Civil United Kingdom
Kulvinder Chandale v Sovereign Network Group & Ors
| MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE Approved Judgment |
Chandale v SNG and others |
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2775 (KB)
Case No: KB-2026-000092
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 29/10/2026
Before:
MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE
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Between:
| KULVINDER CHANDALE | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| (1) SOVEREIGN NETWORK GROUP (2) MARK WASHER (3) REBECCA MORGAN |
Defendants |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Yusif Alhani (instructed by Malik Legal Solicitors)appeared for the Claimant
Hector Penny (instructed by Birketts LLP) for the Defendants
Hearing date: 19 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Thursday 29 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE
Mrs Justice Hill DBE:
Introduction
1. By a claim form sealed on 19 January 2026, the Claimant seeks damages, injunctive relief and other remedies against the Defendant for libel. The Claimant is a private individual who is the owner and occupier of a property in Reading, Berkshire. The First Defendant (“D1”) is a provider of social housing, and is the owner, landlord or managing social landlord of the property immediately neighbouring the Claimant’s property. The Second and Third Defendants (“D2” and “D3”) are both employees of D1, respectively, its Chief Executive and Assistant Director of Localities.
2. The Claimant’s claim relates to a letter dated 22 January 2025, sent by D3 to the Claimant’s MP, Olivia Bailey, in response to certain queries that Ms Bailey’s office had raised with D2 by email on 24 December 2024 (“the Publication”).
3. By order sealed on 15 September 2026, Collins Rice J directed a trial of preliminary issues relating to meaning. The Claimant’s case on meaning was set out in her Particulars of Claim (“POC”) at [29]-[30], which was modified at trial as explained at [8] below. Pursuant to Collins Rice J’s order at [4], the Defendants set out their case on meaning in a notice dated 6 October 2026.
4. In Millett v Corbyn [2021] EWCA Civ 567, [2021] EMLR 19 at [8], the Court of Appeal referred to the standard approach for a judge at first instance seeking to determine meaning, namely that the judge should “capture an initial reaction, before reading or hearing argument”. I performed this task by reading the Publication without knowing what either party wanted to say about its meaning; forming some provisional views; reading the statements of case and skeleton arguments; hearing the parties’ oral submissions at the trial and reserving judgment. This is my judgment on the preliminary issues.
The Publication
5. D3’s letter dated 22 January 2025 reads as follows (with paragraph numbering added for ease of reference):
“[1] Thank you for your e-mail of 24 December to Mark Washer, regarding Kulvinder Chandale. Apologies for the delay in responding to this enquiry. As the Assistant Director of Localities, Mark has asked me to respond on his behalf.
[2] Ms Chandale is not a tenant of SNG, however SNG took legal action against her together with partner agencies for harassment against her neighbours. The case went to full trial and a restraining order was awarded against her.
[3] Because this case has been through the legal process and the trial has concluded, it wouldn’t be appropriate for us to answer Ms Chandale’s questions.
[4] Any concerns Ms Chandale had regarding the Court Case should have been raised with her Solicitor at the time and any challenges her representatives deemed valid would/should have been bought up as part of the trial.
[5] For any legal action we always ensure that it is reasonable and proportionate.
[6] I appreciate that you will not be able to offer a full response to you[r] constituent based on the above, but hope you understand the reasons for this.
[7] Should you require any further information regarding this letter please do let me know”.
6. In her POC at [18], as modified by counsel’s submissions at the trial (which disavowed reliance on [4] of the letter for this purpose), the Claimant complains that the words at [2] of the letter were defamatory of her.
The preliminary issues for the trial
7. Collins Rice J defined the issues for the trial as follows:
“(a) the natural and ordinary meaning of the publication complained of (as particularised in the claim);
(b) whether, and to what extent, in the meaning found, the publication complained of was or included statements of fact or expressions of opinion;
(c): whether, in the case of any expression of opinion, the publication complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion; and
(d) whether, in the meaning found, the publication complained of is defamatory at common law”.
The parties’ competing cases on meaning
8. At trial the Claimant’s counsel indicated that the meaning set out at [29](5) of the POC and the argument on innuendo set out at [30] thereof were no longer pursued. He distilled the remaining pleaded case on meaning set out at [29](1)-(4) and (6) to the following:
“The Claimant had harassed her neighbours. SNG, together with partner agencies, had taken legal action against her for that conduct and, following a full trial, the court had found that she had harassed her neighbours and imposed a restraining order against her. Her conduct was sufficiently serious to require the court to restrain her.”
9. The Defendants’ case on meaning was as follows:
“SNG [the First Defendant] took legal action against the Claimant because she had harassed her neighbours.”
10. It can be seen that the differences between the parties on meaning were relatively modest. Both agreed that the Publication bore the meaning that the Claimant had harassed her neighbours. Where the parties differed was as to whether the meaning also included reference to a judicial finding of harassment against the Claimant; and one to the effect that her conduct had been so serious that a restraining order was considered necessary.
