Miscellaneous United Kingdom

BIO v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Official source

Appeal No. UA-2025-001895-UOTH

RULE 14 ORDER: It is prohibited for any person to disclose or publish any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant in these proceedings. Failure to comply with this order may amount to contempt of court and could lead to a fine, imprisonment or other sanction.

This order does not prevent the use of any information or documents by any court or tribunal within subsequent proceedings in this case.

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER

Between:

BIO

Appellant

– v –

The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions

Respondent

Before: Upper Tribunal Judge Butler

Decided on consideration of the papers

Representation:

Appellant: In person

Respondent: Mr W. Razzaq, Decision Making and Appeals, DWP

On appeal from:

Tribunal: First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber)

Tribunal Case No: 1754-6534-5788-9857

Tribunal: Judge R. Dooris

Tribunal Venue: Decision made on the papers

Decision Date: 05 September 2025

DECISION

As the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law, it is SET ASIDE under section 12(2)(a) and (b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and the case is REMITTED to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing by a fresh tribunal.

DIRECTIONS

A. The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to consider BIO’s appeal afresh.

B. The new First-tier Tribunal should not involve the legally qualified member previously involved in considering this appeal on 5 September 2025.

C. The new First-tier Tribunal is directed to apply the following decisions and principles when dealing with this appeal:

(a) In TR and (2) GD v SSWP (PIP/ESA) [2025] UKUT 332 (AAC), In TR and GD v SSWP (PIP/ESA) [2025] UKUT 332 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal considered the circumstances in which the FTT may have jurisdiction where an application for mandatory reconsideration is, in substance, a request for revision raising grounds which, if established, would be capable of amounting to official error. The new Tribunal must apply the analysis at paragraph 121 of that decision, including paragraph 121(a), to the facts as it finds them; and

(b) In Dawod v SSWP and Alla (UC)[2026] UKUT 360 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal confirmed that a mandatory reconsideration notice making a positive decision not to extend time to admit a late application for revision may demonstrate the Secretary of State has considered whether to revise the decision in question. See paragraph 77 of that decision. This analysis in Dawod would appear to be relevant to the matters set out in paragraph 121(c), (d) and (e) of TR so far as they may apply to BIO’s appeal;

D. The new Tribunal must not take account of circumstances that did not apply at the relevant date of the Secretary of State’s entitlement decision. Later evidence can be considered as long as it relates to the circumstances at the time of that decision: see R(DLA) 2/01 and R(DLA) 3/01.

E. Within one month of the date this Decision is issued, the Secretary of State is to provide BIO and the First-tier Tribunal with a written submission explaining the decision-making history for BIO’s UC claim, the history and events leading up to the decision dated 08 April 2024, and addressing her arguments about having been given the wrong advice by DWP, and attaching copies of all relevant documents, including the 08 April 2024 decision.

F. If the parties decide to send additional written evidence to the First-tier Tribunal, this should be sent to the relevant HMCTS regional tribunal office within one month of the issue of this decision.

G. The Tribunal hearing the remitted appeal is not bound in any way by the decision of the previous First-tier Tribunal.

H. Copies of this decision, the permission to appeal decision and the written submissions on behalf of the Secretary of State (dated 22 May 2026) and the Appellant’s reply dated 12 June 2026 shall be added to the bundle to be placed before the First-tier Tribunal hearing the remitted appeal.

These Directions may be supplemented by later directions by a tribunal judge, registrar, or case worker, in the Social Entitlement Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal.

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. I made an anonymity order in this case, at the Appellant’s request. The initials “BIO” have been chosen at random and do not have any connection to the actual name of the Appellant.

2. I note from the Upper Tribunal’s online system that BIO has contacted the Upper Tribunal on several occasions to see if an early decision could be made about her appeal rather than the three month period generally given for this. With apologies, it has not been possible to make the decision on an earlier basis because of the pressures of other Upper Tribunal work.

Factual background

3. On 08 August 2025, BIO lodged an appeal with the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”). In her SSCS1 appeal form, BIO recorded that the relevant mandatory reconsideration notice was dated 23 July 2025.

