Administrative United Kingdom
WW v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/52568/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Newport
On 22 October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE DAVIES
Between
WW
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Joseph of Counsel instructed by Law Lane Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Penry-Williams, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a 29-year-old citizen of Pakistan. He appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) against the Respondent’s decision dated 16 January 2025 to refuse his protection claim made on 25 September 2023.
Anonymity
2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS.
4. In summary, the Appellant asserts that he would be at risk of death or serious harm from unknown non-state actors on his return to Pakistan on account of his Christian faith, his public criticisms of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws and sectors of Pakistani Islamic society.
The Hearing
5. The hearing was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
Issues
6. The Respondent accepted the material factual basis of the Appellant’s claim and Mr Penry-Williams confirmed that the credibility point mentioned in the Respondent’s Review [6] is no longer in issue. Credibility is accepted. The Respondent accepts that the Refugee Convention is engaged because of the Appellant’s religion. What remains in dispute is whether the Appellant would be at risk on return. Mr Joseph confirmed that a humanitarian protection claim is advanced in the alternative and a claim under Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR is advanced on the same factual matrix, which will stand or fall with the protection claim. No standalone Article 8 ECHR claim is advanced.
7. The parties agreed that the issues for determination in this appeal are –
(a) Whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm;
(b) Whether the Appellant could obtain sufficient protection and/or internally relocate;
Evidence
8. I heard evidence from the Appellant who adopted what he had stated in his witness statement as his evidence-in-chief and was cross-examined by Mr Penry-Williams. I reserved my decision.
Legal Framework
9. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, s32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applies. Following the guidance in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 413 (IAC), I must first determine, on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for a Convention reason (or such a characteristic is attributed to them by an actor of persecution); and
(b) Whether the Appellant does in fact fear such persecution.
10. If those questions are answered in the affirmative, I must then determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.
11. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
FINDINGS
12. I have taken account of everything I have heard and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round. I shall refer to the evidence and submissions so far as necessary to explain my findings and reasons.
13. In assessing the Appellant’s account of events, I am mindful that the Respondent has accepted the core factual basis of the Appellant’s account.
14. I also take into account the country background evidence which was relied on by both parties in respect of the remaining matters in dispute – the CPIN: Christians and Christian converts, Pakistan, July 2026 (“the CPIN”); and Country Guidance case of AK & SK (Christians: risk) Pakistan (CG) [2014] UKUT 569 (IAC) (“Country Guidance case”). There was no country schedule within the Appellant’s bundle of evidence, and no reference to any country background material, other than the CPIN, in the ASA. However, in submissions, Mr Joseph referred to particular country background material within the bundle, including articles about misuse of anti-blasphemy laws and the treatment of Christians accused of blasphemy, which I take into account.
15. The Respondent maintains the position set out in her refusal letter that, as a Christian by birth, the Appellant is not at real risk on return to Pakistan because, whilst he has claimed to have a subjective fear of non-state actors in Pakistan, his fear is not considered to be objectively well-founded. Furthermore, even if he were found to have a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from non-state actors in Pakistan, the country background evidence (the CPIN) indicates that “Christians by birth are, in general, unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state solely on account of their religion.”[4.1.1]. The Respondent also relies on the Country Guidance case of AK&SK which held that “Christians in Pakistan are a religious minority who, in general, suffer discrimination but this is not sufficient to amount to a real risk of persecution” (paragraph 240). It is considered that there would be sufficient protection available to him.
16. The Respondent submits that there is sufficient state protection from the non-state actors the Appellant claims to fear and that the evidence relied on by the Appellant in this appeal does not demonstrate these individuals or groups control the state or can be equated with the Pakistan authorities.
17. The Appellant asserts that he is at risk not solely because he is a Christian but because he has publicly criticised Pakistan’s blasphemy laws and the wider societal treatment of Christians in Pakistan by extremist Islamic groups. He has done so by disseminating videos and social media content which has generated threatening and abusive responses. In submissions, Mr Joseph acknowledged that the abusive threats of death included within the bundle which were received by the Appellant do not address him individually and are from unknown persons. However, he asserted that death and violence threats addressed to “all Christians” are indicative of how the Appellant would be perceived on return to Pakistan and the treatment he would receive. I find those assertions speculative and there is no evidence as to how those unknown individuals would have the ability or reach to trace the Appellant. The Appellant also references threats received from local Muslim residents who lived near his home in Pakistan and former classmates and professors who are affiliated with the TLP, a known extremist group. The Appellant provided evidence of a mob gathering outside his family home in April 2024 and asserted that this led directly to his family members going into hiding and showed that threats had progressed beyond words into action and supports the claimed risk he faces on return.
18. The Appellant confirmed in oral evidence that he had no knowledge of any FIR, legal proceedings, or formal blasphemy allegations against him by the Pakistan authorities. He has never attempted to convert anyone to Christianity. He is educated, having come to the UK for study and completed a foundation course, and previously worked in Pakistan in sales-related roles. He remains in contact with his mother and brother, who have been in hiding since the mob gathering outside their home in April 2024. He accepted that they had remained undiscovered for approximately two and a half years but stated that efforts had been made to locate them and they had avoided detection by moving between locations. He had not reported the threatening groups to the police because of his previous negative experiences when attempting to register an FIR concerning his missing brother and to practical difficulties in pursuing matters whilst in the UK. He maintained that relocation within Pakistan would not remove the risk because his criticisms of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws and his public advocacy would expose him to danger wherever he lived and that false accusations of blasphemy can rapidly provoke mob violence.
