Tax United Kingdom
Fucius Capital Limited v The Commissioners for HMRC
Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01489 (TC)
Case Number: TC 10076
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
By remote video hearing
Appeal reference: TC/2025/05047
VAT Late Payment Penalty
Heard on: 23 October 2026
Judgment date: 26 October 2026
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE Rachel Mainwaring-Taylor
TRIBUNAL MEMBER NAME Gill Hunter
Between
FUCIUS CAPITAL LIMITED
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Way of Counsel
For the Respondents: Mr M A Nawaz and Ms R Chana litigators of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office
DECISION
Introduction
1. The matter before the Tribunal was an appeal against late payment penalties charged under Schedule 26 to the Finance Act 2021 (Schedule 26) in respect of late payment of VAT in respect of the period 07/25.
Background
2. The Appellant’s VAT for the period 07/25 should have been paid by 7 September 2025.
3. The Appellant paid the VAT for the period 07/25 in two parts on 20 October and 22 October.
Issues
4. Both parties agreed that the VAT was paid late and that the penalties had been correctly raised and notified.
5. The sole issue before the Tribunal was whether the Appellant had a reasonable excuse for the late payment.
Law
6. Paragraph 12(1) of Schedule 26 states that “liability to a penalty does not arise in respect of a failure to make payment if the person satisfies HMRC (or on appeal, the tribunal) that the person had a reasonable excuse for the failure”.
7. There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a reasonable excuse, but paragraph 12(2)(b) of Schedule 26 states that “where a person relies on another person to do anything, that is not a reasonable excuse unless the first person took reasonable care to avoid the failure”.
8. The approach the Tribunal should take in considering reasonable excuse is set out in Perrin v HMRC [2018] UKUT 156 (TCC) and can be summarised as follows:
(1) First the Tribunal must establish the facts upon which the taxpayer relies.
(2) Next, it must decide which of those facts is proven.
(3) Then it must “assess whether those facts (including, where relevant, the state of mind of any relevant witness) are sufficient to amount to reasonable excuse, judged objectively” and the time when that objectively reasonable excuse ceased.
(4) Finally, the Tribunal must decide whether the taxpayer remedied the default without undue delay after the reasonable excuse ceased.
Submissions
9. The Appellant submitted that it had specifically sought advice on what to do about the upcoming deadline from an objectively well-qualified professional advisor and that it was therefore reasonable to rely on that advice, even if it turned out not to be correct.
10. The Appellant said this did not fall within paragraph 12(2)(b) of Schedule 26 because it had not relied on someone else to do anything. This was not a situation where the taxpayer had engaged an accountant to submit a return and they had failed to do so. The Appellant had specifically sought advice on what to do in light of the imminent deadline and had relied on that advice.
11. The Appellant cited Judge Jonathan Richards in Mirza v HMRC [2022] UKUT 000291 (TCC) para 49:
“Reliance on incorrect advice is capable of being a reasonable excuse. Of course the taxpayer will need to show that the advice was indeed relied on as part of the process of establishing that the excuse relied on was ‘genuine’ in the sense set out in Perrin. The taxpayer will also need to establish, taking into account all relevant attributes of that taxpayer, that reliance on the incorrect advice was reasonable. The mere fact that advice is incorrect does not render all reliance on that advice necessarily unreasonable.”
12. The Appellant received clear advice not to submit the return until the liability had been established. The Appellant maintained that Mr Zhao (company director) had understood this also to mean that no payment should be made until the liability was established and that this was reasonable in the circumstances, based on the advice given. It did not merely say not to rush to submit the return. It went on to say that HMRC would issue a central assessment. The Appellant argued that this further explanation as to what would happen after the deadline was passed demonstrated that the advice on which it relied appeared objectively to be considered. This explanation made Mr Zhao’s understanding of and reliance on the advice all the more reasonable.
13. The Appellant submitted that the reasonable excuse ceased upon the receipt of clear advice as to the correct position and course of action on 16 October 2025. The Appellant immediately took steps to recover the VAT owed from its customer, filed its return on 21 October 2025 and paid the tax on 20 and 22 October.
14. HMRC agreed that if there were a reasonable excuse that ceased on 16 October 2025, the Appellant remedied the default without unreasonable delay.
15. HMRC submitted, however, that it was not reasonable for the Appellant to have understood the advice as it did or to have relied on it.
16. HMRC pointed out that the Appellant had received clear information upon being registered for VAT in June 2025 of what would happen if it did not meet the deadline of 7 September for submission of its return and payment of any tax due. The information sent with confirmation of registration clearly stated that a penalty could be issued in those circumstances.
17. HMRC submitted that the Appellant could have clarified its position sooner and had it done so it would have been in a position to file and pay on time. HMRC acknowledged the complexity of the Appellant’s circumstances but maintained that this was not an excuse for not meeting its obligations.
18. HMRC accepted that the Appellant genuinely wanted to reach the correct answer as to its liability, but said a reasonable taxpayer with the size of potential exposure the Appellant had would not have left it until the last minute to do so.
19. HMRC argued that it was not reasonable to rely on the email advice without taking further action to clarify or confirm the position, given that the Appellant knew missing the payment deadline could result in financial penalties and the sums involved were substantial.
Facts
20. The Appellant relied on the following facts:
(1) It did not know whether its supplies were chargeable or exempt and this question was not straightforward.
(2) Mr Zhao was confused as to the status of the supplies but believed that they were exempt for most of the period to 16 October 2026.
(3) Mr Zhao was aware of and concerned about the deadline of 7 September 2025 as it was clear the detailed advice would not be given in time to meet it.
(4) Mr Zhao expressly asked the advisor what to do about the deadline.
(5) Mr Zhao understood the advisor’s response to mean that no payment should be made and acted in reliance on this advice.
21. We consider these facts to be proven.
Discussion
22. Having accepted the above facts asserted by the Appellant, we have to “decide whether, viewed objectively, [they] do indeed amount to an objectively reasonable excuse for the default…to ask [ourselves] the question “was what the taxpayer did (or omitted to do or believed) objectively reasonable for this taxpayer in those circumstances?”” (Perrin).
23. We accept that reliance on professional advice is capable of being a reasonable excuse (following Mirza). The question is whether it was in this case. That requires us to consider, first, whether “the excuse relied on is “genuine” in the sense set out in Perrin”, and second, whether the reliance on the advice was reasonable.
24. Having listened to all the evidence, we consider that Mr Zhao’s reliance was genuine, so the question is whether it was objectively reasonable for Mr Zhao to believe the advice was not to make a payment and to rely on that advice.
25. The advice in question read as follows:
“I appreciate that the VAT return deadline is today, but given the effective date of registration is January 2023, this would be a 31-month return. I would suggest we don’t rush the submission until we’ve had a chance to properly review your supplies.
In the meantime, HMRC will issue a central assessment, which will be reversed once the VAT return is submitted or if the registration ultimately needs to be cancelled.”
26. We consider that although the advice only expressly refers to the submission of the return, not the payment, it is possible for someone to read it as including both, particularly given the second sentence.
27. However, considering all the circumstances here, the Appellant’s awareness that there were potential penalties for missing the deadline and the large sums involved, we do not think it was objectively reasonable to rely on this wording without seeking further clarification from the advisor.
28. We did not see any evidence of the Appellant seeking clarification or confirmation of the position.
29. The appeal is dismissed.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
30. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Release date:
26th October 2026
If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our tax lawyer in Paris.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).