Miscellaneous Etats-Unis
Q.R. v. D.K.
Q.R. v. D.K., No. 2464, September Term, 2025. Opinion Filed on October 29, 2026, by Albright, J. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER In determining whether one is a de facto parent, the putative de facto parent’s maintenance of a residence other than the one in which they lived with the minor does not preclude putative de facto parent, per se, from establishing that they met the second prong of the test adopted in Conover v. Conover. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER In determining whether one is a de facto parent, the particular living arrangement of the putative de facto parent and the minor child must be considered. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER Ultimately, whether or not a putative de facto parent meets Conover’s second prong does not depend, exclusively, on whether that putative de facto parent maintains another residence, but on the contours of the household from the child’s point of view. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT The “de facto parenthood test measures the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child . . . without reference to the parent’s characteristics or the relationship’s origins.” Kpetigo v. Kpetigo,
(2018). “What matters . . . is the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child and the child’s best interests, not the relationship’s title or consanguinity.”
. CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT A putative de facto parent “bears the burden of proving the following when petitioning for access to a minor child: (1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.” Conover v. Conover,
(2016). CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT Because “de facto parenthood would interfere with the relationship between legal parents and their children,” we require putative de facto parents to meet a “narrowly tailored [test] to avoid infringing upon the parental autonomy of a legal parent.” Conover v. Conover,
(2016); Basciano v. Foster,
256 Md. App. 107
, 144 (2022). CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT A “de facto parent” is “a party who claims custody or visitation rights based upon the party’s relationship, in fact, with a non-biological, non-adopted child.” Kpetigo v. Kpetigo,
(2018). CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT De facto parenthood arises when, “with the [legal] parent’s knowledge and consent,” Kpetigo v. Kpetigo,
(2018) and while “labor[ing] alongside [the legal parent] in their family,” the de facto parent becomes “a psychological parent” to the child, V.C. v. M.J.B.,
(2000). In these situations, “the child[] [has] a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide for them. That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the emotional bonds that develop between family members as a result of shared daily life.” V.C.,
. CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY Even though a parent’s fundamental right to parent is implicated in a custody case, parents in such cases do not necessarily enjoy “the full panoply of constitutional due process protections” afforded criminal defendants. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE > CONTINUANCE The Court “has consistently affirmed denials of motions to continue . . . in the absence of unforeseen circumstances to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably mitigated, where untimely requests were made, [and] where procedural rules were ignored[.]” Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, Inc.,
(2011).
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE > CONTINUANCE
It is not an unforeseen circumstance to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably
mitigated when the litigant requests their counsel to withdraw, and their counsel acts on
the request.
Circuit Court for Charles County
Case No. C-08-FM-25-000604
REPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 2464
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
Q.R.
v.
D.K.
______________________________________
Leahy,
Albright,
Raker, Irma S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
______________________________________
Opinion by Albright, J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 29, 2026
*Tang, Rosalyn, J. did not participate in the
Court’s decision to designate this opinion for
publication pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.
2026.10.29
14:58:44 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
In Conover v. Conover,
(2016), the Supreme Court recognized de facto parenthood and adopted a four-prong test, first established by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,
(Wisc. 1995), for
determining when a putative de facto parent is in fact a de facto parent. Thus, after
Conover, a putative de facto parent “bears the burden of proving the following when
petitioning for access to a minor child:”
(1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
with the child;
(2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;
(3) the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant
responsibility for the child’s care, education and development,
including contributing towards the child’s support, without
expectation of financial compensation; and
(4) the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient
to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship
parental in nature.
Conover,
.
In this appeal from the Circuit Court for Charles County, the court concluded that
Appellee D.K.1 is the de facto parent of a child born to Appellant Q.R. through artificial
insemination while the parties were in a romantic relationship. Ms. R. does not dispute
that Ms. K. satisfied the first, third, and fourth prongs of the Conover test.
