Tax United Kingdom

Crescendo Entertainment Ltd (now in liquidation) & Anor v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01495 (TC)

Case Number: TC 10077

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

In public by remote video hearing

Appeal references: TC/2025/03268

TC/2025/03270

PAYE and NICs – Notices of requirement to give security – jurisdiction – reasonableness and proportionality of decision to issue – relevance of hardship/ability to pay – held disproportionate so flawed – first appellant now wound up – no need for protection as no ongoing or future trading – appeals allowed and the notices set aside

Heard on: 30 April 2026 supplemented by written submissions received in October 2026

Judgment date: 28 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE NIGEL POPPLEWELL

Between

CRESCENDO ENTERTAINMENT LTD (NOW IN LIQUIDATION) (1)

YORAM JAKOB BEN-ISRAEL (2)

Appellants

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

Representation:

For the Appellants: Thomas Malato-Johnson of counsel instructed by Edwin Coe LLP

For the Respondents: Siobhan Brown litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

1. This appeal concerns notices of requirement to give security (“NORs” or “the notices””) issued by HMRC to the appellants on 12 March 2025. Security is sought from Crescendo Entertainment Ltd (“the company”), and its sole director, Mr Ben-Israel, on a joint and several basis. The NORs are for £111,958.19 in respect of PAYE under Part 4A Income Tax (PAYE) Regulations 2003 (“PAYERegulations”), and £75,026.60 in respect of NICs under Part 3B Schedule 4 Social Security Contributions Regulations 2001 (“NIC Regulations”). The total amount, therefore, for which security is required is £186,984.78.

2. The main issue in this appeal concerned jurisdiction. Firstly, whether it is (broadly speaking) supervisory or appellate, but in either case whether the decision to issue the NORs was reasonable and proportionate. And secondly, in either case, whether the decision maker, or indeed this Tribunal, could (and in the appellants’ view should) take into account hardship to the appellants and their ability to pay.

3. The appellants were represented by Mr Malato-Johnson, HMRC by Miss Brown. I was very much assisted by their clear submissions both written and oral. But whilst I have considered all of the relevant evidence, I have not found it necessary to refer to each and every argument advanced, or all of the authorities cited, in reaching my conclusions.

THE COMPANY IN LIQUIDATION

4. At the date of the hearing, HMRC had presented a winding up petition to the High Court (see [13 (39)] below).

5. After the hearing, but before I had written this judgment, I received an email from Mr Malato-Johnson telling me that on 6 May 2026 that winding up petition was heard by Judge Agnello KC sitting in the Insolvency and Companies Court. Mr Malato-Johnson appeared for the company. The judge ordered that the company should be compulsorily wound up and, therefore, at the date of this decision, it is now in liquidation.

6. In light of this, at my request, the tribunal contacted the Official Receiver to ascertain its further intentions as regards this appeal. The Official Receiver confirmed that the company had been wound up on 6 May 2026 and that it did not wish to continue with the proceedings.

7. I sought further submissions from the parties. Through no fault of theirs, I did not receive these until comparatively recently. In essence Mr Malato-Johnson submitted that as the company was no longer trading, there was no need for HMRC to be protected and thus the appeals should succeed and the notices set aside.

8. HMRC submitted that as the company had gone into liquidation and all debts have been written off they would not be pursuing the second appellant to provide security nor would they prosecute him should I be minded to dismiss the appeals.

9. In light of this change of circumstances, and for reasons given in detail below, I have decided to allow the appeals and to set aside the notices.

THE LEGISLATION

10. There was no dispute about the relevant legislation which I set out, in brief, below.

11. Under the PAYE Regulations (“Regs” each a “Reg”) Part 4A (Regs 97M–97X), an officer may require security where the officer “considers it necessary for the protection of the revenue” (Reg 97N (1)). Persons who may be required include the employer (Reg 97O) and, where the employer is a company, its directors and other officers (Reg 97P), and HMRC may require more than one person to give security on a joint and several basis (Reg 97P (2)).

12. The NIC Regulations, Schedule 4, Part 3B (paras 29M–29X) mirror the PAYE provisions as regards NI contributions.

13. A NOR is issued pursuant to the matters in Reg 97Q and a person may appeal against the NOR or any requirement in it (Reg 97V (1); para 29V (1)). On such an appeal the tribunal may confirm, vary or set aside the NOR (Reg 97V (5); para 29V (5)) (“the variationprovisions”).

14. Failure to comply with a requirement to give security is a strict liability criminal offence under section 684(4A) Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, “(4A) A person whofails to comply with a requirement imposed under PAYE regulations to give security, or further security, for the payment of any amount commits an offence if the failure continues for such period as is specified; and a person guilty of an offence under this subsection is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”.