4. On 11 August 2025, DWP challenged the validity of BIO’s appeal. It wrote that it appeared BIO had made her request for mandatory reconsideration outside of absolute time. DWP wrote that the appeal form was disputing an out of time mandatory reconsideration dated 23 July 2025, which it had communicated to BIO through her UC journal. DWP stated the appeal notification was returned to the FTT to consider as out of time. DWP attached a copy of the mandatory reconsideration notice (“MRN”) dated 23 July 2025.

5. The MRN contained the correct name for BIO at the top of the letter but addressed her incorrectly by another name in the salutation (“Dear X”). The MRN stated that BIO had asked DWP to look again at the decision on her universal credit claim made on 08 April 2024, and this request was made out of time. The MRN stated that DWP was not able to accept BIO’s request for mandatory reconsideration and had refused her application for it.

6. On 15 August 2025, a legal officer of the FTT made directions for BIO to provide exceptional reasons within 21 days, supported with evidence about why the appeal had been made late/out of time and why it should not be struck out.

7. On 21 August 2025, BIO submitted a response to the directions. She also uploaded a copy of the MRN, and entries from her Universal Credit journal. BIO also provided medical evidence about a range of medical matters, including a miscarriage in March 2024, treatment she was receiving in April 2024 and an emergency admission to hospital for suspected meningitis on 13 March 2025. BIO also provided evidence of a consultation on 09 July 2025 for sudden visual disturbance, which had led her to go to Accident and Emergency. BIO resubmitted this evidence on 28 August and 29 August 2025.

8. On 05 September 2025, an FTT Judge struck out BIO’s appeal on the basis that there were no wholly exceptional and relevant reasons why BIO could not have requested mandatory reconsideration within the relevant timescales. The FTT Judge wrote that the medical evidence did not show BIO was incapable of making a request for mandatory reconsideration within 13 months.

9. The FTT Judge also wrote that BIO appeared to be stating that the DWP had advised her she could not have her universal credit (“UC”) backdated. The FTT Judge wrote that the UC journal did not show this and there was no evidence of BIO discussing this with her work coach. The FTT Judge wrote: “If she believes that an officer of the DWP have [sic] given her incorrect advice then she can make a complaint to the DWP, it is not an appealable matter.”

10. The FTT Judge produced a Statement of Reasons for their decision on 18 September 2025. This reiterated that the medical evidence did not show BIO was incapable of making a request for a mandatory reconsideration within 13 months, observing that she was clearly able to contact medical professionals and attend appointments. The FTT Judge reiterated that while BIO appeared to be stating DWP had advised her she could not have her UC backdated, if she believed an officer of the DWP had given her incorrect advice she could make a complaint, but it was not an appealable matter.

The Upper Tribunal decision granting permission to appeal

11. On 07 April 2026, I granted BIO permission to appeal. I decided the following appeal grounds were arguable with a realistic prospect of success:

(a) It was not clear from BIO’s appeal form that she was saying the incorrect statement DWP made about back pay, was in her UC journal, or only mentioned there. BIO’s appeal had referred to her UC journal and call logs. The FTT may have made an error of law by assuming BIO was only describing what BIO’s UC journal recorded;

(b) While the FTT does not have to deal with every piece of evidence a party provided, the FTT arguably should have addressed BIO’s medical evidence about experiencing a miscarriage. This might represent relevant evidence the FTT had failed to address;

(c) The FTT had very little information available to it about what decision BIO was seeking to appeal. DWP had informed the FTT BIO was challenging her work capability assessment and was out of time to do so. However, DWP had not provided a copy of that decision letter. BIO was not asked if this was what she disputed. BIO’s appeal grounds in her SSCS1 appeal form appeared to suggest DWP had incorrectly told her that she would not be entitled to a payment of benefit, and this led to a delay in BIO applying for it or challenging that statement by DWP. It was possible BIO was arguing that DWP had made an official error in a decision. If so, BIO could potentially ask DWP to revise (which means change) that decision more than 13 months after it was made. The FTT did not appear to have considered whether this was what BIO was arguing. The FTT Judge had referred to what BIO had written, stating she could make a complaint to the DWP, but it was not an appealable matter. Without, however, knowing more about what BIO was challenging, it was unclear that the FTT could properly reach that conclusion on the evidence before it; and

(d) Alternatively, the FTT may have misdirected itself in law in failing to consider whether BIO was asking DWP to revise the decision based on DWP having made some form of official error (regulation 9 of the Universal Credit etc. (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 2013 – “the UC etc., (D&A) Regulations 2013”). Considering this issue does not mean the FTT had to agree that BIO was, in substance, applying for a revision for official error, but it was unclear whether the FTT considered the issue and was therefore entitled to conclude that BIO was not asking for that type of change to be made.

