Civil United Kingdom
Tessa Shaw & Anor v Alexandra Stephani
| High Court Approved Judgment | Shaw & An. v Stephani |
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2776 (KB)
Case No: KB-2026-000554
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 28 October 2026
Before:
ANDREW KINNIER K.C.
Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court
Between:
(1) TESSA SHAW
(2) MATTHEW GREENWOOD-NIMMO
| Claimants | ||
| – and – ALEXANDRA STEPHANI (As Administratrix of the Estate of ERIC STEPHANI) |
||
| Defendant |
Sarah Prager K.C. (instructed by Stewarts Law LLP) for the Claimants
Marie Louise Kinsler K.C. and Rebecca Brown (instructed by DWF Law LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing: 29 July 2026
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down remotely on 28 October 2026 at 10.30 a.m. by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and released to the National Archives.
ANDREW KINNIER K.C. sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court:
Introduction
1. By an application (dated 22 April 2026) Mrs Alexandra Stephani, the Defendant, seeks an order setting aside the Claim Form and its service and a declaration that this court has no jurisdiction to try the claim against her. Liability was admitted in pre-issue correspondence so the question is whether England and Wales is the appropriate forum for the trial of quantum (as the Claimants contend) or Australia (as the Defendant submits).
PART 1 – the background
The accident
2. The claim arises out of a road traffic accident. On 26 November 2023, Mr Matthew Greenwood-Nimmo, the Second Claimant, was driving a Fiat Tipo car along the A5 in Shropshire. Ms Tessa Shaw, the First Claimant, was sitting in the front passenger seat. A Honda Civic car driven by Mr Eric Stephani, the Defendant’s son, collided with the Claimants’ car. Tragically, Mr Stephani died at the scene and both Claimants sustained serious injuries.
3. Following the accident, the Claimants were first admitted to the Royal Shrewsbury Hospital but the First Claimant was later transferred to the Royal Stoke University Hospital for spinal surgery. On 10 and 13 December 2023, the First and Second Claimants were respectively discharged into the care of friends until they returned to Australia on 26 January 2024.
The parties: their citizenship, residence and domicile
4. At the time of the accident the First Claimant was an Australian national which she remains. The Second Claimant held and continues to hold both British and Australian citizenship. They were both resident and domiciled in Australia: they lived (and still live) in Melbourne and were (and continue to be) employed by the University of Melbourne. Although Mr Stephani was a US citizen living in Denbighshire, the Defendant, the administratrix of her son’s estate, is also a US citizen but resident and domiciled in New York state.
The parties’ discussion of jurisdiction, applicable law and service
5. On 12 March 2024, liability was admitted by DWF, solicitors retained by Direct Line which provided motor insurance cover to Mr Stephani. The admission was subject to further consideration of jurisdiction and applicable law.
6. Direct Line’s position was later confirmed in an e-mail sent by DWF to Stewarts Law LLP (“Stewarts”), the Claimants’ solicitors, on 10 April 2026. It was said that the state of Victoria was the appropriate forum; the claim had no connection to this jurisdiction other than as the Claimants’ holiday destination; all disclosure lay in Australia where the Claimants’ losses continued to accrue; the lay witnesses were based in Australia; the Claimants’ continuing treatment was provided in Australia and so Australian experts should be retained. The e-mail also said that no English experts should be retained until the question of jurisdiction had been resolved.
7. On 19 December 2025, in response to a request from Stewarts, DWF confirmed that, if contrary to their view that the claim should be brought in Australia and proceedings were issued in England and Wales, to avoid unnecessary cost and delay, it would accept service without prejudice to jurisdiction and any service-related points. The concession was conditional: Direct Line would not be named as a party and a suitable representative of Mr Stephani’s estate would be appointed under CPR 19.12(2)(b).
8. The concern that no-one seemingly represented Mr Stephani’s estate was resolved in January 2026 when DWF confirmed that, following the discovery that she had been granted probate on 2 July 2024, they were instructed to act for the Defendant who should be the party to the threatened claim.
9. On 3 February 2026, DWF again wrote to Stewarts about service. As the Defendant was domiciled in the United States, an application for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction would usually be required but, to save time and costs, she offered to accept service on DWF on three conditions: first, Mrs Stephani was the only named Defendant in the claim; secondly, the agreement to accept service was without prejudice to jurisdiction and any point arising from service of the proceedings; thirdly, if the Defendant challenged jurisdiction, the Claimants would bear the burden of establishing forum conveniens as if they had applied to serve out of the jurisdiction.
The claim
10. Proceedings were issued in this court on 9 February 2026 and deemed served on 26 March 2026. On 8 April 2026, the Acknowledgement of Service was served in which jurisdiction was contested.
