Administrative United Kingdom
First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) – Charity, 30 October 2026, n° [2026] UKFTT 1500 (GRC)
NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01500 (GRC)
Case References: 1) FT.CA.2025.0024
2) FT.CA.2026.0016
3)FT.CA.2026.0017
4)FT.CA.2026.0019
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Charity
Heard at: Field House
Heard on: 17th, 18th and 19th August 2026
Decision given on: 30 October 2026
Before
JUDGE ARNELL
JUDGE DWYER
Between
1. Harald Torbjorn gabriel Jakob Kinde
2. Matthew Fearnley
3. Peter West
4. Carmen Rodney
Appellant(s)
and
THE CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENGLAND AND WALES
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellants: Thomas West, Solicitor Advocate of Richard Slade and Partners LLP
For the Respondent: Adrian Francis, Counsel
Decision:
I. Appeals FT.CA.2025.0024, FT.CA.2026.0017 and FT.CA.2026.0019 are dismissed
II. Appeal FT.CA.2026.0016 is allowed in part: “a period of 12 years” is substituted for “a period of 15 years” in paragraph 2 of the Disqualification Order dated 04 September 2025 in respect of Matthew Fearnley.
REASONS
A. Background
1 The background to these appeals is lengthy and largely uncontentious between the Parties. It is therefore not our intention to rehearse it in full within this Decision. What follows under this heading is a summary of the basic timeline of events leading to the decisions under appeal. Further reference is made to specific background events and wider context throughout this Decision where necessary to explain our findings and conclusions.
2 The Appellants appeal against orders of the Charity Commission for England and Wales (“the Commission”) made under section 181A of the Charities Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”) on 04 September 2025, disqualifying them from being a charity trustee and/or trustee of a charity for any or all charities generally, whether registered with the Commission or not (“the Disqualification Orders”). The Disqualification Orders also disqualified the Appellants from holding any office or employment with senior management functions in any such charity.
3 Each order was accompanied by an individual Statement of Reasons (“SOR”) setting out the specific findings in relation to that Appellant. The periods of disqualification imposed by the Disqualification orders are:
a. Harald Torbjorn Gabriel Jakob Kinde (“JK”) – 15 years;
b. Matthew Fearnley (“MF”) – 15 years;
c. Peter West (“PW”) – 10 years; and
d. Carmen Rodney (“CR”) – 6 years (reduced on review from 8 years)
4 On 20 January 2025, upon giving notice to the Appellants of their intention to disqualify, the Commission also made an Order under section 181B (4) of the 2011 Act suspending PW from being a charity trustee or trustee for a charity.
5 Noble Tree Foundation (registered charity number 1103565) (“NTF”) is a charitable company that was registered by the Commission on 04 May 2004. NTF’s objects are:
1) to advance religion by declaring worldwide the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ;
2) the advancement of education worldwide in such subjects as the trustees shall decide; and,
3) the relief of those in need, by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage.
6 The Appellants were all trustees of NTF appointed on the following dates: JK on 04 May 2004, PW on 02 April 2016, MF on 28 January 2021 and CR on 07 June 2021. A fifth trustee was appointed on 14 September 2023, but they are not subject to the Disqualification Orders. NTF went into administration on 03 June 2024.
7 From around 2018/2019 NTF underwent a change in operations, switching their focus to the provision of social housing. With the consent of the Commission, NTF’s Articles of Association were amended by a special resolution on 10 December 2020 which was signed by the then Trustees of NTF: JK, PW and Paul Golf. This amendment removed the previous prohibition on Trustee renumeration subject to an additional provision, clause 6.8, which provided:
A Trustee or connected person may enter into a contract for the supply of services, or of goods that are supplied in connection with the provision of services, to the Company where that is permitted in accordance with, and subject to the conditions in, sections 185 and 186 of the Charities Act 2011 in return for a payment or other material benefit but only if:
i. the goods or services are actually required by the Charity, and the Trustees decide that it is in the best interests of the Charity to enter into such a contract;
ii. the nature and level of the remuneration is no more than is reasonable in relation to the value of the goods or services and the amount or maximum amount of remuneration is set out in an agreement in writing;
iii. a minority of the Trustees are subject to such an agreement in any financial year.
8 Noble Tree Housing Ltd (“NTH”) (company no:10286029) is a wholly owned subsidiary of NTF which operated to manage properties which NTF owned or leased. Between January 2020 and March 2023, NTF held 100% of the shares in NTH. From 01 March 2023 those shares have been held on trust for NTF by JK and MF. The Appellants have, at various times, all been Directors of NTH. JK and MF remain Directors. PW, CR and NTF’s fifth trustee all resigned as Directors of NTH on 30 April 2024. The ownership of NTH is currently in dispute due to an Addendum to the 01 March 2023 trust deed, dated 15 January 2024 (“the Addendum”) and signed by JK and MF, which purports that ownership of NTH “stays” in the personal ownership of JK and MF (or their nominated companies) in the event NTF is “put into restructuring, administration, liquidation or something similar”.
9 On 03 March 2021, NTF entered into a Business Management Agreement with NTH (“the BMA”). The terms of the BMA allowed for a minimum payment of £10,000 per month to be made by NTF to NTH for its services. Further the BMA also provided for discretionary payments to be made by NTF to NTH of “any surplus revenue”. On the same date NTH entered into a Business Agreement (“the BA”) with Kinde & Co Ltd (“K&C”), a company of which JK was the sole director, and Fearnley and Fearnley Ltd (“F&F”), a company of which MF was the sole director. The terms of the BA provided that K&C and F&F would each be paid £5000 per month to manage and operate NTH. Further the BA provided that K&C and F&F:
“shall be granted a discretionary part of the surplus as agreed between NTH and Noble Tree Foundation Limited on semi-annual basis and as appropriate after property acquisitions. They have full rights to distribute their portion of the surplus as they see fit.”
10 Upon the Commission identifying a significant increase in NTF’s reported income, the Commission opened a regulatory compliance case in respect of NTF on 05 December 2022. 0n 06 April 2023, NTF’s auditors raised matters of material significance (MoMs) pursuant to section 156 of the 2011 Act. On the same date NTF submitted a Report of a Serious Incident in which they informed the Commission that the auditors had identified a “technical breach” of NTF’s governing document by which two trustees had undertaken and been paid for professional work within the same accounting period. Following a review of the MoMs by the Commission an inquiry into NTF was opened.
11 On 10 October 2023 the Commission made an order under section 76(3)(f) of the 2011 Act, prohibiting NTF from entering into:
“e. Any transaction which would result in all, or part of the Charity’s funds being transferred to any of the Charity’s trustees or connected persons, as defined within section 118 of the Act; or
f. Any contracts with a company connected to any of the Charity’s trustees, including, but not limited to, Kinde & Co Limited, Fearnley & Fearnley Limited and Noble Tree Housing Limited.
without the written approval of the Commission”
12 An interim manager was appointed by the Commission on 11 March 2024 under section 76(3)(g) of the 2011 Act but was subsequently discharged on the 07 June 2024 following NTF entering administration.
B. The Hearing
13 These appeals were submitted on a single GRC1 appeal form and were originally assigned a single case reference number encompassing all four Appellants’ appeals. However, upon the submission of the Commission, the Tribunal considered that separate case numbers were necessary for each Appellant to protect the Appellant’s individual right to apply for permission to appeal this Tribunal decision. In line with the overriding objective at Rule 2 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (General Regulatory Chamber) Rules 2009 (“Rule”), these cases were heard together pursuant to Rule 5(3)(b).
14 The Appeals were listed for a three-day face to face hearing at Field House which took place on 17 to 19 August 2026. The Appellants attended and were collectively represented by Thomas West of Richard Slade and Partners. Mr West noted during closing submissions that differences in the Appellants’ accounts limited the extent of submissions he was able to make, but he felt this did not preclude him from acting for all Appellants.
15 The Commission was represented at the hearing by Counsel, Adrian Francis. Ian Birnie, Investigator and the assigned Case Officer, attended as a witness for the Commission.
16 JK confirmed at the commencement of his evidence that he experiences anxiety and explained the impacts this may have on his ability to give evidence. The Tribunal took account of this when considering his evidence and the conduct of the hearing. Regular breaks were given in proceedings and when requested by a participant.
C. The Law
17 Part 2 of the 2011 Act contains provisions for the functions of the Commission including its objections (section 14), general functions (section 15) and general duties (section 16).
18 Section 76 of the 2011 Act (in so far as is relevant) provides:
(1) Subsection (3) applies where, at any time after it has instituted an inquiry under section 46 with respect to any charity, the Commission is satisfied—
(a) that there is or has been a failure to comply with an order or direction of the Commission, a failure to remedy any breach specified in a warning under section 75A, or any other misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the charity, or
(b) that it is necessary or desirable to act for the purpose of—
i. protecting the property of the charity, or
ii. securing a proper application for the purposes of the charity of that property or of property coming to the charity.
(3) The Commission may of its own motion do one or more of the following—
[…]
(f) by order restrict (regardless of anything in the trusts of the charity) the transactions which may be entered into, or the nature or amount of the payments which may be made, in the administration of the charity without the approval of the Commission;
19 Pursuant to Section 77 of the 2011 Act it is an offence to contravene an order made under section 76(3)(f) punishable on summary conviction by a fine.
20 Section 185 of the 2011 Act provides, is so far as is relevant:
(1) This section applies to remuneration for [goods or] services provided by a person (“P”) to or on behalf of a charity where—
a. P is a charity trustee or trustee for the charity, or
b. P is connected with a charity trustee or trustee for the charity and the remuneration might result in that trustee obtaining any benefit.
(2) If Conditions A to D are met in relation to remuneration within subsection (1), P is entitled to receive the remuneration out of the funds of the charity.
Condition A
Condition A is that the amount or maximum amount of the remuneration—
(a) is set out in an agreement in writing between the charity or its charity trustees (as the case may be) and P under which P is to provide the [goods or services, or goods and services,] in question to or on behalf of the charity, and
(b) does not exceed what is reasonable in the circumstances for the provision by P of the [goods or services, or goods and services,] in question.
Condition B
Condition B is that, before entering into that agreement, the charity trustees decided that they were satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the charity for the [goods or services, or goods and services,] to be provided by P to or on behalf of the charity for the amount or maximum amount of remuneration set out in the agreement.
Condition C
Condition C is that if immediately after the agreement is entered into there is, in the case of the charity, more than one person who is a charity trustee and is—
(a) a person in respect of whom an agreement within Condition A is in force,
(b) a person who is entitled to receive remuneration out of the funds of the charity otherwise than by virtue of such an agreement, or
(c) a person connected with a person falling within paragraph (a) or (b),
the total number of them constitute a minority of the persons for the time being holding office as charity trustees of the charity.
Condition D
Condition D is that the trusts of the charity do not contain any express provision that prohibits P from receiving the remuneration.
21 Section 181A of the 2011 Act provides that the Commission may make an order disqualifying a person from being a charity trustee or a trustee for a charity, in relation to all charities or in relation to such charities or classes of charity as may be specified in the order.