Instead, Ms. R. here argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Ms. K. and
the minor lived together in the same household—Conover’s second prong. She contends
1
To protect the privacy of the parties and the minor child, we refer to the parties
and adult witnesses by their initials and refer to the minor child by randomly selected
initials. We mean no disrespect in doing so.
that, because this finding was in error, the court abused its discretion in concluding that
Ms. K. is the minor’s de facto parent. Ms. R. points to the fact that Ms. K. maintained
another residence in the District of Columbia and argues that Ms. K.’s doing so negates
the living-together prong per se. We disagree.
Ms. R. presents two questions for our review,2 which we have rephrased as
follows:
I. Did the circuit court err when it found Ms. K. and the minor
child lived together in the same household and, on that basis,
abuse its discretion when it concluded that Ms. K. is a de
facto parent to the minor child?
II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms.
R.’s Motion for Continuance at the custody trial?
We answer both questions in the negative and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Early Relationship and Pregnancy
Ms. R. and Ms. K. were previously involved in a romantic relationship. The
parties met in 2018 and began dating in 2020. The parties were never engaged or married.
2
Ms. R. presented the questions as follows:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by determining that Appellee was
a de facto parent when she maintained an entirely separate residence
and did not live in the same household with the minor child?
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request
for a continuance so that Appellant could have counsel present to assist
her at an evidentiary hearing involving the determination of de facto
parenthood after her prior counsel withdrew from the case two days
prior to said hearing?
2
During their entire relationship, Ms. K. maintained an apartment in the District of
Columbia, and Ms. R. maintained a residence in Maryland.3
In 2019, Ms. R. prepared to have a child through the process of artificial
insemination by undergoing two surgeries, the first in 2019 and a second in 2020. The
parties shared in the planning of the pregnancy. Specifically, Ms. K. went to doctor’s
appointments with Ms. R., helped to pay for the mobile application used by the fertility
clinic to select the donor, discussed the characteristics of the ideal donor, filtered out
donors that didn’t meet their criteria, listened to the voices of potential donors, and paid
the additional fee to hear the voices of the potential donors. Ms. K. assisted in selecting
the donor. Together they selected a donor of Asian descent because they “didn’t want to
go with a white sperm donor” and Ms. K. didn’t want “a Spanish donor.”
Ms. R. received her first intrauterine insemination injection in 2021. Ms. K. took
Ms. R. to her insemination appointments, recounting that for one appointment, she had to
“pick up the canister [of sperm,] put it in [her] car[,] and take [the canister and Ms. R.] to
[be] inseminated.” Following the insemination procedure, Ms. R. would “lay in the bed
all day” at Ms. K.’s District of Columbia apartment. In December 2021, after five cycles
of intrauterine insemination injections, Ms. K. received a call from Ms. R. exclaiming,
“we’re pregnant.”
3
Ms. R. lived in an apartment in Columbia, Maryland, when she and Ms. K. began
their relationship. In 2024, Ms. R. and the minor child moved to their current residence, a
townhome in Waldorf, Maryland.
3
The Birth of Q.D.
Ms. R. gave birth to Q.D. on August 19, 2022, via cesarian-section. Many family
members, including Ms. R.’s mother and father, traveled to Maryland to be with Ms. R.
for the birth of her son. Under hospital policy, only one person was allowed to
accompany Ms. R. into the operating room. Ms. R. selected Ms. K. to be with her in the
operating room and witness the birth of Q.D. While Ms. R. recovered from giving birth,
Ms. K. stayed with her for “periods of time” in the maternity department, “leav[ing] to go
to work” and returning to the hospital “in the evening.” Ms. K.’s name was not on Q.D.’s
birth certificate. Even so, Q.D. calls her “mama Mǔqīn” (mother in Mandarin).
Family Life
From his birth, Q.D. lived with Ms. R. Following Q.D.’s birth, Ms. K. ate meals,
cleaned, slept, and left for work from Ms. R.’s Maryland apartment. Ms. K. would depart
from “work at 3:30 p.m.,” go to her District of Columbia apartment “to take care of [her]
cat[,]” drive to the grocery store to purchase items for Ms. R. and Q.D., and return to Ms.