The Claimants’ pleaded injuries
11. As alleged in the Particulars of Claim, Ms Shaw’s injuries are significant and extensive. She is said to have suffered a burst fracture to the L3 vertebrae which caused severe compression of the spinal cord and required spinal fixation surgery at L1-L5. She also sustained incomplete Cauda Equina syndrome at L2 which is a permanent spinal cord injury with permanent limitation of physical function and independence. Ms Shaw also suffered anterior wall bruising; a fractured left clavicle; a severe injury to her left thoracic nerve with left cubital tunnel syndrome; bursitis to her left shoulder; an injury to the sciatic nerve in her lower back; right-sided tennis elbow and an adjustment disorder with anxiety and significant travel anxiety.
12. Mr Greenwood-Nimmo’s pleaded injuries are also serious. He is alleged to have suffered a possible fracture to his upper jaw; a grade 1 sprain to his right acromioclavicular joint and rotator cuff tear to the right shoulder; an injury to his sternum; two fractured ribs; an abdominal wall haematoma; a soft tissue injury to his right hip; neck and thoracolumbar back pain (which aggravated existing but asymptomatic changes); a significant left lower limb injury with a fracture to his left tibial plateau; an injury to his lateral sural nerve; colo-rectal symptoms and an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressive mood.
13. Ms Shaw relies upon reports in seven medical expert disciplines: trauma and orthopaedic surgery; rehabilitation medicine; shoulder surgery; hand and peripheral nerve surgery; spinal cord physiotherapy; psychiatry and occupational therapy. Mr Greenwood-Nimmo relies upon expert evidence in six fields: trauma and orthopaedic surgery; vascular and major trauma surgery; shoulder surgery; cardiothoracic surgery and psychiatry. The Particulars of Claim anticipate that the Claimants may seek permission to rely upon expert evidence in four further disciplines: pain; orthotics; accommodation and forensic accountancy. All the Claimant’s present experts are based in England and Wales and the Defendant’s three experts are in Australia.
The Claimants’ pleaded losses
14. Both Claimants have served Schedules of Loss. The total pleaded value of the First Claimant’s claim is £9,618,545.17. Past losses are alleged to amount to £450,333.05 of which the principal elements are care and case management costs (£133,769.69); lost earnings (£72,221.51) and accommodation (£65,290.58). The main heads of future loss are care and case management costs (£2,659,082.74); lost earnings (£1,402,179.48); holidays (£1,076,830.19) and medical treatment and therapies (£1,040,295.71).
15. The total value of the Second Claimant’s claim is said to be £3,468,871.89. He claims past losses of £173,525.27 of which the most significant heads are loss of earnings (£57,752.55); holidays (£47.168.33) and medical treatment and therapies (£23,958.59). Future losses of £3,027,195.16 are sought which chiefly consist of household expenses (£950,604.61); aids and equipment (£700,487.49) and holidays (£695,517.83).
PART 2 – the application
The evidence
16. The application is supported by the statement of Mr Michael Renshaw (dated 22 April 2026), one of the partners at DWF with care and conduct of the Defendant’s case. The Claimants’ response is contained in the statement of Mr Christopher Deacon (dated 1 July 2026), the partner with responsibility for their case. Although the parties agree the burden lies on the Claimants to establish the appropriateness of this jurisdiction, as the application was made by the Defendant, it is more convenient to start with a summary of Mr Renshaw’s evidence to which Mr Deacon responded.
Mr Renshaw
17. Mr Renshaw’s evidence is that Australia (and the state of Victoria in particular) is the appropriate jurisdiction. If proceedings are brought in the Victorian courts, the Defendant will submit to their jurisdiction, the admission of liability will be maintained and no point on limitation will be taken.
18. For the purposes of CPR 6, Mr Renshaw accepts the live question is whether England is clearly or distinctly the appropriate forum for the trial and so, in all the circumstances, the court should exercise its discretion to permit service out of the jurisdiction. The burden of satisfying that condition lies on the Claimants and Mr Renshaw says they have not discharged it. Indeed, all the relevant connecting factors, in Mr Renshaw’s view, point clearly and strongly towards Australia as the appropriate forum.
19. Mr Renshaw says that there is no substantial connection between the parties and this jurisdiction. None of the parties is resident or domiciled in England and Wales and the Claimants’ connections with this jurisdiction are limited. In contrast, the Claimants have close ties to Melbourne where they live and work and they both hold Australian citizenship. The “vast majority” of the Claimants’ alleged losses accrued or will accrue in Australia to which they returned two months after the accident. Their limited connections with this jurisdiction (for example, the instruction of UK-based experts) are artificially constructed and should not weigh in the balance.
20. Mr Renshaw’s evidence on the applicable law was somewhat hesitant and he tentatively suggested that English law may not apply.
21. In relation to the shape of the future trial, a hearing in England and Wales will be inconvenient, unsuitable and contrary to the interests of justice and those of the parties. For example, the difference in time zones has already presented difficulties when arranging the Claimants’ consultations with their case manager. Those difficulties will be greater still at trial. The principal factual witnesses on quantum are in Australia including the Claimants themselves, their friends and colleagues and the First Claimant’s parents.
