring to the beneficial interest and not to the legal interest or title (or simply to ‘title’), the most natural interpretation is that the deed sought to do what the most natural reading of those words suggests, to transfer or assign the entirety of the beneficial interest in the Property to the trustee, for it to hold on the trusts of the Scheme in accordance with clause 3.1 of the deed. There was no need to transfer the legal title to give effect to the Scheme. What was required was for the trustee to become the beneficial owner of the Property such that it could hold it on those trusts.
29. In response to this point, Mr Firth relied on the Baxendale-Walker report and, in particular, the following statement (at 10.2.2):
‘Where the asset is mortgaged (as is ually [sic] the case) then of course it is the equity of redemption which is being passed to the trust. No consent of the lender is required. For accounting purposes, it is appropriate to leave the asset and matching liability on the balance sheet and to add a note that “In the accounting period the company gifted the equity of redemption in [description of fixed asset] to a Remuneration Trust.”’
30. The suggestion is that this shows that the company was mistaken as to what asset was owned, believing that there was a pre-existing equitable interest, being the equity of redemption. This submission is asking the paragraph in the Baxendale-Walker report to do a considerable amount of work. This paragraph appears to me to be concerned with the accounting treatment of an assignment after it has been carried out rather than with either the form or the substance of the assignment. Whilst I accept that the board read the report and knew that the Property was subject to a legal charge, there is no evidential basis for assuming that they had any particular understanding of what the paragraph quoted above meant for the purposes of the transaction they were undertaking. As Mr Firth pointed out, the expression ‘equity of redemption’ is no longer a useful concept as mortgages are no longer created through a conveyance of the fee simple, as Nugee J explained in Courtwood Holdings SA v Woodley Properties Ltd [2018] EWHC 2163 (Ch) at [173].
31. It is conceivable that, if this were a claim for the rectification or rescission of the deed (no such claim being before the court), the surviving director of the company might have given evidence that she was materially mistaken in some way, either because of this paragraph in the Baxendale-Walker report or otherwise. It is, however, wholly unclear to me how this paragraph might have affected the directors’ understanding of the reference in the deed to the ‘whole of the beneficial right and interest presently owned by the Company in the Assets’. I see no reason for that expression to bear any meaning other than its usual and obvious meaning.
32. There is also some tension in this argument put forward on behalf of the company. On the one hand, it supposes that the company believed that there was a pre-existing equitable interest in the Property but, at the same time, it seeks to argue that the deed sought to transfer the legal title (or, perhaps, the legal and beneficial ownership) in the Property. The second proposition does not follow from the first.
33. To define the subject matter of the deed as the legal interest in the Property would be to replace the words used with something which is not found in the language of the documents at all (see BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Eurosail-UK [2013] 1 WLR 1408 at [64], Lord Hope DPSC). In that context, I do not consider that the requirement in clause 2.2 of the deed for the trustee to do all such things as are necessary to perfect the assignment (said by the company to connote the execution of a TR1 form of transfer) assists. That assumes what is sought to be established. Clause 2.2 is a conventional provision in a deed which effects a disposition and does not connote some particular step being anticipated, especially where the unspecified step is inconsistent with the express words of the disposition.
34. The company also relies on the provision in clause 2.1, that the assignment was ‘free of all liens and charges’. Mr Firth submitted that, because of the registered charge in favour of BOS, the company could not declare a trust giving the trustee the beneficial interest free of all liens and charges, such that further steps on the part of the company would be required. I disagree. What was assigned was all the beneficial interest and right of the company in the Property, which to the knowledge of all concerned was already subject to the BOS charge. The reference to the assignment being ‘free of all liens and charges’ clearly means that the company was itself not retaining any liens or charges itself; this cannot be a reference to the BOS charge.
35. Mr Firth submitted also that the use of the word ‘hold’ in clause 3.1 (i.e., where the trustee agreed to hold the assigned property subject to the trusts giving effect to the Scheme), and its absence from the operative clause 2.1, point against the intention to create a trust. In Shah v Shah [2010] EWCA Civ 1408, a shareholder completed a stock transfer form and wrote to the intended transferee, stating that he intended to hold the interest until registration, but did not deliver the share certificate. Arden LJ held that the use of the words, ‘I am … holding’, rather than assigning or giving, showed an intention on the part of the donee to hold as trustee until the transfer was registered, see at [22]. This is coupled with an argument that it is of moment that a deliberate decision was taken not to include any express declaration of trust in the deed of assignment. It is pointed out that the company had taken advice and made a decision not to make a declaration of trust when it could have done so. It was plainly capable of doing so, as evidenced by the fact that one of the documents executed as part of the Scheme was indeed a trust instrument.