15. Level 5 on the standard scale is a reference to the scale set out in section 37(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, level 5 being liable to a fine or maximum fine of £5,000. However, for relevant offences that £5,000 limit has been removed by section 85(1) of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. In D-Media Communications Ltd v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 430 (“D-Media”) Judge Berner observed at [15] that the limit had not been removed for offences under section 684 (4A).

THE EVIDENCE AND THE FACTS

16. I was provided with a bundle of documents compiled by HMRC, and a supplemental bundle, comprising mainly financial information, compiled by the appellants. These were supplemented by further documents including those annexed to HMRC’s skeleton argument, and by an RTI schedule handed up during the hearing. Oral evidence on behalf the appellants was given by Mr Ben-Israel who tendered two witness statements. Oral evidence on behalf of HMRC was given by Officer Jennifer Harrison (“Officer Harrison”), the officer responsible for issuing the NORs, who also provided a witness statement. From this evidence I find as follows:

Background

(1) The company was incorporated on 12 July 2021 and is involved in building entertainment software. Initial funds came from Mr Ben-Israel (the sole director and a shareholder) and some other investors. It was Mr Ben-Israel’s unchallenged evidence that he had personally invested approximately £800,000 of his own money into the company.

(2) It was his evidence, too, which seems to be borne out by the financial evidence to which I refer later, that the business has not reached the stage where it has sufficient income to sustain itself. Mr Ben-Israel is currently reliant on loans and handouts from family members and friends to keep himself financially afloat. He is drawing no funds from the business.

(3) The company has been registered as an employer since 10 June 2022. On the date on which the NORs were issued, the company had seven employees.

(4) Between June 2024 and February 2025, the company made a number of modest payments in respect of PAYE and NICs in amounts between £3,000 and £5,000.

(5) On 17 January 2025, HMRC sent a security warning letter to the company. It explained the NOR regime and that if a notice was required at the date of that letter, security of £153,590.69 would be required. This was based on amounts outstanding for PAYE and NICs at that date, together with estimates, for both, for the following four-month period.

(6) It told the company that it needed to pay its outstanding PAYE and NICs on or before 27 January 2025.

(7) HMRC’s note of a telephone conversation which took place between the appellants’ agent (“the agent”) and HMRC on 29 January 2025 records that the agent had told HMRC that Mr Ben-Israel “is raising cash flow as he is struggling right now and is willing to pay the debt off once cash flow is raised”. And that a time to pay arrangement would be required.

(8) A note of a subsequent telephone conversation which took place between the agent and HMRC on 11 February 2025 records that the agent told HMRC that the appellants had paid £4,000 last week and were trying to sell two properties to get funds. If an attempt was made to contact Mr Ben-Israel, “… he will probably not pick up phone”.

(9) HMRC made further attempts to contact Mr Ben-Israel and the agent later in February 2025 but were unsuccessful in making contact.

(10) The NORs were issued to the appellants (in identical terms) by Officer Harrison on 12 March 2025 identifying the amount of security for PAYE and, separately, for NIC. The total amount is, as previously stated, £186,984.78. The date on which the security was due was stated to be 21 April 2025, and the period of time for which HMRC would hold that security, as 24 months.

(11) The amount of security was based on both; the estimated amount of PAYE and NICs to be paid by the company for a four-month period (looking forward), which was identified as PAYE of £53,371 and NICs of £33,786; and the then current amount of arrears of PAYE and NICs, identified as PAYE of £58,587.18 and NICs of £41,240.60.

(12) The NORs went on to explain time to pay arrangements and also what would happen if the recipient did not give security (namely that it is a criminal offence and the recipient might face criminal prosecution and pay a fine if the security is not paid).

(13) The appellants did not pay the security and subsequently appealed against the decision to issue the NORs on 11 April 2025. They requested a review. On 24 April 2025, Officer Harrison issued her view of the matter letter confirming the breakdown of the amounts set in the NORs, the appellants’ responsibility to pay PAYE and NIC correctly and on time, and that security is requested “when we believe there is a risk that future liabilities will not be paid in full and on time”.

(14) On 25 April 2025, the appellants’ lawyers made further representations to HMRC concerning the review. On 6 June 2025, HMRC concluded their review and upheld the NORs. They extended the date for the provision of security to 16 July 2025.

(15) On 4 July 2025, the appellants lodged their appeal with the tribunal.

RTI information

(16) HMRC’s PAYE records for the company show that on 30 September 2025, a payment of £141,081.67 was made to offset the company’s then outstanding PAYE liabilities.

(17) A further PAYE record for periods between 5 October 2024 and 5 April 2026, showed RTI charges of varying amounts including around £17,000 for periods between November 2025 and February 2026, and around £16,000 for the periods in March and April 2026.

Officer Harrison’s evidence

(18) Officer Harrison has worked in the securities team of HMRC since March 2023. She was handed the case for the appellants on 5 March 2025 in order to enable her to consider whether to issue a NOR.

