Miscellaneous United Kingdom

ZZ (Deprivation of Liberty in the Public Interest) (No 2)

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCOP 57 (T2)

Case No: 13919068

IN THE COURT OF PROTECTION

Civil Justice Centre,

1, Bridge Street West,

MANCHESTER M60 9DJ

Date: 29.10.2026

Before :

HIS HONOUR JUDGE BURROWS

Sitting as a nominated judge of the Court of Protection at Tier 2

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

A LOCAL AUTHORITY Applicant
– and –
ZZ
(by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor)
Respondent

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

ZZ (Deprivation of Liberty in the Public Interest) (No. 2)

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Written submissions only:

Lucinda France-Hayhurst (instructed by the Local Authority Solicitor) for the Applicant

Rachel Baker (instructed by Peter Edwards Law) for the Respondent

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

JUDGMENT

This judgment was delivered in public, and the proceedings are subject to the Transparency Order dated 9th June 2023. The anonymity of ZZ must be strictly preserved, and nothing must be published that would identify ZZ, either directly or indirectly, including by identifying any of the other persons or entities anonymised in this judgment. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

HIS HONOUR JUDGE BURROWS:

INTRODUCTION

1. The parties presented the Court with an agreed order in this long running case. That order provides for a declaration that ZZ’s present arrangements amount to a deprivation of his liberty, but they are nonetheless in his best interests and should be approved by the Court.

2. Two issues that arise out of that. The first is whether the arrangements do amount to a deprivation of liberty, which, in the light of A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland [2026] UKSC 16, (“the NI case” hereafter) is less straightforward than it was before June of this year. For the reasons I give below I have concluded that ZZ is and will be deprived of his liberty in these arrangements and that he therefore falls within the protections of Article 5 of the European Convention.

3. The second issue is in some ways more profound. It is clear from the arrangements that ZZ’s restrictions are primarily to protect the public due to his sexual risk profile. There is still some debate as to whether such measures should be characterised as being in P’s best interests in Court of Protection cases. Again, and for the reasons I shall explain below, I am entirely satisfied that they are, and they should be approved and authorised.

4. I invited written submissions from the parties, and I have received very helpful Position Statements from Ms France-Hayhurst and Ms Baker, for which I am grateful.

BACKGROUND

5. This matter concerns the care and support arrangements for ZZ, a young man who has been the subject of longstanding proceedings before the Court of Protection. His background is best summarised in the judgment handed down by the Vice President, Mrs Justice Theis, VP, in March 2024, when allowing an appeal against an earlier judgment of mine: see Local Authority A v ZZ [2024] EWCOP 21.

6. The following passage from Her Ladyship’s judgment provides the relevant background:

[5] ZZ is a 20 year old man with a diagnosis of mild learning disability ('LD'), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ('ADHD') and possible obsessive compulsive disorder ('OCD'). He suffered sexual abuse as a child and has himself been convicted of sexual assault on a 5 year old family member, resulting in an Intensive Referral Order for 12 months and a Sexual Harm Prevention Order ('SHPO'), which expires in October 2024. It is a condition of the SHPO that ZZ does not live or sleep in any premises where there is also a child under the age of 18 years unless approved by the local authority and does not have unsupervised contact with a child.

[6] ZZ became a looked after child pursuant to s 20 Children Act 1989 (CA 1989) in November 2019. He was placed at a residential and educational setting that is able to work with children displaying sexually harmful behaviours.

[7] Within that placement ZZ continued to exhibit difficult and challenging sexualised behaviours.

[8] As ZZ approached adulthood, he moved to a supported living placement in a self-contained flat in October 2021.

[9] The local authority applied on 24 March 2022 to authorize ZZ's deprivation of liberty at his current placement. The application was transferred to the welfare pathway in July 2022 due to a material change in ZZ's circumstances, namely that he wished to enter into a relationship and engage in sexual relations with his girlfriend, TD.

[10] ZZ had been assessed in July 2021 by a Consultant Clinical Neuropsychiatrist to 'pose a very high risk of committing harmful sexual acts towards others' by virtue of his 'intrusive [sexual] thoughts' which were deemed obsessional in nature.

[11] ZZ has repeatedly made clear his wish to live with his girlfriend, TD, and her mother were he able to make that decision himself, has repeatedly expressed a wish to live without restrictions (of all kinds) and is deemed at high risk of absconding.