36. The question is whether the settlor evinced an intention to deprive itself of its beneficial interest in the Property (Deslauriers v Guardian Asset Management Limited [2017] UKPC 34 at [41). It seems to me clear, both from the deed of assignment and from the resolutions made on the same day as part of the same Scheme, that this is precisely what the company intended to do. What the Baxendale-Walker report indicated (paragraph 5.6) was required was the gifting of assets to the ‘Remuneration Trust’, which could be done ‘by executing the appropriate Deed of Assignment and Transfers’. If legal and beneficial ownership was to be gifted, then a transfer would be required and not a deed of assignment. This would not be so where only beneficial ownership was to be given to the trustee. There is no evidence that the directors of the company had any actual understanding of the difference between a trust and an assignment or which would support the conclusion that they would not objectively have intended a separation of legal and beneficial ownership unless the word ‘trust’ was used. Furthermore, the categorical statement that the whole of the company’s beneficial right and interest in the Property is assigned obviates any need for a statement as to who ‘held’ the (legal title in the) Property. In Shah v Shah, the use of the word ‘hold’ created a bare trust to last only until registration of the share transfer. A temporary trust such as that would have served no purpose here.
The effect of the rule in Milroy v Lord
37. The company’s arguments proceed on the footing that it can never be permissible to construe an assignment of a beneficial interest as separating legal and beneficial title and thus having the same effect as a declaration of trust. There are two separate points which can be made on the basis of authority.
38. First, there is the general rule that equity will not perfect a failed gift, and will not without more give effect to an ineffective transfer of (legal) title by treating it as a declaration of trust, or else ‘every imperfect instrument would be made effectual by being converted into a perfect trust’: Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De G, F & J 264; Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 at 511-512, Lord Evershed MR.
39. Separately, the claimant relies on authority for the proposition that it is impermissible to treat an assignment as a declaration of trust. I consider that this second point goes to the true construction of the document and not to whether or not equity will intervene to save a failed gift. The two points are conceptually distinct. The question whether an ineffective gift can be saved can logically arise only once the court has determined that as a matter of interpretation the gift is ineffective. The rule stated in Milroy v Lord concerns the question whether assets have been vested in a person, either by an absolute transfer from A to B, or by a transfer from A to B where B is to hold as trustee. Where such a transfer is intended, ‘the Court will not hold the intended transfer’ (i.e., if invalid) ‘to operate as a declaration of trust’ (Turner LJ).
40. I have explained why I do not consider this to be the question to arise here. As a matter of interpretation, the company was not by the deed of assignment seeking to transfer the legal title to the property. There was no imperfect gift of the legal title.
41. A different question arises where the issue is whether a putative settlor has successfully declared a trust over his or her property. In such a case the question is whether the settlor has manifested an intention to part with his beneficial ownership of the property.
42. Mr Firth accepted that the use of the word ‘trust’ is not required in order for a court to be able to find the requisite intention. As Scarman LJ explained in Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527 at 530, with reference to the then current 27th edition of Snell’s Principles of Equity:
‘… We are concerned only with the first of the three certainties [necessary for the creation of a trust] and it is this:
“The words” — that is the words of the declaration relied on — “must be so used that on the whole they ought to be construed as imperative … No particular form of expression is necessary for the creation of a trust, if on the whole it can be gathered that a trust was intended. ‘A trust may well be created, although there may be an absence of any expression of terms imposing confidence.’ A trust may thus be created without using the word ‘trust,’ for what the court regards is the substance and effect of the words used.”
Mr Blythe has taken the court through the detailed evidence and submits that one cannot find anywhere in the history of events a declaration of trust in the sense of finding the deceased saying: “I am now disposing of my interest in this fund so that you, Mrs Paul, now have a beneficial interest in it.”’
43. See too Deslauriers v Guardian Asset Management Limited at [40]-[41]:
‘40. In order to declare himself a trustee, a settlor need not employ the express language of a declaration of trust. As Sir George Jessel MR observed in Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 18 Eq 11, 14:
“It is true he need not use the words, ‘I declare myself a trustee,’ but he must do something which is equivalent to it, and use expressions which have that meaning; for, however anxious the Court may be to carry out a man's intention, it is not at liberty to construe words otherwise than according to their proper meaning.”