22 Section 181A (6) provides:
(6) The Commission may make an order disqualifying a person under this section only if it is satisfied that—
a. one or more of the conditions listed in subsection (7) are met in relation to the person,
b. the person is unfit to be a charity trustee or trustee for a charity (either generally or in relation to the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order), and
c. making the order is desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order
23 In the instant appeals the relevant condition in section 181A (7) is condition D, which provides as follows:
| D | that the person was a trustee, charity trustee, officer, agent or employee of a charity at a time when there was misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the charity, and— (a) the person was responsible for the misconduct or mismanagement, (b) the person knew of the misconduct or mismanagement and failed to take any reasonable step to oppose it, or (c) the person's conduct contributed to or facilitated the misconduct or mismanagement. |
24 The statutory test is cumulative and each of the elements must be proved. If the conditions in section 181A are met (and the procedural requirement in section 181C of the 2011 Act are met) the Commission may make an order. The statutory language confirms that even where all elements of the test are satisfied the Commission has discretion as to whether or not to make an order under this section.
25 Pursuant to Section 181B of the 2011 Act, an order under section 181A must specify the period of time for which the person is disqualified. The period of time must not exceed 15 years from the day on which the order takes effect and must be proportionate.
D. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction and function
26 S.319 and Schedule 6 of the 2011 Act provide circumstances in which an appeal may be brought to the Tribunal against specified decisions, directions or orders of the Commission and the powers of the Tribunal if an appeal is allowed.
27 Ss.319 (4) and (5) of the 2011 Act provide:
4) In determining such an appeal the Tribunal—
(a) must consider afresh the decision, direction or order appealed against, and
(b) may take into account evidence which was not available to the Commission.
(5) The Tribunal may—
(a) dismiss the appeal, or
(b) if it allows the appeal, exercise any power specified in the corresponding entry in column 3 of Schedule 6.
28 Column 3 of Schedule 6 sets out the powers of the Tribunal if an appeal against an order made by the Commission under section 181A is allowed as follows:
Power to—
(a) quash the order in whole or in part and (if appropriate) remit the matter to the Commission;
(b) substitute for all or part of the order any other order which could have been made by the Commission;
(c) add to the order anything which could have been contained in an order made by the Commission.
29 Accordingly, the role of the Tribunal in this appeal is to make a de novo decision considering the evidence before it, even where that evidence was not available to the Commission at the time the decision under appeal was made. When considering an appeal by re-hearing the Tribunal’s approach is bound by the Court of Appeal’s judgement in R (Hope and Glory Public House Limited) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2011] EWCA Civ 31 as approved by the Supreme Court in Hesham Ali (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 at paragraph 45. The Tribunal must stand in the shoes of the Commission and take a decision based on the evidence before it, giving appropriate weight to the Commission’s decision as the body tasked by parliament with making such decisions. It follows that as the Tribunal is required to stand in the shoes of the Commission when reaching its decision, it too must have due regard to the statutory objectives, functions and duties at sections 14, 15 and 16 of the 2011 Act. The Tribunal must use its own judgement and can vary a decision where we disagree with it, despite having given due weight to the Commission’s decision.
30 It was submitted by Mr West on behalf of the Appellants that the Commission is bound by the contents of the respective SORs and unable to advance further reasons or grounds on appeal. In particular, Mr West submitted that the Respondent was unable to raise allegations of dishonesty against the Appellants where this had not been specifically cited in the SORs. Whilst accepting there were references to integrity within the SORS, and there may be some crossover in the terms integrity and honesty, Mr West submits dishonesty was not raised by the Commission until the provision of Skeleton Arguments. This he submits is procedurally unfair as it has prejudiced the Appellant’s ability to prepare for the hearing and provide evidence to rebut the allegation. The Commission disputes this and submits it would unduly restrict their ability to set out their case. Further they submit the Appellants’ case is centred on acting in good faith and therefore they consider it must be open to them to challenge that assertion.
31 We reject the Appellants’ interpretation of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in these appeals. The overriding basis of the Appellants’ Grounds of Appeal is that they have acted in good faith. Thus, whether the Appellants acted dishonestly has been brought into the arena by the Appellants and as such the Commission must be able to respond to this and test the assertion that the Appellants acted in good faith. We do not accept any prejudice has been caused to the Appellants as they had fully prepared on the basis that there was no dishonesty on their part when discharging their duties as Trustees. We considered that the case to which they have to answer is sufficiently clear from both the SORs and the Commission’s Response to the appeals.
32 The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Both Parties, relying on the case of Dr Alan Blacker v The Charity Commission for England and Wales [2022] UKFTT 178 (GRC), submitted that the burden of proof rests with the Appellant. We disagree with this submission in part. The Appellant in Blacker was the seeking a waiver of an automatic disqualification under s.181 of the 2011 Act. In the instant appeals the Appellants are not subject to automatic disqualification, rather they are seeking the quashing of a discretionary order disqualifying them under section 181A. As such it is for the Commission to demonstrate that the statutory criteria in section 181A are met. If the Commission succeeds in doing so the burden then rests with the Appellants, as the party seeking to disturb the status quo, to show that the order for disqualification should not be made or that the length of the order should be varied.
E. Pleadings
33 The Appellants’ Notice of appeal does not challenge the factual basis of the Commission’s findings set out within the respective SOR’s. The Notice of Appeal sets out the Appellants’ main grounds of appeal which can be summarised as follows:
(a) The Commission erred in law by failing to distinguish between “misconduct” and “mismanagement” which prevented the Appellants from understanding the case against them;
(b) The Commission did not exercise their discretion correctly in deciding to make the Disqualification Orders as: they failed to take into consideration or give sufficient weight to their own evidence; misunderstood and mischaracterised some of the Appellants’ evidence; and gave weight to matters of little or no relevance;
(c) In reaching the Decision, the Commission acted unfairly because: they did not give the Appellants a fair opportunity to make representations; they did not provide advice or guidance to the Appellants and conducted the Appellants’ interviews in a hostile and unfair manner; and
(d) The lengths of the disqualifications imposed were unfair and unreasonable as the Commission did not appropriately balance the impact on the Appellants’ reputations and the Charity’s beneficiaries.
34 The grounds of appeal are not particularised more specifically within the Notice of Appeal. The Appellants did not provide a Reply to the Commission’s Response.
35 The Commission’s Response dated 21 November 2025 is extremely detailed. In summary the Commission resists the appeals and maintains that in respect of each Appellant the statutory criteria are met for making the Disqualification Orders and the making of those orders were justified in all the circumstances. The Commission relies on several different grounds of misconduct and/or mismanagement for each Appellant as detailed in the SORs. They submit the Appellants’ conduct undermines their integrity and their failure to recognise wrongdoing meant they remain a risk and unfit to act as a trustee of any charity. The Commission considered it is in the public interest to make the Disqualification Orders to protect public trust and confidence in charities. Finally, they maintain the period of disqualifications imposed are reasonable and proportionate and should not be reduced.
36 We also had the benefit of Skeleton Arguments provided by both Parties in advance of the hearing.
37 The Appellants submit within their Skeleton Argument that the matters relied on by the Commission do not satisfy any part of the test in section 181A of the 2011 Act and as such no disqualification order should be made. In the alternative they submit the periods of disqualification imposed by the Disqualification Orders are disproportionate and should be reduced.
38 Further, within their Skeleton Argument the Appellants sought to refine their first ground following promulgation of the decision in Vladimir Potanin v The Charity Commission for England & Wales [2026] UKFTT 271 (GRC). They no longer seek to pursue the submission that it was wrong in principle for the Commission not to distinguish between “misconduct” and “mismanagement”. However, in summary they submit that “misconduct” denotes the most serious behaviour with a mental element to it which requires the Commission to address and clearly state what level of knowledge or intention they allege a person had. Further they submit only an express finding of misconduct, addressing culpability, will attract the highest sanction.
39 In closing submissions, Mr West confirmed the Appellants understand that the role of the Tribunal is to make a de novo decision and as such they no longer seek to rely on the grounds raised regarding procedural failings in the Commission’s investigation. Mr West accepted the Appellants have had a fair opportunity to present their case to the Tribunal.
F. Evidence
40 The Commission, in consultation with the Appellants, prepared the Hearing bundle spanning 3542 numbered pages. The Tribunal was also provided with an agreed Bundle of Authorities in advance of the hearing. It was agreed at the outset of the hearing that, in light of the detailed Skeleton Arguments, opening submissions would be dispensed with. Submissions were heard from the Appellants and the Commission in closing at the conclusion of the evidence.
41 We heard evidence from all four Appellants and the Commission’s witness, Ian Birnie, at the hearing. All witnesses adopted their witness statements as their evidence in chief and were asked questions under cross examination/re-examination.
42 During the course of the Hearing, JK made reference to additional documents and at the request of the Tribunal, the Appellants’ Representative provided copies of two additional documents to the Tribunal and the Commission at the start of the second hearing day. Those documents were:
i. Side letter to Loan Agreement (“Side Letter”); and
ii. Letter to JK from The Insolvency Service dated 08 July 2026
43 Further at the conclusion of the evidence the Tribunal requested that each Party, as part of their closing submissions, address the financial circumstances of the NTF throughout the relevant period, which both Parties did. In support of their submissions the Commission provided two documents to the Tribunal and the Appellants entitled: “Respondent’s Issue-Specific Witness Statement and Commission Interview Review” and “Respondent’s Issue-Specific Document Review”.
44 Whilst it is our intention to only refer to the relevant facts and evidence necessary to explain our decision, the Parties can nevertheless be assured that we have considered and had due regard to all of the evidence provided in the Bundle and at the hearing.
G. Findings of Fact
45 As noted above, the Commission in making the Disqualification Orders identified several examples of conduct, they submit amounts to misconduct or mismanagement. The identified examples largely relate to unauthorised trustee benefits, failure to manage conflicts of interests and failure to safeguard the interests of the charity.
46 Due to the breadth of issues in the Appeals, it has been necessary to broadly categorise our findings under the below subheadings. Unless specified otherwise our findings apply to each Appellant. Where a finding is made which does not universally apply to all Appellants, this is clearly identified. The Tribunal’s discussion and conclusions on the application of these findings to the Appellants’ individual circumstances are set out separately in respect of each appeal under headings I through L below.
47 The Appellants have not sought to challenge or deny the factual basis of the Commission’s finding. The primary focus of their grounds of appeal and the primary disputes in these appeals arise in relation to the knowledge, intention or culpability of the Appellants whilst trustees of NTF. Specifically, the Appellants dispute that any of them individually or as a whole acted in bad faith or were dishonest at any time. The Appellants have maintained throughout that they were passionately committed to furthering NTF’s cause and providing housing to vulnerable members of society.
48 As has now been accepted by the Appellants following promulgation of the decision in Potanin, which although not binding we find highly persuasive, the Commission is not required to specify and differentiate between those allegations which it finds amount to misconduct and those it finds amount to mismanagement. It follows that the Tribunal when standing in the shoes of the Commission also need not embark on this task. We agree with the Tribunal in Potanin at paragraph 81 that “[w]hat matters is whether the conduct in question, taken in its real-world context, meets the composite threshold”.
49 “Misconduct” nor “mismanagement” are defined within the 2011 Act. The Commission has published guidance, “The discretionary disqualification power: power to disqualify from being a trustee” which provides as follows:
“Misconduct includes any act (or failure to act) in the administration of the charity where the person committing it knew (or ought to have known) that it was criminal, unlawful or improper. Mismanagement includes any act (or failure to act) in the administration of the charity that may result in charitable resources being misused or the people who benefit from the charity being put at risk. A charity’s reputation may be regarded as property of the charity.”