The parties’ submissions

12. Mr Razzaq represents the Secretary of State in the appeal to the Upper Tribunal. He has provided helpful written submissions dated 22 May 2026. Mr Razzaq supports the appeal on the basis the FTT has made material errors of law, summarised below, and invites me to remit it to a new Tribunal to decide.

13. Mr Razzaq argues that the FTT made an error of law by failing to consider whether BIO was asking for a revision decision based on an official error by DWP. He refers to official error as set out in regulation 9 of the UC etc., (D&A) Regulations 2013. This states:

“9. A decision may be revised where the decision-

(a) arose from official error; or

(b) was made in ignorance of, or was based on a mistake as to, some material fact and as a result is more advantageous to a claimant than it would otherwise have been.”

14. Mr Razzaq submits there is very little evidence available in the papers given to the FTT about the decision BIO was challenging. Mr Razzaq argues that while the FTT considered the medical evidence BIO had provided in response to its directions, the FTT had not given full consideration to the appeal grounds BIO was putting forward. From those appeal grounds, it could be suggested that BIO was stating an official error had occurred. Mr Razzaq observes that the FTT did consider the UC Journal, but this was not the only means of communication that BIO had referred to in her appeal grounds. She had also referred to calls with DWP.

15. Mr Razzaq argues this was an error of law as the FTT failed to explain why it had not considered whether there might be official error by DWP. Mr Razzaq notes that paragraph 7 of the Statement of Reasons referred to the fact BIO may have been misadvised by DWP. He submits, however, that this does not sufficiently address the matters in her grounds of appeal. Mr Razzaq submits that while there is generally a 13-month time limit for making a request for revision on any ground (subject to special circumstances), that time limit does not apply to an application for revision on the ground of official error under regulation 9 of the UC etc. (D&A) Regulations 2013.

16. Mr Razzaq argues that the FTT has failed to adequately address the principal arguments BIO was putting forward in her appeal, despite it being required as a matter of fairness to show the FTT had given proper consideration to the arguments (paragraph 6 of CI/747/2011).

17. Mr Razzaq also argues that the FTT made an error of law in not adequately explaining how it concluded it did not have legal jurisdiction to deal with the appeal. He cites paragraph 2 of CCS/2152/04, in which Mr Commissioner Howell QC stated:

‘It is well established that even if a decision itself may be sound, it amounts to an error in law making it necessary for the decision to be set aside if sufficient findings and reasons are not spelt out to give the parties a reasonable understanding of the basis on which it has been reached. This is a necessary safeguard since otherwise it is not possible to know whether the tribunal may have misdirected itself or omitted to take account of some material consideration in the case.’

18. Mr Razzaq argues that the errors of law addressed above are material and that they justify setting aside the FTT’s Decision dated 05 September 2025. He submits that if the decision is set aside, any other errors of law by the FTT will be subsumed by the rehearing.

19. In response, BIO argues that the FTT’s decision should be set aside because the FTT Judge did not consider, or mention in the Statement of Reasons, much of the material she had provided, including evidence about her medical circumstances and her efforts to resolve matters amicably with DWP. BIO refers to the fact the MRN used the wrong name for her, which led her to believe that her case was not given a fair, unbiased consideration or made with correct information. BIO also states that the submissions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to the Upper Tribunal include a typing error for her name and her national insurance number, which she believes further supports her case.

20. BIO questions the relevance of the cases that Mr Razzaq has cited, stating they are not similar to her issue as possible owed back pay.

21. BIO submits that the numerous medical issues set out in her letter sent to all parties on 27 April 2026, and supported by other evidence, are relevant to the reasons why her challenge was made late. BIO states she sent this evidence to the original FTT Judge. She writes that on top of this, she had been given incorrect documents from DWP.

22. BIO states that she believes the current judge (which I understand to mean the Upper Tribunal) should allow her appeal to progress and not to be delayed. She refers to the Judge allowing both parties enough time to fairly provide statements and reasons and she believes the judge can make a decision based on all evidence.

