Miscellaneous United Kingdom

MARSHALL GROUP AB v OWGH LIMITED

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2753 (IPEC)

Case No: IP-2025-000081

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENTERPRISE COURT

Rolls Building

Fetter Lane

London, EC4A 1NL

30 October 2026

Before :

MISS CHARLOTTE MAY KC

(Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between:

(1)
MARSHALL GROUP AB
(2)
MARSHALL AMPLIFICATION PLC
Claimants
– and –
OWGH LIMITED Defendant

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Mr Theo Barclay (instructed by Stobbs IP Limited) for the Claimants

The Defendant did not appear and was not represented

Hearing date: 2nd October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

APPROVED JUDGMENT

I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic. This judgment was handed down by the judge remotely by circulation to the parties’ representatives by e-mail and release to The National Archives. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10.30am on 30 October 2026.

Miss Charlotte May KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge):

introduction

1. By this action, the Claimants sue the Defendant for infringement of the following UK registered trade marks (collectively referred to as “the Trade Marks”):

Trade Mark Classes and Illustrative Goods Registration Number Registration Date
MARSHALL [word] 9, 14, 20, 21
Including inter alia “headphones”
UK00914378533 17 July 2020
3, 6-9, 11, 14-16, 20, 21, 24, 26-28, 32-35, 38, 41-43
Including inter alia “headphones” and “retail services in relation to…headphones”
UK00003228255 29 March 2019
MAJOR [word] 9, 25, including inter alia “headphones” UK00913971759 02 February 2017

2. The Trade Marks are registered in the name of the Second Claimant. The First Claimant is the Second Claimant’s UK licensee. Infringement is alleged pursuant to s.10(1) and/or s.10(2) Trade Marks Act 1994 (TMA), although the pleaded case under s.10(2) TMA was not specifically addressed in evidence or argument at trial. As will be apparent below, it is sufficient for me to address the case under s.10(1) TMA.

3. The acts of the Defendant about which complaint is made concern the offer for sale and sale of MARSHALL-branded headphones on Amazon UK. There is no dispute that the Defendant undertook these acts. However, there is a dispute as to whether the goods in question (i) had been put on the market in the UK or EEA by the Claimants or with their consent, thereby giving the Defendant a defence under s.12(1) TMA unless the Claimants had legitimate reasons to oppose the Defendant’s further dealings in the goods under s.12(2) TMA and/or (ii) are counterfeit.

representation at TRIAL

4. The Claimants were represented by Mr Theo Barclay instructed by Stobbs (IP) Limited. The Defendant had previously been represented by Mr Pépin Aslett instructed by Orwins Law Limited. Orwins had been the solicitor on the record for the Defendant throughout the proceedings.

5. However, on 29 September 2026 (three days before the hearing date for the trial), Orwins made an application for an Order pursuant to CPR 42.3 declaring that it had ceased to act for the Defendant and removing Orwins from the court record. The application was supported by the Witness Statement of Andrew Haffner of the same date. Mr Haffner is the Partner at Orwins who had conduct of the matter on behalf of the Defendant.

6. In his Witness Statement, Mr Haffner explained that throughout the proceedings, he has corresponded with the Director of the Defendant, Mr Yosef Stern, via a particular email address. Mr Stern is the signatory to the Defence and Amended Defence.

7. Mr Haffner also explained that the Defendant has been indebted to Orwins since about May 2026, and that despite repeated requests for payment, those fees remained outstanding. Mr Haffner set out a detailed chronology of the dates when he has chased the Defendant for payment. I do not need to repeat it all here. It is sufficient to record the following salient dates and circumstances:

i) On 2nd, 4th and 15th September 2026, Mr Haffner emailed Mr Stern seeking payment on account of Counsel’s fees in accordance with his firm’s usual practice. In his email response of 15th September, Mr Stern confirmed that the Defendant did not have sufficient funds to make any payment to Orwins. Failure to provide payment resulted in a proposed conference with Counsel being rearranged on multiple occasions and ultimately cancelled.