50 Further the Commission’s published policy paper “Power to disqualify from acting as a Trustee” provides non exhaustive examples of what may amount to misconduct or mismanagement as follows:
(ii) providing false or deliberately misleading information to the commission
(iii) an individual, by virtue of their conduct, has received unauthorised private benefit and this has caused loss to the charity’s assets (including its reputation)
(iv) repeated failure to meet reporting requirements
(v) a breach of a commission order or direction
51 We accept that it is necessary to consider the level of knowledge or intent behind the Appellants’ actions or inactions when making findings of misconduct and/or mismanagement. We do not accept the Appellants’ submission that only findings of misconduct can attract the longest periods of disqualification. Culpability is one of a number of factors that we must take into account when determining whether the conditions in section 181A(6)(b), (c) and section 181B are met.
NTF’s finances and the impact of trustee renumeration
52 Throughout their evidence and during their interviews with the Commission, the Appellants consistently maintained that the sums removed from NTF as trustee remuneration in various forms, as explored in more detail later in this decision, were not excessive or unreasonable when seen in the context of the considerable value being added to NTF. JK in particular, being the Trustee who, by his own admission, was primarily responsible for the financial affairs of NTF, sought to submit that the charity was doing so well and experiencing such growth that the amounts paid out as discretionary sums were reasonable. Only MF conceded that NTF’s outcome may have been different had those amounts had not been removed.
53 There was a maintained refusal to acknowledge that NTF had faced any prolonged period of financial instability and that the amounts paid in trustee remuneration may have contributed to NTF entering administration. Instead, the Appellants and in particular JK submitted that NTF had only experienced the financial difficulties for a short period prior to entering administration and that this had been caused by external factors outside of their control. These external factors they submitted including problems with money not being paid to the NTF that was owed to them by landlords and other companies, failures by external professionals and the impact of the Commission opening their inquiry on NTFs ability to operate.
54 There was clear and overwhelming evidence before the Tribunal, including in NTF’s financial accounts, minutes of trustee minutes and third-party correspondence that the Appellants’ account of the financial state of NTF is inaccurate. Despite being given a further opportunity to do so at the hearing, the Appellants failed to adduce any evidence to dispute this.
55 We find that NTF was experiencing financial fragility from as early as 2021. We further find that due to financial pressures, NTF needed to retain cash assets to fulfil its charitable purpose and was not in in a position to support to significant sums paid in trustee remuneration. We find the Appellants knew or ought to have known this.
56 We are satisfied on the evidence before us that JK and MF were aware or ought to be aware, of the financial state of the charity from 2021 and deliberately misrepresented this to the Commission. We find this amounts to misconduct and/or mismanagement.
57 PW and CR by their own admission did not “get involved” in NTF’s finances. We find that their lack of oversight and unwillingness to actively safeguard NTF’s property and its beneficiaries is a wilful breach of their trustee duties and amounts to misconduct and/or mismanagement.
58 JK and MF accepted that NTF was operating on a medium/high risk financial strategy. We find there was a lack of consideration by all Appellants as to whether a different strategy was in the best interests of the charity and its beneficiaries. For example, there was no consideration as to whether it would be better to provide housing to fewer beneficiaries with more secure funding. We find that the medium/high risk strategy described by the JK and MF was not an appropriate operational model for NTF, as demonstrated by its demise. We find that this operational model was not implemented for the long-term benefit of NTF’s beneficiaries as all of the risk was borne by NTF. All the more so when at the same time JK and MF were taking significant payments from NTF funds as detailed under the following headings.
59 We find that NTF suffered financial loss as a direct result of the actions or inaction of the Appellants. We are satisfied on the evidence before us that JK and MF, as experienced Company Directors, were aware or ought to have been aware of the risks to NTF of the admitted high risk business model adopted on behalf of NTF and PW and CR failed to take any responsibility of oversight. We are satisfied this amounts to misconduct and/or mismanagement.
60 JK, MF and PW submitted repeatedly that the payments made in trustee remuneration, in particular the discretionary payments discussed in more detail below, represented value for money for NTF. We conclude this is a ludicrous submission when by their own admission the Appellants did not consider other operating models or explore alternative service providers.
61 We find that the JK and MF did not have regard to the financial needs of NTF when authorising large payments to themselves. JK and MF utilised the charity as a vehicle for personal financial gain. Had NTF not made such significant payments to JK, MF and their respective companies those monies could have been used by NTF to support its beneficiaries. But for their actions, it is possible NTF may have avoided administration.
BMA/BA
62 On 03 March 2021, NTF attempted to enter into two agreements: the BMA and the BA. For the sake of clarity CR was not a trustee at the time the BMA and BA were purportedly approved. CR confirmed that she did not read these documents following her appointment as a trustee of NTH and relied on trust in her colleagues.
63 At the time the BMA and BA were signed NTF had only 3 trustees: JK, MF and PW. It is now not in dispute that these agreements were entered into in breach of the NTF’s Articles of Association and section 185 of the 2011 Act.
64 It is indisputable that proposing to enter into the BMA and BA created a conflict of interest for JK and MF. MF and PW maintained that at the time the BMA and BA were entered into they believed this was permitted as they could effectively manage the conflicts of interest arising from them. Within their witness statements and during their evidence to the Tribunal, they submitted that it had been their understanding that if JK was excluded from the decision regarding the K&C agreement and MF was excluded from the decision regarding the F&F agreement (as they described it the “two for one approach”) this would be sufficient to manage the conflicts and allow for quorate decisions.
65 JK initially gave evidence in line with that of MF and PW, however, later into his evidence he stated that at the time they “needed to get going” and so it was necessary to sign the BMA and BA so they could “start billing” NTF and “get on with the work”. When asked if it would have been possible to start the work without billing NTF until there were sufficient trustees to effectively manage the conflict of interest, JK responded, “no because I needed the money.” He submitted that they were committed to housing vulnerable people “and so we cut corners”.
66 However, during their interviews when asked about how the conflict of interest was managed, JK, MF nor PW put forward the “two for one approach” on which they now rely. PW when asked simply stated “it wasn’t an issue for us”. JK and MF submitted that they thought if PW gave approval that would be sufficient.
67 Further in October 2023, in response to the Commission opening a statutory inquiry JK wrote that the BMA and BA were “signed in the spring of 2021 when we had 5 trustees for a while”. Whilst it is acknowledged that there was a brief period of around three weeks in June 2021, when NTF did have five trustees, this statement is demonstrably inaccurate as the attempts to enter into the BMA and the BA predate this period by a number of months. When asked by the Commission whether he accepted this was misleading, JK replied “someone who may have proofread it may have picked up the misleading impression but sorry if I got it wrong”.
68 In relation to the prohibitions on entering into such agreements within NTF’s governing documents and section 185 of the 2011 Act, specifically the requirement that they be granted to only a minority of trustees in any financial year, JK, MF and PW all submitted that they had made a genuine mistake in understanding what was meant by a minority or a majority.
69 The Commission conceded that the initial draft amendment to NTF’s Articles of Association, submitted to them by NTF’s then legal representative, was written in such a way as to suggest that trustee renumeration would be permitted provided it was not made to a majority of trustees. However, the Tribunal had before it the Commission’s response to NTF’s proposed amendment, dated 16 July 2026 which states:
• Removing the prohibition in 6.2 would allow 1 out of 3 trustees to be paid for services; but
• S185(2) condition c could not be complied with if 2 out of 3 trustees were to be paid for services.
• Therefore what would be required is not just the lifting of the prohibition but an express power to pay a majority of trustees. Although the Commission could authorise a majority trustee payment position to apply it would only do so in exceptional circumstances, where there is no apparent alternative, and it is clearly in the charity’s interests […]We would need a very clear and compelling explanation of how the conflicts of interest relating to decision making around the provision of services would be managed both initially and on an ongoing basis with only 1 unconflicted trustee able to make decisions[…]; and
• It appears there is a simple solution that would avoid the need to have a majority of trustees in receipt of payments for services i.e. the appointment of at least 2 additional trustees.
70 JK said in evidence that the contents of that response “could not be clearer” but submitted that he had never seen that advice before and it had not been provided to him by the legal representative. The Commission submit that this amounts to an allegation of professional negligence.
71 In his witness statement, JK stated “The concept of “a minority” was understood in general terms, but it was not explained to us with precise mathematical or legal clarity depending on the exact number of trustees in office at any one time”. In his evidence to the Tribunal he stated accepted they had “got it wrong”. He maintained that “two out of four is not a majority; it is a grey area”. He said NTF had always wanted a fifth trustee and they “had an ambition to get it right”.
72 PW submitted throughout simply that this was “not his area” but he believed that paying two out of four trustees was permitted. MF submitted that he had not read the governing document and was not aware of the statutory requirements but he had thought they were able to enter into it. He accepted, that he should have made himself familiar with the requirement.
73 None of the explanations provided by the JK, MF or PW address why they attempted to enter into agreements, that at the time would have allowed for remuneration for two out of three trustees. It is inconceivable to this Tribunal that any of these individuals would not have appreciated that two out of three constituted a majority of trustees. Whilst JK maintains he is not an expert in charity law, managing conflicts of interest is a fundamental principle of company law which JK said he was fully experienced.
74 It is also of note that on 18 September 2020, less than six months prior to the attempt to enter into the BMA and BA, NTF’s then legal representatives advised the Commission that due to a change in circumstances trustees no longer needed remuneration but NTF still wanted to amend their governing document to allow for this.
75 The Commission also raised that the terms of both the BMA and the BA are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements contained in NTF’s governing documents or section 185 of the 2011 Act as they do not provide an adequate description of the services to be provided nor do they stipulate the maximum amounts which could be paid in either management fees of discretionary payments. No clear explanation as to why this had been permitted was provided by JK, MF or PW save for to say that JK and MF would be doing important work for NTF and the BMA and BA represented value for money for the charity.