(19) She reviewed HMRC’s internal systems on that date and noted: The PAYE debt of £99,827.78; that the last payment made towards PAYE had been on 28 February 2025; the company’s status on Companies House was active and it had seven live employees; a NOR warning letter had been issued on 17 January 2025; the contact with the agent on 29 January 2025 reflected information that the director was trying to raise cash to pay the debt; and on 11 February 2025 the agent had advised that the appellants were trying to sell two properties and had been advised in turn that a NOR might be issued.

(20) She accepted that the note of the contact on 29 January 2025 recorded that the agent told HMRC that the appellants were struggling financially at that time.

(21) She knew that failure to comply with a NOR was a criminal offence and that she was aware, at the time she issued the NORs, that the appellants were facing cash flow difficulties. She was also aware that the appellants were trying to sell property to pay the outstanding amounts. She accepted that she knew that the appellants were impecunious but did not ask the appellants whether compliance with the notice was actually possible. She had not asked for bank statements because HMRC had made seven attempts to call the appellants who had not responded.

(22) She had not asked for a statement of liabilities or cash flows and had not considered the company’s accounts at Companies House.

(23) It was her evidence that there was no requirement for an officer in the securities team to consider hardship or ability to pay before issuing a NOR, given that the issue was to consider the risk to future revenue. She thought that this understanding was based on HMRC guidance.

Mr Ben-Israel’s evidence

(24) Mr Ben-Israel’s evidence was that it was important to retain the seven employees since their know-how was crucial to the development of the company’s business. If they were made redundant, then the company could not possibly carry on. It would also demonstrate a lack of confidence in the future of the company.

(25) The employees were not getting paid, but they were receiving payslips as if they were being paid, and he assumed that this was the basis on which the RTI information was provided to HMRC. He relied on the agent to deal with this and couldn’t give an explanation as to why the agent was submitting returns to HMRC which were ostensibly increasing the PAYE debt when no actual payment of wages were being made to the employees.

(26) He was not able to pay HMRC as neither he nor the company had any money. This was evidenced by the financial information supplied to HMRC. He had to pay what, in his view, were essential liabilities, and foremost amongst these were, historically, the employees. Without them the business could not have remained feasible.

(27) He had behaved as a reasonable and responsible director. He was doing everything in his power to raise money. A company called YBI Properties 1 Ltd, in which he has a 50% beneficial interest, owns property at 18 Old Church Street, Chelsea, London SW3 5DQ, registered under Title Number LN46662. He is also 100% beneficial owner of a property at 33 Redcliffe Road, Chelsea, London SW10 9NJ (together “the Chelsea properties”). Both are currently on the market yet neither has sold. Once they have been, he intends to pay off his debts to HMRC.

(28) He had used a substantial repayment/credit from HMRC for research and development to offset his PAYE and NIC liabilities.

(29) He was aware of his obligations to HMRC, as an employer, but was forced not to pay HMRC because of a lack of funds. He had put a substantial amount of his own money into the company and was waiting for the Chelsea properties to sell. He was optimistic about the prospects for the business and in particular an arrangement with Abbey Road Studios, but start-ups take a long time to come to financial fruition, and at the moment there is no income being generated by the company which will enable him to pay the outstanding, and ongoing, liabilities to HMRC. He had made payments to HMRC of amounts between £3,000 and £5,000 and so he was doing his best to pay.

(30) He did not communicate with HMRC because he had asked his agent to do so.

(31) The large credits which were evidenced in his bank statements were payments by friends and family as he was relying on their largesse to keep him financially solvent. The only independent income from which he benefited was rents from his personally owned Chelsea property.

(32) If the NORs are enforced, the company would be forced to go into liquidation and he would go into bankruptcy.

(33) He struggles to pay his day-to-day expenses and could not afford to give HMRC any security. He could not afford to pay anything.

Accounts and other financial information

(34) The accounts filed at Companies House for the year ended 31 July 2024 show that the company made an operating loss of £1,324,039. Details of how that loss is made up are set out on page 8 of those accounts.

(35) Those accounts were signed off by Mr Ben-Israel on 16 September 2024.

(36) The accounts filed at Companies House for the year ended 31 July 2025 show that the company made an operating loss of £716,727. Details of how that loss is made up are set out on page 8 of those accounts.

(37) Mr Ben-Israel provided two witness statements. With the second of these he exhibited bank statements, mortgage documentation, and his 2025 tax return. The bank statements show that on various relevant dates, his bank account was overdrawn in amounts between approximately £5,000 and £16,000. It was modestly in credit on 28 February 2026. His tax return confirms his oral evidence that he was receiving rental income from one of the Chelsea properties. The mortgage information confirms that in September 2025 he borrowed £2.1 million for a 12 month period, for which interest of £224,280 is payable. On the sale of that Chelsea property he will be required to discharge an outstanding mortgage. He has recently asked the sales agent to reduce the sale price of that property from £3.4 million to £2.8 million.