ii) On 22nd September 2026, Mr Haffner emailed Mr Stern to inform him that since payment remained outstanding, including in relation to Counsel’s fees for trial, Orwins would have to come off the record. Accordingly, a Notice of Change was attached to that email for execution by Mr Stern.

iii) Mr Haffner did not get a response to that email. As a result, he sent a further email on 23rd September 2026 explaining that, in the absence of the signed Notice of Change, Orwins would be obliged to apply to the Court to come off the record.

iv) At 8.17am on 24th September 2026, Mr Stern responded and explained that he had attempted to sign the Notice of Change but had been unable to do so. This prompted Mr Haffner to resend the Notice of Change documentation for electronic signature. However, and despite email chasers on 24th, 25th and 28th September 2026, no response was received from Mr Stern.

v) As a result, Orwins issued an application under CPR 42.3 on 29th September 2026. Mr Haffner confirmed in his Witness Statement that a copy of the application had been sent to Mr Stern via the same email address, although the Statement did not provide any details about the date or time of that email.

8. CPR 42.3 is headed “Order that a solicitor has ceased to act” and provides under rule 42.3(1) that a solicitor may apply for an order declaring that he has ceased to be the solicitor acting for a party. Rule 42.3(2) provides that notice of the application must be given to the party for whom the solicitor is acting (unless the court orders otherwise) and that the application must be supported by evidence.

9. According to the notes in the White Book at paragraph 42.3.4, where a party or client does not attend the hearing of the application, proof of service on them should be provided and this should be done by filing a certificate of service. CPR 6.29 provides that, in relation to service by email, the certificate of service requires the date and time of sending the email. As noted above, some of that detail was missing from Mr Haffner’s statement.

10. Orwins’ application was first brought to my attention on 1st October 2026, the day before the hearing. I was invited by Orwins to resolve the application on the papers in advance of the hearing. I declined to do so, as I was concerned to ensure that the Defendant had had proper notice of it. In the circumstances, I asked Mr Haffner to attend the start of the trial, which he did via video link, so that I could satisfy myself that the Defendant was aware of the application.

11. Mr Haffner confirmed to me orally at the start of the trial that he had had some brief email exchanges with Mr Stern after Orwins had sent Mr Stern the application. I understand that some of those exchanges related to without prejudice communications, with which Orwins were willing to assist the Defendant despite the application. However, Mr Haffner informed me that one email from Mr Stern timed at 4.08pm on 1st October 2026 stated as follows:

“Thanks for your emails and information. We would like to you to keep representing us in this case. Please let us know ASAP what do you need from us right now for that purpose.”

12. Mr Haffner explained that this put him and his firm in an untenable position, since the Defendant’s fees remained unpaid and Orwins was still not in receipt of funds that would enable representation at trial. Orwins is obviously not obliged to incur potential liability to Counsel or otherwise fund a client’s litigation from its own resources. Moreover, I am told that it was an express term of Orwins’ engagement letter with the Defendant that:

“if a court case is pending, we will normally require sufficient payment in advance as cleared funds to pay disbursements, such as the fees of counsel and witnesses, and also for our charges for preparing for trial and attending at court. We reserve the right not to prepare for trial or to instruct counsel if payment is not made, even if your case would thereby be prejudiced.”

13. Mr Haffner immediately responded to Mr Stern, asking again for payment of fees, but he did not receive any response to that email or any further contact from Mr Stern; nor did his firm receive any monies from the Defendant.

14. I understand from Mr Haffner that Mr Stern is currently located in Israel and had no intention of attending the hearing in person. Without waiving any privilege, Mr Haffner also said that he had informed Mr Stern that the Defendant had the option to attend remotely or to make an application to adjourn. I understand that Mr Haffner sent Mr Stern a copy of the link so that he could join remotely if he wanted to. He also tried to contact Mr Stern by telephone on the morning of the trial but could not get through. Suffice it to say that Mr Stern did not attend the trial remotely and there was no application for an adjournment before me.