R.’s apartment to “be with [her] and [Q.D.] throughout the night.”
Q.D. gave Ms. K. Mother’s Day and birthday cards addressed to Mǔqīn in Ms.
R.’s handwriting. Ms. K. listed Q.D. as the “beneficiary for all her assets.”
Ms. K. slept at Q.D.’s home on most nights from August 2022, when Q.D. was
born, until November 2022 when the romantic relationship “deteriorated.” Moreover, the
parties began to disagree on how to raise Q.D. In March 2023, seven months after Q.D.
was born, the parties were no longer “consistently spend[ing] the night together.”
4
Despite the change in Ms. R.’s and Ms. K.’s romantic relationship, the parties
continued to co-parent Q.D. Ms. K. continued to contribute to the cost of daycare and
purchase items for Q.D., including clothes, diapers, and food.
Pleadings, Motions, and Petitions
On April 22, 2025, Ms. K., pro se, filed a Complaint for Custody of Q.D., holding
herself out as a de facto parent of Q.D. Three days later, Ms. K., still representing herself,
amended her complaint. She sought joint physical custody and joint legal custody of Q.D.
The Amended Complaint stated that joint custody was in the best interest of Q.D. because
Ms. K. is “a fit and proper person to have joint physical [and joint legal] custody of
[Q.D.]” Ms. K. claimed that she was “in [Q.D.’s] life since birth and cared for him
because he is my son.” In her pleading, Ms. K. asserted that “[Q.D.] knows [her] as one
of his mothers[,]” and that she “can provide a safe and stable environment for [Q.D.]”
Ms. R. was served with the Summons and Amended Complaint for Custody on April 29,
2025.
On April 29, 2025, the parties cross-filed petitions for protection. Ms. K. and Ms.
R. both consented to the entry of a Final Protective Order (FPO) without admitting the
allegations in the petitions. Under the issued FPOs, the parties were to have no contact
with each other, and Ms. K. was to have no contact with Q.D. The FPOs were made
effective through April 29, 2026.
On June 2, 2025, Ms. R., represented by counsel, filed a Response to Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint for Custody (“Answer”). Ms. R. alleged that she is the “biological
mother” of Q.D. and that Ms. K. “has no standing to request custody [or] visitation of the
5
minor child [because] she is not a biological parent, nor a de facto parent to the minor
child.” In her Answer, Ms. R. declared, “Plaintiff fails the four-prong test to determine de
facto parentage, as she does not meet any of the four requirements for de facto parentage,
and therefore the ability to seek custody and/or visitation of the minor child.” (Emphasis
added). Specific to the second prong, Ms. R. asserted that
Plaintiff has not lived in the home of the minor child. The Plaintiff lives in
Washington DC, and the Defendant and the minor child live, and have lived
for the duration of the minor child’s life, in Waldorf, Maryland. The Plaintiff
and Defendant have never cohabitated and shared a residence together.
The custody trial was initially scheduled for July 21, 2025. Ms. K. requested, and
was granted, a continuance on July 17, 2025, to, inter alia, (1) file a Second Amended
Complaint to clearly state the necessary information showing her entitlement to the relief
being requested, (2) respond to Ms. R.’s Answer because the “nature of the document
reads like a Counter-Complaint[,]” and (3) allow her newly obtained counsel time to
“prepare a proper case for de facto custody.” The trial was continued until September 26,
2025.
On July 17, 2025, i.e, the day the continuance was granted, Ms. K. filed her
Second Amended Complaint for De Facto Parent Status and Child Custody (“Second
Amended Complaint”). Ms. K. asserted that together the parties decided to and planned
for a baby “by way of genetic donor.” The Second Amended Complaint pled specific
facts to support claims that: “through [Ms. R.’s] words and actions” she “consented to
and fostered the bond that [Ms. K.] shares with the minor child[;]” the parties “existed at
the same time and same place, having a sexual relationship, and raising a child like a
6
family[;]” the “parties worked together to ensure the minor child had what he needed[;]”
Ms. K. made “financial contributions [] without the expectation of reimbursement as []
part of raising a child[;]” and the parties “operated like a couple raising a child together.”