The winding up petition

(38) On 7 November 2025 HMRC presented a petition to the High Court for the winding up of the company on the grounds that it was unable to pay its debts and was insolvent because of that inability (“the winding up petition”). The petition records the company’s indebtedness as being £88,457.36 in respect of NICs and PAYE at the date of the petition.

(39) As mentioned above, the winding up petition has now been heard, and the company is now in liquidation. It was wound up on 6 May 2026 and all debts have been written off.

DISCUSSION

Submissions

Pre liquidation submissions

17. In summary, Mr Malato-Johnson submitted as follows:

(1) His core submissions are threefold. Firstly, regarding jurisdiction and decision-making error. Secondly, hardship and ability to pay on the evidence. Thirdly, on quantum.

(2) On jurisdiction, he submits that the tribunal has, essentially, a full appellate jurisdiction. It is not purely supervisory. This is a consequence of the provisions of Reg 97V(5) and para 29V(5) which provide that on appeal, the tribunal’s powers include confirming the requirements in the notice, varying those requirements or setting it aside.

(3) These powers are not provided in respect of security for VAT or CIS, where the jurisdiction is purely supervisory. Cases involving security for those must therefore be distinguished.

(4) There is clear case law supporting this submission. In D-Media, Judge Berner distinguished the position for PAYE and NIC from security required for VAT and said that, at [20] and [21]: “…although I accept that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in relation to security for PAYE and NICs is to some extent supervisory in nature, it is an appellate jurisdiction. This supervisory approach, that is having regard to the reasonableness of HMRC’s decision is… limited to… Whether the giving of security is necessary for the protection of the revenue… All other aspects, on the other hand, are matters on which the Tribunal is entitled to form its own view and on doing so to confirm, set aside or vary the Notice of Requirement…”.

(5) D-Media includes a comprehensive analysis of the relevant statutory provisions as, too, has the recent decision in Duma v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 262 (“Duma”).

(6) Duma endorsed the principle that the tribunal has full appellate jurisdiction, considered D-Media in some detail, and conducted its own review of the relevant authorities.

(7) The relevance of this is that the tribunal can take account of material which was not available to the decision-making officer at the time of that officer’s decision.

(8) It is also clear from D-Media and Duma that one of the matters which should be taken into account either by the tribunal or by the decision-making officer (or indeed both) is an appellant’s ability to pay, and the hardship that appellant would suffer if they were required to give security in the amount set out in a notice.

(9) One reason for this is because of the criminal sanctions which follow for failing to satisfy a NOR. A second is that hardship can be taken into account once a NOR has been issued (the PAYE Regulations provide for hardship to be considered on an application to reduce security set out in a NOR), and it would therefore be perverse not to take it into account when considering the issue of a NOR in the first place.

(10) He distinguishes the case law cited by HMRC on the jurisdiction and hardship points. Bluechipworld Sales & Marketing Ltd v HMRC [2019] UKFTT 705 (“Bluechipworld”) and IPSC Recruitment Ltd v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 247 (“IPSC”), whilst both dealing with PAYE and NIC notices, do not analyse these provisions in any detail, unlike Duma which is the latest word on the subject and is to be preferred.

(11) The same is true of Highlake Ltd v HMRC [2016] UKFTT 08 (“Highlake”), and Rosebronze Ltdv HMRC LON/84/154 (“Rosebronze”). The latter deals with security for VAT only. Dicta in the former regarding inability to pay are in the context of VAT security, albeit that the appeal involved both VAT and PAYE/NIC security. Blocksure Ltd (in liquidation) v HMRC UKFTT 397 (“Blocksure”) was a late appeal case and at [118] the tribunal made no findings on the correctness of the approach taken in D-Media.

(12) Shortly stated, therefore, the decision maker should have taken into account hardship/ability to pay and a failure to do so renders the original decision unreasonable, even on a purely supervisory basis. The tribunal in any event has an appellate jurisdiction and can consider the facts as at the date of the hearing and in light of those facts can vary or set aside the requirements in the notice.

(13) D-Media was not appealed. Even if an application for permission to appeal Duma has been made, it is still good law and is to be preferred to all of the other authorities.

(14) On the evidence it is clear that Officer Harrison did not consider that hardship/ability to pay was something that she was required to take into account when reaching her decision to issue the NORs. It was not clear from her evidence how she had reached that conclusion, but it appeared to be from HMRC’s guidance.

(15) Her evidence was that at that time, she knew that both the company and Mr Ben-Israel were impecunious. She knew of the information given by the agent to HMRC over the phone. She could have examined (but did not) the company’s accounts. She knew that Mr Ben-Israel was trying to raise cash to pay the debt.

(16) As a matter of legal principle, therefore, she should have taken these issues into account. Her failure to do so renders the decision to issue the NORs an unreasonable one. If she had taken these matters into account, she would have realised that neither the company nor Mr Ben-Israel were able to satisfy the NORs and that both would therefore automatically commit a criminal offence.