22. As to experts, notwithstanding Mr Renshaw’s request that no England-based experts be instructed, Stewarts nonetheless retained 10 in this jurisdiction. For that reason alone, the residence and domicile of the Claimants’ experts should carry no weight. The practical reality is that the Claimants’ experts’ reports will need to be updated if the claim were to continue in London. Putting to one side the cost, impracticality and inappropriateness of requiring the Claimants and their young child to travel to the United Kingdom for examination or consultation, Mr Renshaw’s view was that the court would not be assisted by English experts. Given the nature of the claims of life-long losses and the need for continuing treatment, the court will be best helped by evidence from professionals whose colleagues will provide care and treatment in Australia and consistent with standards and requirements in that country. To that end, the Defendant has thus far instructed three experts in Australia. The same point equally applies to the non-medical experts.
23. Mr Renshaw also said that questions such as the availability in Australia of social security benefits, state-supported childcare and other local economic factors are matters which an Australian judge is likely to have “a far better ‘feel’ for”. Similar considerations apply to the effect of domestic tax arrangements on the Claimants’ claims for loss of earnings and pension contributions.
24. If the claim were to proceed in England and Wales, significant additional evidence would be needed and, in contrast to an Australian judge and lawyers, the English legal teams and an English judge would experience a “learning curve” on all quantum matters.
Mr Deacon
25. Mr Deacon maintains that England and Wales is the appropriate forum. Although he accepted that the Claimants lived and worked in Australia, Mr Deacon said that they regularly travelled to this jurisdiction. The Second Claimant was born here and emigrated to Australia when he was 29 years old. He has family and close friends in England and Wales who are also close to his wife and child. The Second Claimant, an academic economist, has close professional connections here, most notably with the University of York. Mr Deacon also said the Defendant’s involvement in the litigation was due to the letters of administration she was granted by the Family Division of the High Court in London because Mr Stephani lived in Denbighshire.
26. The “overriding” connection with this jurisdiction is that English and Welsh law applies to the assessment of the Claimants’ damages. Mr Deacon also relied upon Direct Line’s involvement in this litigation. Direct Line is the paying party and so to all intents and purposes it is defending the claim. It is domiciled in England; it provided an indemnity for Mr Stephani, the Welsh-domiciled responsible driver; it admitted liability; it made interim payments and it is giving instructions to and receiving advice from DWF.
27. In relation to disclosure, medical and treatment records have been and continue to be collected without difficulty. There is no reason to doubt that relevant documents in Australia will not be made available for English proceedings. As to the shape of the trial, Mr Deacon is sceptical whether the Claimants’ treating clinicians will be required to attend. He also observed that thus far the time differences between London and Melbourne have not been problematic. In relation to witnesses of fact, the Claimants will travel to England for the purposes of medical examinations, consultation with their lawyers and to give evidence at trial. Their close friends who cared for them after their discharge from hospital live in Cheshire and so they can attend the trial if required. The First Claimant’s Singapore-based parents can, if needed, also come to London to give evidence.
28. As to experts, considerable expense will be incurred should the Claimants be required to instruct fresh experts in Australia if this court declines jurisdiction. Should it be necessary, the Defendant’s three Australia-based experts may give evidence remotely with the court’s permission. The Claimants intend to retain Mr Daykin as their expert actuary. Together with Dr Llewellyn, an expert economist, they both understand the exercise required when determining the correct discount rate under the Damages Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”). It would be more cost-effective for their services to be used if the case were allowed to proceed in London.
29. Mr Deacon says the English courts are well used to assessing damages awards in foreign currency and the Claimants’ preliminary schedules demonstrate the ease and convenience with which spreadsheets can calculate quantum.
The law
30. The approach to deciding the appropriate forum has been considered at the highest level in the cases of Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Limited [1987] AC 460 and Lungowe and others v. Vedanta Resources plc and another [2019] UKSC 20, [2020] AC 1045. Rather than recording all the references to the authorities made by the parties, I have summarised below the principles that are directly relevant to determining the application.
31. The authorities were recently reviewed by Popplewell LJ in Limbu and others v. Dyson Technology Limited and others [2024] EWCA Civ 1564, [2025] 2 All ER (Comm) who summarised the approach thus:
“22. … In determining the appropriateness of the forum, the court looks at connecting factors to determine with which forum the action has the most real and substantial connection (Spiliada at p. 478A). These include not only factors affecting convenience or expense, but also other factors such as governing law, the place where the parties reside or carry on business, and where the wrongful acts and harm occurred (Spiliada p. 478A-B, Vedanta at [69]) …
23. … if the court concludes that the foreign court is more appropriate by reference to connecting factors, applying the relevant burden of proof, the court will nevertheless retain jurisdiction if the claimant can show by cogent evidence that there is a real risk that it will not be able to obtain substantial justice in the appropriate foreign jurisdiction (Vedanta at [88]). Cogent evidence does not mean unchallenged evidence (Vedanta at [96]). This is often conveniently treated as the second stage in the analysis because it usually calls for an assessment of different evidence, but it does not involve a different question: if there is a real risk of denial of justice in a particular forum it is unlikely to be an appropriate one in which the case can most suitably be tried in the interests of the parties and for the ends of justice: Vedanta at [88] … second stage factors may also be relevant to the first stage in which is juridically a single holistic exercise in seeking to identify where the case can most suitably be tried in the interests of the parties and for the ends of justice.”