Specific to the disputed second prong of the de facto parenthood test, the Second
Amended Complaint stated, “[t]hat since his birth, the minor child has resided with the
Defendant, and the Plaintiff when she was there.” Ms. K. specifically requested
“recogni[tion of] Plaintiff as a de facto parent to [Q.D.]” and “shared physical and shared
legal custody of [Q.D.]”
Also on July 17, 2025, Ms. K. filed her Answer to Defendant’s Counter-Complaint
Titled Response to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Custody (“Answer to Counter-
Complaint”). Ms. K. denied that she lacked standing to request custody or visitation of
Q.D. She further denied that she did not meet the four-prong de facto parent test.
Ms. R. filed her Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for De Facto
Parent Status and Custody (“Answer to Second Amended Complaint”) on August 15,
2025. While Ms. R. admitted to a romantic relationship with Ms. K., she denied each
statement pertaining to planning the pregnancy, supporting Ms. R. during her pregnancy,
and parenting of Q.D. that Ms. K. asserted. In answer to where Q.D. resided, Ms. R.
admitted that Ms. K. “came to [Ms. R.’s] home in the evenings until [Q.D] was seven (7)
months old.”
The minor child has always resided with [Ms. R.], as she is his parent. The
child has never resided with [Ms. K.], as the parties have never lived together.
Further, [Ms. K.] only came to [Ms. R.]’s home in the evenings until the child
was seven (7) months old. [Ms. K.] never stayed in [Ms. R.]’s home again
after March 2023.
7
Ms. R. Asks Her Counsel to Withdraw
On September 9, 2025, Ms. R.’s counsel—on Ms. R.’s request—filed a Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel. In support of the Motion, Ms. R.’s counsel stated:
1. Defendant has requested that Counsel withdraw from the case, and has
provided her consent to this withdrawal of counsel by her signature on the
attached Order of Withdrawal. . . .
2. Pursuant to Md. R. Civ. P. Cir. Ct. 2-132, this withdrawal will not cause
undue delay, prejudice or injustice. Defendant is aware that the trial is set on
the docket for September 26, 2025, and will not be asking for a continuance
based on the withdrawal of counsel.
3. Plaintiff[’]s counsel does not oppose the withdrawal as evidenced by their
signature on the Order of Withdrawal, filed concurrently with the Motion.
Ms. R. consented to the Motion’s proposed Order, signing it on September 9, 2025, under
a line that said, in bolded capital letters, “Seen and Agreed.” The circuit court granted the
Motion on September 24, 2025, and issued a notice to employ new counsel on the same
day.
After the circuit court granted counsel’s Motion to Withdraw on September 24,
2025, Ms. R. requested a continuance to obtain new counsel. In her Motion for
Continuance, Ms. R. explained the timing of her filing:
The Defendant was represented by legal counsel, Tara Steinnard Talley, who
filed a motion to withdraw on or about [September 9, 2025].
At the time the Defendant attempted to contact the Court to request a
continuance, the motion to withdraw had not yet been formally accepted, and
the Court record still showed the Defendant as being represented by counsel.
As a result, the Court instructed that any continuance must come from the
attorney of record, even though the Defendant no longer had the benefit of
legal representation in practice.
The withdrawal was handled without proper notice or transition, and the
Defendant was not adequately informed by former counsel that they would
be required to represent themselves in the next hearing.
8
Ms. R. “d[id] not feel capable or competent to self represent” because “the best interests
and custody of a minor child” are “serious[] legal issues.” Ms. R. asserted that she “ha[d]
been making diligent efforts to retain new representation but ha[d] not yet been
successful due to the short timeframe and logistical challenges.” “Th[e] request [was]
made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay, but to ensure fairness, due process,
and the competent presentation of the facts in this case.” The Motion for Continuance
justified the request on “legal grounds and equity[,]” stating:
Courts have consistently held that due process requires that parties be given
a fair opportunity to secure legal representation, especially in matters
affecting parental rights.