Why there was no oral hearing of this appeal

23. Neither party requested an oral hearing of this appeal. I took their preferences into account. I decided the interests of justice did not require an oral hearing. The parties both consider the FTT made material errors of law. It is not necessary to have an oral hearing in order to determine that issue. Holding an oral hearing is not required to resolve matters and would simply delay determining the appeal to the Upper Tribunal. It was therefore proportionate to determine the appeal on the papers, as I have done.

My decision

24. At the permission stage, I only needed to be persuaded that it was arguable with a realistic (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of success that the FTT had made an error of law in a way that was material. At this substantive stage, I need to be satisfied that the FTT made one or more errors of law that were material.

25. I am satisfied that the FTT made material errors of law in relation to the appeal grounds addressed at paragraphs 11(c) to (d) above. Mr Razzaq has addressed these grounds at paragraphs 13 to 18 above. I agree with the arguments he has put forward. I am satisfied they demonstrate the FTT made material errors of law.

26. After the FTT made its decision, a three-judge panel of the Upper Tribunal decided in TR and GD v SSWP [2025] UKUT 332 (AAC) that where a claimant had asked DWP to revise its decision more than 13 months after the original decision, whether the FTT has jurisdiction on appeal depends on the Secretary of State having considered an application that is, in substance, a request for revision that raises grounds that are capable of amounting to an official error.

27. In paragraph 40 of its decision in TR, the Upper Tribunal confirmed it was not defining what is meant by an official error but reminded itself that official error had been described in a case called R(H)2/04 as the kind of mistake that is “a clear and obvious error of fact or law made by some officer on the facts disclosed to him, or which he had reason to believe were relevant”.

28. In TR, the Upper Tribunal decided that if an application had been made but the Secretary of State had not yet considered it, the FTT might consider staying the appeal to allow the Secretary of State to consider it (paragraph 121(c) of decision).

29. In a recent decision called Dawod v SSWP and Alla (UC) [2026] UKUT 360 (AAC), another three-judge panel of the Upper Tribunal observed that in a case called R(CJ) and SG v SSWP [2017] UKUT 324 (AAC), the Secretary of State had made a positive decision not to extend time to admit a late application to revise a benefit decision. The Upper Tribunal in Dawod made the point that the decisions in CJ did show that the SSWP had “considered whether to revise”.

30. BIO may think that these cases have nothing to do with her appeal because they do not involve the same circumstances as hers. They set out, however, relevant principles to be applied in a wide range of cases, including BIO’s specific case.

31. DWP appears to have treated BIO’s request as an application to revise the decision dated 08 April 2024 on an “any ground” basis and, accordingly, one subject to the ordinary 13-month time limit. The decision in TR confirms that where an appellant asks DWP to revise (meaning to change) an existing decision on a basis that, if made out, would be capable of demonstrating DWP had made an official error, the request can be made at any time and is not limited to the 13-month time period that applies to other types of revision request.

32. The decision in TR explained that if DWP has not considered changing its benefit decision in an “any time” revision case, the FTT might decide not to proceed with the appeal until DWP has considered whether to revise its decision. However, paragraph 77 of the decision in Dawod indicates that a positive decision by DWP not to extend time for a party to ask for mandatory reconsideration, may demonstrate DWP having considered whether to revise the decision in question. I mention this because it appears to be what DWP decided in its MRN dated 23 July 2025.

33. While TR and Dawod were decided after the FTT struck out BIO’s appeal, I am satisfied that based on the law as it stood on 05 September 2025, the FTT made material errors of law by failing to consider whether BIO was asking DWP to change its decision on the ground of official error. The FTT was aware that BIO had put forward an argument about what DWP had told her would or could happen and had later discovered this appeared to be wrong. The FTT characterised this as something that could only be raised as a complaint.

34. The FTT therefore misdirected itself in law by failing to consider whether BIO was, in substance, seeking revision on the ground of official error, which would not have been subject to the ordinary 13-month time limit. It also made an error of law in failing to explain adequately why what BIO complained of could not amount to official error. In my assessment, the FTT also made an error of law by reaching a conclusion that the issue could only be dealt with as a complaint, without having the relevant information and evidence required to be able to properly reach that conclusion.