32. The place of commission is a relevant starting point when considering the appropriate forum for a tort claim: VTB Capital plc v. Nutritek International Corporation [2013] UKSC 5, [2013] 2 AC 337, para. 51. Lord Mance observed that “viewed by itself and in isolation, the place of commission will normally establish a prima facie basis for treating the place as the appropriate jurisdiction”. In the context of an international transaction, Lord Mance also observed that “it was likely to be over-simplistic” to view the place of commission in isolation when considering the appropriate forum for resolving the dispute. For that reason, he recognised that the “significance attaching to the place of commission may be dwarfed by other countervailing factors.”
33. As to governing law, at para. 46 of his judgment in VTB Capital, Lord Mance said it was “generally preferable, other things being equal, that a case should be tried in the country whose law applies.” That factor carries particular weight if the issues of law were likely to be important and if there was evidence of relevant differences in the legal principle or rules applicable to such issues in the two jurisdictions in contention as the appropriate forum.
34. The Claimants placed great weight on the presence of Direct Line in this jurisdiction. At this point, it is enough to note that in Spiliada, Lord Goff concluded that in certain circumstances a court could take into account the fact that the insurers were managed in England. At 486D-F, he said that:
“Usually this is a matter of no concern in English litigation; because, in subrogation claims, the action is in this country (unlike other countries) brought in the name of the assured, and the rights being enforced are the rights of the assured. But in the case of an application such as that in the present case, it is shutting one’s eyes to reality to ignore the fact that it is the insurers who are financing the litigation and are dominus litis; and this is, in my view, a relevant factor to be taken into account: see the Société du Gaz case, 1926 S.C. (H.L.) 13, 20 per Lord Sumner.”
35. In considering the appropriate forum, it is important for the court to know the likely issues that will arise at trial. In particular, the defendant should identify the issues that are likely to arise in the foreign jurisdiction: VTB Capital, para. 192 per Lord Clarke. The court should also have in mind the overall shape of any trial given the likely issues which may need to be decided: VTB Capital, para. 193 per Lord Clarke. At this stage, the purpose of the exercise is simply to state what the issues of fact are likely to be so that the court can gauge whether England is clearly or distinctly the appropriate forum for the trial of the issues.
36. Although the practical demands of the litigation may weigh heavily in its exercise, the court’s discretion is neither defined by nor limited to their consideration: Brownlie v. FS Cairo (Nile Plaza) LLC [2021] UKSC 45, [2022] AC 995, para. 78. On the contrary, the ultimate objective was, as Lord Goff concluded in Spiliada at 480G, “to identify the forum in which the case can be suitably tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice.” At para. 79 of his judgment in Brownlie, Lord Lloyd-Jones found that the test of appropriate forum provided an effective mechanism to prevent acceptance of jurisdiction “in situations where there is merely a casual or adventitious link between the claim and England.”
37. Funding arguments normally arise at the second stage of the Spiliada analysis: for example, Lubbe v. Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545; Vedanta; Oliveira & ors v. Brazil Iron Limited & ors [2025] EWHC 606 (KB)). In Connelly v. RTZ Corp Plc [1998] AC 584 the court was concerned with the operation of a mine in Namibia. The claimant had worked at the mine and alleged that he had sustained personal injuries because of an unsafe system of work. It was accepted that Namibia was the natural forum so the case turned on the second stage of the Spiliada exercise. Lord Goff said that the general rule was that a stay would not be refused simply because a claimant had shown that financial assistance was available to him in England but not in the appropriate forum because “financial assistance for litigation is not necessarily regarded as essential, even in sophisticated legal systems.” He continued at 873H:
“Even so, the availability of financial assistance in this country, coupled with its non-availability in the appropriate forum, may exceptionally be a relevant factor in this context. The question, however, remains whether the plaintiff can establish that substantial justice will not in the particular circumstances of the case be done if that plaintiff has to proceed in the appropriate forum where no financial assistance is available.”
38. Given the overarching importance of trying the case suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice, the court will generally not hesitate to stay proceedings in this jurisdiction merely because the claimant would be deprived of a higher award of damages: Spiliada, at 482D-483C. Each case, however, will turn on its own facts: Spiliada, at 483D.
The Claimants’ submissions
39. Ms Sarah Prager KC, counsel for the Claimants, accepts that they bear the burden of proving that England and Wales is the appropriate jurisdiction.