Proceeding without counsel in a custody matter may lead to an unjust
outcome that affects not only the parties, but also the well-being of the child
involved.
A brief continuance would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and
would allow the Defendant the necessary time to retain new legal counsel
and prepare for a full and fair hearing.
Ms. R.’s Motion for Continuance requested a sixty-day continuance to retain new
counsel.
The circuit court denied Ms. R.’s Motion as a preliminary matter in the custody
trial on September 26, 2025. Prior to denying the Motion, Ms. R. confirmed to the court
that she had been notified by her prior counsel that a continuance would not be granted
for lack of counsel. The circuit court also ascertained that Ms. R. had one witness (other
than herself) present and ready to testify. And, while the court ruled that it would deny
Ms. R.’s continuance motion, it did indicate, from the outset, that it would delay closing
arguments so that Ms. R. could secure counsel.
9
The Custody Trial
The custody trial started on September 26, 2025. Ms. K. was represented by
counsel and testified on her own behalf. Ms. K. did not call any witnesses. The court
admitted twenty-one of Ms. K’s exhibits into evidence including photographs, doctor
appointment communications, daycare invoices, greeting cards, purchase receipts, bank
and credit card statements, emails, and 6,852 pages of text messages between the parties.
Ms. R., a pro se litigant during the evidentiary hearing, testified on her own behalf and
called her sister, Ms. B., as a witness. Ms. R. offered one exhibit as evidence, but it was
not admitted by the court. After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court adjourned,
postponing closing arguments. The circuit court notified Ms. R. that she could obtain
counsel to “argue the law” at closing argument.
On November 14, 2025, the circuit court heard closing arguments and delivered its
ruling orally on the record. The circuit court first summarized its findings of fact from the
exhibits received into evidence and witness testimony.
The exhibits[:] there were photographs, the sonogram, holding him at birth,
[] being the one person chosen to go into the delivery room. [Q.D.] was in
the hospital crib. There were texts about doctor’s appointments. There were
happy birthday cards to Ms. [K.] from, quote, [Q.D.] to Mǔqīn[:] thanks for
being a great mom. There was a card from Ms. [R.] saying, thanks for
showing care and concern. There was a birthday card in January 25 from
[Q.D.]. Happy Mother[,] and then there was a happy Mother’s Day, Mǔqīn,
and the first birthday party photographs. []Ms. [K.] was the contact for [Q.D.]
at the daycare. Ms. [K.] paid for the daycare. She used days off. There was a
document, and I know, Ms. [R.], you said it didn’t prove anything, but it
wasn’t contradicted. But [] it showed days off from work to care for [Q.D.]
when there was no childcare. Lots of photos of Ms. [K]. with [Q.D.]. In
August of ‘22, there was a text from Ms. [R.] to Ms. [K.] saying, you’re a
great mom[,] you’re a great parent. You’re so good for him. I see that you
love him.
10
Okay. So, the testimony from my notes. [] They decided to have the child
together, went to the fertility doctor together, looked at donors, she provided
money for it, decided on the Chinese donor together, split the cost of hearing
the donors’ voices, which was an extra cost in order to hear voices . . .
The Defendant called her to say, we are pregnant. [] Ms. [K.] was put on the
doctor’s forms as a parent and other matters also, other documents as well.
She made [Q.D.] the beneficiary for all her assets. That she slept at [Ms. R.’s]
house until 2022 when the relationship started to get rocky.
[Ms. R.] denied that [Ms. K.] wanted a child or wanted marriage. [] She
denies that Ms. [K.] went with her to her appointments. She states she didn’t
want her involved and eventually broke up with her due to the discord. She
tried to remain friends, but it was too stressful[,] that they had done all of the
selection of the donor and all the other things alone. She never intended to
do it with [Ms. K.], and that she wants sole custody, no visitation for [Ms.
K]. She chose [Ms. K.] to be in the delivery room because they were still in
a relationship then. But Ms. [K.] did not consistently spend the night with
her. And anything she wrote[,] read[,] said or wrote concerning her being a
mother was when they were still in a relationship. And she denied that Ms.