41. Nevertheless, a settlor’s intention to deal with the property so as to deprive himself of its beneficial ownership must be clearly evinced. …’
44. Deslauriers’ case was an orthodox application of these principles. Mrs Deslauriers had executed a trust in which she recited an intention shortly to transfer property into the names of trustees to be held upon the trusts declared, but she never did so. A further recital indicating that the trust was to take effect immediately did not assist the defendants, who contended that a bare trust arose upon the execution of the trust instrument, not the trusts declared in the instrument (see at [43]). The Privy Council accordingly held (at [44]) that the recital did not indicate an intention on the part of the settlor to constitute herself as trustee before the property was vested in the trustees. The settlement was intended to be effected only by a transfer to trustees.
45. Mr Firth’s submission, however, was that a document described as an assignment simply cannot take effect as a declaration of trust, because of the statement in Richards v Delbridge (approved in Deslauriers’ case) that a court cannot construe words other than according to their proper meaning. That statement must be viewed in its full context, which makes clear that whether a settlor has declared herself a trustee is a matter of construction and words must be used which have that meaning. Deslauriers’ case makes plain that the court looks at precisely what the parties contend was being achieved, and then considers whether, as a matter of interpretation, it has been achieved. These cases are not authority for some bright-line rule of construction that a document which assigns an interest can never be construed as having the effect of leaving the settlor as trustee, holding on trust for the assignee. The question is whether the settlor’s intention to deal with the property so as to deprive herself of the beneficial ownership of it is clearly evinced: Deslauriers at [41].
46. In the present case, and unlike in Deslauriers’ case, the validity of the deed of assignment does not depend on the interposition of a trust to take effect until the later vesting of the Property in the trustee. That is because, for reasons I have already explained, on construction there was a valid assignment of the company’s beneficial interest in the Property and thus no need for the imposition of a trust to bridge the temporal gap until a gift could be completed.
47. The authorities relied on by the company in this context demonstrate, on analysis, a distinction between (a) the true construction of the document or documents in issue in the events which have happened, and (b) whether, if there has been an imperfect gift such as to invoke the rule in Milroy v Lord, equity can and should do anything to save the gift. For instance, the majority of the Court of Appeal in Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075 held that there was no valid legal transfer or equitable assignment of shares without delivery of the share transfer certificate, but went on to hold that equity could intervene because it would be unconscionable for the donor of the shares to recall the gift. Then, in Sheffield v Sheffield [2013] EWHC 3927 (Ch), it was held as a matter of construction that a declaration of trust by a beneficiary of his beneficial interest was indeed such a declaration, and not an assignment, where the question for the court was whether that beneficiary had become a sub-trustee such that the head trustees remained accountable to him. The judge then expressed views about Milroy v Lord, which were not part of the ratio and in any event concerned with the role and status of the sub-trustee.
Conclusion on the first issue
48. I consider that the objective meaning of the deed, fully supported by the resolution prepared together with it and executed immediately afterwards, was to constitute the trustee the beneficial owner of the Property without affecting the legal title. Since the deed effected a ‘difference between the identity of the legal title holder and the beneficial owner (or owners) then’ the effect of what was done was that ‘the legal title will be that of a trustee and the beneficial interests will all be equitable interests arising under that trust’ (quoting the words of Lord Briggs in the LA Micro Group case at [20]). An equitable interest was, therefore, engrafted onto the legal title by the deed of assignment (see Commissioner of State Revenue v Rojoda Pty Ltd [2020] HCA 7 at [44]).
49. This conclusion is reached by ascertaining the objective meaning and effect of the deed of assignment, not by the intervention of equity in rescuing an otherwise imperfect gift.
Uncertainty of objects
50. The next question to arise is whether the discretionary trust created as part of the Scheme (i.e. on which the trustee agreed to hold the Property in clause 3.1 of the deed of assignment) is void for uncertainty of objects.