76 JK, MF and PW accepted that NTF did not take legal advice on the validity or content of the BMA or the BA.
77 Under this heading we make the following finding of fact, on the balance of probabilities, based on all the evidence before us:
i. We find that JK and MFs’ positions, as trustees of NTF and Directors of K&C and M&F respectively, created a clear conflict of interest. The terms of the BMA and the BA created significant personal benefits for JK and MF and the conflict of interest would have been apparent to JK, MF and PW.
ii. We find that NTF did not have enough unconflicted Trustees to effectively manage the conflict of interest. We do not accept that the conflict could be effectively managed by JK and PW voting on the F&F agreement and MF and PW voting on the K&C agreement.
iii. We find that the BMA and the BA were not legally binding as: they were entered into in breach of NTF’s Memorandum of Association and section 185 of the 2011 Act and as both JK and MF were conflicted and therefore NTF was inquorate (having only one unconflicted trustee) at the time they were purportedly approved.
iv. We find that JK, MF and PW were aware at the time that they did not have sufficient unconflicted trustees to approve the BMA and the BA and proceeded to enter into them regardless.
v. We find that as the only unconflicted Trustee, PW, in approving the BA and BMA relied entirely on the advice of JK and MF in breach of his duties as a trustee to act in the best interests of and safeguard the property of NTF.
vi. We find that JK and MF by participating in the Decision to approve the BMA and the BA from which they would receive personal benefits breached their duties as trustees to act in the best interests of the NTF.
vii. We find that the PW and JK were aware of the requirements that only a minority of trustees could receive remuneration within the same financial year. We find that MF ought to have been familiar with the position with regards to trustee remuneration and was under a duty to furnish himself with this understanding. All the more as he was to receive a significant personal benefit from charitable funds.
viii. We find that JK, MF and PW must have known that two out of three trustees receiving renumeration did not constitute a minority in light of their experience in both charities and companies.
ix. We find that JK and PW had received advice and were aware that two out of four trustees receiving renumeration did not constitute a minority. We do not accept the Commission’s advice of 16 July 2020 was never provided to them. We find the advice was clear that to avoid a majority “at least 2 additional trustees” would need to be appointed i.e. NTF would need at least five trustees.
x. We find that MF in his role of trustee ought to have familiarised himself with NTF’s governing documents and the statutory requirements regarding remuneration and therefore ought to have known that that remuneration to two out of four trustees was not permitted.
xi. We find that JK’s response to the Commission in October 2023 following the opening of the inquiry was a deliberate attempt to mislead the Commission into believing the BMA and BA had been entered into lawfully at a time when NTF had five trustees.
xii. We find that the terms of the BMA and BA are vague, generic and in breach of NTF’s Memorandum of Association and section 185 of the 2011 Act.
xiii. We find that the BMA and the BA were not subject to market value or any value for money analysis. The BMA and the BA do not identify the scope or nature of the services to be provided. There is no evidence to suggest that any of the trustees considered alternative providers for these services. No legal advice was taken on the terms of the BMA or the BA by any of the trustees. And by entering into these agreements, JK, MF and PW breached their duty to act in the best interests of the charity.
xiv. We are satisfied the above amounts to misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of NTF and JK, MF and PW were responsible for this.
xv. We find that CR failure to familiarise herself with NTFs governing document, the BMA and the BA following her appointment NTH was a breach of her trustee duties which amounts to misconduct or mismanagement.
Payments made under BMA/BA
78 There is some inevitable cross over between this and the preceding heading. Our findings under this heading should be read with the benefit of the findings made under the previous heading. For the sake of clarity, we have already found that the BMA and BA were entered into unlawfully by JK, MF and PW, it therefore follows that we can be satisfied that any payments made under those agreements, either as management fees or discretionary payments, were unauthorised and unlawful.
79 It follows from the findings made above, that we are satisfied that any payments made whilst NTF had fewer than five trustees were made in breach of section 185 of the 2011 Act and that breach was deliberate or grossly negligent. When JK was asked by the Commission why they started making payments under these agreements when he knew they did not have enough trustees, he said they had needed to be paid. When asked to expand on this by the Commission he said “well what’s wrong with that”. He was further asked about this comment by the Tribunal and he explained it was a 24/7 job which was taking up all his time and he had to be paid for his work.
80 It is not disputed that across 2021 and 2022 JK (or K&C) received the following payments purportedly under the BA:
i. Management fees – £180,000
ii. Discretionary payments – £607, 886.32
81 It is not disputed that across 2021 and 2022 MF (or F&F) received the following payments purportedly under the BA:
i. Management fees – £184,000
ii. Discretionary payments – £607,886.32
82 The Tribunal had before it Trustee Meeting Minutes dated 24 February 2021 which state:
“It was agreed that any commission payable to any 3rd parties and JK and MF would be done on a discretionary basis decided by MF and JK as long as the majority of any transaction surplus would go to the charity[…]”
83 PW and CR submitted that they were not involved in the financial management of NTF, they operated on trust with JK and MF and were primarily involved in NTF’s pastoral remit. PW said had no problem with JK and MF paying themselves and was unconcerned that they had made the payment decisions without board approval. He said he wouldn’t have questioned the discretionary payments. When asked to reflect on this he said he had no regrets, would do the same again and although he now understands the payments should not have been made, he considers they were value for money.
84 In interview with the Commission, JK submitted he was not involved in deciding the amount of or authorising any discretionary payments and that this had been determined by the other trustees. MF told the Commission that all of the trustees were involved in deciding the amounts. JK’s evidence on this remains unclear as it was inconsistent and contradictory.
85 MF however accepted in evidence that himself and JK had solely been responsible for this with no oversight. He accepted that this shouldn’t have occurred and that these monies were taken out without authority, although he believed they were authorised at the time. He conceded that he no longer asserts that taking out those monies was not misconduct or mismanagement.
86 When asked about whether the payments were in the best interests of NTF, JK stated “I feel very justified in receiving these amounts, I have no regrets. We created £40mil in value for the charity”. Both JK and MF submitted that they considered the payments were reasonable as they were very clear that at least 50% of any profits remained in the charity. The Commission submitted that practically this was not the case as the amount which remained in NTF was needed to cover NTF’s liabilities, for examples any repairs on properties, and to support NTF’s beneficiaries. Further the Commission submitted that NTF needed the profits from the sale of properties as working capital. JK submitted that the needs of the charity were considered and there was provision to pay a lesser amount under the BMA and BA.
87 It was put to JK and MF that the Commission had identified from NTF’s bank statements four payments received by K&C and F&F, being made on the same day as payments were made to two third parties, Will Bailey Property Limited and Tim Holmes. JK denied that there was a duplication of work and said the third parties did not do everything, but he failed to provide a clear explanation of the work he had undertaken which warranted these payments. He said he had not produced evidence of the work he had done because he had not been asked to. MF gave a clear and detailed description to the Tribunal of the work that he had undertaken which he submitted was distinct and separate to that undertaken by the two third parties. The Tribunal had before it correspondence from Tim Holmes detailing the scope of work undertaken for the charity.
88 Under this heading we make the following findings of fact, on the balance of probabilities, based on all the evidence before us:
i. We find that there was no oversight of the payments made to JK and MF under the BMA and BA. The amounts of the discretionary payments were decided and paid by JK and MF to themselves with no input from the other trustees.
ii. We find the amounts paid to JK and MF under the BMA and BA were not in the best interests of the charity and no evidence has been provided to show what work was undertaken for these payments for them to be considered reasonable. Therefore, we conclude that they were excessive and unreasonable in light of the NTF’s ultimate entering into administration.
iii. We find that JK and MF authorised these payments to themselves in order to use NTF as a vehicle for financial gain with no consideration as to whether they were required by NTF to be used for the benefit of their beneficiaries.
iv. We find that JK and MF attempted to mislead the Commission into believing the payments were determined and authorised by the board of trustees.
v. We find that PW and CR, by allowing JK and MF to decide the amounts of and authorise payments to themselves, failed to safeguard NTF and its beneficiaries in breach of their duties as trustees.
vi. We find that PW and CR still do not acknowledge or accept that as the unconflicted trustees they should have been responsible for checking payments made under these agreements.
vii. We find that despite his submissions that he brought significant value to the charity, JK failed to give a clear explanation of the work that he had undertaken on the NTF’s behalf or evidence that he carried out any work which would justify receiving these payments.
Bridging Loan to Clean Energy Investments Ltd
89 The following facts are uncontroversial:
i. On 19 March 2021, NTF provided a bridging loan of £122,000 (“the Loan”) to Clean Energy Investment Limited (“CEIL”).
ii. At that time JK was the sole Director and a person with significant control of CEIL. The Loan was repayable by no later than 18 April 2021 along with interest of 33% for its duration.
iii. The Loan was secured with 150,000 shares in Eco Energy World PLC (“the Shares”).
iv. The Loan was signed by MF on behalf of NTF and JK on behalf of CEIL.
v. CEIL defaulted, the Loan was cancelled in December 2021 and the entire value of the Loan was never repaid.
90 It is also not disputed that NTF were interested in renewables in order to make their properties energy efficient and green.
91 The value of the Shares is unknown. JK submitted that prior to NTF entering administration he had been actively trying to sell them but had been waiting in order to achieve the best value. At various points each Appellant submitted that they considered the Shares represented value for money. However, in his evidence to the Tribunal MF conceded that in hindsight NTF had not received value for money. JK maintained throughout that the Shares still represented value for money regardless of the fact that that value has not been realised and they have not been able to be sold up to the date of the hearing.
92 It is accepted that the minutes of the trustee meeting which record the decision to enter the loan, signed by PW, JK and MF are dated 15 April 2024: almost one month after the Loan was signed. The Tribunal understands the Appellants’ submission on this point to be that the agreement of the trustees was reached prior to the date of entering into the loan and it was recorded in the minutes of the next trustee meeting so as to have a record of the agreement in writing. It is also accepted that JK is listed as an attendee in the minutes. The minutes record:
“It was approved that £122,000 would be lent to Clean Energy Investment Limited on 19 March 2021. Jakob Kinde is a director of this company This bridge loan is fully secured by 150,000 shared in EEW Eco Energy World plc […] as well as obtaining $200,000 in carbon credits and a profit of £42,260 for providing this facility”
93 As above at paragraph 42, the Tribunal and the Commission were provided with a copy of the Side Letter during the Hearing. JK’s evidence to the Tribunal on this matter was lengthy and at times unclear. In summary JK submitted that the Side Letter was a binding agreement which had formed part of the original agreement, had been before the other trustees at the time they had made the Decision to enter the Loan and which entitled NTF to carbon credits of a significant value. JK stated that this agreement remained valid notwithstanding NTF cancelling the Loan in December 2021. JK was unable to offer any explanation as to why the Side Letter had not been produced previously to the Commission or the Tribunal, nor why there was no reference to an entitlement to carbon credits within NTF’s financial accounts. JK was insistent that entering into the Loan had been in the interests of NTF and had been a good investment. The Commission submitted that Loan contained an entire arrangement clause and therefore the Side Letter could not have formed part of it.
94 There are significant conflicts on the issues under this heading between the Appellants’ evidence and inconsistencies in their individual accounts. It is therefore necessary to summarise each Appellant’s evidence in order to explain our findings.
i. PW in his interview with the Commission stated that he could not recall NTF entering into the Loan, had not taken part in any due diligence relating to the Loan and was not aware that JK was a director of CEIL. He said he was not aware of the Shares but thought something may have been discussed at a board meeting. He was unaware that CEIL had defaulted on the loan. He does not address the Loan in his witness statement. In his evidence to the Tribunal he stated that he remembered the Loan being discussed but confirmed he was not aware that JK was a Director of CEIL or that CEIL had defaulted on the Loan. He said he was aware of the need for due diligence but as this is not his area, he wouldn’t have been in a position to ask any pertinent questions.
ii. CR’s evidence in relation to the Loan was confusing. CR was not a trustee at the time Loan was entered into and during her interview with the Commission she confirmed this and said only that she remembered the Shares being discussed in one or two trustee meetings. In her witness statement CR said “[t]here was awareness that he was involved in the company”. It is difficult to understand how CR is able to make this submission when she was not a trustee at the relevant time. In her evidence to the Tribunal she recalled seeing a presentation about the Loan but upon the Commission suggesting it could not have been a presentation about approving the Loan, as this was done prior to her joining NTF as a trustee, she clarified that she believed the purpose of the presentation she had seen was for the purpose of showing the direction for green investment in NTF.