19. I find that the Appellant is not at real risk of persecution on return to Pakistan for the following reasons.
20. The CPIN country guidance and the Country Guidance case emphasise the distinction between converts to Christianity and those born into the faith. The Appellant is a born Christian, and I find that he would not face a real risk of persecution merely because of his faith. He does not assert that his faith alone places him at risk but asserts that his online criticism places him at risk. However, I find that he does not fall within any of the categories of Christian in Pakistan identified in the Country Guidance case or CPIN as facing an enhanced risk by reason of his online activity which is critical of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws and societal behaviour towards minority Christian groups. He is not of adverse interest to the Pakistan authorities and there are no formal blasphemy charges against him. He has not attempted to convert anyone from Islam to Christianity. I note headnote 6. of the Country Guidance case in relation to non-state actors who use blasphemy laws against Christians and which states, “A blasphemy allegation, without more, will not generally be enough to make out a claim under the Refugee Convention. It has to be actively followed either by the authorities in the form of charges being brought or by those making the complaint. If it is, or will be, actively pursued, then an applicant may be able to establish a real risk of harm in the home area and an insufficiency of state protection”. The Appellant has received criticism from the non-state actors he has described in his witness statement, a number of whom are unknown to him. However, whilst these may make allegations against him, there is no evidence of blasphemy charges being brought by the authorities in response.
21. I have considered the documents adduced by the Appellant in the round in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439. I have appraised the documents in the light of the evidence about the nature of each document, its provenance, timing and background evidence, and in the light of all the other evidence in this case. I attach little weight to the relevance of these documents to the Appellant’s claim insofar as they relate to sufficiency of state protection or internal relocation.
22. The Appellant’s account of his inability to seek protection from the authorities is inconsistent with the objective country evidence. I note in particular the CPIN which states “A Christian by birth who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a rogue state actor and/or a non-state actor may be able to obtain protection from the state, unless they can show that the state is actively pursuing a blasphemy allegation against them by bringing formal charges” [5.1.2]. The CPIN goes on to state that “In general, Pakistan has a functioning legal framework and mechanisms for protection, and a person may be able to seek state protection. However, implementation is inconsistent in practice, particularly in cases involving blasphemy allegations, mob violence, or intimidation by extremist actors.” [5.1.4] The CPIN identifies action taken by the authorities to address the misuse of the blasphemy laws, including enhanced penalties for false accusations and an announced ban on the TLP, whose members in the Appellant’s home area and from his student days the Appellant claims to fear. I do not accept the Appellant’s assertion that his own experiences demonstrate an absence of state protection. The FIR adduced by the Appellant himself demonstrates that the complaint was formally recorded by the authorities and is consistent with the existence of a functioning criminal justice system.
23. Taking all of the country background evidence together, I find there to be an effective justice system in place in Pakistan and sufficiency of protection from persecution. I also find that the option of relocation to areas such as Sindh (where just under half a million Christians reside) or the Punjab province would be an option open to the Appellant. The CPIN confirms at para 6.1.2 that a Christian by birth with a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a non-state actor is likely to be able to internally relocate to escape that risk, particularly where the risk is localised and no blasphemy charge is being actively pursued. I find that relocation is both possible and reasonable. The Appellant is educated, employable and capable of establishing himself elsewhere in Pakistan. I do not find that relocation would be unreasonable or unduly harsh.
Application of the law to the facts
24. To qualify for protection under the Refugee Convention, the Appellant must fear persecution for one of the reasons set out in that Convention. The Respondent has conceded that there is a Convention reason, namely religion, and I therefore make that finding.
25. Given my findings above, I am not satisfied that it is reasonably likely that he would face persecution for a Convention reason on return.
26. However, even if I had found that the Appellant fears persecution for a Convention reason, I do not find it reasonably likely that there would not be sufficient protection available on any return to Pakistan. In reaching this conclusion, I remind myself of the test set out in Horvath [2001] 1 AC 489. I remind myself that the effectiveness of a system of protection is to be judged not just by its ability to punish those responsible after the event but also to deter and prevent the risk in question. Further, that as no State can achieve complete protection against isolated and random attacks, this cannot be expected of the home State. The standard is therefore not that which eliminates all risk amounting to a guarantee of protection in the home State, rather a practical standard which takes account of the duty a State owes to its own nationals.
27. It is clear on the country background evidence before me that there is an effective police force and justice system in Pakistan. The Appellant was unable to show that the persons he fears have any power and influence over the state authorities in Pakistan. The objective country evidence supports that finding. I am therefore satisfied that there would be sufficient protection in Pakistan on any return.
28. Given my findings, I do not find it reasonably likely that the Appellant could not internally relocate within Pakistan.
29. Accordingly, the appeal on asylum grounds is dismissed.
Humanitarian Protection Claim
30. For substantially the same reasons, I am not satisfied that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm on return to Pakistan. The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is therefore dismissed. It follows that the appeal on human rights grounds is also dismissed.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal on the Refugee Convention grounds is dismissed.
The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is dismissed.
The appeal on human rights grounds is dismissed.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed Date 29 October 2026
V Davies
Judge V Davies
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
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