40. As to the relevant legal principles, Spiliada is the leading case. The Claimants must show that the courts of England and Wales are clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum in which to hear the claims. The court has a wide discretion and will consider all factors relating to the claims and the litigation generally in deciding the question. To that end, Ms Prager submits that the court should consider all factors including (but not limited) to five particular matters: first, the location of the incident and the parties’ places of residence: Spiliada at 465E and 478A; secondly, the nature of the dispute and the legal and factual issues such as local knowledge, the availability of witnesses and their evidence and expense: Spiliada at 480B; thirdly, the applicable law (but only to the extent that legal issues arise) is important and any proven differences between the applicable law and that of the forum; fourthly, the factual focus which is concerned with the location of the principal witnesses and documents: VTB Capital at 371C and 372C; finally, the availability and adequacy of funding in the competing fora: Oliveira [2025] EWHC 606 (KB), paras. 107, 115-119 and 134.
41. Irrespective of the Defendant’s position, the presumptive applicable law is that of England and Wales. Although this presumption may be displaced if the tort is manifestly more closely connected with a jurisdiction other than England and Wales, such cases are exceptional. There is almost no realistic prospect that an English court would apply any law other than that of England and Wales given the accident on which the claim is based happened in this country. It involved a driver who was resident in Wales and cars which were registered and insured here.
42. Ms Prager’s skeleton argument identified 16 reasons which she submitted pointed to England and Wales as the appropriate forum, three of which carry significant weight: the fact that the accident happened in England; English law is applicable and is best considered by an English judge; if the case proceeded in Australia, English law experts would be needed. As to the rest of her reasons, Ms Prager’s submissions can be summarised thus:
(a) The Claimants’ injuries and initial direct losses were sustained in England and Wales and the witnesses relevant to those points are in this jurisdiction.
(b) The Claimants’ recovery is case managed from England by an English case manager.
(c) Although the Claimants live and work in Australia and the Defendant is in the United States, Direct Line (the paying party) is here. Therefore, both the tortfeasor and the paying party were resident within the jurisdiction at the time of the accident and the latter remains so. Judgment will, therefore, fall to be enforced within England and Wales.
(d) The Claimants are able easily to access legal representation in England. By contrast, their funding options in Australia are limited. Although the Claimants could fund the proceedings by conditional fee agreements, the evidence is that they could not obtain insurance against an adverse costs order.
(e) The language of the trial will be English and is spoken in both countries.
(f) Disclosure will be found in both England and Wales and Australia. Treating clinicians are in both jurisdictions. In any event, disclosure is held digitally and is readily accessible in both countries. The location of disclosure is a neutral factor.
(g) The important witnesses of fact will be the Claimants (who are ready, able and willing to give evidence in London) and, conceivably, the case manager (who lives in England). If their evidence were required, other witnesses could give evidence remotely. Therefore, the location of lay witnesses is a neutral consideration.
(h) The Claimants’ experts are based in England and Wales and further medical examinations will take place here. Set against that consideration, the Defendant has instructed three experts in Australia and further examination for those purposes can and will take place there.
(i) Notwithstanding Mr Renshaw’s suggestion, it is unlikely (if not improbable) that an expert on the “local economy” in Australia will be required. With the exception of evidence on the appropriate discount rate, the Claimants’ position is that no such experts have ever been granted by or sought from an English court.
(j) The availability of qualified one-way costs shifting (“QOWCS”) in English courts is a legitimate juridical advantage on which the court can place some weight.
The Defendant’s submissions
43. Ms Marie Louise Kinsler KC and Ms Rebecca Brown, counsel for the Defendant, submit that the application gives rise to one fundamental question: whether the court can be satisfied that England and Wales is the appropriate forum for the trial of quantum in the Claimants’ claim. The answer is “no” because Australia is plainly the correct jurisdiction.
44. There was no disagreement between the parties that the foundational principle was stated by Lord Goff in Spiliada: the court’s task is to identify the forum in which the case can be suitably tried for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice. Ms Kinsler, however, emphasised that the court is not exercising a discretion as Ms Prager argued. On the contrary, the court is required to reach an evaluative judgment of whether England and Wales is the more appropriate forum based on “a summary examination of connecting factors between the case and one or more jurisdictions in which it could be litigated”: Vedanta, para. 66. Importantly, the court looks at connecting factors to determine with which forum the claim has the most real and substantial connection. There is no dispute between the parties that those factors include those affecting convenience or expense; governing law; the parties’ places of residence or business and the place where the wrongful act occurred.
45. Ms Kinsler and Ms Brown make three general points which they say should inform the court’s approach to the application. The first is that in evaluating the appropriate forum, the court should keep in mind the overall shape of the trial in light of the forensic issues: VTB Capital, para. 192. It is the critical context in which the connecting factors fall to be considered. The trial will be solely concerned with damages. Factual and expert evidence will be required in relation to all the heads of loss pleaded in the provisional schedules. The Claimants have already instructed 10 experts and indicated a wish to rely upon at least three more. Updated reports will be needed for which the Claimants will need to be examined. A conservative estimate of trial length is three to four weeks. The second point is that although each decision on forum is fact-specific, the authorities give clear guidance on the approach to individual connecting factors. Finally, it was submitted that in personal injury claims, the case-law shows that the claimant’s residence is a strong connecting factor. The location of the accident and the defendant’s domicile attract less weight: Cooley v. Ramsey [2008] EWHC 129 (QB); Wink v. Croatia Osiguranje DD [2013] EWHC 1118 (QB); Stylianou v. Toyoshima [2013] EWHC 2166 (QB).