iii. In his interview with the Commission MF said that he did not know that JK was a director of CEIL. He said JK had brought the Loan to the table and so JK had not been involved in the decision to approve it. He stated that he and PW reviewed the prospectus and decided it would be a good deal because, if CEIL defaulted, they would take control of the Shares which they believed were good value and it opened up a place for them in the green energy market. In his witness statement however MF stated “Peter West and I received a presentation from Jakob Kinde about the potential for investment. We were aware that he was a director of this company and so he was not allowed to vote on the decision”. In his evidence to the Tribunal MF said that he had made a mistake in interview with the Commission as he had been aware that JK was a director but wasn’t aware that he was the sole director. He said that he remembered doing due diligence and the agreement to enter into the loan was made as part of a discussion between himself and PW. He said that carbon credits were discussed as part of the decision to enter into the agreement and were one of the reasons he considered it was a good investment for NTF. MF stated that he had done research on carbon credits as he was sceptical about them. He could not say whether he and PW had seen the Side Letter at the time that the Loan was approved but said that as his signature was on it he must have seen it.
iv. JK in his interview with the Commission referred to the Loan as a carbon credit deal. He said he was aware of his conflict and that is why he didn’t vote on it. He said although he was a director of CEIL he didn’t receive any benefit from the Loan because although he was a director he was “just a representative for a client”. He submitted despite the default the Loan was still a real benefit to NTF because part of the loan repayment was an amount of carbon credits. Surprisingly JK does not address the Loan within his witness statement. In his evidence to the Tribunal JK submitted that he had not been involved in the decision to grant the loan due to his conflict and that it was never the intention that he would receive a personal benefit from it. He maintained that the agreement represented good value for NTF as when the loan was cancelled in December 2021, NTF took control of the Shares and could have taken control of carbon credits with a significant value. As above JK also gave lengthy evidence relating the Side Letter. Throughout his evidence, due to the multiple roles he held in the organisations involved it was unclear which entity JK was referring to when he said “we”. When asked who was negotiating for CEIL said he was but variously said he was acting in the capacity of trustee for NTF and director of CEIL. He stated that MF had been involved in negotiating the repayment of the Loan.
95 Under this heading we make the following finding of fact, on the balance of probabilities, based on all the evidence before us:
i. We find that JK when seeking to obtain the Loan from NTF was required to give consideration to his duties as trustee of NTF and the best interests of NTF and he failed to do so. We find that JK required funds to complete a private transaction. We are satisfied he presented the Loan to NTF and convinced MF and PW to enter into it solely for his personal benefit to complete this transaction.
ii. We find that acquiring the Shares did not represent value for money for NTF as that value was never realised. Now that NTF is in administration, it is unlikely any value will be realised for the benefit of NTF in the future. The Tribunal was surprised at JK’s persistent submission, as an experiences business person that a defaulted loan and shares for which no value is likely to be realised represented value for money for NTF.
iii. We cannot be satisfied that the Side Letter formed part of the original Loan Agreement as this is contradicted by the entire arrangement clause within the Loan Agreement. We find that the Side Letter amounts to an agreement to agree which may not be enforceable. Whilst MF accepted that his signature appears on the Side Letter, the Tribunal noted that MF’s signature on the Side Letter is electronic and he appeared to display genuine surprise when presented with it. We find that JK was knowledgeable on the subject of carbon credits and knew or ought to have known that any entitlement to carbon credits for NTF was speculative. We find that JK misrepresented the nature of NTF’s potential entitlement to carbon credits, to the unconflicted trustees, in that it was represented to form part of any repayment of the Loan, in order to persuade them to enter into the Loan arrangement for his personal benefit. We further find that JK attempted to misrepresent the nature of NTF’s potential entitlement to carbon credits as forming part of any repayment of the Loan to the Commission.
iv. We find that MF and PW failed to do due diligence or carry out a risk assessment before approving the Loan and failed to take professional advice. We further find MF and PW failed to sufficiently assess whether entering into the Loan was in the best interests of NTF. We find they failed to secure value for money for NTF and there was no consideration as to whether those monies could have been used in another way which would have been of benefit to NTF’s beneficiaries.
v. We find that JK, MF and PW failed to manage the conflicts arising from entering into the Loan. JK submitted that he had negotiated with CEIL on behalf of NTF for repayment of the Loan. We find that as sole director of CEIL this would result in JK effectively negotiating with himself. We find the conflict of interest which arises from this could not fail to be apparent and are therefore satisfied that JK proceeded in full knowledge of the conflict of interest. We find that the decision to cancel the Loan resulted in a direct personal benefit to JK as a Director of CEIL. We further find that MF and PW relied almost entirely on the information provided to them by a conflicted trustee, JK, in reaching a decision as to whether to enter into the Loan. Further they permitted JK to “negotiate” with CEIL, a company of which he was the sole director, for repayment of the Loan.
vi. We find the above amounts to misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of NTF as a result of which NTF suffered a significant loss. We find in respect of JK that this conduct was deliberate and dishonest. We find in respect of MF and PW that this conduct was grossly negligent.
vii. For the sake of clarity, we find that CR was not involved in the decision to enter into the Loan.
Payments to Bo Blue Creative LTD
96 It is accepted that between 29 September 2022 and 28 February 2023 invoices totalling £55,608 (“the Invoices”) were issued to and paid by NTF to a marketing company called Bo Blue Creative Limited (“BBCL”).
97 It was accepted in oral evidence that BBCL were carrying out work for a group of companies: F&K Creative Limited (as it was then); F&K Renewables Limited (as it was then); and F&K Content (collectively “the F&K Brand”). JK and MF are Directors of F&K Creative Limited and F&K Renewables Limited. Fearnley & Kinde Limited, a company in which JK and MF each own 50% of the shares, is a person of significant control in F&K Creative Limited (as it was then) and F&K Renewables Limited. It is now accepted that the Invoices related to work done by BBCL for the F&K Brand.
98 It is accepted that BBCL had carried out work for NTF in the past. The Commission submits that the descriptions of the work within the Invoices were clear and that JK and MF were aware that NTF’s fund were being used to pay for work completed for JK and MF’s private companies.
99 JK was consistent in his evidence that MF was the lead on branding and marketing matters and he had not been aware that these payments had been made describing it as a “mistake” and “completely wrong”. PW and CR also submitted that they had no knowledge of BBCL or the Invoices.
100 MF accepted that he was the lead on marketing and the relationship with BBCL. In his interview with the Commission, MF stated that F&K Creative was a private company that did all its work for NTF and was “kind of a pseudonym” for NTF. In his evidence to the Tribunal, he accepted this was not correct and said that the invoices had been paid by NTF in error and this had not been picked up because BBCL was also doing work for NTF. He explained that there would be a meeting each week, with himself, JK and members of NTF staff where they would review NTF’s outstanding invoices to decide on which payments to prioritise etc. He submitted that they did not review each invoice in detail but instead had a list of invoices, which is how they had failed to identify the Invoices were not payable by NTF.
101 Under this heading we make the following finding of fact, on the balance of probabilities, based on all the evidence before us:
i. We find that payment of the Invoices was a mistake and not a deliberate attempt to misuse NTF funds.
ii. We find that the account given in interview by MF was dishonest. Whilst we appreciate that attending an interview is likely to be an unfamiliar and possibly stressful experience, we do not consider this would have the level of impact on a person’s ability to recall events needed to explain MF’s submission at that time that the F&K Brand was essentially another name for NTF. However, we consider the dishonesty resulted from panic and confusion upon a mistake being discovered which he was not aware of until that time. We find this amounts to misconduct and or mismanagement in the administration of NTF by MF.
iii. The Appellants failed to put in place a sufficient system of accounting for the approval and payment of invoices. They therefore failed to safeguard the property of NTF in breach of their duties as trustees. This failure is aggravated by the number of invoices which were mistakenly paid as a result. We find this failure amounts to misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF.
Benchmarking Report
102 On 03 November 2023, NTF’s legal representatives submitted a request to the Commission for permission for NTF to authorise payment of £5000 per month each to K&C and F&F. The basis of this request was that those payments were purportedly due to those companies under the BMA and BA. The request also stated, as part of the submissions as to why it was necessary for those payments to be made, that JK and MF “may wish to take their own legal advice on their rights as against the Charity and will not be in a position to do so without funds”.
103 It was necessary for NTF to seek approval from the Commission as an order made by the Commission pursuant to section 76(3)(f) of the 2011 Act was in place at this time. The Commission refused to approve the request as they had reviewed the BMA and BA and found them to be invalid. As such they submitted that to approve such payments would contravene charity law and prohibitions in NTFs governing document.
104 On 23 January 2024 the Commission wrote to NTF’s legal representatives acknowledging that NTF by that point (following the arrival of Mr Gordon) had sufficient trustees to allow for a valid decision to be made as to whether to enter into an agreement with K&C and/or F&F. However, they stated (emphasis ours):
“the Commission is not satisfied that the trustees have provided sufficient evidence to support the assertions that the agreements represent good value to the charity. There does not appear to be any form of benchmarking exercise, or consideration of another company[…].
We would therefore request that the non-conflicted trustees demonstrate how they have considered this and provide the supporting evidence before we would consider this request.
[…]
We are unsure why the Commission was provided with invoices for Kinde & Co and Fearnley & Fearnley. As we have stated previously, we consider the previous agreements to be invalid and it is our understanding that any new agreements that may be approved in line with the s76(3)(d) Order, would not be retrospective.”
105 In response to this request on 06 February 2024, NTF submitted the “Confidential Report prepared for the Charity Commission by Peter West, Carmen Rodney and Dean Gorson” (“the Benchmarking Report”).
106 Paragraph 1.4 of the Benchmarking Report states:
“The process of preparing this note has taken place outside of the Company’s usual board meetings and we have established a separate committee of the non-conflicted trustees for this purpose”
107 Further paragraph 2.2 of the Benchmarking Report states:
“[…] JK and MF has a personal interest which conflicts with their professional duties as trustees. Accordingly, they have been excluded from the decision-making process outlined below and have not participated in the preparation of this note. The decision is made by the three non-conflicted trustees only.”
108 All Appellants gave conflicting evidence on this topic. MF maintained he was not involved in preparing the Benchmarking Report.
109 PW’s evidence to the Tribunal was consistent with the account he gave during his interview with the Commission in that he maintained he had little to no involvement with benchmarking exercise or the preparation of the Benchmarking Report and he believed JK and MF were leading on it. In interview he stated “I didn’t go through the details enough or I didn’t pay attention to it. And I should have done with hindsight. I just let them get on with it and trusted them” and accepted in his evidence to the Tribunal that the paragraph 2.2 of the Benchmarking Report was misleading.
110 JK’s evidence was inconsistent. Whilst in his interview with the Commission he stated he was only involved in the research, in evidence to the Tribunal, he stated he was involved in research, providing information and comments to legal representatives.
111 CR also gave contradictory evidence on this topic saying in her interview that all of the trustees had participated in preparing the Benchmarking Report but submitting in her oral evidence that JK and MF were not involved. When it was put to her that JK had accepted some involvement in its preparation she clarified that she had meant not involved in writing the Benchmarking Report and explained that due to personal circumstances she had experienced in 2024, she may struggle to recall things which occurred in that period accurately.
112 On this allegation no affirmative submissions could be made by Mr West on behalf of the Appellants as it was not possible for him to resolve the conflict between the Appellants’ evidence.