(17) In any event, the tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the financial position of the appellants at the date of the hearing. The financial evidence clearly shows that neither can afford the security requested. The consequence, therefore, is that they will automatically commit a criminal offence.

(18) I should therefore set aside the notices, vary the notices and reduce the security to zero, or at the very least, reduce the amount by removing the outstanding debt.

(19) The notices were based on historic debt and a four-month look forward period for prospective PAYE and NIC liability.

(20) Duma holds that there is no justification for using a NOR to secure historic debt. This is locking the stable door after the horse has bolted, and arrears should be pursued by ordinary recovery routes (as indeed HMRC are doing through the winding up petition). This therefore is an irrelevant factor which was taken into account by the officer, and impermissibly inflates the security required.

(21) The tribunal should vary the notices so they operate as a genuinely protective (rather than punitive) measure. It clearly has the jurisdiction to do so. So only the look forward provisions should be considered rather than the historic debt situation.

18. In summary Miss Brown submitted as follows:

(1) The burden of showing that the NORs are invalid rests with the appellants who must establish this on the balance of probabilities.

(2) The tribunal’s jurisdiction is primarily supervisory. This is clear from cases such as John Dee, which although dealing with VAT, deals more generally with decisions regarding security which is necessary for the protection of the revenue.

(3) The tribunal’s power to vary or set aside a notice is limited to circumstances where the tribunal has previously found that the original decision has been an unreasonable one. It is essentially a two-step process. The tribunal must consider the reasonableness of that decision based on the information available to the decision maker at the time. When considering this, the tribunal cannot take into account information which has emerged since then. If the tribunal considers that the decision was reasonable, then it stands. There is no power to vary or set it aside. If, on the other hand, the tribunal decides that the decision was unreasonable, then it can vary it or set it aside. The tribunal is not obliged to strike down the notice.

(4) The correct approach is set out in IPSC at [22]:

“For PAYE and NICs, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is broader. Under Regulation 97V(5) of the PAYE Regulations 2003, the Tribunal may confirm, vary, or set aside the NoR. However, the Tribunal is still guided by the principle of reasonableness and proportionality, as established in case law such as D-Media Communications Ltd v HMRC [2016] TC 05183 and Highlake Ltd [2017] UKFTT 0808 (TC) (Highlake). The Tribunal may consider whether the amount of security is reasonable and proportionate to the risk to the revenue, but it does not exercise afresh discretion as to whether security should be required unless HMRC’s decision is found to be unreasonable or procedurally flawed”.

(5) The conclusion in Duma, that the tribunal has full appellate jurisdiction, is incorrect. An application for permission to appeal has been made.

(6) The principles of reasonableness and proportionality of the NORs should be the main focus for this tribunal albeit that it may confirm, vary, or set aside the notices.

(7) The commission of a criminal offence is simply a consequence of a failure to comply with a notice. It is not something which is relevant to the issue of whether the tribunal’s jurisdiction is supervisory or appellate. The same is true regarding the ability of the tribunal to consider hardship once a notice has been issued.

(8) The protection of the revenue is a jurisdiction expressly conferred on HMRC for determination. It is not open to the tribunal to consider facts and matters which were not known to the decision maker at the time of the decision under challenge and so undermined the correctness of the notice.

(9) The decision maker in this case (Officer Harrison) came to a rational and reasonable decision. She considered the outstanding PAYE debt, the fact that the last payment to HMRC had been made on 28 February 2025, that the company was active and had “live employees”, that a warning letter had been issued, and that the agent had been warned that a notice could be issued in telephone conversations with HMRC in February 2025.

(10) Furthermore, HMRC had attempted to contact Mr Ben-Israel on a number of occasions and he had failed to respond, thus demonstrating that he was not seriously engaged with debt management.

(11) As regards quantum, it is entirely rational and reasonable to consider any outstanding indebtedness at the time at which the notice is issued. Failure to pay on time reflects a risk to HMRC. Protection of the revenue includes ensuring that outstanding debts are made good.

(12) The wording in Reg 97N allows HMRC to issue a notice for payments of amounts in respect of which an employer “is or may be accountable to HMRC…”.

(13) The use of the present tense provides a statutory basis for including existing indebtedness.

(14) The four-month look forward period, too, is a reasonable and rational basis on which to assess the requirement for security. It is based on figures provided by the appellants. It is not clear from the evidence of Mr Ben-Israel whether the company was actually paying salary and deducting tax and NICs from it (he thought this was not happening notwithstanding that RTI information to this effect was being submitted by the company) or whether it was not paying those employees yet returning that information. The latter seemed highly unlikely. In any event, it was not clear until the hearing that the employees might not have been being paid, and thus the RTI information on which Officer Harrison based her decision was relevant information.