[K.] paid for anything. And she stated what existed three years ago was not
relevant.
Ms. [R’s] sister testified that she lived with the Defendant since 2018. That
Ms. [K.] was not on the lease. She had no keys. She did not live there. No
recollection of[,] of Ms. [K.] buying or paying for anything over the years.
After [Q.D.] was born, Ms. [K.] came maybe three days a week to spend the
night. When they moved to Waldorf, she didn’t come as often. And she
knows all this because she talks to her sister often and checks the Ring
camera often.
The circuit court determined, based on the admitted evidence, that Ms. K. met her
burden on the four prongs of Conover v. Conover. The circuit court’s findings of
credibility highlighted that Ms. K. was very credible in contrast to Ms. R. and Ms. B. The
circuit court found that “everything [Ms. K.] said was true[,]” while Ms. R. and Ms. B.
were “tr[ying] so hard to say this never happened . . . [but] it just didn’t ring true.”
I actually found Ms. K. very, very credible. I think everything she said was
true. She was very detailed. She was very specific. Very hurt when things
didn’t go the way they had been going. Acknowledged that the relationship
went[,] well[,] didn’t[,] went unwell, basically. Acknowledged that things
11
got different and got tougher, but did not feel that that changed her ability to
be a parent to [Q.D.]
...
What I thought about Ms. R.’s and her sister’s testimony was that it was
strained to find none of the above. It was twisted to find none of the above. I
did not find it credible. . . . [T]hey tried so hard to say this never happened[,]
it was never my intention[,] I never meant it to be[,] I never expected this to
be. And it just didn’t ring true to me.
The circuit court found that Ms. K. met the first Conover prong, proving that Ms.
R. consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship with Q.D.
Number one is that the biological or adoptive parent consented to and
fostered a petitioner’s formation of a parent-like relationship with the child.
All right. The testimony is different. But here’s my take on it, because I have
to find the credibility.
...
I believe . . . and she knew so many details about why a Chinese person was
selected. What about the voices? What about being in the delivery room?
And, of course, Ms. R. says, well, that’s because we were in a good
relationship then, but that changed later. . . . But I think that everything that
Ms. K. testified was true.
...
So, I think that everything that Ms. K. said did, in fact, happen. And I think
that Ms. R. did, in fact, consent to and foster . . . Ms. K.’s formation of a
parent-like relationship with the child. And I think she did that while it was
in her best interest, while it was good for her, while the relationship was
good, and then after the relationship went sour, just said, I don’t need this
anymore.
Finding that Ms. K. met the second Conover prong, the circuit court contemplated
the extent to which Ms. K. and Q.D. must live together in the same household. The court
noted the simplicity of the second prong when the parties are married and the
complication of the requirement in the instant case. The court reasoned as to the second
Conover prong that:
12
All right. Number two, that the petitioner and the child lived together in the
same household. The [] Kpetigo case was easy for the court because parties
lived together for six years. They were married. So, no court in Maryland has
said it’s got to be at least two years or it’s got to be this or it’s got to be that.
And every time one of these cases comes out, they evolve. Going all the way
back to Trox[el], if you wish, but Trox[el] was grandparents and that still
holds true, that grandparents don’t get de facto parent rights unless they are.
So, it is a factor to be considered. And I struggled with that because if we
take that literally and we say, oh, no, they didn’t live together enough, they
didn’t live together long enough, they didn’t live together frequently enough,
then we’re done. And I don’t think that’s the way it’s meant to be. . . . So I
think that, and I may be wrong, and if this case is appealed, I may be reversed,
but I do not think it’s a hard and fast rule that takes away from the fact that
these people did at least to some degree live together for some time while
things were good, and then still continued to co-parent until things got really
bad.