46. Taking each relevant connecting factor in turn:
(a) The Claimants’ predominant connections are with Australia where they live, work, own a home and receive treatment for their injuries. Importantly, their very significant future losses will be incurred in Australia. In the context of a quantum-only trial, domicile and permanent residence are the “key” connections. The Claimants’ connections with England and Wales are limited and outweighed by those with Australia.
(b) Direct Line is not a party to the litigation and so the fact that it is domiciled in England and Wales is irrelevant.
(c) Although the place of the commission of the tort is relevant and may be important, the weight to be attached to it depends upon the context.
(d) Applicable law will have little relevance at trial because legal issues (with the exception of the discount rate) are unlikely to be important. In any event, the Australian courts are adept at applying English law: see, for example, O’Reilly v. Western Sussex Hospitals NHS Trust [2010] NSWSC 909.
(e) Practical convenience is an important aspect of the court’s evaluative judgment and it will involve, among other considerations, accessibility to the courts for parties and witnesses: Vedanta, para. 66.
(f) The principal factual witnesses are all in Australia and arranging for their travel to London would be costly and impractical. The practical problems caused by witnesses in different time zones were considerable.
(g) The court should consider the expert evidence in light of Mr Renshaw’s e-mail of 10 April 2024 in which he stated plainly the view that, until jurisdiction was resolved, it would not be appropriate to retain experts in England.
(h) The vast majority of the documents (in particular, the medical and employment records and documents relating to financial losses) were in Australia.
(i) Overall, an Australian court is best placed to assess damages for claimants resident in Australia.
Discussion
47. In considering whether England and Wales is the appropriate jurisdiction in which to try the Claimants’ claims for damages, the court is carrying out an evaluative assessment based on a summary examination of connecting factors between the case and the jurisdictions in which it might be litigated: VTB Capital, paras. 97 and 156; Lungowe, para. 66.
The place of the accident
48. The starting point for considering the appropriate forum for a claim in tort is the place of commission. Here, Mr Stephani’s negligence was committed while he was driving on the A5 in Shropshire. As Lord Mance held in VTB Capital, the place of commission will normally establish a prima facie basis for treating the place as the appropriate jurisdiction unless there are countervailing considerations.
Applicable law
49. For the purposes of this application only, the Defendant accepted that English law applies. Although it is generally preferable to try a case in the country whose law applies, the likely primary disputes at the quantum trial will be ones of fact, not law. With one important exception, neither the parties’ evidence nor their submissions identified or anticipated any significant contentious legal questions. Therefore, the applicability of English law is a positive and significant factor connecting the claim to this jurisdiction but only to the extent that legal points are likely to arise.
50. The exception is the significant question of the discount rate. Two points are relevant: first, the weight, if any, it should attract as a juridical advantage to the Claimants; secondly, whether and, if so, to what extent evidence may be required on the precise rate to be applied. As to the former, the discount rate in this jurisdiction is more favourable to claimants than in Australia (including the state of Victoria) but, as Lord Goff held in Spiliada, that is not a point which should weigh in favour of England. As to the latter, if the litigation proceeds in Australia, there may be a question whether English or Victorian law applies to the assessment of damages. If English law were to apply (as the Claimants submit is likely), the 1996 Act would be engaged and so an issue may arise whether, for the purposes of s. A1(2) of that Act, a different rate of return is appropriate because the Claimants live in Australia. Therefore, irrespective of jurisdiction, some evidence may be required about investment conditions in Australia to allow the court to decide the appropriate rate. Although Mr Renshaw considered that the Australian court would have a better sense of the relevant material, English courts routinely consider this type of evidence and there is nothing to suggest that its nature and complexity is such that the suggested learning curve would be too great or too steep for an English judge and the parties’ English lawyers to master.
The Claimants’ loss and damage
51. It is common ground that since the Claimants returned in January 2024, they have received medical treatment and extensive care and rehabilitation in Australia. As a result, a substantial, if not the greater, part of their losses were, and continue to be, incurred in Australia. That consideration should, however, be balanced against the fact that the Claimants suffered their significant injuries in this jurisdiction as well as their initial losses.
The parties’ connections
52. It is a distinctive feature of this claim that none of the parties is resident or domiciled in England and Wales. As to the Claimants, although Mr Greenwood-Nimmo, a dual British and Australian national, has significant family and professional ties with this country and the couple travel regularly to this country, he and Ms Shaw live with their child in Melbourne and both work at the University of Melbourne.