(15) Case law such as Bluechipworld, IPSC, Highake and Rosebronze are clear authority for the proposition that hardship/ability to pay is not a factor which HMRC need to take into account when considering whether security is necessary for the protection of the revenue. This applies not just to VAT or CIS cases but to security required under the PAYE/NIC regimes.

(16) There was therefore no need for Officer Harrison to consider hardship when coming to her decision to issue the NORs.

Post liquidation submissions

19. In his post liquidation submissions, Mr Malato-Johnson submitted, in summary:

(1) The liquidation of the company and the Official Receiver’s confirmation that it would not wish to continue with the proceedings, had no impact on the second appellant’s appeal rights which survived the liquidation and that confirmation by the Official Receiver.

(2) The second appellant’s rights to challenge the decision and the notices subsists. He continues to assert those rights and challenges all aspects of the notices.

(3) The notices exist for one purpose only, namely the protection of the revenue. Once that protective rationale falls away, the notices must fall with it. The company is not trading and is not generating, (and will never again generate) any future exposure to PAYE or NIC liabilities. There is therefore no future revenue to protect and no basis for acquiring security in respect of prospective liabilities which will never rise.

20. In her post liquidation submission, Miss Brown submitted that HMRC could confirm that as the company has gone into liquidation and all debts have been written off, they would not be pursuing the second appellant to provide security nor prosecution should the tribunal be minded to dismiss the appeals.

My view

General comments on jurisdiction

21. Mr Milato-Johnson made no challenge to Miss Brown’s assertion that it was for the appellants to show that the NORs are invalid. They have the burden of proof which they must discharge on the balance of probabilities.

22. There was no real dispute between the parties that when considering the notices, I should first consider whether they were reasonable and proportionate. At this stage, therefore, I am exercising a supervisory role. I agree.

23. The real dispute is what happens once I have reached my supervisory decision. Subject to her post liquidation submissions, Miss Brown says that the notices must stand if I find that HMRC’s decision was a reasonable one. In those circumstances, the variation provisions do not apply. They only apply if I find that HMRC’s decision was unreasonable.

24. Mr Malato-Johnson says the precise opposite. In his view if I conclude that the decision to issue the notices was reasonable, I can then use the variation provisions (which confer, in his view, full appellate jurisdiction on me) to confirm, vary, or set aside the notices.

25. I shall come to that in due course, but I start with my supervisory jurisdiction, and a consideration of whether the decision by Officer Harrison to issue the NORs was a reasonable and proportionate one.

Reasonableness and proportionality

26. I set out the case law which is relevant to the exercise of my supervisory jurisdiction below.

27. In The Southend United Football Club Ltd v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs [2013] UKFTT 715 (TC) Judge Bishopp states:

“[10] It is undisputed that our jurisdiction is supervisory only. That is, if we are to allow the appeal we must be satisfied that the decision was one at which the Commissioners could not reasonably have arrived. That understanding of the law derives from the judgments of Farquharson J in Mr Wishmore Ltd v C & E Commrs (1988) 3 BVC 311, of Dyson J in C & E Commrs v Peachtree EnterprisesLtd [1994] BVC 209 and of the Court of Appeal in C & E Commrs v John Dee Ltd [1995] BVC 361. The cases show that we must limit ourselves to a consideration of the facts and matters which were known when the disputed decision was made, so cannot take account of developments since that time, and that we may not exercise a fresh discretion. In other words, if the decision was flawed we must allow the appeal and leave HMRC to make a further determination if they so choose. If we are persuaded the decision was flawed but that, had HMRC approached the matter correctly, they would inevitably have arrived at the same conclusion we should dismiss the appeal”.

28. In the case of Customs & Excise Commissioners v John Dee Ltd [1995] BVC 361 the Court of Appeal stated the tribunal’s role in a security appeal is to: ‘…consider whether the commissioners have acted in a way in which no reasonable panel of commissioners could have acted or whether they had taken into account some irrelevant matter or had disregarded something to which they should have given weight’.

29. In Customs & Excise Commissioners v Peachtree Enterprises Ltd [1994] BVC 209 Dyson J stated: ‘In my judgment, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction the tribunal must limit itself to considering facts and matters which existed at the time the challenge to the decision of the commissioners was taken. Facts and matters which arise after that time cannot in law vitiate an exercise of discretion which was reasonable and lawful at the time that it was effected’.

30. I was not taken to any relevant case law which deals with the concept of proportionality.

31. In R (on the application of Lumsden and others) (Appellants) v Legal Services Board (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 41 ("Lumsden") the Supreme Court (albeit in relation to proportionality as a principle of EU law rather than as purely domestic law) said that:

(1) Proportionality as a general principle of EU law involves a consideration of two questions: first, whether the measure in question is suitable or appropriate to achieve the objective pursued; and secondly, whether the measure is necessary to achieve that objective, or whether it could be attained by a less onerous method (at [33]); and

(2) As is the case for other principles of public law, the way in which the principle of proportionality is applied in EU law depends to a significant extent upon the context at [23]).

