Tax United Kingdom

Florin Merosu v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01497 (TC)

Case Number: TC 10079

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Location: On the Papers

Appeal reference: TC/2025/03616

REINSTATEMENT – proceedings struck out under rule 8(1) – Martland principles – procedural considerations otherwise favour reinstatement – Tribunal lacking jurisdiction in underlying appeal – rule 8(2)(a) – application refused

Heard on: 27 October 2026

Judgment date: 28 October 2026

Before

JUDGE AMANDA BROWN KC

Between

FLORIN MEROSU

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

decision

Introduction

1. I determined this application on the papers with the consent of the parties. The papers before me included the full Tribunal file which included correspondence issued to the parties prior to the appeal being struck out, the Appellant’s application for reinstatement, HMRC’s opposition to that application and the Appellant’s reply to that objection.

2. This is my decision on an application dated 3 August 2026. Florin Merosu (Appellant) seeks the reinstatement of his appeal originally lodged on 14 September 2025 but struck out pursuant to rule 8(1) Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (FTT Rules)on 11 June 2026. Notification of strike out was provided to the parties on 3 August 2026.

Background

3. The appeal concerns:

(1) Discovery assessments issued by HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) on 2 September 2025 for tax years ended 5 April 2022 and 2023 in the sums of £10,009.56 and £10,167.65, respectively.

(2) A closure notice issued on 2 September 2025 for tax year ended 5 April 2024 in the sum of £14,485.88.

(3) Penalty assessments for each of the tax years in which assessments and a closure notice have been issued. The penalty assessments were issued on 13 August 2025. Penalties amounts due for years 2022 and 2023 were suspended. The amount due on the remaining penalty for 2024 is £6,591.07.

4. Each of the assessments and the closure notice notified the Appellant:

“If you disagree with my decision, you can appeal by writing to me. You need to do this within 30 days of the date of this letter telling me why you think my decision is wrong. I will then contact you to try and settle the matter.

If we can’t come to an agreement, I’ll write to you to explain the reasons and set out my current view of the matter.

You can then …

– Take your appeal to an independent tribunal who will decide the matter.”

5. HMRC’s strike out application was made on 6 November 2025. It sought a strike out of the appeal under rule 8(2) FTT Rules on the grounds that the Appellant had not made an appeal to HMRC before notification of the appeal to the Tribunal. As such the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in respect of the dispute. In this regard HMRC correctly stated the legal position. The Tribunal has only the jurisdiction granted to it by Parliament. Section 31A Taxes Management Act 1970 provides for an appeal to be made to HMRC and only after such an appeal has been made can it be notified to the Tribunal.

6. By letter dated 14 January 2026 the Tribunal notified the Appellant of HMRC’s strike out application. The letter explained to the Appellant that an appeal must be made to HMRC before the Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Appellant was invited to indicate whether an appeal had been made to HMRC and to provide a copy of any such appeal in order to demonstrate jurisdictional validity of the original notification of the appeal to the Tribunal.

7. However, the letter also indicated that provided the Appellant could demonstrate that an appeal had been made to HMRC, albeit after the submission of the notice of appeal to the Tribunal, the Tribunal was prepared to accept the subsequent confirmation of an appeal to HMRC as notification of a valid, but new, appeal to the Tribunal. As a matter of procedural convenience that new appeal would have been allocated the same Tribunal reference number as the first appeal.

8. The Appellant did not respond to that letter. In a subsequent letter dated 28 May 2026 the Tribunal advised the Appellant that if he had not made an appeal to HMRC but wished to continue his challenge to the tax and penalty assessments he was required to apply to HMRC to make a late appeal. The letter set out that if HMRC accepted the late appeal the Appellant may then have sought a review or notified the Tribunal of a fresh appeal. The Appellant was also advised that if HMRC refused to accept the appeal there was a right to challenge that decision and invite the Tribunal to give permission for a late appeal to HMRC to be made. Directions were issued with the letter requiring the Appellant to provide a copy of his appeal to HMRC no later than 11 June 2026. The directions clearly stated that if the Appellant failed to do so then his appeal would be struck out.

9. The Appellant did not however, comply with the Tribunal’s direction. This was despite

(1) having written to HMRC on 29 October 2025 requesting that the dispute be admitted into HMRC’s Alternative Dispute Resolution process; and

(2) also having written to HMRC on 28 May 2026 requesting them to accept a late review of their assessment decisions.

