Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Cleveland v. Baffes

Official source
[Cite as Cleveland v. Baffes, 

2026-Ohio-4279

.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA


CITY OF CLEVELAND,                                :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                              No. 115940
                 v.                               :

VASILY Y. BAFFES,                                 :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 29, 2026


                      Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court
                                 Case No. 2025-TRD-012319


                                            Appearances:

                 Mark Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, Aqueelah
                 Jordan, Chief Prosecutor, and Isaiah Pinckney III,
                 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

                 Vasily Y. Baffes, pro se.


MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant Vasily Y. Baffes (“Baffes”) appeals his minor

misdemeanor conviction for assured clear distance in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A).

Baffes alleges (1) the trial court utilized the wrong legal standard in finding him
guilty, (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, (3) the

conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (4) the trial court erred

in proceeding with trial without resolving pending discovery issues.

               After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we overrule

each assignment of error and affirm his conviction.

I. Background Overview

      A. Relevant Facts

               At approximately 4:00 p.m. on July 17, 2025, Michael Shelton

(“Shelton”) had just left work and was traveling eastbound on Interstate 90 when he

merged into the far-right lane approaching State Route 176. He testified that traffic

was moving slowly at the time and eventually came to a sudden stop, causing him to

stop his vehicle. While at a standstill, Shelton’s vehicle was struck from behind by

another vehicle driven by Baffes. Shelton felt what he described as a “boom” when

Baffes collided into the rear of his vehicle. Shelton stated that he did not see Baffes

hit his vehicle because he was “paying attention to what was happening in front of

[him.]”

               After the collision, Shelton and Baffes pulled onto the shoulder of the

road. Shelton testified he called the State Highway Patrol. He also stated that he

helped Baffes change one of Baffes’s tires while “up against the berm.” Shelton

described the situation as “precarious,” explaining that there was a barrier wall that

barely left enough room for traffic to pass.
               State Highway Patrol Trooper David Pangburn (“Trooper Pangburn”)

arrived shortly after receiving a radio dispatch concerning a “two-vehicle non-injury

crash on 90 East . . . right at the split for 176 and 90 West.” Upon arrival, Trooper

Pangburn observed two vehicles on the right side of the berm. He called for a safety

patrol to block the right lane of traffic so he could conduct a crash investigation.

               Trooper Pangburn testified he “spoke with both victims, took

photographs, completed a crash report, and moved both vehicles off the roadway.”

As a result of his investigation, he determined Baffes was at fault for the collision.

He explained that he reached this conclusion after reviewing both parties’

statements and assessing the damage on both vehicles.

      B. Citation and Trial

               As a result of Trooper Pangburn’s investigation, Baffes was issued a

citation charging him with violating R.C. 4511.21(A), assured clear distance, a minor

misdemeanor. Prior to trial, Baffes filed numerous motions, including motions to

dismiss and demands for discovery. Baffes’s motions to dismiss were denied.

               On October 15, 2025, the parties appeared in court for a pretrial.

Baffes represented himself pro se. He advised the court that he had received partial

discovery and was waiting for additional discovery from the prosecutor, including

body-camera footage and interviews that had been conducted by other officers at

the scene. Baffes informed the court that he had emailed the prosecutor and still

had not received a response.
               The trial court explained to Baffes that “[t]hey probably didn’t make

a report. So I’m gonna tell you right now, the body-cam’s probably lost into some

cloud. If it’s not assigned to some RMS number, it wouldn’t have been uploaded.”

Finally, the court told Baffes:

      I don’t know why we need all of these videos, all right. So let’s schedule
      this for trial. And then should there be any discovery issues, should it
      be any discovery issues at trial then I will entertain some motion or a
      dismissal for a Brady violation or something like that, all right. And
      then we’ll talk about that. When do we want to schedule this for trial?

               The court set a trial date for November 12, 2025.