15. In light of what I have set out above, I was satisfied that the Defendant had full knowledge of the application to remove Orwins from the record. However, to ensure that the paperwork was properly in order, I directed Mr Haffner to file a certificate of service that properly records the date and time when the application was served on the Defendant. He undertook to do so with immediate effect (and the certificate is now on the CE file). I therefore granted the Order sought and Orwins was removed from the record.

16. Finally, I was referred by Mr Barclay to CPR 39.3(1), which provides that the court may proceed with a trial in the absence of a party. I considered it appropriate to exercise the discretion I have under that provision to proceed with the trial for the following reasons. First, the Defendant has had proper notice of the hearing date for the trial, as this is recorded in paragraph 19 of the Order for Directions of HHJ Hacon dated 19 May 2026. As is clear on the face of the Order, the Defendant was represented at that CMC hearing by Mr Aslett, instructed by Orwins. Secondly, I am satisfied that the Defendant was informed of the possibility of attending remotely and applying for an adjournment. It is a matter of the Defendant’s own choosing that it was not in attendance and not represented. Thirdly, since the Claimants have gone to the time and expense of preparing for trial and the court has undertaken the appropriate pre-reading, it is proportionate, cost effective and the most efficient use of court time to proceed now. Fourthly, if the court gives judgment or makes an order against the Defendant in circumstances where it has not attended, it can apply for the judgment or order to be set aside under CPR 39.3(3) if it sees fit to do so.

relevant legal principles

17. It is convenient to start with the relevant provisions of the TMA:

9 Rights conferred by registered trade mark

(1) The proprietor of a registered trade mark has exclusive rights in the trade mark which are infringed by use of the trade mark in the United Kingdom without his consent.

The acts amounting to infringement, if done without the consent of the proprietor, are specified in subsections (1) to (3) of section 10.

10 Infringement of registered trade mark

(1) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which it is registered.

(2) …

12 Exhaustion of rights conferred by registered trade mark

(1) A registered trade mark is not infringed by the use of the trade mark in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the United Kingdom or European Economic Area under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where (a) there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further dealings in the goods (in particular, where the condition of the goods has been changed or impaired after they have been put on the market), and (b) the opposition to those dealings interferes with the rights of any other person no more than is necessary to achieve that purpose.

18. It is well established that for infringement under s.10(1) TMA (i) there must be use of a sign by the defendant in the UK; (ii) the use must be in the course of trade; (iii) it must be without the consent of the proprietor; (iv) it must be of a sign which is identical with the trade mark; (v) it must be in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered; and (vi) it must affect or be liable to affect one of the functions of the trade mark. See Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer Plc [2014] EWCA Civ 1403 at [67].

19. It is also well established that when goods are first placed on the market outside the UK and EEA, trade mark rights within the UK and EEA are not thereby exhausted. In other words, neither the UK nor the EU operate a system of international exhaustion. See Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1999] Ch 77 at [31].

20. The question of exhaustion must be determined in relation to the specific goods in issue. See Sebago Inc. & Anr v GB-Unic SA [2000] Ch 558 at [18]-[22]. As a consequence, the fact that the trade mark proprietor has previously marketed or consented to the marketing of the same type of goods under the same mark in the UK or EEA is irrelevant.

21. It is a question of fact whether the goods in issue have been put on the market in the UK or EEA by the trade mark proprietor or with his consent. That consent must be demonstrated unequivocally. See Zino Davidoff SA v A&G Imports Ltd [2002] Ch 109 at [45]. Moreover, it is for the party alleging consent to prove it, and not for the trade mark proprietor to demonstrate its absence. In other words, it is the defendant in a trade mark infringement claim who bears the burden of proving consent. Consent cannot be inferred from silence: see Davidoff at [54]-[61].