(a) The natural and ordinary meaning of the publication complained of (as particularised in the claim)
The legal principles
11. In Koutsogiannis v The Random House Group Ltd [2019] EWHC 48 (QB), [2020] 4 WLR 25 at [11], Nicklin J observed that:
“The Court’s task is to determine the single natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of, which is the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the words bear. It is well recognised that there is an artificiality in this process because individual readers may understand words in different ways: Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157, 173D–E, per Lord Diplock”.
12. At [12], he distilled the principles from the caselaw as follows:
“i) The governing principle is reasonableness.
ii) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant.
iii) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naïve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be naïve.
iv) Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task.
v) Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties.
vi) Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected.
vii) It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense.
viii) The publication must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’ taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic “rogues’ gallery” case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases).
ix) In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication.
x) No evidence, beyond publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning.
xi) The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication’s readership.
xii) Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader.
xiii) In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the Claimants’ pleaded meaning)” (and see Millett at [8] for the Court of Appeal’s approval of this summary).
13. The context to a publication which was seen by all publishees is admissible in determining the meaning of such publication: see Riley v Murray [2020] EMLR 20 at [15]-[17], per Nicklin J, endorsed in Blake v Fox (No 2) [2025] EWCA Civ 1321; [2026] EMLR 3 at [109], per Warby LJ.
14. In certain cases, it is necessary to consider the “levels” of meaning, which were described by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis at [13] as follows:
“They come from the decision of Brooke LJ in Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 11 [45] in which he identified three types of defamatory allegation: broadly, (1) the claimant is guilty of the act; (2) reasonable grounds to suspect that the claimant is guilty of the act; and (3) grounds to investigate whether the claimant has committed the act. In the lexicon of defamation, these have come to be known as the Chase levels. Reflecting the almost infinite capacity for subtle differences in meaning, they are not a straitjacket forcing the court to select one of these prescribed levels of meaning, but they are a helpful shorthand. In Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd, for example, Gray J found a meaning of “cogent grounds to suspect” [58]”.
Application of the legal principles to this issue
15. Applying these principles, I conclude that the hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the Publication to bear the single natural and ordinary meaning that (i) the Claimant had harassed her neighbours; (ii) SNG, together with partner agencies, had taken legal action against her for that conduct; (iii) following a full trial, the court found that she had harassed her neighbours; and (iv) the court considered that her conduct was sufficiently serious that it should impose a restraining order on her.
16. I have determined meaning in this way for the following reasons.
17. First, to remove reference in the meaning to the judicial finding and order, which the Defendants’ proposed meaning does, would be to ignore an important part of the Publication. The words “full trial” at [2] of the Publication tell the reader that the court heard and decided the case; and the Publication explains the outcome, namely the restraining order. Read together, the two sentences convey that the court found that the Claimant had harassed her neighbours and considered her conduct required restraint. To exclude those parts of the Publication from the meaning would breach the requirement in Koutsogiannis at [12] viii) that the Publication must be read as a whole.
18. Second, an ordinary reader would understand the difference between legal proceedings simply being brought and legal proceedings being determined in one party’s favour by the judge. The judicial finding and order adds weight and seriousness to the allegation of harassment made by D1. These details were a material part of the Publication and so should feature in the meaning.
19. Third, the way the Defendants’ proposed meaning works is to “import” the judicial finding into a statement about why D1 brought proceedings: the meaning is therefore, in effect, that D1 was vindicated in bringing proceedings by the fact that the judge found the Claimant to have harassed her neighbours. While this was an attempt to distil a core defamatory meaning from the totality of the Publication, I do not consider that a hypothetical reasonable reader would understand the Publication in this way: rather, I consider this to be an over-elaborate analysis and a strained interpretation of the words used, of the sort to be avoided, in accordance with Koutsogiannis at [12] iv) and vi).
20. Fourth, as in Belafonte v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2026] EWHC 273 (KB), a hypothetical reasonable reader would understand that if a judge imposed a restraining order, the order was considered necessary so as to protect others from the conduct complained of. Belafonte related to an article that referred to a restraining order in the USA which the former Spice Girl Melanie Brown had obtained against the Claimant who was her ex-husband: [5]. Collins Rice J held that the reference to the restraining order would convey to an ordinary reader that “Ms Brown had needed court protection from Mr Belafonte because he had been causing her trouble”: [33]; and that “Mr Belafonte…had harassed Ms Brown in the US”: [35]. I have determined the meaning of this Publication in a similar way.
21. This was, as the Defendants accepted, a Chase level (1) meaning, to the effect that the Claimant had in fact harassed her neighbours.
Issue (b): Whether, and to what extent, in the meaning found, the publication complained of was or included publication of fact or opinion
22. In Koutsogiannis at [16], Nicklin J held that when determining whether the words complained of contain allegations of fact or opinion, the court will be guided by the following points:
“i) The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact.
ii) Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc.
iii) The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion.
iv) Some publication which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as publication of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, i.e. the statement is a bare comment.
v) Whether an allegation that someone has acted “dishonestly” or “criminally” is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact”.