               On October 27, 2025, Baffes filed additional motions with the trial

court, including a motion to compel discovery requesting the City to turn over

information concerning other crashes that had occurred near the scene, body-

camera videos, and witness subpoenas and communications. The City did not

respond to Baffes’s motions.

               A bench trial was held on November 12, 2025. At no point prior to

trial did either Baffes or the prosecution address Baffes’s outstanding motion to

compel. At trial, the City called Shelton and Trooper Pangburn to testify on behalf

of the City. Baffes did not call any witnesses to testify on his behalf. At the

conclusion of the trial, the court found Baffes guilty of assured clear distance, a

minor misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A).

      C. Appeal

               Baffes appeals his conviction, presenting five assignments of error for

our review:
      1. The trial court applied the wrong legal standard by substituting
      generalized traffic-foreseeability reasoning for the element-specific
      ACDA [(assured clear distance ahead)] inquiry.

      2. The trial court erred in denying [Baffes’s] Crim.R. 29 motion because
      the City’s evidence was legally insufficient at the close of its case.

      3. [Baffes’s] conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence
      on the full trial record.

      4. [Baffes’s] conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      5. The trial court erred by allowing trial to proceed without
      meaningfully resolving [Baffes’s] pretrial request for discovery
      materials relevant to causation, witness credibility, and the defense
      theory.

II. Law and Analysis

                For ease of discussion, we will address Baffes’s assignments of error

out of order.

      A. Second and Third Assigned Errors for Review — Sufficiency

                In his second and third assigned errors for review, Baffes claims that

the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for assured

clear distance in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A). As these assignments of error rely on

the same facts and law, we will address them together. Upon a complete review of

the record, we find the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Baffes’s

conviction and overrule his second and third assignments of error.

                1. Standard of Review

                “The test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the

prosecution met its burden of production at trial.” State v. Wilborn, 2024-Ohio-
5003, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Cottingham, 

2020-Ohio-4220, ¶ 32

 (8th Dist.).

A sufficiency review “is not a factual determination, but a question of law.” State v.

Jackson, 

2025-Ohio-109, ¶ 25

 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 

78 Ohio St.3d

380, 386

 (1997). In reviewing a challenge based on sufficiency, we “must consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether the

evidence, if believed, would convince an average person that each element of the

crime had been met.” State v. McClain, 

2026-Ohio-3934, ¶ 1

.

              When reviewing the evidence, we must keep in mind that “[p]roof of

guilt may be supported ‘by circumstantial evidence, real evidence, and direct

evidence, or any combination of all three, and all three have equal probative value.’”

Wilborn at ¶ 38, quoting State v. Radano, 

2017-Ohio-1034, ¶ 35

 (8th Dist.). And

although each type of evidence has its obvious differences, “those differences are

irrelevant to the probative value of the evidence, and circumstantial evidence carries

the same weight as direct evidence.” 

Id.,

 citing State v. Cassano, 

2012-Ohio-4047,

¶ 13

 (8th Dist.). Our review of the evidence is not to determine “whether the state’s

evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant

would support a conviction.” 

Thompkins at 390

.

              2. Applicable Law

              Baffes was convicted of assured clear distance in violation of

R.C. 4511.21(A). “‘Assured clear distance’ is the distance between the car the driver

is operating and a reasonably discernable object in the driver’s path of travel.”
Yarmoshik v. Parrino, 

2007-Ohio-79, ¶ 29

 (8th Dist.). R.C. 4511.21(A) provides

that

       [n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar
       at a speed greater or less than is reasonable or proper, having due
       regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the street or highway and any
       other conditions, and no person shall drive any motor vehicle, trackless
       trolley, or streetcar in and upon any street or highway at a greater speed
       than will permit the person to bring it to a stop within the assured clear
       distance ahead.

               Ohio courts have consistently held that a person violates

R.C. 4511.21(A) if “‘there is evidence that the driver collided with an object which

1) was ahead of him in his path of travel, 2) was stationary or moving in the same

direction as the driver, 3) did not suddenly appear in the driver’s path, and 4) was

reasonably discernible.’” 