22. The CJEU decisions referred to all predate 31 December 2020 and so comprise “assimilated EU case law” pursuant to s.6(3) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended by the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023). They are binding on me.

the issues

23. The parties agreed at the CMC that there were two issues for trial, as follows (see the Schedule to the CMC Order):

i) Whether the MARSHALL Major V headphones offered for sale by the Defendant had been put on the market in the UK or EEA by the Claimants or with their consent.

ii) If yes, whether the Claimants have a legitimate reason to oppose further commercialisation of those goods under s.12(2) TMA and if so, whether such opposition interferes with the Defendant’s rights no more than necessary to achieve that purpose.

24. Whilst it was not stated expressly in the Schedule, it is clear from the Particulars of Claim and the evidence that the Claimants also alleged that the goods are counterfeit. Mr Barclay confirmed at the start of the trial that the Claimants were also inviting the court to make an express finding in relation to that issue.

25. As to issue (i), the Defendant’s pleaded case was that it believed the Claimants had consented to the goods being put on the market in the EEA because the Claimants’ goods are generally available through resellers on Amazon.

26. There was some suggestion in the Defendant’s evidence that this was a case where the burden of proof may shift to the Claimants. However, that point was not pleaded by the Defendant, but should have been if it was to be determined at trial not least because it would have required a proper factual investigation into the Claimants’ distribution model and whether there was partitioning of the market (see Van Doren + Q GmbH v Lifestyle Sports [2003] ETMR 75 at [25]-[42]). In the circumstances, I do not need to say anything more about it.

27. In the event, issue (ii) was not pursued by the Claimants at trial so I do not address it. The Claimants had also pleaded a case in passing off, but that did not add anything to the claim and was also not pursued at trial.

the evidence

28. The Claimants called four witnesses: (i) Mr Daniel Cornelius, Marketing Director of the First Claimant; (ii) Mr Hemal Shah, Channel Manager for Europe at the First Claimant; (iii) Mr Louis Adcock, Trainee Solicitor at Stobbs IP; (iv)Mr Robert Capel, Brand Protection Specialist of the First Claimant. Each witness had provided a written statement (save in the case of Mr Capel, who provided two) and attended the trial in person. This gave me the opportunity to ask some clarifying questions, for which I am grateful. I summarise the key points of this evidence as follows.

29. Mr Cornelius gave evidence about the Defendant’s sale of Marshall-branded headphones via Amazon. According to his evidence, Amazon provides a unique product number called an Amazon Standard Identification Number (ASIN) for each product that is offered for sale via its website. All sellers of a particular product will be grouped by Amazon under the same ASIN. Mr Cornelius first became aware of the Defendant on or about 13 August 2024 because it had become the default seller for the ASIN attributed to Marshall Major V Bluetooth Headphones. The default seller on Amazon is the seller who supports the “Buy Now” option on the product page.

30. Mr Cornelius conducted a test purchase, and the headphones were sent directly by Mr Cornelius to Mr Rob Capel for inspection.

31. Mr Shah gave evidence that on 3 June 2025 he was instructed by Mr Cornelius to make two test purchases from the Defendant. On the same day, he instructed a third-party agent, React, to purchase two pairs of Marshall Major V Bluetooth headphones from the Defendant via Amazon, one in black and the other in cream. On 4 June 2025, Ms Amber Smith of React confirmed to Mr Shah that she had received his instructions and made the purchases. The products were received by React on 5 June 2025. Ms Smith shared the serial numbers with Mr Shah, who in turn forwarded them on to Mr Cornelius to check whether they were recorded on the Claimants’ internal software. Mr Shah instructed React to send the products directly to Mr Capel for inspection.

32. Mr Shah instructed Ms Smith of React to make a second test purchase from the Defendant on 10 June 2025 of Marshall Major V Bluetooth headphones in brown. This product was received by React on 17 June 2025 and sent directly to Mr Capel. The Claimant does not rely on this product because it was not subject to the same review process and documentation as the others.