32. Furthermore, it is clear from cases relating to the VAT default surcharge regime[seefor example The Commissioners for HMRC v Total Technology (Engineering) Ltd [2012] UKUT 418 (TCC) at [74]) that a regime or system could give rise to disproportionality at the level of the regime itself, but could equally be disproportionate only for a particular section of those affected. Thus, the question of proportionality fell to be addressed both at a scheme and at an individual level.

33. With these principles in mind, I now turn to the decision made by Officer Harrison to issue the NORs.

The officer’s decision

34. In her view, the company was a risk to future revenue. There was a risk that future liabilities would not be paid in full and on time. She made her decision having reviewed HMRC’s internal systems. She had noted the outstanding PAYE debt of £99,827.78; she had seen that payment had been made towards PAYE liabilities on 28 February 2025; she had seen that the company status on Companies House was active and that it had seven live employees; a warning letter had been list issued for PAYE by a caseworker from the securities team; contact with the agent showed that Mr Ben-Israel was trying to raise cash to pay the debt and was trying to sell two properties.

35. In her oral evidence she accepted that at the time of issuing the notices, she knew that the appellants were impecunious.

36. She also said that she did not consider hardship/ability to pay as it was her understanding (it was not clear from her evidence what this understanding was based on, whether revenue guidance or legislation) that this was not relevant to her decision.

37. She also said she was aware that should the appellants fail to comply with the notices, they would be committing a criminal offence.

38. I therefore make the following findings of fact:

(1) Officer Harrison knew at the time that she issued the notices that the appellants were impecunious and that they were unable to satisfy them.

(2) She also knew that if they could not satisfy them, they would commit a criminal offence.

(3) She did not consider hardship/ability to pay when coming to her decision to issue the notices.

39. In Miss Brown’s submission, there is no need for Officer Harrison to have considered hardship/ability to pay at all, and so failing to do so does not render her decision to issue the notices, flawed. She cites the case law referred to at [15(15)] above as authority for that submission.

40. Mr Minato-Johnson says the opposite. He says that hardship/ability to pay is relevant to the reasonableness of the decision, so not only should the officer have considered it, but given what she knew at the time she issued the notices, she came to an unreasonable decision on the facts. He cites the cases of Duma and D-Media as authority for that submission.

41. In my view, the answer to this point lies in the concept of proportionality. In a way it is “baked in” to the statutory provision which enables HMRC to issue a NOR in the first place. They can do so if “an officer [HMRC] considers it necessary for the protection of the revenue…”.

42. The word “necessary” chimes with the principles set out in Lumsden. And to my mind it sets a high bar. I return to this later.

43. But it must also be seen in the context of the protection of the revenue. That phrase must be considered in its entirety.

44. So, I also need to consider whether a NOR, in the context of the facts of this appeal, is necessary to achieve the objective pursued. In this case that objective is the protection of the revenue. The revenue requires protection if, according to Officer Harrison, there is a risk that future liabilities will not be paid in full and on time.

45. If that protection can be achieved by a less onerous method than issuing a NOR so the NOR goes beyond what is necessary to achieve that protection, then Lumsden is authority for the proposition that the issue of the NOR is disproportionate. This has the consequence that the decision to issue it is not reasonable and proportionate and is therefore flawed in the judicial review sense.

46. It is my view, although I do not need to decide this, that the NOR regime, as a whole, is a proportionate regime.

47. But any proportionate regime might act disproportionately in any particular circumstances.

48. I need therefore to consider whether the decision to issue notices to these particular appellants is proportionate.

49. The concept of the protection of the revenue must be considered at a practical level. If it is clear that the recipient of a notice will not be able to pay it, then, like Judge Berner in D-Media, I cannot see how the giving of a notice will provide any protection to the revenue. One cannot get blood from a stone. All that the issue of the notice achieves is to bring the recipient within the ambit of committing a criminal offence. If there is no practical likelihood, on the facts, that the security cannot be given, then how, I ask myself, does a notice protect the revenue? The protection lies in the provision of the security. If it is impossible that it can be given, and that impossibility is known to the decision maker, then I cannot see that a notice gives any real protection of the revenue. It might provide theoretical protection, in that it pushes the recipient into a corner whereby failure to comply will result in a criminal offence. And that, according to Miss Brown is one of the reasons for issuing it since it provides an incentive to recalcitrant taxpayers, to settle up.

50. But I cannot see that if a recipient is simply unable to pay the security in the real world, why that theoretical protection is sufficient. We are looking at payment of real money here, with real-world consequences of a failure to do so. If a recipient cannot pay that money, then any future liabilities will not be secured, and so any future risk to HMRC cannot be covered off. Nor can any outstanding debt.