Yarmoshik at ¶ 29

, quoting Pond v. Leslein, 

72 Ohio St.3d

50, 52

 (1995).     A driver violates the statute if “uncontroverted evidence [is

presented] establishing all of the elements necessary to constitute a statutory

violation.” 

Pond at 52

.

               3. Analysis

               Baffes claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

support the final two elements set forth in Pond. He alleges that the evidence failed

to demonstrate that Shelton’s vehicle did not suddenly appear in his path or that

Shelton’s vehicle was reasonably discernible at the time.

               Whether a vehicle is reasonably discernible prior to a collision is

generally a question of fact for the finder of fact to determine. See Williams v. AVI

Food Sys., 

2020-Ohio-5001

, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v.
Major Waste Disposal, 

2016-Ohio-7442, ¶ 21

 (11th Dist.), citing Sharp v. Norfolk &

W. Ry. Co., 

36 Ohio St.3d 172

 (1988), syllabus. In Pond, the Ohio Supreme Court

made clear that “‘[a]n automobile, van, or truck stopped on a highway in a driver’s

path during daylight hours is, in the absence of extraordinary weather conditions, a

reasonably discernible object as a matter of law.’” Id. at 52, quoting Smiddy v. The

Wedding Party, Inc., 

30 Ohio St.3d 35

 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. But

the Court also noted that, “in numerous cases in which a collision occurred at night

or during extraordinary weather conditions that reduced visibility, we have held that

a jury question existed as to whether the object that the driver hit was ‘reasonably

discernible.’” 

Id. at 52

 (collecting cases).

               Here, Shelton stated that the collision occurred shortly after he

finished working that day around 4:00 p.m. The accident occurred during daylight

hours, and there was no evidence demonstrating the presence of extraordinary

weather conditions. This testimony alone is sufficient to support a finding that

Shelton’s vehicle was reasonably discernible prior to the collision. See State v.

Jones, 

2020-Ohio-3367, ¶ 71

 (8th Dist.) (noting that “[a] conviction may rest solely

on the testimony of a single witness, if believed, and there is no requirement that a

witness’ testimony be corroborated to be believed”), citing State v. Flores-Santiago,

2020-Ohio-1274, ¶ 38

 (8th Dist.). As such, Shelton’s vehicle was ‘“a reasonably

discernable object as a matter of law.’” Pond, 

72 Ohio St.3d at 52

, quoting Smiddy

at paragraph two of the syllabus.
              With respect to whether Shelton’s vehicle suddenly appeared in

Baffes’s path, Shelton testified that prior to coming to a stop, the traffic had been

moving slowly. A finder of fact could reasonably conclude that Baffes was on notice

that vehicles ahead may be slower moving or stopped due to the traffic conditions.

To the extent that Baffes claims that the evidence merely supported a finding that

Shelton’s vehicle suddenly stopped and that the City failed to prove that Shelton’s

vehicle “did not suddenly become an obstruction,” that it was “reasonably

discernible in time to stop,” or that Baffes’s speed was inconsistent with maintaining

an assured clear distance, we have previously recognized

      “[w]here conflicting evidence is presented as to any of the
      elements necessary to establish a violation of the statute, a jury
      question is created. ‘Especially in cases involving the assured clear
      distance statute, which, by definition, require evaluation of the conduct
      of the driver in light of the facts surrounding the collision, the judgment
      of a jury is more likely to achieve a fair result than is a judge made rule
      of law.’”

Yarmoshik, 

2007-Ohio-79, at ¶ 31

 (8th Dist.), quoting Ziegler v. Wendel Poultry

Servs., Inc., 

67 Ohio St.3d 10, 12-13

 (1993), quoting Blair v. Goff-Kirby Co., 

49 Ohio

St.2d 5

 (1976).

              Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the City, we find

that Baffes’s conviction for assured clear distance is supported by sufficient

evidence. Accordingly, Baffes’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.

      B. First Error for Review — Legal Standard

              In his first assigned error for review, Baffes alleges that the trial court

failed to properly consider the correct elements necessary to support an assured-
clear-distance conviction in violation of R.C. 4511.21(A). After a thorough review of

the record and relevant law, we find that the trial court utilized the correct legal

standard.

               1. Standard of Review

               Baffes notes that his first assignment of error is “not a sufficiency or

manifest-weight challenge.” Rather, he alleges that when the trial court rendered its

verdict, the trial court failed to address the proper elements necessary to support a

conviction for an assured-clear-distance offense. He did not object to the court’s

alleged errors below and raises this argument for the first time on appeal. As such,

he has forfeited all but plain error. State v. Wilson, 

2026-Ohio-2814, ¶ 16

 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Nieves, 

2022-Ohio-3040, ¶ 28

 (8th Dist.).

               Crim.R. 52(B) provides that plain errors are any “errors or defects

affecting substantial rights [and] may be noticed although they were not brought to

the attention of the court.” “‘Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken

with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a

manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Fluker, 

2026-Ohio-1278, ¶ 69

 (8th Dist.),

quoting State v. Long, 

53 Ohio St.2d 91

 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

“Thus, the party raising plain error must demonstrate ‘that there was an error, that

the error was plain or obvious, that but for the error the outcome of the proceeding

would have been otherwise, and that reversal must be necessary to correct a

manifest miscarriage of justice.’” 

Id.,

 quoting State v. Buttery, 

2020-Ohio-2998

,

¶ 7, citing State v. Quarterman, 

2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 16

.
              2. Analysis

              When rendering its verdict, the trial court stated:

      This is I-90 right after the West 25th exit. It’s where everyone tries to
      get onto the Jennings freeway. It’s narrow. People are always confused
      as to what lane they’re supposed to be in.

      However, it is a knowingness here in the city of Cleveland that that
      interchange right there is one that people have to be cautious about.
      And if you were going 65, 70 — I’m not saying anybody was doing that
      — but 60 miles — if you’re going the speed limit, once you get past the,
      uh, 40th exit and come up near the 25th exit, I mean, yeah. It gets a
      little bottlenecky there. But that’s called traffic. That’s called traffic, all
      right.

      It happens also at, you know, the Hilliard exit in Rocky River at 4:30 or
      4:45 in the afternoon. It happens at the MLK exit off route 2 in the
      afternoon and in the morning cause it’s traffic. And when there’s
      traffic, people have to be more cognizant and aware, reasonably aware
      of how they need to operate the vehicle so as not to run into somebody
      should there be as was described a sudden slowdown but not an
      unreasonable slowdown in traffic.

              Baffes claims that the court’s reasoning fails to consider the elements

set forth in 

Pond, supra,

 and, in turn, created its own legal framework with respect

to an assured-clear-distance analysis. We disagree.

              In reaching its conclusion, the trial court explained that when

operating a vehicle, drivers are expected to be aware of traffic patterns, including a

sudden slowdown in traffic. As discussed above, with respect to Baffes’s sufficiency

arguments, this analysis ties directly into the final two elements of the Pond

framework, i.e., whether Shelton’s vehicle suddenly appeared in Baffes’s path, and

whether Shelton’s vehicle was reasonably discernible at the time of the collision.
               Contrary to Baffes’s claim, the trial court’s explanation did not ignore

or create a new legal standard. Rather, the court’s explanation tied directly into the

elements set forth in Pond. As such, Baffes has failed to demonstrate that the trial

court committed plain error since the court did not operate under an incorrect legal

standard.

               Accordingly, Baffes’s first assignment of error is overruled.

      C. Fourth Assigned Error for Review — Manifest Weight

               In his fourth assigned error for review, Baffes alleges that his

conviction for assured clear distance is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We disagree.