113 Under this heading we make the following finding of fact, on the balance of probabilities, based on all the evidence before us:
i. We are satisfied that JK was involved with the benchmarking exercise and the preparation of the Benchmarking Report. Moreover, we find he led on this project.
ii. We are not satisfied we can conclude that MF was involved in the benchmarking exercise or the preparation of the Benchmarking Report.
iii. We find that PW and CR had little input into the preparation of or decision making surrounding the Benchmarking Report and simply approved it on the basis of trust without seeking to understand its contents, its impact on NTF or whether it was in NTF’s best interest. We find this is a breach of their duties as trustee and a failure to safeguard NTF’s property and its beneficiaries.
iv. We find that the Benchmarking Report was not undertaken with the intention of ensuring that value for money was achieved for the charity. We find that the benchmarking report was prepared with the sole purpose of trying to restart payments to JK and MF, regardless of whether this represented value for money or was in the best interests of the charity.
v. We find that find that the Benchmarking Report was an attempt to deceive the Commission for the personal benefit of JK and MF. The Benchmarking Report explicitly confirmed that the conflicted trustees had not participated in the preparation of this note and this was not true as admitted by JK in his own evidence. We find that JK orchestrated this attempt and PW and CR by approving the report were complicit in the same.
vi. We are satisfied the above amounts to misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF by JK, PW and CR.
Expenses
114 Clause 6.6 of NTF’s Memorandum of Association provides for payment from NTF for any “Trustee’s reasonable out of pocket expenses”. Section 12 of NTF’s Articles of association states that trustees “may be paid all reasonable travelling, hotel and other expenses properly incurred by them in connection with their attendance at meetings of trustees or committees of trustees or general meetings or otherwise in remuneration.”
115 The Commission has published guidance for charities regarding trustee expenses and payments. It is accepted that trustees are entitled to claim reasonable, legitimate expenses incurred while engaged on trustee business. The Commission’s guidance makes clear that expense claims should be supported by bills or receipts and it is good practice for a charity to have an expenses policy.
116 The Commission reviewed statements from NTF’s Metro bank account and identified debits covering expenses and other payments to the Appellants, K&C and F&F, between 01 May 2020 and 11 April 2023 of £154,303 in total:
These amounts are not disputed.
117 The Appellants accepted that an agreement had been reached whereby each trustee would claim a round sum of £1000 per month for expenses. They accepted that receipts were not provided for expenses up to that amount. Despite all the Appellants accepting they were aware that an expenses policy should have been in place, they all agreed that this approach was taken for the sake of convenience with PW stating he didn’t want to “bother with receipts” because he didn’t want to “get bogged down with it”. MF and CR both submitted that the agreement had been in place prior to their respective appointments but accepted that neither had challenged it. The Appellants submitted they were operating through a period of rapid growth and as a result some mistakes may have been made. They all accepted that in hindsight they should have put an expenses policy in place.
118 All of the trustees submitted they considered £1000 a month to be a reasonable amount and suggested that it was probably an underestimation of the amount actually incurred by them with PW stating he was probably “out of pocket”. Whilst all Appellants confirmed they understood that the role of trustee is voluntary role, their accounts of what the £1000 was intended to cover were not consistent. PW referred to it as a “retainer” and CR confirmed she considered it encompassed expenses and remuneration and that she had reported it for tax purposes.
119 It was accepted that JK and MF held the bank cards for NTF. In his evidence JK submitted that the expenses incurred by NTF over and above the £1000 round sum were business expenses, largely relating to client meetings at restaurants. JK was unable to give a clear answer as to whether these expenses had been incurred whilst acting as a trustee of NTF or as Director of K&C.
120 No expense policy has been provided to the Tribunal. No receipts or other documentary evidence was put before the Tribunal to demonstrate that the round figure sums or those over and above the £1000 per month were reasonable and had been legitimately incurred by the Appellants in the course of their role as trustees of NTF.
121 Under this heading we make the following finding of fact, on the balance of probabilities, based on all the evidence before us:
i. We find that JK and MF were each accepting £1000 in round sum allowances per month whilst simultaneously using NTF’s funds to pay for meals and other items and they have failed to evidence that those items were legitimate expenses.
ii. We find that the Appellants considered the round sum expenses as a retainer or salary and they knew or ought to have known that this was not permitted.
iii. We find that all of the Appellants were aware of what was legally required of them in respect of expenses and yet chose to implement and/or receive round sum allowances to which they have not evidenced they were entitled.
iv. We find that the failure to have an expenses policy in places is a failure to safeguard the interests of the charity and breach of the Appellants’ duty as trustees. We further find the Appellants failed to act in NTF’s best interests by ensuring that expenses were reasonable and properly supported by evidence to demonstrate their legitimacy.
v. We find that by having a round sum of money paid out to each Trustee regardless of what expenses were actually incurred amounts to all Trustees receiving remuneration at some point, resulting in the entire board receiving remuneration further discrediting the assertion that there was a misunderstanding that the majority of trustees were not receiving remuneration.
vi. We find that the above amounts to misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF and that all Appellants, by accepting remuneration in this manner, were responsible for it.
vii. We find that this amounts to dishonest conduct on behalf of JK and PW. We find that this amounts to a reckless disregard for charity law on behalf of MF and CR.
Failure to file accounts
122 It is accepted by the Appellants that there was a failure to file NTF’s financial information for Financial Year Ends 2021 and 2022 on time. On 12 February 2024, the Commission’s Inquiry issued an order pursuant to section 84 of the 2011 Act to the Appellants requiring them to submit the outstanding financial information by 08 March 2024 (“the s.84 Order”). It is also accepted that the Appellants failed to comply with the s.84 Order.
123 The due dates and filing dates are as follows:
| FYE | Due Date | Filing Date | Days Late |
| 21 December 2021 | 21 October 2022 | 05 May 2023 | 196 |
| 20 November 2022 | 30 September 2023 | 09 April 2024 | 192 |
124 All of the Appellants submitted that the failure to file was not their fault but a result of being let down by third parties. JK said they were trying everything they could and that the delay was the fault of the auditors. The Commission challenged this submitting that the Appellants had only provided evidence of correspondence on this topic covering a short period but in any event that “snapshot” was sufficient to show that the Appellants had contributed to the delay by not responding to queries from the auditors and not providing them with requested information.
125 It was put to JK that the failure to file financial information in time prevented the Commission from identifying the financial irregularities sooner and that this may have been intentional. JK denied this.
126 Under this heading we make the following finding of fact, on the balance of probabilities, based on all the evidence before us:
i. All the Appellants were responsible for failure to file NTF’s financial information for FYE 2021 and FYE 2022 in breach of the statutory deadlines and the s.84 Order. Whilst it is accepted that JK was the financial lead in NTF, PW and CR’s submission that this was not their area of responsibility is not accepted. As trustees they are unable to abdicate their legal obligations and duties.
ii. The Appellants have failed, despite having ample opportunity to do so, to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the Tribunal that the failure to file NTF’s financial information on time was as a result of failings by third party professional. There is clear evidence before the Tribunal that the actions or inactions of the Appellants contributed to the delay and resulting failure
iii. We find this amounts to misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF for which all Appellants are responsible.
127 We make no finding as to whether the failure to file financial information was a deliberate attempt to conceal the financial state of NTF or the unauthorised trustee remuneration payments. However, we note that had the financial information been filed sooner, it is likely that the Commission may have identified concerns and commenced an inquiry sooner. This in turn may have resulted in fewer unauthorised payments being made to JK and MF and their respective companies.
Payments made after section 76 order and the Addendum
128 Section 76 of the 2011 Act operates to provide the Commission with powers to safeguard a charity’s property following the opening of an inquiry.
129 It is an accepted fact that on 10 October 2023 the Commission made an order pursuant to section 76(3)(f) of the 2011 Act preventing the Appellants from entering into transactions in the administration of NTF without written consent of the Commission (“the s.76 order”). It is also accepted that the following payments were made from a bank account held by NTH, which at the time held NTF’s funds, in breach of the s.76 order:
i. 29 May 2024 – £45,000 each to K&C and F&F
ii. 06 June 2024 – £25,000 each to K&C and F&F
130 Within their witness statements JK and MF submitted that they were advised, by one of the administrators appointed to NTF, John Dickinson, that they were able to make these payments due to NTF entering administration. They acknowledged that the payments were made in breach of the s.76 order but submitted they have erred only in making the payments too early. During his oral evidence JK maintained this position. When asked whether it was likely a person with Mr Dickinson’s considerable experience in insolvency would have advised it was ok to make these payments, JK stated, “this is what I heard, yes” and went on to say they had not told Mr Dickinson of the dates they intended to make the payments. JK confirmed that these sums were for management fees payable under the BA.
131 MF in his oral evidence stated that Mr Dickinson had advised that the s.76 order would be discharged once NTF entered administration, that at the time the impression given was that they could make the payments but accepted “no administrator would have said that which makes me think we got it wrong”.
132 JK was clear in his evidence that he would still have proceeded to make these payments to himself with his only concession being that they should have been made later after the section 76 order was lifted. MF in his evidence stated that in hindsight he accepts those payments should not have been made at all.
133 Further the Addendum which purports that ownership of NTH shall “stay” in the ownership of JK and MF (or their nominated companies) in the event that NTF enters into administration (amongst other things) was signed during the operational period of the s.76 order.
134 When asked by the Commission, MF confirmed that he had never owned NTH and could not explain why the Addendum suggested otherwise but accepted that he had signed it. His evidence was that it had been JK’s idea to add the Addendum with the intention that some part of NTF could carry on as a service company to other charities if NTF should fail. When asked during his interview with the Commission, around one month after the Addendum was signed and prior to the Commission being aware that the Addendum existed, he had reassured the Commission that it was the intention that NTF would continue to own NTH. MF accepted that the Addendum was wrong as it was not the intention that NTH would be owned by JK and MF.
135 In his evidence JK said that he had never denied making mistakes and understood that the language of the Addendum could have been clearer. He stated that administration was not looking like a real possibility at the time the Addendum was created and they had hoped NTF would carry on. He stated that the intention of the Addendum was to try to rescue something from the charity for the sake of the beneficiaries if NTF failed. JK accepted that MF had never had ownership of NTH but submitted that there was possibly more information relating to ownership of NTH within updated versions of the BMA and BA which were not before the Tribunal. He gave conflicting evidence as to whether rent payments due to NTF were still being made to NTH’s account.
136 JK relied on correspondence from The Insolvency Service which he said confirmed their investigation had concluded, they were taking no further action and that everything had been legally sound. This correspondence was provided to the Tribunal at the beginning of day 2 of the hearing. This correspondence does confirm that the Secretary of State does not propose to take disqualification proceedings against JK but does not go further than this.
137 We make no findings as to whether there has been any breach of insolvency or company law as to do so is beyond our jurisdiction. Nevertheless, must consider these issues in the context of the breaches of the section 76 order and the duty to act in the best interests of the charity.
138 Under this heading we make the following findings of fact on the balance of probabilities based on all the evidence before us:
i. We find that NTH was an asset with value to NTF. All assets within NTH should have been held for the benefit of NTF, even during any resulting administration of NTF.
ii. We find that whilst not a legal professional, JK is an individual with extensive experience of corporate finance and company law, who would have been aware of the basic, fundamental rules regarding the management of assets of a company or charity during insolvency.
iii. We find that JK and MF were both aware of the prohibitions within the s.76 order.
iv. We find that John Dickinson did not advise JK and MF that it was legal to make the payments of totalling £70,000 each to K&C and F&F. We accept John Dickinson may have advised that the s.76 order would be discharged upon NTF entering administration.
v. We therefore find that JK and MF authorised those payments to their own companies in the knowledge that they were made in breach of the s.76 order and without any regard to the best interests of the charity which at this point was about to enter administration and only to personally enrich their own connected companies.
vi. We find this amounts to serious misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF and both JK and MF were responsible for this.
vii. We find that the creation of the Addendum was a deliberate attempt to divert NTH, a resource of NTF, away from NTF by JK and MF upon NTF’s future financial outlook becoming clear in breach of charity law.
viii. We find this amounts to serious misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF and both JK and MF were responsible for this.
ix. We find that PW and CR were not a party to either the payments or the Addendum.