[12] In October 2022 the court permitted the instruction of Dr Lisa Rippon to assess ZZ's capacity. Dr Rippon initially concluded in February 2023 that ZZ lacked capacity in the following matters – conducting proceedings, care and support, internet and social media use and contact with others, but had capacity to engage in sexual relations, to marry, to use contraception and to enter into/terminate a tenancy.

[13] In a further report in March 2023, Dr Rippon reconsidered her conclusions, having been asked to what extent ZZ's urges and impulsivity interact with his appreciation of another's consent to engage in sexual relations. Dr Rippon's revised conclusions regarding sexual relations and marriage were summarised by Mr O'Brien as follows:

(1) ZZ lacks insight into his ability to control his behaviour and stop himself from engaging in behaviour that he knows is wrong;

(2) This prevents ZZ from using and weighing information with regards to engaging in sexual activity and he therefore lacks capacity in this area;

(3) ZZ does not have any insight into his own vulnerabilities and may potentially behave in public in a way which places him at significant risk of both sexual exploitation by others but also aggressive behaviour and potential reprisals;

(4) Based on his lack of capacity in relation to engaging in sexual relations, he lacks capacity to marry.

[14] Between January and April 2023 ZZ had threatened to reoffend, attempted to evade supervision and abscond from his placement by counting staff's steps on the stairs and taking steps to bypass the door alarm on the entrance to his flat. He did reoffend in April 2023 by unscrewing his window in order to exhibit masturbation to a member of the public from his bedroom, which is the subject of ongoing criminal proceedings.

[15] At the hearing on 12 and 13 June 2023 Dr Rippon gave oral evidence over two days. On the 12 June 2023 the Judge had a separate meeting with ZZ, who then remained present in the hearing during Dr Rippon's evidence. The Judge considered the written submissions from the parties and in his judgment dated 1 August 2023 he made the following findings about ZZ's capacity: that he had capacity to make decisions about residence; engage in sexual relations; contraception, and to marry. It was agreed ZZ lacked capacity to conduct proceedings; make decisions about care and support and internet and social media use. The Judge determined he lacked capacity to make decisions about contact with others.

[16] According to the local authority they thereafter endeavoured to draw up a Re TZ compliant contact plan but state ZZ's placement are going to serve notice, due to what they consider is the serious risk he poses, if its staff are expected to put into operation a plan for ZZ to have sexual contact with his girlfriend, on or off the premises.

[17] Prior to this hearing the local authority provided further updated information from the allocated social worker, reporting that although ZZ remained in a relationship with TD he also expressed a desire to engage in sexual relations with other female students at his college. The placement also report that ZZ's risky and impulsive behaviour is increasingly difficult to anticipate and manage. ZZ's multi-disciplinary team continue to meet regularly and the minutes report heightened concern about ZZ's anxiety, impulsivity, fixations, comments and deviant behaviour. Mr O'Brien submits this provides further evidence of the connection identified by Dr Rippon between ZZ's complex conditions and his obsessive behaviour, with the result that there is a collective concern that ZZ is at high risk of reoffending sexually due to the anxiety and stress which he is experiencing. Ms Roper submits the court should disregard this evidence in this hearing, which is an appeal against the order on 1 August 2023 on the basis of the evidence available to the court at that time. I agree with Ms Roper. For the purposes of this appeal hearing I have not taken into account the recent updating information.

7. That is the context in which this judgment is to be understood.

PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS

8. ZZ now resides in a supported living placement where he receives 24-hour support. He occupies a property under a tenancy held in his own name. The arrangements are intended both to meet his assessed needs and to manage risks identified by professionals.

9. The current care plan provides for extensive restrictions. ZZ does not possess a key to his home. His movements in the community are supervised. His communications and relationships are subject to oversight and control. His access to technology and social media is restricted. His electronic devices are removed overnight. Various safeguards are in place concerning his contact with others and his activities in the community.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

10. The parties agree that the court's analysis must be undertaken in accordance with the approach identified by the Supreme Court in the NI case, hereafter.

11. The question is not determined solely by reference to continuous supervision and control or freedom to leave, as under the last test the Supreme Court gave us, in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council [2014] UKSC 19, but by consideration of the person's concrete situation viewed as a whole. Relevant factors include the degree of restriction imposed, the extent of coercion, the person's wishes and feelings, the question of consent beyond that defined by the MCA, and whether the arrangements fall within the sphere of relative normality for a person in that individual's circumstances.