51. Clause 2 of the trust instrument provides that the Trust Fund is to be held on trust during the Trust Period (of 125 years) subject to the following trust power, of a type conventionally found in a discretionary trust:
‘2.2 Upon Trust before the expiration of the Trust Period to pay, appropriate, appoint or apply the whole or such part or parts of the income of the Trust Fund arising during the Trust Period as the Trustees may in their absolute discretion think fit to or for the benefit of or to the absolute entitlement of all or such one or more exclusive of the other or others of the Beneficiaries in such shares and proportions if more than one and generally in such manner as the Trustees may in their absolute discretion think fit.’
52. Clause 2.4 provides a further wide power to apply or appoint the capital of the Trust Fund to or for the benefit of the Beneficiaries.
53. Clause 2.5 then provides that the Trust Fund is held by the trustees:
‘At the expiration of the Trust Period upon Trust to apply both capital and income of the Trust Fund to or for the benefit of or to the absolute entitlement of all or such one or more exclusive of the other or others of the Beneficiaries in such shares and proportions if more than one and generally in such manner as the Trustees shall prior to or on the date of such expiration with the consent of the Protector (if any) in their absolute discretion determine.’
54. Clause 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 of the trust instrument defines the Beneficiaries as follows:
‘1.1.4 “the Beneficiaries” means:
(a) any individual who during the Trust Period is or has been a Provider (but not including a person who was a Provider but has died before the execution of this Deed);
(b) any spouse or civil partner of any person who falls within category (a) above;
(c) any person who was the spouse or civil partner of any person who fell within category (a) above immediately before the death of the latter;
(d) the children and remoter issue of any person, living or dead, who falls, or during his lifetime fell, within category (a) above;
(e) any person who is a spouse or civil partner of any person falling with category (d) above;
(e) [sic] any person who was a spouse or civil partner of any person falling with category (d) above immediately before the death of the latter (whether or not such person has subsequently entered into a marriage or civil partnership with a third party);
and Beneficiary has a corresponding meaning PROVIDED THAT no Excluded Person shall be a Beneficiary;
1.1.5 “Provider” and “Employed Person” are interpreted as follows:
(a) In the following two definitions (of “Provider” and “Employed Person”) “employed in the Particular Trade” shall be construed in accordance with the words in Inheritance Tax Act 1984 section 86(1) “employment in a particular trade or profession”, so that Providers and Employed Persons will each be “persons of a class defined by reference to employment in a particular trade or profession”, within the meaning of that subsection.
(i) a “Provider” means an individual who is or has been employed in the Particular Trade and who, while so employed, himself has provided or has been involved, whether as principal, partner, employee, independent contractor or otherwise, in the provision of, in either case in the course of the Particular Trade and during the Trust Period, finance to the Founder or to the Trustees or to any manager of the Trust Fund or any part thereof;
(ii) “Employed Person” means a person who is or has been employed in the Particular Trade;
(b) “the Particular Trade” means the trade or profession of lending money;’.
55. The company contends that the definition of Beneficiaries is conceptually uncertain in that there is no certainty as to the objects of the power. Mr Firth argued that the definition of ‘Provider’ rendered the identity of the Beneficiaries too vague to enable the trust to be administered by the trustee or to be supervised by the court. This was said to be so in two respects: (a) the reference to a person who is ‘involved’ in the provision of finance, and separately (b) the reference to the provision of ‘finance’.
56. It has been established since McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424, that the test for certainty of objects of a discretionary trust is that previously applicable to a mere power of appointment. This is whether it can be said with certainty whether any given individual (i.e. a given postulant) is or is not a member of the class, such that it does not fail simply because it is impossible to ascertain every member of the class: see at 450, Lord Wilberforce. It is, accordingly, not necessary to draw up a complete list of objects of the trust. The practical difficulty in any particular case of ascertaining the existence or whereabouts of members of the class does not render the trust invalid, but it may justify the trustees in approaching the court for directions (see at 457).
57. The majority in the House of Lords in McPhail v Doulton thus approved the application of the then recent decision in Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements (No.1) [1970] AC 508. Lord Upjohn explained the role of the court thus, at 522:
‘The court, whose task it is to discover that intention, starts by applying the usual canons of construction; words must be given their usual meaning, the clause should be read literally and in accordance with the ordinary rules of grammar. But very frequently, whether it be in wills, settlements or commercial agreements, the application of such fundamental canons leads nowhere, the draftsman has used words wrongly, his sentences border on the illiterate and his grammar may be appalling. It is then the duty of the court by the exercise of its judicial knowledge and experience in the relevant matter, innate common sense and desire to make sense of the settlers or parties’ expressed intentions, however obscure and ambiguous the language that may have been used, to give a reasonable meaning to that language if it can do so without doing complete violence to it. The fact that the court has to see whether the clause is “certain” for a particular purpose does not disentitle the court from doing otherwise than, in the first place, try to make sense of it.’