51. I find myself, therefore, agreeing with Judge Berner in D-Media (and indeed Judge Gordon in Duma) that when considering whether to issue a NOR, a relevant consideration which the decision maker should take into account, is the hardship/ability to pay of the particular appellant whose position is under consideration.

52. Officer Harrison should have taken into account the fact that the appellants were impecunious and could not provide security either at all, or in the amounts which she subsequently set out in the NORs.

53. Those notices, when issued, went beyond what was necessary for the protection of the revenue. In the circumstances of these appellants, the notices were disproportionate.

54. I would also make two subsidiary points.

55. Firstly, there is considerable authority from the higher courts (for example from the Court of Appeal in BlackRock Holdco 5 LLC v HMRC [2024] EWCA Civ 330) that some effects or consequences may be so inevitably and inextricably with a decision that, unless they were merely incidental, those consequences have to be a purpose for the making of that decision.

56. In this case it was (and is) an inevitable consequence of the issue of the notices that the appellants would commit a criminal offence. It was known to Officer Harrison that this would be the case if the appellants could not satisfy the security required by the notices, and she also knew that the appellants would not be able to satisfy them as they did not have the means to do so.

57. So she is fixed with the purpose of issuing the notice to make the appellants commit that criminal offence as that was the inevitable consequence of their issue. And that is clearly something which is, at best, irrelevant to the making of the decision to issue the NORs. It is something which she should not have taken into account when making that decision.

58. Secondly, HMRC have issued a winding up petition, which, as mentioned at [4] and [5] above, has resulted in the company being put into liquidation. In Lumsden terms, this is a less onerous method of achieving the protection of the revenue than the issuing of the notices, and so further calls into question their proportionality.

59. For the sake of completeness, I mention that I have considered Mr Malato-Johnson’s submission that the decision to issue the notices is flawed as it takes into account an arrears component which is not necessary for the protection of the revenue. I reject that submission. I agree with Miss Brown that the protection of the revenue does encompass the existing position and that outstanding indebtedness at the date of the issue of the notices is something which can reasonably be taken into account by the decision maker (as it was in this case).

60. Having therefore concluded, having exercised my supervisory jurisdiction, that the decision to issue the NORs was not a reasonable or proportionate one, (and so was both unreasonable and procedurally flawed) I now need to consider the consequences of that conclusion.

61. I do this in light of the fact that the company has been wound up, all debts have been written off, and HMRC have confirmed that they will not be pursuing the second appellant for security.

The variation provisions

62. Miss Brown’s view is that I can now consider variation provisions. This is supported by Judge Brown’s view set out in the extract from IPSC set out at [15(4)] above.

63. For the purposes of this decision and given that it is contrary to the position espoused by Mr Malato-Johnson, I express no view as to whether or not this is correct. But given the adversarial nature of the tribunal process, I accept it, and so now go on to consider the variation provisions and their impact on the NORs.

64. I can consider those in light of all the information which was before me at the hearing, and the subsequent post liquidation information and submissions. For the same reasons I as I have set out above as regards the decision itself, I am of the view that hardship/ability to pay are matters which I can take into account when considering the variation provisions.

65. I approached these provisions in the following way. I have considered initially whether I should set aside the notices on the basis that they are not necessary for the protection of the revenue. I have considered this afresh based on the evidence before me.

66. If I decide that the notices are necessary, I need to go on to consider whether they should be varied.

Set aside?

67. The essential question is whether the notices are required for the protection of the revenue. It seems to me pretty clear that if the company has been wound up and has ceased to trade, it will not be generating any PAYE or NIC liabilities, and thus there are no liabilities against which HMRC need protection. This is as submitted by Mr Malato-Johnson; it is consistent with the principles set out in D-Media and Duma, and is the meaning of the expression “protection of the revenue” construed both literally and purposively.

68. This applies to both appellants.

69. As mentioned above, notices are not intended to recover pre-existing PAYE or NIC debts, even though, as I have said, those can be taken into account when considering the reasonableness of the issuing officer’s decision.

70. HMRC have also confirmed that they will not be pursuing the second appellant to provide security on the basis that the company has gone into liquidation and all debts have been written off. So, any pre-existing liability to PAYE or NIC no longer exists.

71. In light of these principles, and of HMRC’s concession that they will not be pursuing the second appellant, it is my view that the notices are not necessary for the protection of the revenue.

DISPOSITION

72. I have determined as a matter of principle (under my supervisory jurisdiction) that the decision to issue the NORs was an unreasonable and disproportionate one. I have therefore gone on to exercise my appellate jurisdiction under the variation provisions.

73. Under that jurisdiction, in light of the company’s liquidation, I have concluded that the notices are not necessary for the protection of the revenue. They should be set aside.

74. I therefore allow both appellants’ appeals and set aside the notices.

RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

75. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date:

28 October 2026

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