10. The Appellant’s failure to comply carried the automatic consequence that his appeal was struck out. Notification of strike out was provided on 3 August 2026.

11. By an application dated and received on 3 August 2026 the Appellant applied for reinstatement. The application was well drafted and addressed the legal test for reinstatement, despite the Appellant acting on his own behalf and without formal representation. The application accepted that there were inaccuracies in his 2022, 2023 and 2024 tax returns because of claims to expenses that were never incurred. He explained the claims were included in his returns by his accountant and without his knowledge and he did not see the returns before they were submitted. The application states “I appealed to HMRC in writing and corresponded with the compliance officer dealing with my case, and I applied for Alternative Dispute resolution. I also required HMRC to carry out a review of the decision.” The application also explains that the Appellant had not complied with the Tribunal’s direction because he “did not understand that the Tribunal was asking for a copy of [his] earlier appeal to HMRC rather than for the outcome of that review”. The application then states:

“I now enclose at Tab A a copy of my appeal to HMRC against the disputed decision dated [date of your appeal to HMRC], which predates my Notice of Appeal to the Tribunal dated [date of your Notice of Appeal]. That is the document the Direction of 28 May 2026 required”.

12. There was, however, no Tab A in the bundle of documents. Tab H, not otherwise referred to in the application, was listed as “correspondence with HMRC officer Emmanuel Logue”. Tab H is undated but purports to be a response to an email from Mr Logue. It provides an all but identical explanation for the reason for the inaccurate returns and overclaimed expenses but also provides information on actual expenses said to have been incurred. The letter does not formally state that it is an appeal against the assessments but is plainly a challenge to them.

13. The application then proceeds to explain why in all the circumstances it is reasonable that the appeal be reinstated.

14. By notice dated 24 August 2026 HMRC objected to the reinstatement application. Their objection is predicated on the absence of any appeal having been made to them prior to the notification given to the Tribunal on 14 September 2025.

15. HMRC explain that the Appellant’s application to be accepted into ADR was not progressed because the Appellant had not demonstrated that he had protected his dispute by appealing to HMRC within the required 30 days. They note that they have not actioned the Appellant’s request for a late review dated 28 May 2026 pending the outcome of the present proceedings.

16. In his reply to HMRC’s objection the Appellant does not repeat that an appeal was made to HMRC prior to notifying an appeal to the Tribunal. Rather, it states that on 24 August 2026 he applied to HMRC to submit a late appeal.

17. By his reply, he makes an alternative application that the reinstatement proceedings be stayed for 28 days to allow HMRC to determine the late appeal application.

Findings of fact

18. On the basis of the papers before me I make the following findings of fact:

(1) The Appellant was assessed to penalties for inaccuracies in his 2022 – 2024 tax returns by penalty assessments dated 13 August 2025.

(2) The Appellant was assessed to tax by way of discovery assessments and an amendment made in a closure notice, each of those decisions being notified on 2 September 2025.

(3) The Appellant had 30 days from 13 August and 2 September 2025 respectively in which to appeal those assessments to HMRC.

(4) Despite statements/indications to the contrary the Appellant did not appeal to HMRC by the relevant deadline.

(5) The appeals notified to the Tribunal on 14 September 2025 were therefore made without the necessary antecedent statutory step required for a valid appeal.

(6) The Appellant’s letter of 29 October 2025 requesting to be admitted into ADR did not state that it was an appeal to HMRC but could, and in my view ordinarily would, have been treated by HMRC as an application to make a late appeal. I find that the letter was, in substance, a request that HMRC admit a late appeal. It did not, without HMRC agreeing to admit the appeal late or the Tribunal granting permission for a late appeal, result in an effective statutory appeal

(7) On 28 May 2026, the Appellant again wrote to HMRC. That letter restated the basis of challenge and requests that HMRC undertake a late “review” of the assessments. I find that this letter was also, in substance, a request for late appeal.

(8) There is currently no decision by HMRC whether to admit a late appeal.

Legal test for reinstatement

19. The application before me to determine is the application to reinstate the proceedings which were struck out. Pursuant to rule 8(5) FTT Rules, an application for reinstatement is permissible only where an appeal has been struck out for failure to comply with directions which provide that non-compliance will or may result in the appeal being struck out.

20. The test to be applied by the Tribunal in the context of a reinstatement application made under rule 8(5) Tribunal Procedure FTT Rules is as provided by the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) in the case of Martland v HM Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) (“Martland”) as now confirmed by the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 14.