58. The point made here, that the court will strive to give workable meaning to a trust, was later expressed in the following way by Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, in Inland Revenue Commissioners v McMullen [1981] 1 AC 1 at 19:
‘… I would wish to express agreement with a contention made on behalf of the appellants and of the Attorney-General, but not agreed to on behalf of the respondents, that in construing trust deeds the intention of which is to set up a charitable trust, and in others too, where it can be claimed that there is an ambiguity, a benignant construction should be given if possible. This was the maxim of the civil law: “semper in dubiis benigniora praeferenda sunt.” There is a similar maxim in English law: “ut res magis valeat quam pereat.” It certainly applies to charities when the question is one of uncertainty (Weir v. Crum-Brown [1908] A.C. 162 , 167), and, I think, also where a gift is capable of two constructions one of which would make it void and the other effectual (cf. Bruce v. Deer Presbytery (1867) L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 96, 97; Houston v. Burns [1918] A.C. 337, per Lord Finlay L.C., at pp. 341-342, and cf. also In re Bain [1930] 1 Ch. 224, 230).’
59. The editors of Underhill and Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees (20th edn) give these examples, at 10.79, of how a benignant construction might save a clause from conceptual uncertainty where its objects are concerned:
‘Thus, a residuary bequest “to those beneficiaries who have only received small amounts” may be validated in context by being restricted to those who had received legacies of £25, £50 and £100 where other legatees had received £200 or £250. Similarly, a private discretionary trust for “Cambridge students” might be validated by restricting it to students from time to time studying as junior members of the University of Cambridge, so excluding foreigners studying English at Cambridge language schools, students at Cambridge Sixth Form Colleges and students whose homes are in Cambridge but who are studying elsewhere.’
60. The principal way in which Mr Firth argued the definition of Beneficiaries was conceptually uncertain was that it could not be understood what was intended by the use of the word ‘involved’. The relevant definition states that, in order to be a Provider, a person must be employed in the trade or profession of lending money and, whilst so employed, has provided or has been involved, whether as principal, partner, employee, independent contractor or otherwise, in the provision of finance to a relevant person. The company’s submission is that being ‘involved’ admits of every possible gradation from the trivial to the integral.
61. Mr Firth posited the following individuals, suggesting that it was not possible to know, conceptually, whether each of the following were in or out of the class:
(a) the bank’s credit committee member;
(b) the relationship manager;
(c) the analyst who prepared the credit paper;
(d) the solicitor who drafted the facility;
(e) the worker who photocopies a ‘finance’ contract so that it can be signed;
(f) the clerk who processed the drawdown,
(g) the receptionist who took the call.
62. I have not experienced the difficulty urged upon me by the company in relation to the conceptual meaning of this provision. Even without a benignant construction, I consider that the requirement for involvement in the provision of finance requires the identification of an objective commercial activity connected to the provision of finance. This seems to me to be what the general usage of the word ‘involved’ entails.
63. I agree with Mr Firth that, when faced with an argument that a discretionary trust is invalid, the court must first construe the clause, in order to form a view of and to determine whether the clause is conceptually certain. When the comments of Sachs LJ that the court considering conceptual certainty is not sitting as a court of construction (see Re Baden’s Deed Trusts (No.2) [1973] Ch 9 at 21) are put in context, he was not suggesting otherwise. He was saying merely that doubtful cases need not be resolved at this stage. As Lord Upjohn recognised in McPhail v Doulton at 523 (and now, of course, substituting in reference to the Business and Property Division):
‘Many difficult and borderline cases may occur in any one of these situations. But mere difficulty is nothing to the point. If the trustees feel difficulty or even doubt upon the point the Court of Chancery is available to solve it for them.’
64. As an exercise in contextual construction, the same principles apply as I have discussed above, see at paragraph 17. It is a relevant background fact here that the trust has been created as part of a tax avoidance scheme. Its purpose and the way in which it was intended to operate is clear not only from the surrounding documents (such as the Baxendale Walker report), but also from the trust instrument itself.