33. Mr Adcock gave evidence that on 4 March 2025, he instructed a third-party investigator called Brand Intelligence to conduct two test purchases from the Defendant via Amazon of Marshall Major V Bluetooth headphones, one in black and the other in brown. The following day, he received test purchase reports from Brand Intelligence, confirming details about the test purchases. The products were delivered directly to Brand Intelligence on or about 6 March 2025 (for the black pair) and 8 March 2025 (for the brown pair), and they sent them directly on to Mr Capel for inspection.

34. Mr Capel gave evidence about the Claimants’ retail and e-commerce software system, called ‘Qlik’. He explained that the Qlik system is only accessible to a limited number of designated employees at the Claimants, of which he is one. All genuine Marshall products are assigned a unique serial number during manufacture, which is recorded on Qlik as part of a quality control process. Until the serial number is recorded, the product cannot be shipped and distributed. Mr Capel explained that it is possible to search for a serial number on the Qlik system. If the number is not found on the system, Qlik generates a message that states “There are no matches for your search” and the product bearing that number is not a genuine Marshall product.

35. Mr Capel also gave evidence about his inspection of five of the Marshall Major V headphone test purchases described above – the two instructed by Mr Adcock from Brand Intelligence, the first two instructed by Mr Shah from React, and the one from Mr Cornelius. He gave evidence that none of the serial numbers on these products were found in the Qlik system. This evidence was corroborated by a screen recording of the serial number of each test purchase being entered by Mr Capel into the Qlik system, each time returning the same message “There are no matches for your search”. These recordings were exhibited to Mr Capel’s evidence, and I have watched them all.

36. In addition, Mr Capel explained that he had undertaken a careful visual inspection of each trap purchase and compared it to a genuine pair of Marshall Major V Bluetooth headphones. In each case, he had identified various aspects of the test purchase product and its internal and external packaging which were inconsistent with a genuine Marshall product. All of this is detailed in Mr Capel’s Second Witness Statement, and I do not need to repeat it here. It is sufficient for my purposes to concentrate on one example test purchase product which was handed up to me at trial, alongside a genuine Marshall product. This enabled me to see for myself the differences that Mr Capel had set out in his written evidence, as supplemented by the answers he provided to me under oath.

37. The product in question was a pair of black Marshall Major V Bluetooth headphones purchased by Ms Smith of React on 4 June 2025. It comes in a rectangular black box which bears the name “Marshall MAJOR V” on the front of the box, alongside a photograph of one ear of the headphone that bears the name Marshall. In both cases, Marshall is presented in the stylised script as shown in the images in Annex A below and consistent with the Second Claimant’s device mark set out in paragraph 1 above.

38. This product was described as “Test Purchase C” in Mr Capel’s evidence and had been given the Marshall internal reference number Mar0000491. It is addressed in Mr Capel’s Second Statement from paragraph 53.

39. I include a copy of the relevant page of the Amazon website and the order details in Annex A below. It can be seen that the product is sold by the Defendant.

40. Mr Capel identified the following differences between the outer packaging of the test purchase and the genuine Marshall product:

i) The contrast and colouring of the packaging is different. Mr Capel described the packaging of the test purchase as slightly darker, and that is certainly how it appears in the photographic images in the review of the product he exhibited to his evidence. However, to my eye in the flesh, the test product is paler although nothing turns on this; they are obviously different, albeit that the difference in shade is quite subtle.

ii) The serial number on the bottom of the test purchase which is missing from the genuine product.

41. Mr Capel identified the following differences between the test purchase and the genuine Marshall product:

i) The gold control knob on the bottom corner of the right earpiece is different: it is in a slightly lower position; it is a paler colour; and the swirl engraving or style is different, with a less defined bevel edging.

ii) The black fret on the earpiece is a slightly different and duller black colour.

iii) The material used to cover the earpiece is different and of a poorer quality.

iv) The indented or engraved writing on the inside of the leather cover of the headband is also of a poorer quality. The text is not as deep into the leather, with the result that the font looks slightly larger.

v) The input for the jack is off centre.