               1. Standard of Review

               In contrast to a sufficiency challenge, which challenges the adequacy

of the evidence presented, a manifest-weight challenge attacks the evidence’s

persuasiveness. State v. Reillo, 

2026-Ohio-2701, ¶ 24

, citing State v. Jordan, 2023-

Ohio-3800, ¶ 15. “[W]hile a review of the sufficiency of the evidence asks whether

the State met its burden of production, a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge

looks to whether the State met its burden of persuasion.” 

Id.,

 citing State v.

Messenger, 

2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26

.

               Under a manifest-weight review, we “must weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.” In re Z.C., 

2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14

, citing Eastley

v. Volkman, 

2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21

. As such, a manifest weight of the evidence

challenge will be sustained and a new trial ordered “only in the exceptional case in

which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” (Cleaned up.) 

Reillo at

¶ 27

.

              2. Analysis

              As discussed above, the evidence was sufficient to support Baffes’s

conviction for assured clear distance. However, Baffes claims that the evidence

demonstrates that this was not a routine rear-end collision but was instead an

“evasive-response event” or “developing traffic event” caused not merely by a

sudden stop in traffic, but also roadway hazards and additional “unresolved

mechanics.” He alleges the trial court erred in failing to give greater weight to such

evidence. In short, Baffes does not direct us to any evidence contradicting the trial

court’s findings but merely disagrees with how the trial court weighed and

interpreted the evidence presented.

              For these reasons, we find that Baffes’s conviction for assured clear

distance is not one of the exceptional cases where the conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Baffes’s fourth assignment of error is

overruled.
      D. Fifth Assigned Error for Review — Discovery Violation

              In his fifth and final assigned error for review, Baffes claims that the

trial court erred when it proceeded to trial without meaningfully resolving his

pretrial request for discovery materials.

              We find that the trial court erred when it failed to rule on Baffes’s

motion to compel prior to trial. However, Baffes did not object to the trial court

proceeding to trial without first addressing his motion. As such, he has waived all

but plain error. And since the record fails to demonstrate that but for the court’s

failure the outcome would have been different, we overrule Baffes’s fifth assignment

of error.

              1. Standard of Review

              “An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on discovery

motions for abuse of discretion.” Cleveland v. Johnson, 

2026-Ohio-739, ¶ 17

 (8th

Dist.), citing Broadview Hts. v. Vukotic, 

2025-Ohio-5855, ¶ 17

 (8th Dist.). “The

term ‘abuse of discretion’ means a ruling that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable.” State v. McAlpin, 

2026-Ohio-148, ¶ 14

. However, “[c]ourts do not

have discretion to erroneously apply the law.” Shiftmed, L.L.C. v. Westchester

Parkway Consulting, L.L.C., 

2025-Ohio-1554, ¶ 18

 (8th Dist.), citing Johnson v.

Abdullah, 

2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 39

. We are reminded that “when applying the abuse-

of-discretion standard ‘we should not substitute our judgment for that of the trial

court.’” T.C. v. R.B.C., 

2025-Ohio-1544, ¶ 10

 (8th Dist.), quoting Mills v. Mills,

2025-Ohio-452, ¶ 28

 (8th Dist.).
               2. Applicable Law

               In a criminal case, discovery is governed by Crim.R. 16 which

requires, in relevant part, that the City

      provide copies or photographs, or permit counsel for the defendant to
      copy or photograph, the following items related to the particular case
      indictment, information, or complaint, and which are material to the
      preparation of a defense, or are intended for use by the prosecuting
      attorney as evidence at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the
      defendant, within the possession of, or reasonably available to the
      state, subject to the provisions of this rule[.]

Crim.R. 16(B). The purpose of this rule is “to provide the parties in a criminal case

with the information necessary for a full and fair adjudication of the facts, to protect

the integrity of the justice system, the rights of defendants, and the well-being of

witnesses, victims, and society at large.”        Crim.R. 16(A).     In traffic cases,

Traf.R. 11(D) permits a defendant to request discovery in accordance with

Crim.R. 16.