DISCUSSION

12. Applying that approach, I am satisfied that the arrangements imposed upon ZZ are highly restrictive. Almost every aspect his life is regulated and controlled. There is supervision of his movements, his communications are monitored, his relationships with others are controlled. He is severely restricted in his use of technology. In short, he is unable to exercise the degree of personal autonomy that an ordinary adult in the community would normally enjoy.

13. I do not consider these arrangements can properly be characterised as falling within the sphere of relative normality. Whilst regard must be had to ZZ's individual circumstances and needs, a substantial proportion of the restrictions are imposed because of the risk he presents to others and the need to protect the public. Their purpose is not solely to provide care and support. In that respect the present case bears a close resemblance to Y County Council v ZZ[1] [2013] EWCOP 463, in which Moor J recognised the relevance of restrictions imposed for the protection of others when considering whether a deprivation of liberty arose.

14. I have also considered carefully whether ZZ consents to the arrangements.

15. I accept that ZZ frequently presents as cooperative and that he has engaged positively with professionals involved in his care. He has achieved significant progress. Certain restrictions have been reduced over time, and he has expressed approval at some aspects of the current placement.

16. However, the evidence demonstrates that ZZ wishes to enjoy substantially greater autonomy than is presently available to him. He wishes to possess his own key and to enjoy greater freedom in his relationships, communications and daily life. What he ultimately wants, not surprisingly, is to live a more normal and independent existence. His compliance with the current arrangements reflect an acceptance of present reality rather than genuine agreement with the restrictions themselves.

17. Whilst the objective and subjective elements of deprivation of liberty overlap, it is still appropriate to deal with them separately, provided that one does not lose sight of that overlap, which I do not.

18. When dealing with the objective element of deprivation of liberty, I have to consider how the restrictions imposed upon ZZ are experienced by him. In other recent cases much has turned on this since the NI case now requires the Court to focus on how P experiences the circumstances in which they are placed. There has been a number of Tier 2 judgments and one very recent exceptionally clear Tier 1 judgment (NHS Leicester, Leicestershire & Rutland ICB v AA (& others) [2026] EWCOP 56 (T1) (TJ Sharron) in which this is addressed. At the present time, there is also a judgment from Mrs Justice Theis, in Essex County Council v ST [2026] EWHC 2328 (Fam).

19. The only Tier 2 judgment I will mention is that of His Honour Judge Tindal in TW v Worcestershire County Council [2026] EWCOP 54 (T2). At [55] when the Judge summarises his approach to the objective element he says this:

In short, if someone actively objects to their placement – particularly if that leads to conflict and unhappiness, or even potentially physical restraint – there is clearly an element of coercion as they are being compelled to live somewhere they did not want to live, which points towards ‘confinement’. By contrast, if someone is actively happy in their placement, that would not only point towards ‘valid consent’, it would also point against their being ‘confined’ at all because they would not experience any element of coercion. So, in MIG, MEG and Mustafa, it was their broad (if not unqualified) acceptance of their respective placements which underpinned their protective and caring purpose, ‘relative normality’ and lack of coercion, so they were not ‘confinements’ in the first place, even aside from the evident ‘valid consent’ to them. Likewise, in the more borderline case of AR, the absence of objection could not constitute AR’s valid consent to the placement, but it weighed against his ‘confinement’. In SM, objection was occasional and changeable, so could not itself change a placement that was not a deprivation of liberty into one that was. By contrast, in RF, clear and consistent objection pointed strongly towards ‘confinement’. So, clear and consistent objection is not determinative but a significant factor: generally and in this case.

20. ZZ falls somewhere between the different categories in Judge Tindal’s classification. ZZ is in a position where life outside an institutional environment is a welcome one. It is clear he would rather be where he is than someone more restricted. This is also the situation in cases concerning those who are discharged from detention under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA), including those who are restricted patients placed on conditional discharges. They accept the new restrictions; but what option do they have? ZZ is in the same position. He knows that he is better off where he is than in a more restricted environment, and for that he is grateful. However, it is clear he would rather have greater freedom. For that reason, his position is closer to that of mere acquiescence rather than actual agreement.