42. Mr Capel identified the following differences between the internal packaging of the test product and the genuine Marshall product:

i) The cardboard wrap around the charging cable and input jack is of a different colour, with poorer print quality.

ii) The “M” symbol at the tip of the jack is less refined.

iii) The colour of the instruction manual is different, with less contrast and definition.

43. Most of these differences are illustrated by photographs in the test purchase review that Mr Capel exhibited to his statement. I include a copy of the relevant pages of that exhibit at the end of this judgment at Annex B, although I should note that it is easier to see the differences “in the flesh” than via the photographs in the Annex.

44. As noted above, Mr Capel undertook an equivalent analysis and review in relation to the other four test purchases from the Defendant. In each case, he identified a number of differences between the Defendant’s product and the genuine Marshall product which he set out in his Second Statement, together with illustrative photographs in the test purchase reviews exhibited to the Statement. All the purchases were also properly evidenced with copies of the relevant page on Amazon demonstrating that the headphones were being sold by the Defendant, the invoices, and the Amazon packaging.

45. Finally, Mr Capel described the strict security measures that the Claimants apply in relation to test purchases to ensure that there is no risk of interference with the products. I do not need to set out the detail of those measures here, but record that I am satisfied that they were applied to the test purchases in issue in this case.

46. The Defendant provided two witness statements during the course of the proceedings from Mr Stern. The first related to the Claimants’ application requiring the Defendant to answer a Part 18 Request. The second was intended to comprise Mr Stern’s evidence for trial. Whilst this evidence was not formally admitted into the proceedings, Mr Barclay asked Mr Capel in chief about one paragraph of Mr Stern’s Second Witness Statement, and he also referred to it in his closing submissions. In the circumstances, Mr Barclay agreed that I should take account of this evidence, subject only to the qualification that the Claimants had not had any opportunity to challenge it and therefore do not accept it to be true.

47. In his Second Witness Statement, Mr Stern said that the Defendant had purchased the headphones in issue from a third-party wholesaler called AK Partners Europe SRL and its subsidiary KA Wholesalers Limited, both based in Romania. This is consistent with the Amended Defence (at §12A) and is supported by invoices provided by the Defendant in disclosure. Importantly, however, the Defendant does not know from whom AK Partners purchased the goods (see Response 2 to the Defendant’s Part 18 Response).

48. Mr Stern denied that the test purchases were counterfeit but did not provide any material evidence to support a contrary view:

i) He suggested that the goods that Amazon shipped may not in fact have come from the Defendant’s stock, but there was no evidence to support that view.

ii) He said that he had contacted an entity called Luxury Personified LLP, an allegedly authorised Marshall dealer in India, who had confirmed their product was genuine. However, this is irrelevant since there is no evidence to suggest that the test purchases originated from this dealer.

iii) He said that Lockwood Fulfilment Limited, a third-party that handles Amazon returns for the Defendant, had conducted an inspection of Marshall Major V headphones received at its facility and confirmed they were “consistent with” genuine Marshall product. It is far from clear which products Lockwood inspected, but they cannot have been the test purchases in issue (which were not returned).

iv) He said that the Defendant had checked the EAN barcodes on returned products and “validated” them as registered Marshall barcodes. In response to a question from Mr Barclay (as referred to above), Mr Capel explained that the Claimants use the same barcode for each product line. As a result, the fact that the barcodes on the test purchases were the same as genuine Marshall products does not shed any light on whether the test purchases were genuine or counterfeit.

49. Mr Stern said that it was the Defendant’s belief that the headphones had been placed on the market in the EEA or the UK by the Claimants or with their consent. His reason for this belief was that Marshall-branded headphones, including the Major V range, were widely available through authorised and third-party resellers on Amazon and other online marketplaces, as well as through major retailers in the UK such as Argos, Currys and John Lewis. In his view, that was consistent with the goods in issue having been placed on the market in the UK or EEA by the Claimants or with their consent. He said that AK Partners would not have been able to source and supply genuine Marshall-branded goods in commercial quantities unless they had been put on the market in the EEA by the Claimants or with their consent.

findings of fact

50. I have summarised the key evidence above. I accept the evidence from the Claimants in its totality, which was clear and meticulous. I only asked questions of Mr Cornelius and Mr Capel and consider that they both answered them truthfully. I accept the evidence set out in Mr Stern’s Second Statement only to the extent that the Defendant purchased the goods in issue from the third-party wholesalers referred to above (as this was supported by contemporaneous disclosure). Based on that evidence, I make the following findings of fact.