35. BIO says that the decisions Mr Razzaq has mentioned are not based on the same circumstances as her case. However, the authorities concerning the adequacy of a tribunal’s reasons, on which Mr Razzaq relies, establish principles capable of applying across a range of factual circumstances. They support BIO’s challenge to the FTT striking out her appeal. This is because they explain that the FTT needs to explain its decision adequately so that a party can understand why they have been unsuccessful, including about the arguments the person has put forward. Applied to BIO’s case, these principles meant that the FTT needed to explain why it had rejected her arguments about DWP having given her incorrect advice, and the statement that the matter could be dealt with only by way of a complaint did not provide an adequate explanation.

36. Turning to the other grounds where I granted permission to appeal, I agree with Mr Razzaq that because I have decided the FTT made material errors of law in the ways addressed at paragraphs 13 to 17 and paragraphs 33 to 35 above, it is not necessary to go on to consider the other grounds summarised at paragraph 11(a) and (b) above. Given what I have decided, it is inevitable that the FTT’s strike out decision must be set aside.

Conclusion, including disposal

37. Having decided the FTT’s decision involved material errors of law, it is appropriate to exercise my discretion to set aside the Tribunal’s decision dated 05 September 2025 under section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Section 12(2)(b) of that Act requires me to either remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration or to remake the decision.

38. Mr Razzaq invited me to remit the appeal to a new First-tier Tribunal. BIO has argued that there should be enough evidence for the judge to make a decision. It is not completely clear whether she means the preliminary issue of whether her FTT appeal can proceed or the substantive issue of whether her FTT appeal should succeed. I do not, however, consider there is sufficient evidence for me to fairly and justly decide either matter.

39. As I explained when granting permission to appeal, there is a lack of information available about the decision DWP made on 08 April 2024, and what advice BIO may have been given about how a limited capability for work decision might work in her case. BIO’s most recent submissions describe being referred for a limited capability for work assessment in October 2023 and not being assessed until March 2024. This differs from the way in which her challenge was expressed in her SSCS1 appeal form. Both descriptions might amount to claims of official error by DWP, but potentially on different bases.

40. Without being provided with the relevant documents, including the 08 April 2024 decision and an explanation of what happened leading up to that decision, it is not possible to understand the decisions that were made and why BIO considers they were wrong. Nor is it clear which grounds BIO is raising, to be able to assess whether they are capable of being an official error, if they are made out. As explained above, it is also possible that other evidence, such as telephone call records, might clarify whether something was said capable of amounting to official error, or that BIO asked for mandatory reconsideration at an earlier point in time, meaning she had made an any ground request for revision within the 13-month period.

41. The First-tier Tribunal is the primary tribunal for deciding factual matters. It is best placed to explore and evaluate the evidence (currently not provided), and to make appropriate findings of fact.

42. I therefore remit BIO’s appeal for consideration by a new First-tier Tribunal. I have made a direction at E of the Directions on page 2 for the Secretary of State to provide the First-tier Tribunal with a written submission and copies of relevant documents. I have also made a direction at D of the Directions for the new First-tier Tribunal to apply the following decisions and principles when dealing with this appeal:

(a) In TR and GD v SSWP (PIP/ESA) [2025] UKUT 332 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal considered the circumstances in which the FTT may have jurisdiction where an application for mandatory reconsideration is, in substance, a request for revision raising grounds which, if established, would be capable of amounting to official error. The new Tribunal must apply the analysis at paragraph 121 of that decision, including paragraph 121(a), to the facts as it finds them; and

(b) In Dawod v SSWP and Alla (UC) [2026] UKUT 360 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal confirmed that a mandatory reconsideration notice making a positive decision not to extend time to admit a late application for revision may demonstrate the Secretary of State has considered whether to revise the decision in question. See paragraph 77 of that decision. This analysis in Dawod would appear to be relevant to the matters set out in paragraph 121(c), (d) and (e) of TR so far as they may apply to BIO’s appeal.

43. Although I have set aside the FTT’s decision dated 05 September 2025, I am not making any findings, or expressing any view, about whether the FTT has jurisdiction in relation to BIO’s appeal and if so, the merits of that appeal. The next Tribunal will need to consider evidence, make relevant findings of fact, and provide its reasoning for the decision it reaches.

Judith Butler

Authorised for issue: 21 October 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our social security lawyer in Paris.


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