The circuit court found that Ms. K. assumed obligations of parenthood by taking
on significant responsibility for the child’s care, education, and development, without the
expectation of reimbursement, thereby establishing the third Conover prong. The circuit
court recounted how Ms. K. purchased household items, contributed to the cost of
daycare, and engaged in feeding, bedtime, and diaper changes, among other things:
All right. Number three, where the petitioner assumed obligations of
parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care,
education, and development, including contributing towards . . . the child’s
support. And I think that clearly happened. Payments were made, daycare
was paid for, groceries were bought, diapers were bought, many things were
paid for, diapers were changed, bottles were fed to the child, putting the child
to bed, you know, all of those things were definitely happening. Obviously,
less and less as Ms. R. started pulling back, and then not at all once Ms. R.
really pulled back. But I think that there’s no question that Ms. K. did all of
those things to the extent that she was able to, even as it got less and less,
including the stalking and hanging around and that kind of stuff that when
you were still trying to see him.
Prior to the circuit court making a positive finding on the fourth Conover prong, it
sought clarity from the parties on Q.D.’s age. Upon confirming that Q.D. was
13
approximately two and a half or two and three quarters, the circuit court concluded that
Ms. K. “has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with
the child a [] bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.” The court summarized:
He’s old enough to know who’s who. Children that age, [are] old enough to
understand who feeds him, who changes his diaper, who plays with him, who
takes him places, who’s at his daycare when they’re doing little events and
things like that. He’s old enough to . . . know that. And so, . . . I do think that
there was enough time for . . . a sufficient length of time for there to have
been established . . . a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature. I
think that did happen.
After finding that Ms. K. met all four Conover prongs, the court concluded that
Ms. K. is a de facto parent to Q.D. The circuit court again noted the difficulty in
determining to what extent the putative de facto parent must live with the minor child.
Nonetheless, the court found that the burden was met by Ms. K.:
I do find that there is a de facto parenthood relationship because I think that
all of these factors are met. And I know that the argument can easily be made
from a legal standpoint about living together and about how long they lived
together or didn’t live together, but I don’t think that the way the law is
developing that it’s meant to create particular cutoff times and especially
when the other parent is the one cutting off the time.
Having found that Ms. K. is a de facto parent, the circuit court then moved to the
best interest analysis under the Sanders-Taylor factors.4,5 The court found that it would be
4
See Taylor v. Taylor,
(1986); Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders,
(1997).
5
The circuit court found: that “there’s no question [Ms. R. and Ms. K. are] both fit
parents[;]” there was “no negative indication” as to the “character and reputation of the
parties[;]” that “Ms. K. is extremely sincere and wants [access]” but “no willingness on
Ms. R.’s part to share custody[;]” that Ms. K. would “maintain the child’s relationship
with the other parent[;]” that Q.D. is not old enough to have a preference regarding
14
in the best interest of Q.D. to maintain a relationship with his de facto parent. To this end,
the circuit court granted Ms. K. visitation with Q.D. and physical and legal custody to
Ms. R. In conformity with its oral findings, the circuit court issued its “Amended Order
of Court” on December 23, 2025.6
This timely appeal followed. We add additional facts below as necessary.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Maryland Rule 8-131(c), this Court reviews “both the law and evidence”
when reviewing actions tried without a jury. B.O. v. S.O.,
252 Md. App. 486
, 501 (2021). Our Supreme Court distilled “three distinct aspects of review in child custody disputes[.]” In re Yve S.,
(2003) (citation modified).
First, when the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous
standard of Rule 8-131(c) applies.
“A trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous if there is competent or material evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion.” Azizova v. Suleymanov,
(2019) (citation modified). “[We] will
give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131.
custody; that the geographic proximity allows for easy access; each party has a stable
home for the child; there are no known financial issues; the parties are employed; the
child’s health is not at issue; Q.D. had a good relationship with both parties; the parties
were separated for “seven months” which is “[not] that long” and “[Q.D.] would
remember” and “certainly get used to reestablishing his relationship with Ms. K.[;]” no
prior abandonment or surrender of custody; and no evidence of “potential disruption of
the child’s social and school life.”
6
The order was amended (without substantive changes) because the original order
did not upload properly.
15
Second, “if it appears that the court erred as to matters of law, further proceedings
in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless.”
In re Yve S.,
.