21. For all those reasons I am quite sure he is objectively deprived of his liberty.

22. Moving on to the subjective element. Compliance, acquiescence and resignation should not be confused with consent. Even if ZZ possesses the ability to provide valid consent to these arrangements, for the reasons outlined above, I am not satisfied that he does in fact do so. Rather, he accepts the arrangements because he recognises that they presently exist and because he sees no alternative. That is not the same as giving genuine consent to them. The subjective element identified in NI is therefore established.

23. Looking at the matter in the round, I am satisfied that both the objective and subjective elements required by Article 5 ECHR are present. The restrictions are extensive and pervasive. They are maintained in significant part because of the risk ZZ presents to others. They substantially curtail his autonomy and freedom of action. They do not fall within the sphere of relative normality. Furthermore, I am not satisfied that ZZ validly consents to them.

24. Other judgments refer to the third limb for deprivation of liberty, namely, state attribution. It is clear the State is explicitly involved in the restrictions imposed on ZZ. In any event, it seems to me that when a set of restrictions are to be approved by this Court, State attribution is automatically triggered: see A LA in Yorkshire v SF (by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) [2020] EWCOP 15, Cobb, J. at [28] .

25. I therefore conclude that ZZ is deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 ECHR.

BEST INTERESTS

26. That conclusion does not determine whether the arrangements should continue.

27. Can it be in a person’s best interests to have significant restrictions imposed upon him for the protection of the public?

28. I am entirely satisfied that the present arrangements remain in ZZ's best interests. They represent the least restrictive means presently available of meeting his needs whilst managing the significant risks identified by the professional evidence.

29. I derive particular assistance from the reasoning of Moor J in Y County Council v ZZ and of Mrs Justice Lieven in Birmingham City Council v SR; Lancashire County Council v JTA [2019] EWCOP 28.

30. The SR case was concerned with conditionally discharged MHA patients, which ZZ is not. The important part of that judgment for present purposes, however, is at [29] where Lieven, J. (as she then was) says this, approving Moor, J.:

The issue as to whether a patient can be detained because s/he poses a risk to the public, and it is said to be in his/her best interests to be detained for that reason, was considered by Moor J in Y County Council v ZZ [2013] COPLR 463. Moor J recognised that the purpose of the restrictions on P’s liberty was to address, prevent and control P’s sexual urges and he said at [49];

“I have come to the clear conclusion, for all the reasons given by the various doctors, that it is lawful as in Mr ZZ's best interests to deprive him of his liberty in accordance with the local authority care plan, pursuant to schedule A1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. I make that declaration. In doing so, I am following the advice of the expert professionals who know Mr ZZ so well. Indeed, the Official Solicitor accepts, on his behalf, that I should do so. I make it clear to Mr ZZ that I have no doubt that the restrictions upon him are in his best interests. They are designed to keep him out of mischief, to keep him safe and healthy, to keep others safe, to prevent the sort of situation where the relative of a child wanted to do him serious harm, which I have no doubt was very frightening for him, and they are there to prevent him from getting into serious trouble with the police.”

31. Indeed, in relation to the same P, with the same restrictions, Mr Justice Peter Jackson (as he then was) reached the same decision in Re N (Deprivation of Liberty) [2016] EWCOP 47.

32. Then at [40], her Ladyship goes on:

“Equally, I have no doubt, and there is no dispute or any potential for a dispute, that it is in both patients’ best interests that they should be cared for and accommodated in the community settings proposed. In reaching this conclusion I take fully into account their wishes and feelings, which in both cases are that they are allowed to live in the proposed placements.”

33. I would add that in DY v A City Council & An NHS Trust [2022] EWCOP 51, Judd, J. explicitly approved Lieven, J. in SR [20].

34. My conclusion follows on from that of the above cases, which are binding on me. The fact that the arrangements serve an important public protection function does not detract from their benefit to ZZ himself. It is plainly in his interests that he should be protected from reoffending, from exposure to criminal sanction and from the serious consequences that would inevitably follow were those risks to crystallise.

35. In those circumstances I am satisfied that his deprivation of liberty is necessary, proportionate, lawful and in ZZ's best interests.

CONCLUSION

36. I will approve the order, and direct annual reviews of ZZ’s deprivation of liberty.

37. That is my judgment.

Notes

[1] Although they share false initials, this ZZ is not the same person as the earlier ZZ.


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