65. Clause 1.1.5(a) makes plain that the definition of Provider (which forms the basis of the definition of the Beneficiaries of the trust) is to be construed in accordance with the words in Inheritance Tax Act 1984 section 86(1): “employment in a particular trade or profession”. The requirement for involvement in the provision of finance does not appear in isolation. It was the intention of the settlor that there must be a direct connection with a particular trade or profession, in order that the benefit of the statutory provision might be obtained. This points, consistent with general usage as I have already noted, to the need for substantive involvement in the provision of finance by a person in order to qualify. It is to be remembered that a person is a Provider only if he is both an employee in the particular trade or profession, and involved in the relevant provision of finance. The need for both of these requirements to be satisfied also points to the intention that the involvement be substantively, and not only indirectly, connected to the provision of finance.
66. Mr Firth submitted that the provision is no more certain than the gift held to be uncertain and thus invalid in Re Wright’s Will Trusts [1982] Lexis Citation 1509. The testatrix in that case left her residuary estate to be held by her will trustees ‘for such people and institutions as they think have helped me or my late husband including’ certain expressly named objects. The Court of Appeal agreed with the judge below, who had said that ‘“helping” the testatrix “could mean anything from helping the testatrix across the road to saving her from death, dishonour or bankruptcy”.’ As Fox LJ put it, ‘[t]he problem is that one does not know what the testatrix meant by “help”’.
67. The question of what sort of past “help” Mrs Wright had in mind when making her will was not one which could have been capable of determination through a process of construction by sitting in her proverbial armchair. The subjective element was such that the meaning was incapable of ascertainment. The same might be said of a trust power to benefit “my old friends” or those with “moral claims” on the settlor (as discussed by the House of Lords in Re Gulbenkian). The involvement in the provision of finance by an employee entails no such purely subjective consideration. It is an objective criterion. As I explain more fully below, someone whose role does not comprise any substantive participation in the provision of finance seems to me not to be involved in it.
68. When construing a document, the court should consider each suggested interpretation, and check it against the provisions of the contract and investigate its commercial consequences. Where a provision is said by one party to be conceptually uncertain, one must undertake this exercise by examining the proposition that the provision is incapable of construction. To that end, the various examples which Mr Firth has put forward are helpful. They are generic and greater detail of the precise role of each putative individual, and knowledge of the way in which finance was in fact provided in each case, would be required in order to make a conclusive determination. At that stage, it would be largely an evidential question, as discussed by Lord Upjohn in McPhail v Doulton (see paragraph 57 above). The existence or potential existence of borderline cases is to be expected and does not render a provision conceptually uncertain. All the court requires to consider at this stage is whether, if the court were asked on a directions application whether Mr X or Ms Y were Providers, it would be capable of doing so.
69. While Mr Firth maintained the position that the provision could not be construed, this proposition must be tested against various options. If the suggested difficulty relates to the level of ‘involvement’, then different potential such levels must be considered. Mr Firth suggested that it was from ‘the trivial to the decisive’. It seems to me that the options are (a) those who actually provide finance themselves, (b) those who are substantively involved in the process of providing finance, and (c) those who are indirectly or peripherally so involved, recognising in each case that the person in question must be employed in the trade or profession of providing finance. The natural meaning of the word ‘involved’ suggests something wider than someone who personally provides finance themselves. That leaves those who are substantively participators in the process, and those who provide only indirect assistance.
70. For present purposes it is unnecessary to decide the position of every conceivable individual whose role might be connected with a financing transaction. It is sufficient that the expression is capable of bearing a legally ascertainable meaning which the court could apply if called upon to determine whether a particular individual fell within the class.
71. Nonetheless, I conclude that it is possible to say that (b) is the correct construction, limiting the objects of the trust to those who are substantively involved in the provision of finance. An extension to anyone with any conceivable connection, however tenuous, would serve no intelligible purpose. The core purpose of the trust is to ensure compliance with s.86 of the Inheritance Act 1984 and thus to facilitate the Scheme. An excessively broad class would bring within it individuals who could not conceivably ever have been intended to benefit. The need for connection, not only to the provision of finance, but to its provision to individuals connected with the trust, also points towards a construction requiring a substantive degree of connection tying those factors together. Furthermore, a wider meaning would render the trust potentially more difficult to administer as the trustees would have a needlessly wider class of objects to ascertain and consider (which is a very different thing from saying that a wider meaning would render the trust void for uncertainty). The expression may be confined by its statutory and commercial context to persons who play a substantive role in the provision of finance in the course of the trade or profession of lending money. This does not involve rewriting the definition but identifying the degree of connection to the financing activity which the language, read in context, objectively requires.