53. The most significant disagreement at the hearing was prompted by Ms Kinsler’s submission that in quantum-only personal injury claims, the claimant’s residence is a strong connecting factor while the locus of the accident and the defendant’s domicile attract less weight. In the three authorities ultimately relied upon in support of the submission (Cooley, Wink and Stylianou), the common question was whether, for the purpose of ground 9(b) of para. 3.1(9) of CPR PD 6B or its predecessor, damage had been sustained in this jurisdiction. The court concluded in each case that although the initial injury had been sustained abroad, the sequelae and losses had been suffered here. That was sufficient to satisfy ground 9(b) and its predecessor. The short point is that each was a first instance decision that turned on its own facts. Pertinently, the claimants’ residence and domicile attracted greater weight because the injuries of two of them (Mr Cooley and Ms Stylianou) were so severe that they could not easily travel to Australia, the jurisdiction in which the index accidents had happened. In Wink, it would have been a considerable inconvenience for the claimant to travel to Croatia because of the nature of the continuing health problems caused by the accident. By contrast, in this case the Claimants are ready, willing and able to travel to England.
54. Turning to others who are said to link the claim to this jurisdiction, little (if any) weight can be attached to the fact that Mr Stephani lived in North Wales. His connection with this jurisdiction is of historic relevance only, especially in relation to a quantum-only trial. The Defendant, his mother, is a US citizen who is resident and domiciled in New York state. She has no connection at all with this country.
55. As to Direct Line, it is not a party to the litigation. That said, it is the paying party who has conducted the defence; admitted liability; made interim payments; contested jurisdiction and instructed experts. As in Spiliada, the court should not close its eyes to these matters but the pertinent question is what weight they should attract. Compared to the more substantive considerations (such as the place of the accident; the applicable law; the residence and domicile of the parties; the shape of the trial and practical convenience), Direct Line’s role in the litigation and residence in this jurisdiction carry relatively less weight. Furthermore, absent any reason to believe that enforcement proceedings would be relevant or in some way problematic, the fact that judgment would, if necessary, be enforced in England and Wales against Direct Line is not a material factor.
The practicalities of the litigation
56. Practical convenience is an important consideration when assessing the appropriate jurisdiction. Among other matters, it concerns the practical reality of the trial and accessibility to the courts for the parties and their witnesses so as to minimise costs: Vedanta, para. 66.
57. The starting point is the anticipated shape of the litigation and ultimately the trial. As matters stand, the principal evidential issues in a quantum trial are likely to turn on the factual and medical evidence; the nature and extent of the Claimants’ injuries and their sequelae and the quantification of the main heads of loss. The appropriate discount rate is also likely to be an important battleground.
58. Disclosure: the parties agreed that disclosure is a neutral factor. In practice, documents will be collected from both here and Australia and held and accessed digitally. Disclosure will therefore be easily accessible in the two jurisdictions.
59. Factual witnesses: The main witnesses of fact are likely to be the Claimants and possibly their UK-based case manager. There is no suggestion that the Defendant will call any witnesses of fact. The Claimants live in Australia but they are able, indeed keen, to come to London for the trial. I remind myself that their willingness to come here does not necessarily mean that the English courts are conveniently accessible to them, but it is a material consideration. Their willingness to attend a trial in this country should be tempered by their potentially significant travel and accommodation costs which would not be incurred were the matter to proceed in Australia. The Claimants’ case manager is resident and domiciled here and manages their recovery from this jurisdiction. England would be the more convenient jurisdiction for the case manager to give evidence but equally it could be provided remotely if needed. On the whole, the Claimants’ willingness to come to London for the trial coupled to the fact that their case manager is resident and domiciled here, marginally incline in favour of England.
60. As to the other factual witnesses, there is nothing to suggest that the Claimants’ Cheshire-based friends could not attend the trial in London to give evidence about their initial recuperation period or, if this court were to refuse jurisdiction, to do so remotely in an Australian court if required. The First Claimant’s parents who are based in Singapore would come to London if necessary but they could also give evidence remotely. The Defendant raised the prospect that the First Claimant’s sister as well as representatives of the Claimants’ employer, their colleagues and friends might be required to give evidence. They are all resident in Australia and so presumably a trial in Melbourne would be more convenient for them. Although I am sceptical whether oral evidence would be required from these witnesses, if the trial were to be heard in London, it could be given remotely and at a convenient time for both the court and the witnesses so as to ensure a fair and just hearing. Taken in the round, the location of these other witnesses is a neutral consideration.
61. Expert witnesses: the expert evidence will be chiefly concerned with the medical experts who treated the Claimants; the medical experts’ prognoses; care and case management experts, employment experts and experts to address the appropriate discount rate. Thus far, the Claimants have only instructed UK-based experts but, absent permission for expert evidence and as Ms Prager fairly accepted, no weight should be placed on that fact when deciding jurisdiction.
62. The Defendant has instructed three experts, all of whom are based in Australia. If, as seems likely, further expert evidence is required, the Defendant’s additional experts may also be based in Australia. In short, there is no evidence that any expert could not remotely attend a trial in England where the courts are well used to accommodating witnesses who are based abroad and in different time zones.