H. Discussions and Conclusions
139 We now turn to consider the statutory test as it applies to each Appellant in light of the findings made above. Our findings in respect of each Appellant are set out under separate headings below.
140 In reaching our conclusions there are a number of questions we must answer in respect of each Appellant:
i. Were they a trustee, charity trustee, officer, agent or employee of a charity at a time when there was misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the charity?
ii. Were they:
a) the person responsible for the misconduct or mismanagement;
b) a person who knew of the misconduct or mismanagement and failed to take any reasonable steps to oppose it; or
c) a person whose conduct contributed or facilitated the misconduct or mismanagement?
iii. Are they a person who is unfit to be a charity trustee or a trustee for a charity?
iv. Is making a disqualification order desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence in charities generally or in the charities or classes of charity specified or described in the order?
141 If we consider the answers to all of the above questions is yes, we then must ask ourselves what is the proportionate period for which they should be disqualified.
142 When considering proportionality, we must take into account a number of factors including but not limited to the circumstances surrounding the misconduct or mismanagement, the persons culpability; the level of risk posed to charities and whether that risk is ongoing.
143 The Commission’s published guidance provides that when considering what is a proportionate period of disqualification in any case the Commission uses three bands as a reference. These are:
i. The Upper Band (over 10 years and up to 15 years) – This is reserved for particularly serious cases and the guidance provides a list of factors which if present would denote this level of seriousness. It is important to note that these factors do not exclusively require dishonesty or fraudulent conduct giving rise to damage to a charity or its reputation but also include reckless or grossly negligent behaviour.
ii. The Middle Band (5 to 10 years) – This band applies to serious cases where the person’s culpability or the risk or loss to charity is serious but not so serious to justify consideration of the upper band.
iii. The lower band (less than 5 years) – This band applied to cases where the test to disqualify is met but a relatively short period of disqualification is proportionate when considering the level of: damage or loss caused to the charity or charities; the persons level of knowledge or culpability; and the risk posed but the person to a charity or charity and the subsequent threat to public trust and confidence.
144 The guidance also contains a helpful, non-exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances which may be taken into account when determining the proportionate period of disqualification.
I. Discussion and Conclusions – FT.CA.2025.024 – JK
145 Our discussions and conclusions under this heading relate to the statutory test as it applies to JK.
146 We start by confirming that JK was a trustee of NTF at all material times and crucially at a time when there was misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF as set out above.
147 We are satisfied as detailed above that JK was responsible for misconduct or mismanagement in relation to:
i. the overall financial management of NTF;
ii. failing to effectively manage the conflicts of interest when attempting to enter into the BMA and BA;
iii. attempting to deceive the Commission into believing that the BMA and BA had been entered into lawfully by the requisite number of trustees;
iv. unlawfully authorising significant payments to himself and MF as management fees and discretionary payments under the invalid BMA and BA;
v. failing to manage the conflict of interest around and receiving an unauthorised benefit from the Loan to CEIL;
vi. attempting to deceive and mislead the Commission into believing that he was not involved in the preparation of the Benchmarking Report, which if approved may have allowed him to receive personal benefits from NTF’s funds;
vii. using NTF’s bank card to pay for meals and other items not supported by evidence that they were expenses legitimately incurred;
viii. dishonestly and unlawfully authorising payments of £70,000 each to his and MF’s companies in breach of the s.76 Order; and
ix. dishonestly and unlawfully attempting to remove a valuable asset, namely NTH, from NTF for his own personal benefit in breach of the s.76 order.
148 We are satisfied as detailed above that JK contributed to or facilitated misconduct or mismanagement insofar as:
i. failure to file NTF’s financial information for FYE 2021 and FYE 2022 in breach of the statutory deadlines and the s.84 Order;
ii. failure to have a policy in place to effectively manage conflicts of interest;
iii. failure to have an expenses policy in place which safeguarded the interests of NTF;
iv. failure to ensure expenses claimed were properly supported by evidence; and
v. failure to ensure a process of accounting with sufficient safeguards was in place to protect NTF property.
149 We must now decide whether JK is unfit to be a trustee or trustee for a charity. The Tribunal has found that JK consistently and repeatedly failed to act with honesty and integrity. Beyond the specific findings of dishonesty set out above the Tribunal also considered JK’s evidence to the Tribunal was inconsistent and evasive. He made repeated reference to additional documents which he said supported his evidence but which were not before the Tribunal. JK is legally represented and the Parties were given sufficient time to gather and submit the evidence on which they intended to rely. We consider these references to additional evidence were part of JK’s persistent attempts to evade answering questions put to him by the Commission and the Tribunal.
150 Further JK has repeatedly failed to, and demonstrated they are unwilling to, comply with their trustee duties by: failing to act in NTF’s best interests; failing to act in compliance with charity law and NTF’s governing documents; and having a wilful disregard for the management of conflicts of interest.
151 Further we find that JK has exploited a position of trust as a trustee of a charity in general and as the trustee with primary responsibility of NTF’s finances. We consider JK knew the influence he had over the other trustees and the trust they placed in him. He then used this trust to avoid scrutiny and facilitate the approval of decisions which provided significant personal benefit to him.
152 We found that JK used NTF as a vehicle for personal financial benefit and consider his evidence demonstrated that his primary motivation was personal gain. This was clearly evident from his submissions that they had chosen not to comply with charity law by waiting to have a sufficient number of trustees before attempting to enter into the BMA and BA because he “needed the money”. Further even at a time when NTF was facing imminent administration, JK took steps to remove further significant sums from money held on trust for NTF and his only concession on this point is that the payments were made “too early”.
153 Throughout his evidence it was unclear in what capacity JK was acting at any given time: trustee of NTF, Director of NTH, Director of K&C or Director of CEIL. It was clear during his evidence to the Tribunal that JK did not understand the distinctions or why it was important to make the distinctions between his various roles. He referred to NTF throughout as a company with a high-risk model, with no acknowledgement that it may not have been in the interests of NTF to operate at that risk level.
154 We do not consider JK displayed any genuine remorse for impact of NTF’s failure on its beneficiaries. Whilst JK expressed disappointment that NTF had ultimately failed, beyond making general statements that accepted some mistakes were made JK failed to acknowledge any fault on his part or accept any accountability for this in any meaningful way. JK showed no reflection on the impact of the high-risk operational strategy nor the impact of himself and MF receiving significant sums from NTS and maintained throughout that NTF’s failure had all been beyond his control and the fault of external actors.
155 We find that JK presents an ongoing risk of misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of charities. Therefore, we conclude that JK is unfit to be a charity trustee or trustee for a charity in relation to all charities. We further conclude that JK is also unfit to hold an office or employment in a charity with senior management functions.
156 We then move to determine whether the imposition of a disqualification order is desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence. We are satisfied this is the case. The instances of misconduct or mismanagement set out above allowed JK to misappropriate almost £1million in NTF funds. This is damaging to the public reputation of NTF and the public’s trust and confidence in charities in general. There are no factors before us which we consider weigh against the presumption that it is desirable in the public interest to impose a disqualification order on JK. Given the nature and seriousness of the misconduct and mismanagement for which JK bears some of the responsibility we conclude it is necessary to protect public trust and confidence in charities that a disqualification order be made.
157 Overall, we are satisfied, as a matter of discretion that it is was appropriate for a disqualification order to be made against JK.
158 We now turn to consider the proportionate duration of JK’s disqualification order. We consider that the misconduct or mismanagement which we have found JK was responsible for is so serious that it warrants a disqualification in the Upper Band. There are also a significant number of aggravating features present including: the persistent and deliberate misconduct or mismanagement; the persistent disregard for compliance with charity law, the resulting financial loss to NTF and the attempts to mislead the Commission. JK displayed a concerning lack of reflection on his actions and their impact on NTF. He repeatedly blamed multiple professionals and did not meaningfully accept any personal responsibility.
159 We find in JK’s case there are there are no mitigating features present that would suggest a shorter period of disqualification should be considered. Whilst it is true that JK made a self-report to the Commission this was only done after the MoMs report from NTF’s auditors was submitted and the contents of the self-report were misleading. We are therefore satisfied that JK’s misconduct was so egregious as to warrant the maximum period of disqualification available. This is a statutory maximum and the imposition of that period is not an indication that this is the most serious example of misconduct conceivable to the Tribunal, rather it is a course of misconduct or mismanagement when taken in the context of all the circumstances of this case, sufficient to meet the test necessary to warrant it. Indeed, the seriousness of JK’s misconduct and mismanagement and the ongoing risk he presents to charities is such that if the power were available, the Tribunal may have given serious consideration as to whether a longer period of disqualification beyond the 15 years was appropriate.
160 We do not consider that disqualifying JK for this period will have a disproportionately adverse effect on his reputation; the importance of protecting the charitable sector from dishonest and fraudulent conduct far outweighs the impact on a person responsible for the same’s reputations. Further we do not consider that there will be any adverse interest on NTF’s beneficiaries as NTF is now in administration and even if that were not the case, JK has consistently and deliberately failed to administer NTF with the best interests of its beneficiaries taking primacy.
161 For all of the reasons set out above, and having considered all of the evidence and submissions, we are satisfied the statutory criteria for disqualifying JK from being a charity trustee or trustee for a charity are met. We are also satisfied that the maximum period of 15 years is the appropriate length of disqualification. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
J. Discussions and Conclusions – FT.CA.2026.0016 – MF
162 Our discussions and conclusions under this heading relate to the statutory test as it applies to MF.
163 We start by confirming that MF was a trustee of NTF at all material times and crucially at a time when there was misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF as set out above.
164 The Tribunal is satisfied that MF was responsible for misconduct or mismanagement in relation to:
i. failing to effectively manage the conflict of interest when attempting to enter into the BMA and BA;
ii. unlawfully authorising significant payments to himself and JK as management fees and discretionary payments under the invalid BMA and BA;
iii. failing to manage the conflict of interest around the granting of the Loan to CEIL;
iv. using NTF’s bank card to pay for meals and other items not supported by evidence that they were legitimately incurred expenses;
v. dishonestly and unlawfully authorising payments of £70,000 each to his and JK’s companies in breach of the s.76 Order;
vi. dishonestly and unlawfully attempting to remove a valuable asset, namely NTH from NTF, for his own personal benefit in breach of the s.76 order; and
vii. failing to familiarise himself with NTF’s governing documents and his legal duties as a trustee upon being appointed.
165 We are satisfied as detailed above that MF contributed to or facilitated misconduct or mismanagement insofar as:
i. failure to file NTF’s financial information for FYE 2021 and FYE 2022 in breach of the statutory deadlines and the s.84 Order;
ii. failure to have a policy in place to effectively manage conflicts of interest;
iii. failure to have an expenses policy in place which safeguarded the interests of NTF;
iv. failure to ensure expenses claimed were properly supported by evidence; and
v. failure to ensure a process of accounting with sufficient safeguards was in place to protect NTF property.