72. I have reached this view without the application of a benignant construction of the kind explained by Lord Hailsham in the McMullen case. If I was wrong in the view I have expressed above, however, I would unhesitatingly conclude that such a construction should be applied, with the same result.
73. Once this is established, it can be seen that the court would be quite able, in the event it was ever called on to do so, to determine whether any individual was or was not an object. Mr Firth’s seven examples do not lead me to the view that the court is unable to ascertain the intention of the meaning of the reference to involvement. In each case one is looking at the nature and extent (but principally the nature) of the connection between the tasks carried out by any individual and the provision of finance to a relevant person. The less substantive the role of any individual and the more tenuous their actual connection with the actual process of the provision of finance, the more likely it is that it falls outside the definition. It is again worth stressing that the court does not determine at this stage whether any posited individual would be within the class or not, but considers whether the court would be incapable of determining that question if called upon to do so.
74. To that end, I consider that the court could, once provided with full details of the job description and role of each individual, reach a conclusion on whether or not they were objects of the trust. Those directly involved in forming the decision to provide finance and in how it should be structured, and in creating that structure, are directly and substantively involved and a court would have little difficulty in concluding that they were within the definition. The solicitor drafting the facility might struggle to meet the requirement of being employed in the trade or profession of providing finance, but an in-house solicitor doing so appears to be substantively involved. Individuals who provide assistance only after the decision is taken and the deal is structured, or (as in the case of a receptionist) whose involvement is clearly peripheral to the transaction even if important to the organisation, are not obviously substantively involved. In all cases, however, their precise role would have to be assessed in order to reach a definitive conclusion. I have no doubt that the court could decide those cases if they arose. The examples relied upon by the claimant are characteristic of disputes about the application of a criterion rather than uncertainty as to what the criterion means.
75. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the concept of being involved in the provision of finance while employed in the trade or profession of lending money is conceptually certain for the purposes of the law of trusts.
76. The argument that the reference to the ‘provision of finance’ was uncertain received very little attention at the hearing, even though it was not formally conceded. Mr Firth suggested that it was ambiguous, giving the example of the sale of goods on terms that payment need not be made immediately but after a certain number of days. This would involve the provision of credit during the grace period before payment was required. I do not consider that it would involve the provision of ‘finance’ to the buyer.
77. I consider it to be tolerably clear that the provision of finance, which, it is to be remembered, must be provided in the trade or profession of ‘lending money’, denotes the provision of funding by persons engaged within that trade or profession. The sale of goods on credit does not entail the provision of funding as that expression is generally understood. The suggestion that the provision of finance is conceptually uncertain is not one which requires any further discussion.
Conclusion on the second question
78. For the reasons I have set out above, I consider that the discretionary trust created on 14 October 2014 was not void for uncertainty of objects. Having carried out what Lord Upjohn characterised as the duty of the court to make sense of the settlor’s expressed intentions, I consider it perfectly possible to give a reasonable meaning to the language used.
The ultimate default gift
79. In light of my decision on the first two questions, the consequential question as to the validity of the trust in the event that the trusts of income and capital during the Trust Period were void, does not arise. In those circumstances, I will explain briefly why, if the question had arisen, I would have concluded that the ultimate default gift in clause 4 did not save the trust from invalidity.
80. The discretionary trusts of income and capital to apply during the Trust Period are set out at paragraphs 51 to 53 above. Also material on the present question is clause 2.5, which provides that the trustees hold:
‘2.5 At the expiration of the Trust Period upon Trust to apply both capital and income of the Trust Fund to or for the benefit of or to the absolute entitlement of all or such one or more exclusive of the other or others of the Beneficiaries in such shares and proportions if more than one and generally in such manner as the Trustees shall prior to or on the date of such expiration with the consent of the Protector (if any) in their absolute discretion determine.’
81. Clause 4 then provides:
‘4. Ultimate Default Gift
4.1 In so far as any income or capital of the Trust Fund may otherwise be undisposed of by this Deed, it shall be held on trust for WWF-UK (the World Wildlife Fund), registered as a charity in England under number 1081247.’