23. Further, as Warby LJ explained in Blake and others v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000:
“22…Section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 [“the 2013 Act”] provides for a defence of “honest opinion” which is relatively generous. But the first condition for the availability of this defence is that the statement was one of opinion: see s 3(2) of the 2013 Act. A statement will only be defensible under s 3, therefore, if it is recognisable as a comment or opinion as distinct from an imputation of fact. If it is not, the defendant will need to prove that it is substantially true (s 2 of the 2013 Act) or that it was a reasonable publication on a matter of public interest (s 4 of the Act).
23. Opinion is synonymous with “comment”. It is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation or the like. As with meaning, the court deciding whether a statement is one of fact or opinion looks only at the words complained of and their immediate context, and the ultimate question for the court is the objective question of “how the words would strike the ordinary reasonable reader”. This question may be considered after the meaning has been decided, or at the same time, or in the reverse order, which is common practice.
24. This is a highly fact-sensitive process that focuses on the particular statement at issue. One factor for consideration is whether the statement contains any indication of the basis on which it is made. At common law a statement that contains no indication of or reference to any supporting facts is liable to be treated as a statement of fact. The second condition for the statutory defence of honest opinion is “that the statement complained of indicated whether in general or specific terms the basis of the opinion”: s 3(3) of the 2013 Act. Beyond these extreme cases, “[t]he more clearly a statement indicates that it is based on some extraneous material, the more likely it is to strike the reader as an expression of opinion”.
24. Neither party in this case contended that the Publication contained expressions of opinion. In my judgment they were right to take that position. Applying the principles set out in the preceding paragraphs, the Publication complained of would strike the ordinary reader as a statement of fact: it purported to report the fact and outcome of legal proceedings as events that had happened, without qualification or reference to any basis or “extraneous material” (see Blake at [24]). Further, there was nothing in the Publication to suggest that the writer was exercising an element of deduction or inference, nor did the Publication have the hallmarks of a “criticism” or “remark”: the writer was simply purporting to report matters of fact.
Issue (c): Whether, in the case of any expression of opinion, the publication complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion
25. Given my conclusion that the publication complained of did not include any expression of opinion, this issue does not arise.
Issue (d): Whether, in the meaning found, the publication complained of is defamatory at common law
26. At common law, an imputation or meaning will be treated as defamatory if it meets two requirements. The “consensus requirement” is that the meaning is one that “tends to lower the Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally”; in other words, the behaviours or views complained of attributed to the claimant in the statement were such that they were “contrary to common, shared views of our society”. The “threshold requirement” is that the meaning is one that “would tend to have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that people would treat the Claimant”: see Millett at [9], Blake at [26] and Gatley on Libel and Slander (13th edition, 2022) at 2-001.
27. The Defendants conceded that their proposed meaning was defamatory of the Claimant at common law. Counsel confirmed in oral submissions that it followed that if the court accepted the Claimant’s proposed meaning, that would also be defamatory of the Claimant at common law.
28. I consider that counsel was right to make this concession: I agree that learning that someone had harassed their neighbours and be found by a judge to have done so would “tend…to lower the Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally” and “would tend to have a “substantially adverse effect” on the way that people would treat the Claimant.
Conclusion on meaning
29. Accordingly, for these reasons, I have determined the preliminary issues as follows:
Issue (a): The natural and ordinary meaning of the publication complained of (as particularised in the claim): The meaning was that (i) the Claimant had harassed her neighbours; (ii) SNG, together with partner agencies, had taken legal action against her for that conduct; (iii) following a full trial, the court had found that she had harassed her neighbours; and (iv) the court considered that her conduct was sufficiently serious that it should impose a restraining order on her. This was a Chase level (1) meaning, to the effect that the Claimant had in fact harassed her neighbours.
Issue (b): The Publication was a publication of fact.
Issue (c): Not applicable.
Issue (d): The Publication was defamatory at common law.
30. The Claimant will need to amend the POC to reflect the meaning found above and then the Defence will follow. I invite the parties to agree directions to reflect these matters.
31. As to costs, the usual order after a trial of preliminary issues would be that the costs of the trial would be costs in the case. Here, counsel for the Defendants sought an order that the Claimant pay around a third of their total costs of the trial, to reflect the late service of the Claimant’s Skeleton and the shift in the Claimant’s position on meaning.
32. I do not consider that such a departure from the usual rule would be merited. The Claimant had a good reason for the Skeleton being slightly delayed (namely that she was engaged in a court hearing on another matter on the day in question) and informed the Defendants of this when exchange of Skeletons was due to take place. Further, the Claimant’s change in position on meaning was relatively modest, and no more than often occurs when issues are narrowed ahead of a hearing. The parts of the Defendants’ Skeleton which were rendered otiose were therefore limited. For those reasons I order that the costs of the trial of preliminary issues be costs in the case.
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Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).