21. Martland concerned an application to bring an appeal out of time. However, and subject to paragraph 24 below, the test is also applicable to an application to reinstate following a strike out.

22. The UT considered the relevant authorities of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court and the appropriate test when considering a breach of the FTT Rules and relief from the associated sanction. The UT summarised the approach taken in the authorities:

“[40] In Denton, the Court of Appeal was considering the application of the later version of CPR Rule 3.9 above to three separate cases in which relief from sanctions was being sought in connection with failures to comply with various rules of court. The Court took the opportunity to “restate” the principles applicable to such applications as follows (at [24]):

“A judge should address an application for relief from sanctions in three stages. The first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the 'failure to comply with any rule, practice direction or court order' … If the breach is neither serious nor significant, the court is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages. The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. The third stage is to evaluate 'all the circumstances of the case, so as to enable [the court] to deal justly with the application including [factors (a) and (b) in Rule 3.9(1)]”

[41] In respect of the “third stage” identified above, the Court said (at [32]) that the two factors identified at (a) and (b) in Rule 3.9(1) “are of particular importance and should be given particular weight at the third stage when all the circumstances of the case are considered.

[42] The Supreme Court in BPP implicitly endorsed the approach set out in Denton. That case was concerned with an application for the lifting of a bar on HMRC's further involvement in the proceedings for failure to comply with an “unless” order of the FTT.

[43] … The clear message emerging from the cases – particularised in Denton and similar cases and implicitly endorsed in BPP – is that in exercising judicial discretions generally, particular importance is to be given to the need for “litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost”, and “to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions and orders”. …”

23. The UT then concluded that a similar approach should apply to the Tribunal.

24. In applying the Martland test in the context of reinstatement the UT has provided further guidance in the case of Chappell v The Pensions Regulator [2019] UKUT 209. Critically when considering a reinstatement following strike out the UT requires that the Tribunal:

(1) Take account of the previous breaches in compliance which led to the granting of the unless order breach of which led to the strike out when considering stage 1 of the Martland test i.e. when determining the seriousness and significance of the breach (at paragraph [99]).

(2) When conducting the balancing exercise at the third stage particular importance is to be given to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and to enforce compliance with rules, practice directions, and orders (at paragraph [100]).

(3) At this stage it will also be relevant to consider whether the Appellant can instil confidence that there will be future compliance (at paragraph [125]).

(4) The Tribunal should take no account of merits of underlying appeal when considering a failure to comply, the merits being relevant only in the case of a strike out on the basis of no reasonable prospects of success(at paragraphs [87] and [94]).

25. It is to be noted that in Viking Enterprises Limited v HMRC [2020] UKFTT 306 (TC) the Tribunal considered continued non-compliance to be relevant when assessing whether an appeal should be reinstated, and that reinstatement should not be granted unless the Appellant has complied or provided a compelling reason for non-compliance by the time the reinstatement is considered.

Applying Martland

26. In the context of reinstatement, the first two components of the Martland test require the Tribunal to consider what led to the appeal being struck out and determine the seriousness and significance of the failure.

27. This appeal was struck out because the Appellant had failed to comply with an unless order. Any failure to comply with an unless order will usually be significant. The terms of an unless order explicitly warn the taxpayer of the consequence of a failure to comply and so it should be expected that, in the ordinary course, a failure to comply should carry the stated consequence.

28. In this regard the Appellant was directed to provide a copy of the document demonstrating either that an appeal had been made to HMRC prior to the submission of the notice of appeal to the Tribunal or that the Appellant had subsequently made an application to make a late appeal to HMRC which had been considered or was being considered by HMRC. The Appellant failed to comply with that direction on or before 11 June 2026 despite the fact that by that date he had written to HMRC on two occasions both of which I have found represented an attempt to appeal to HMRC. The Appellant was therefore in a position to have complied but did not.

29. His explanation is that he did not understand what was required of him and/or that he was waiting for a response to his letter of 28 May 2026.

30. I do not consider that a particularly good reason for non-compliance. The terms of the direction were clear as to what was required and the Appellant could, by 11 June 2026, have provided copies of either or both of the application to be admitted into ADR and the request for late “review”. However, he did not do so.