166 We must now decide whether MF is unfit to be a trustee or trustee for a charity. The Tribunal has found that MF consistently and repeatedly failed to act with integrity. We are satisfied he has gained significant personal financial gain to the detriment of the charity. Further MF has been grossly negligent in ensuring he was complying with NTF’s governing documents and charity law. MF submitted that he is unfamiliar with charity law but we do not find this to be an acceptable position for a trustee to rely on. These were not significantly complex or nuanced principles but fundamentals of both company and charity law which are easily accessible. Therefore, we conclude that MF is unfit to be a charity trustee or trustee for a charity in relation to all charities. We further conclude that MF is also unfit to hold an office or employment in a charity with senior management functions.
167 We then move to determine whether the imposition of a disqualification order on MF is desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence. We are satisfied this is the case. The instances of misconduct or mismanagement set out above allowed MF to misappropriate almost £1million in NTF funds which is damaging to the public reputation of NTF and the public’s trust and confidence in charities in general. Public trust and confidence in charities would be seriously eroded if such misconduct did not result in the imposition of a disqualification order. There are no factors before us which we consider weigh against the presumption that it is desirable in the public interest to impose a disqualification order on MF.
168 Overall, we are satisfied, as a matter of discretion, that the criteria for disqualifying MF from being a charity trustee or trustee for a charity are met and that it is was appropriate as a matter of discretion for a disqualification order to be made against MF.
169 We now turn to consider the proportionate duration of MF’s disqualification order. We find that the misconduct or mismanagement which we have found MF was responsible for is so serious that it warrants a disqualification in the Upper Band. There are also a significant number of aggravating features present including: the persistent and deliberate or grossly negligent misconduct or mismanagement; the persistent disregard for compliance with charity law, the resulting financial loss to NTF, the evidence of MF’s inability to discharge the duties of a trustee and the significant personal gain to MF
170 However, whilst we do not minimise the seriousness of MF’s conduct we find in MF’s case there are there are some mitigating features present that would suggest a shorter period of disqualification should be considered. MF‘s primary day-to-day function within NTF related to branding and marketing and whilst he had duties as a trustee in relation to the management of NTF’s finances, he was not the trustee who took the lead on finances. Further and most importantly MF was the only Appellant who showed any meaningful indication that they had reflected on their errors and appreciated the seriousness of the misconduct or mismanagement and its impact on NTF. Not least, he appeared to us to be the only trustee that could identify the errors that were made and fully understood what those errors were. We consider that MF displayed genuine remorse for his actions and as a result we consider the future risk he poses to charities in general is reduced. Due to the seriousness of the misconduct, we do not consider however that this mitigation is such as to warrant a disqualification outside the upper band. We consider the proportionate period of disqualification for MF is 12 years.
171 Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in part. We substitute “a period of 12 years” in paragraph 2 of the Disqualification Order dated 04 September 2025
K. Discussions and Conclusions – FT.CA.2026.0017 – PW
172 Our discussions and conclusions under this heading relate to the statutory test as it applies to PW.
173 We start by confirming that PW was a trustee of NTF at all material times and crucially at a time when there was misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of NTF as set out above.
174 The Tribunal is satisfied that PW was responsible for misconduct or mismanagement in relation to:
i. failing to effectively manage the conflict of interest when attempting to enter into the BMA and BA;
ii. failing to manage the conflict of interest around the granting of the Loan to CEIL;
175 We are also satisfied as detailed above that PW knew of misconduct or mismanagement and failed to take any reasonable steps to oppose it insofar as he failed to prevent JK and MF unlawfully authorising significant payments to themselves as management fees and discretionary payments under the invalid BMA and BA;
176 We are further satisfied as detailed above that PW contributed to or facilitated misconduct or mismanagement insofar as:
i. failure to file NTF’s financial information for FYE 2021 and FYE 2022 in breach of the statutory deadlines and the s.84 Order;
ii. failure to have a policy in place to effectively manage conflicts of interest;
iii. failure to have an expenses policy in place which safeguarded the interests of NTF;
iv. failure to ensure expenses claimed were properly supported by evidence; and
v. failure to ensure a process of accounting with sufficient safeguards was in place to protect NTF property.
177 We must now decide whether PW is unfit to be a trustee or trustee for a charity. Thomas West submitted on behalf of PW that he should be judged on what he knew, we disagree with this submission and consider the pertinent question is what he should have known. Although we have made no explicit findings that PW has acted dishonestly in the administration of NTF, we are satisfied that he has failed to act with integrity. PW by his own admission has displayed a complete, wilful abrogation of responsibility by having a complete disregard for his trustee duties. Further his grossly negligent failure to act has enabled others to engage in inappropriate behaviour which resulted in a significant financial loss to NTF.
178 PW is a person with extensive experience within the charitable sector. As such his significant failures to comply with trustee duties and to manage NTF’s resources responsibly is almost beyond comprehension. The number of instances of misconduct or mismanagement that occurred during his tenure as an experienced trustee demonstrates the extent to which he divorced himself from his responsibilities. Whilst PW was incredibly candid throughout the Commission’s investigations and his evidence to the Tribunal, we find the attitude he exhibited supported the comment in the Interim Managers report that he displayed a “surprisingly dismissive attitude towards charity governance and legal matters”. We consider that if PW conducts himself in this way, without any meaningful oversight, during his involvement with other charities, it is an instance of sheer luck that those other charities have not also experienced problems, which must be as a result of the integrity of the other trustees of those charities. Whilst PW may be influential and have the intention to act in the best interests of a charity, he is not competent or willing to provide the necessary scrutiny or financial oversight to be an effective trustee. Even at the Hearing, PW was insistent that all payments made to JK, MF and their connected companies represented good value for the charity despite having no idea what work they had done or whether it represented fair market value.
179 Finally, it is not the case that PW was only a passive bystander to the misconduct or mismanagement, he gained a personal financial benefit from the failure to have a system in place to ensure that trustee expenses were legitimately incurred. At one point he told the Tribunal that he was sure he had incurred far more than the £1000 he was claiming by, amongst other things, ‘sending numerous emails’. This demonstrates his lack of understanding as to what can legitimately be claimed as an expense and to distinguish it with work which should be undertaken in a voluntary capacity as a trustee, which if compensated for would constitute remuneration.
180 Therefore, we conclude that PW is unfit to be a charity trustee or trustee for a charity in relation to all charities. We further conclude that PW is unfit to hold an office or employment in a charity with senior management functions.
181 We then move to determine whether the imposition of a disqualification order is desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence. Given the nature and seriousness of the misconduct or mismanagement for which PW bears some responsibility and his failure to meaningfully reflect on the impact of his actions or inactions we are satisfied this is the case.
182 We now turn to consider the proportionate duration of PW’s disqualification order. We find that the misconduct or mismanagement is so serious that it warrants a disqualification at the upper limit of the middle band. We find that PW’s grossly negligent disregard for compliance with charity law demonstrates he poses a serious ongoing risk to charities in general which in turn, given his involvement in other charities, poses a serious threat to public trust and confidence in charities. PW stated that he had no regrets, would do the same again and was doing the same in another charity in which he was involved. We find he has failed to reflect on the mistakes made in any meaningful way. Whilst we accept that PW is passionate about the work of charities and his conduct is more reckless than dishonest, we do not find there are any mitigating features that persuade us a shorter period of disqualification would be appropriate. We are satisfied that a period of disqualification of 10 years is proportionate.
183 For all of the reasons set out above, and having considered all of the evidence and submissions, we are satisfied the statutory criteria for disqualifying PW from being a charity trustee or trustee for a charity are met. We are also satisfied that the appropriate length of disqualification is 10 years. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
L. Discussions and Conclusions – FT.CA.2026.0019 – CR
184 Our discussions and conclusions under this heading relate to the statutory test as it applies to CR.
185 We start by confirming that CR was a trustee of NTF at a time when there was misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of NTF as set out above.
186 We are satisfied as detailed above that CR knew of misconduct or mismanagement and failed to take any reasonable steps to oppose it insofar as:
i. Failed to prevent JK and MF unlawfully authorising significant payments to themselves as management fees and discretionary payments under the invalid BMA and BA;
187 We are further satisfied as detailed above that PW contributed to or facilitated misconduct or mismanagement insofar as:
i. failure to file NTF’s financial information for FYE 2021 and FYE 2022 in breach of the statutory deadlines and the s.84 Order;
ii. failure to have a policy in place to effectively manage conflicts of interest;
iii. failure to have an expenses policy in place which safeguarded the interests of NTF;
iv. failure to ensure expenses claimed were properly supported by evidence; and
v. failure to ensure a process of accounting with sufficient safeguards was in place to protect NTF property.
188 We must now decide whether CR is unfit to be a trustee or trustee for a charity. As with PW, Thomas West submitted that we should consider what CR knew but again we consider the pertinent question is what she should have known. We consider that CR failed to demonstrate competence to comply with the duties and responsibilities of a trustee to a reasonable standard. Further her failure to comply has enabled other to engage in inappropriate conduct. Throughout the Commission’s investigations and her evidence to the Tribunal, CR maintained that she had acted on trust and did not acknowledge or reflect that this was not sufficient to safeguard the interests of NTF and their beneficiaries. CR spoke at length about her experience as a School Governor. When asked by the Tribunal whether she would take on trust what she was told in relation to the background of a person coming into a school, she went into detail about how this would be inappropriate and the checks that should always be carried out to protect vulnerable children. However, she appeared to lack any understanding of or accept any responsibility for the equivalent controls which are required for a charity with vulnerable beneficiaries such as NTF. CR’s evidence to the Tribunal was conflicting and confusing. Whilst we accept that she was struggling to recall some events due to her personal circumstances, it appeared at times that she was more concerned with protecting JK and MF than protecting NTF’s assets. She was consistent and insistent that she had acted on trust and that the payments to JK and MF seemed reasonable without having carried out any assessment of what they were doing or whether it was fair market value for the charity.
189 We therefore conclude that CR is unfit to be a charity trustee or trustee for a charity in relation to all charities. We further conclude that CR is unfit to hold an office or employment in a charity with senior management functions.
190 We then move to determine whether the imposition of a disqualification order is desirable in the public interest in order to protect public trust and confidence. Given the nature and seriousness of the misconduct or mismanagement for which CR bears some responsibility and her failure to meaningfully reflect on the impact of her actions or inactions, we are satisfied this is the case. We were provided with no evidence that CR would act differently in future and are concerned with the lack of comprehension and acknowledgement, despite all of the evidence presented, JK and MF acted unlawfully.
191 We now turn to consider the proportionate duration of PW’s disqualification order. We find that the misconduct or mismanagement is so serious that it does not warrant a disqualification in the lower band. We consider that a disqualification in the middle band is proportionate due to: the risk posed to charities by CR; the disregard shown for compliance with charity law and the duties of trustees; and the loss to the charity caused by the misconduct or mismanagement.
192 For all of the reasons set out above, and having considered all of the evidence and submissions, we are satisfied the statutory criteria for disqualifying CR from being a charity trustee or trustee for a charity are met. We are also satisfied that the appropriate length of disqualification is 6 years. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
Signed Judge Arnell Date: 29 October 2026
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