51. First, I find that the test purchases comprised products bearing the Trade Marks and each of them had been offered for sale and sold in the UK by the Defendant via the Amazon website. I am in no doubt that the products Mr Capel inspected were goods from the Defendant and in the form supplied by the Defendant. Any suggestion that Amazon had shipped different goods, not from the Defendant, is rejected. This was not made out on the evidence and is most unlikely bearing in mind that five different test purchases were made at different times and in relation to different colours.

52. Second, I find that the test purchases are counterfeit products. The evidence to support that conclusion was overwhelming. First and foremost, the fact that the serial numbers on the test purchases were missing from the Claimants’ records system clearly demonstrates that they are not genuine. Second, the long list of differences between the test purchases and the genuine Marshall headphones was powerful and persuasive. Whilst there was an allegation in the Amended Defence (at §12) that the observed differences between the test purchases and genuine Marshall headphones were “within ordinary manufacturing variances and/or tolerances”, that was not addressed by Mr Stern in his statement and there was no other evidence to support it.

53. Third, I find that the Defendant has failed to prove that the test purchases were put on the market in the UK or EEA by the Claimants or with their consent. There was simply no evidence to support the Defendant’s pleaded case on this issue. To the contrary, as noted above, the Defendant accepted in its Part 18 Response that it did not know where or from whom its supplier had acquired the goods. The fact that the Claimants have previously marketed and sold headphones of the same type and bearing the Trade Marks in the UK is irrelevant, as the case law summarised above makes clear. What matters is whether the Claimants consented to the marketing and sale in the UK or EEA of the specific goods in issue, and there is no evidence that they did.

54. For completeness, I note that Mr Barclay referred me in closing to some correspondence between the Defendant and Amazon dated 29th September 2025 that had been provided in disclosure. That correspondence concerned a “Plan of Action” to get the Defendant’s store relisted on to Amazon after it was taken down by Amazon because of perceived breaches of the Amazon IP and Counterfeit policies. In the Plan, Mr Stern accepts that he did not have a letter of authorisation from the Claimants to sell cream and black Marshall Major V headphones, and that going forward he would only purchase from brand-authorised distributors approved by the Claimants.

55. Mr Barclay submitted that, based on this disclosure, the court can infer that the Defendant positively did not have consent to sell the goods in issue. I do not think that the disclosure goes that far, not least because it does not identify specifically which pairs of headphones are being considered. However, that does not matter, since it is for the Defendant to prove consent, not for the Claimants to prove lack of it. As I have explained above, there is no evidence to support a finding of consent, and the Defendant has totally failed to discharge that burden.

INFRINGEMENT

56. In light of my findings, there can be no doubt that the Defendant is liable for infringement of each of the Trade Marks under s.10(1) TMA for two reasons: first, because the goods in issue are counterfeit and second because, even if that is wrong, they were not put on the market in the UK or EEA by the Claimants or with their consent. On either case, the Defendant has used in the course of trade in the UK a sign which is identical to each Trade Mark and in relation to the same goods (headphones) for which they are registered without the Claimants’ consent. That use will obviously affect or be liable to affect the functions of the Trade Marks.

57. In the circumstances, there is no need to go on and consider the alternative pleaded case under s.10(2) TMA.

CONCLUSION

58. I give judgment for the Claimants. I will hear Counsel as to the form of Order if it cannot be agreed.

ANNEX A

Exhibit RC/1iii – Marshall Major V headphones in black, purchased on 4 June 2025

ANNEX B

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Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.