In all of the circumstances

31. In assessing all of the circumstances I take account that the failure to comply was a serious and significant breach for which there is a reason but not a particularly good one, together with the following matters:

(1) The need to ensure compliance with directions (a factor to which I must give particular weight).

(2) The Appellant has generally remained engaged in the dispute and has demonstrated a continuing intention to challenge HMRC’s decisions.

(3) His application for reinstatement was made very promptly but it inaccurately suggested that the Appellant had appealed to HMRC before notifying the Tribunal.

(4) The merits of the substantive basis for challenge are not relevant when considering reinstatement following strike out for failure to comply with an unless order.

(5) An inability for the Appellant to challenge HMRC’s decision carries for him a significant financial cost.

(6) This is not a matter which on 11 June 2026 HMRC could reasonably have concluded was settled and not under continuing dispute given the Appellant’s letter of 28 May 2026.

(7) Had the Appellant provided either the ADR letter or the request for late review it is likely that he would have been treated as having complied with the directions.

(8) By his reinstatement application the Appellant has provided copies of both letters to the Tribunal and has therefore now complied with the terms of the direction which led to strike out. Compliance was achieved within hours of notification of the strike out.

(9) If the proceedings are not reinstated HMRC appear to indicate that they will proceed to consider whether to accept the Appellant’s late appeal request.

32. I must therefore determine whether, in all of the circumstances listed above and in accordance with the overriding objective to deal with matters fairly, it is appropriate to reinstate the proceedings.

33. Were it the case that I were only balancing together those factors I would have decided to reinstate the proceedings. I would have reached that conclusion notwithstanding the particular weight which must be given to compliance with Tribunal directions and the absence of a good reason for the Appellant's default. This is on the basis that by the date for compliance the Appellant had taken the substantive step contemplated by the direction by seeking to pursue a late appeal with HMRC. His default was in failing to provide the Tribunal with copies of the relevant correspondence. He applied for reinstatement immediately on receiving notification of the strike out and, by that application, remedied the default, his application attaching the letters of 29 October 2025 and 28 May 2026. HMRC could not reasonably have regarded the underlying dispute as having come to an end.

34. However, I have decided that the proceedings cannot properly be reinstated. Although I would otherwise have granted relief from the procedural consequence of the Appellant's default, rule 8(5) is a procedural power and cannot confer upon the Tribunal jurisdiction which it does not otherwise possess. The jurisdictional issue raised by HMRC's original strike out application therefore remains to be considered.

35. In order for an appeal against these decisions to be validly notified to the Tribunal, the antecedent statutory requirements must first have been satisfied. I have found that no appeal had been made to HMRC before the Appellant notified his appeal to the Tribunal on 14 September 2025. Although the Appellant subsequently sought to make a late appeal to HMRC, HMRC have not yet determined whether to admit it. The Tribunal therefore presently has no jurisdiction in relation to the substantive appeal. Rule 8(2)(a) FTT Rules provides that the Tribunal “must” strike out proceedings where it has no jurisdiction. Where, as here, it has already been established that the Tribunal presently has no jurisdiction, and nothing has occurred since the rule 8(1) strike out which cures that jurisdictional defect, it is not a proper exercise of the rule 8(5) discretion to reinstate proceedings which rule 8(2)(a) would immediately require the Tribunal to strike out.

36. My decision not to reinstate the proceedings does not, however, extinguish the Appellant's ability to pursue his challenge. As I have found, he has on at least two occasions asked HMRC to admit a late appeal. HMRC have yet to determine that request. If HMRC refuse to admit the appeal late, the Appellant may apply to the Tribunal under section 49(2) TMA 1970 for permission to give the notice of appeal to HMRC out of time. If HMRC admit the late appeal, or the Tribunal gives permission under section 49(2), the statutory appeal process can proceed. Subject to the applicable statutory requirements, the Appellant may thereafter become entitled to notify his appeal to the Tribunal.

Stay application

37. I refuse the Appellant’s application for a stay of the reinstatement proceedings pending HMRC’s determination of his late appeal application. As I have said, until HMRC determine that application the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in the dispute concerning the penalty and tax assessments. Deferring a decision on reinstatement will not give the Tribunal jurisdiction in the appeal which has been notified to the Tribunal. Even if HMRC admit the late appeal does not retrospectively transform the defective notification of an appeal into a valid one simply because the antecedent condition has then been satisfied. HMRC’s decision will generate new appeal rights which can be exercised in due course.

This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date:

28 October 2026


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

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