82. HMRC argues that, in the event that the discretionary trust in clause 2 is void for uncertainty of objects, clause 4.1 is nonetheless valid, such that there is an immediate absolute trust for WWF-UK. I would note at this point that WWF-UK has indicated that it does not wish to participate in these proceedings.
83. The inclusion of an ultimate default gift for a charity who is never intended in fact to receive any benefit from a discretionary trust is a well-established device. In ensuring that there can never be a resulting trust back to the settlors or their estates it can serve a number of purposes. It can avoid the possibility of such a resulting trust taking effect decades after the creation of a trust, and the concomitant difficulty in then establishing the identity of the settlors’ personal representatives and heirs. It provides, in the case of a family trust, some default provision in the event that all beneficiaries are wiped out in a disastrous event or that there are no living or potential future beneficiaries at the end of the trust period, in whose favour appointments could be made or a variation of the trust sought. In a trust made by UK settlors, such a clause often serves a fiscal purpose. In order to obtain the intended tax effects, it will often be essential upon the creation of a trust that there is no possibility (however remote) of a settlor receiving any future benefit from the trust.
84. The claimant’s position is that the clause will have been included in order to ensure compliance with Inheritance Tax Act 1984, s.13(2), which disapplies beneficial treatment where a participator in a close company which disposes of property to the trustees of a trust may ‘at any time’ have the trust property applied in their favour. This seems to me to be more likely than not to be the case but, in any event, it must be likely that the generally held understanding that such clauses are necessary for fiscal efficacy will have informed its inclusion. It is common ground that the tax planning nature of the trust is a factor that can be taken into account in construing its terms.
85. Given the nature of an ultimate default clause, the suggestion that it was objectively intended to take effect even if all the prior trusts were for any reason void ab initio (as opposed to their later failing) is one which should be approached with significant caution. It seems to me quite inherently unlikely that a settlor who intends quite plainly to benefit a defined class of objects (whether or not such intention is coupled with an intention to mitigate tax liabilities) would intend in the event such trust is invalid that the property should all pass to a charity which was not otherwise an object of the trustee’s dispositive powers. The purpose of a tax avoidance scheme is to achieve a primary aim using a tax efficient method; it is not its purpose to ensure that tax is avoided at all (other) costs even if the primary purpose of the scheme is entirely thwarted.
86. Mr Macklam pointed out that, if clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of the trust instrument are void for uncertainty of objects, then clause 2.5 will likewise be void for the objects are by definition the same. This clause provides for the trustees to appoint any remaining trust assets to the Beneficiaries at the end of the Trust Period. It is a trust power, the exercise of which the court could compel if the trustees were to neglect to comply with it. It is a matter of construction whether a power of appointment with a gift over in default of exercise is a mere or a trust power: Re Leek [1967] Ch 1061. The mandatory nature of clause 2.5 is quite apparent. This is a further indication that it was the settlor’s intention that the trust property should in any event pass to the identified class of beneficiaries, and that reliance on the ultimate default provision in clause 4.1 really would be a matter of last resort.
87. Complication was added to the argument on this point at the hearing, in the form of discussion as to whether WWF-UK has a vested defeasible or a contingent interest, and as to the application (if any) of the authorities concerning the acceleration of interests upon the failure or termination of earlier interests. I am not aware of any authorities considering these questions in the context of ultimate default gifts following discretionary trusts in conventional form, and none were cited to me. These vexed questions have arisen historically where an income or life interest has been followed by an interest in remainder, and have been further complicated where in the past the income interest failed by reason of the rule against perpetuities.
88. I do not consider that such complications affect the question of construction whether the words ‘may otherwise be undisposed of’ in the ultimate default gift include the circumstances of the discretionary trusts of capital and income being wholly void ab initio. For the reasons I have given above I do not consider that they do. If I am wrong in my conclusion on certainty of objects, I would hold that clause 4.1 fails as well such that the beneficial interest in the Property was held by the trustee on resulting trust for the company.
Conclusion
89. For the reasons I have given above, and despite Mr Firth’s attractively presented arguments, I am satisfied that the deed of assignment dated 14 October 2014 took effect to vest the beneficial interest in the Property in the first defendant as trustee, and that clause 2 of the trust instrument made on the same date was not invalid for uncertainty of objects.
90. I will hear from counsel further after judgment is handed down on the form of declaration to give effect to this decision.
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