63. Four further points arise: first, although it is too early to identify the questions that might be agreed or narrowed, there is at the very least a fair prospect that the factual and expert issues will either be resolved or substantially reduced in scope before trial thereby eliminating or reducing the need for some factual and expert evidence. Secondly, I share Mr Deacon’s particular doubts whether the Claimants’ treating clinicians will be required to give oral evidence. There is nothing in the materials before the court (and Ms Kinsler did not suggest otherwise) to indicate that their evidence will be materially contentious. Thirdly and more broadly, Mr Renshaw questioned whether the court would be best assisted by English experts in a case where future losses will be sustained and continuing treatment given in Australia and in accordance with local standards and practice. It was not clear from the Defendant’s evidence whether in relation to the Claimants’ future care, for example, Australian standards and requirements are materially different from those in England and, if so, to what extent. Therefore, it was not clear whether the difference (if any) between English and Australian standards was significant and, if so, whether English experts would best assist the court in deciding the claim. Finally, were the claim to proceed in Australia, experts on English law would be required which (depending upon the extent to which the evidence was contentious) may add to the length of a trial in Melbourne compared to London.
64. In relation to the availability of state benefits in Australia or the effect of Australian tax regulations on the loss of earnings and pension claims, irrespective of where the claim will be fought, expert evidence would be needed on these matters. Although an Australian judge may be more familiar with the relevant benefits schemes or tax provisions, English courts are used to dealing with such evidence. As with evidence of local investment conditions in Australia discussed in para. 50 above, there is nothing to suggest that the nature of the evidence is such that it would add substantially to the work and costs should the litigation continue in England.
65. Inevitably, the Claimants’ experts will need to update their reports. Although the Claimants may try and accommodate any consultation appointments around their holidays to the United Kingdom and so reduce the costs, it may not always be possible to do so. Related to this point, I have also considered Mr Renshaw’s evidence that the arrangements for the Claimants’ consultations with their UK-based experts has already been difficult. Mr Deacon’s evidence takes the opposite view: he said that the difference in time zones has not been problematic. I cannot resolve this point on the papers but the position appears to be that the consultations with the Claimants’ UK-based experts took place and so any time zone-related obstacles were overcome.
66. All things considered, the location of the expert witnesses is another neutral factor.
67. Trial: there was no serious disagreement with Ms Kinsler’s cautious estimate of a three- to four-week trial if all or the principal points were to remain in issue and expert evidence was called in all or the main contentious disciplines. That said, there is at the very least a fair prospect that some factual and expert evidential disputes will substantially narrow or even resolve before trial. I did not understand this to be seriously disputed. Therefore, the practical reality may well be that the trial is likely to be substantially less than three or four weeks irrespective of jurisdiction.
68. Funding: exceptionally this may be a relevant factor: Spiliada, at 873H. Although funding under a conditional fee agreement is available in Australia, the evidence is that the Claimants would not be able to find insurance cover for any potential liability for adverse costs. Two points are relevant: although the court is carrying out a single juridical exercise when seeking to identify the appropriate forum, funding usually falls to be considered at the second, not the first, stage of the Spiliada analysis. Crucially, whatever limits may exist on the availability of insurance to cover adverse costs liability, the Claimants do not suggest they could not obtain substantial justice in Australia. That point, in my judgment, is decisive. Funding considerations, therefore, do not fall to be considered.
69. QOWCS: ultimately, the QOWCS is an example of a juridical advantage to which, for the reasons given by Lord Goff in Spiliada, English courts attach little, if any, weight.
Conclusion
70. As is readily clear from the evidence, the relevant connecting factors do not all point in one direction. But viewed overall, I am satisfied that England and Wales is the forum with which the action has the most real and substantial connection. Put differently, the claim’s connections with this jurisdiction are not merely casual or adventitious. In summary: the accident happened in England and the Claimants sustained their injuries and initial losses here. English law is applicable but I acknowledge, with the significant exception of the discount rate, this factor carries less weight because contentious legal questions are unlikely to arise. Although none of the parties is resident or domiciled in England and Wales, the Claimants have genuine connections with this country and the Second Claimant, in particular, has close family and professional links with this jurisdiction. As to practical convenience, the Claimants are ready, willing and able to attend a trial in London and their case manager is based here. If required, other witnesses who are based abroad can give their evidence remotely. Similarly, any experts based in Australia can also give their evidence remotely. English courts are used to adapting their sitting hours to accommodate witnesses who are out of the country and to do so in a way which assures a just and fair hearing. This claim will be no different.
Disposal
71. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Claimants have demonstrated that England and Wales is clearly and distinctly the appropriate forum in which to try their claim against the Defendant. Accordingly, the application is refused.
72. I will deal with any consequential matters on the papers but, if necessary, at a short hearing. Finally, I should like to thank Ms Prager, Ms Kinsler and Ms Brown for their considerable assistance and, in particular, the quality of their submissions.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).