               A party may file a motion to compel compliance with this rule “no

later than seven days prior to trial, or three days after the opposing party provides

discovery, whichever is later.” Crim.R. 16(M). If it is brought to the court’s attention

that a party has failed to comply with discovery, Crim.R. 16(L)(1) provides: “[T]he

court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a

continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not

disclosed, or it may make such other order as it deems just under the

circumstances.”
               3. Analysis

               Prior to trial, the court never addressed or ruled on Baffes’s motion to

compel that had been filed two weeks before trial. Traf.R. 11(E) specifically requires

all pretrial motions to be ruled on prior to trial. As such, we recognize that the trial

court erred when it proceeded to trial without first addressing and ruling on Baffes’s

pretrial motion to compel.

               However, prior to trial, Baffes did not object to the court proceeding

to trial without first addressing his motion to compel nor did he bring to the court’s

attention that discovery had yet to be resolved. As such, he has forfeited all but plain

error with respect to the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion to compel. See

Wilson, 

2026-Ohio-2814, at ¶ 16

 (8th Dist.), citing Nieves, 

2022-Ohio-3040, at ¶ 28


(8th Dist.). Baffes therefore bears the burden to demonstrate that but for the court’s

error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Jones,

2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 17

.

               Baffes directs us to our decision in Johnson, 

2026-Ohio-739

 (8th

Dist.), in support of his claim that his conviction should be vacated due to this

discovery violation. But Johnson is distinguishable from the case at bar.

               In Johnson, the defendant filed several motions to compel discovery

prior to trial. When the trial date arrived, the prosecution had still not provided

discovery to the defendant. The trial court “attributed the City’s failure to provide

discovery to Johnson’s decision not to provide an email address. The trial court then

required Johnson to proceed to trial without discovery over Johnson’s objection.”
Id. at ¶ 19. We reversed, finding that the defendant’s failure to provide an email to

the prosecution did “not relieve the City of its obligation to provide discovery to

Johnson. The City has an affirmative duty to provide a defendant with discovery

after written demand.” Id. at ¶ 22.

              In Johnson, the record was clear that the City had failed to provide

discovery to the defendant and proceeded to trial over the defendant’s objection. We

do not have the benefit of a similar record here. Rather, the record in this case is

unclear whether discovery was outstanding when trial began. And Baffes did not

bring to the court’s attention that discovery was outstanding or that the City had not

complied with the requests set forth in his motion to compel. Instead, Baffes chose

to proceed to trial without raising an objection. As such, Baffes’s reliance on

Johnson is misplaced.

              It has been well established that “appellate review is strictly limited

to the record.” State v. Yancy, 

2026-Ohio-1549, ¶ 15

 (8th Dist.). Thus, “[e]vidence

outside the record cannot be used in a direct appeal.” In re A.T., 

2021-Ohio-2934

,

¶ 34 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hartman, 

2001-Ohio-1580

; State v. Ishmail, 

54 Ohio

St.2d 402

 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus (“A reviewing court cannot add

matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s proceedings,

and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.”).

              Due to the limited record before us, we are unable to determine

whether discovery was outstanding at the time of trial, what the alleged outstanding

discovery may have contained, or whether the alleged outstanding discovery would
have changed the outcome of the proceedings. Baffes alleges that the body-camera

videos and interviews he requested could have provided impeachment evidence that

would have been relevant at trial. But without the alleged documents or videos

before us, Baffes’s claims are merely speculative.

               For these reasons, we are unable to conclude that the trial court’s

error rises to the level of plain error and that the outcome of the trial would have

been different had the court ruled on Baffes’s motion to compel prior to trial.

Accordingly, Baffes’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

               Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we

overrule Baffes’s five assigned errors for review.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction

having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to the trial

court for execution of sentence.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


______________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR

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