Third, “when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion[,] . . . the [court’s]
decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”
There
is an abuse of discretion when:
no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court, when
the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, when the
court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences
before the court, when the ruling is violative of fact and logic, or when its
decision is well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing
court.
Jose v. Jose,
, 598–99 (2018) (citation modified).
DISCUSSION
I. The circuit court did not err when it found that Ms. K. and Q.D. lived
together in the same household, nor did it abuse its discretion in its ultimate
conclusion that—having met the four prongs of Conover—Ms. K. is a de facto
parent to Q.D.
A. Legal Framework
We begin our analysis by summarizing parental rights and their expansion to third
parties under the doctrine of de facto parenthood. We then turn to the disputed second
Conover prong and relevant decisions from other jurisdictions that address the “living
together” prong of the de facto parent test. Finally, we review the circuit court’s findings
on whether Ms. K. satisfied the second Conover prong and consider the circuit court’s
ultimate conclusion that Ms. K. is a de facto parent to Q.D.
16
1. Fundamental Rights of Parents
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the right of a parent to
“establish a home and bring up children” in 1923. Meyer v. Nebraska,
(1923). The Court recognized this right as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville,
(2000). Protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the liberty interest encompasses the “care, custody, and control of their children,” Troxel,
, and recognizes a “cognizable and substantial” interest in retaining custody of their children, Stanley v. Illinois,
(1972).
In Maryland, “a parent’s liberty interest in raising a child [is] a fundamental one
that cannot be taken away unless clearly justified.” In re Yve S.,
. The right to rear one’s children is “essential,” and the right is included among a parent’s “basic civil rights.” Wagner v. Wagner,
(1996) (citation modified). “The proper starting point for legal analysis when the State involves itself in family relations is the fundamental constitutional rights of a parent.” In re Yve S.,
.
However, the rights of parents are not absolute because “the best interest[s] of the
children is the paramount fact” when deciding questions of custody. A.A. v. Ab.D.,
Md. App. 418, 441
(2020) (quoting Kartman v. Kartman,
(1932)). In determinations of custody, the court seeks to balance the child’s “indefeasible right to have their best interests fully considered” against liberty interests of the parent. Basciano v. Foster,
256 Md. App. 107
, 131 (2022) (citation modified).
17
To this end, we “recognize a rebuttable presumption that the child’s best interests
will best be served by custody in a biological parent, over a third-party.” Karen P. v.
Christopher J.B.,
(2005) (citation modified). Regarding third-
party petitioners,
[w]here the dispute is between a fit parent and a private third party, both
parties do not begin on equal footing in respect to rights to care, custody, and
control of the children. The parent is asserting a fundamental constitutional
right. The third party is not. A private third party has no fundamental
constitutional right to raise the children of others.
E.N. v. T.R.,
(2021) (citation modified). A third-party seeking custody of a child must rebut the presumption in the biological parent by a preponderance of the evidence. Shurupoff v. Vockroth,
(2003).
Until recently, a third-party petitioning to obtain custody of a child from her
natural parents had to demonstrate parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances.
McDermott v. Dougherty,
(2005). Today, however, we recognize “a narrow class of third parties who have a special relationship with a child” where a showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances is not required. Kpetigo v. Kpetigo,
(2018); Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 133. The narrow class of third parties is de facto parents. Kpetigo,
.
De facto parenthood does not hinge on the child’s legal parent being absent.
Instead,
rebutting the presumption of custody in the biological parent, is not
dependent on its development during the absence of the biological parent. A
relationship resulting in bonding and psychological dependence upon a
person without biological connection can develop during an ongoing
biological parent/child relationship. Particularly is this true when the
18
relationship is developed in the context of a family unit and is fostered,
facilitated and, for most of the child’s life, encouraged by the biological
parent.
Conover, 450 Md. at 76–77 (2016) (quoting Monroe v. Monroe,
(1993)) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, because “de facto parenthood would interfere with the relationship between legal parents and their children,” we require putative de facto parents to meet a “narrowly tailored [test] to avoid infringing upon the parental autonomy of a legal parent.” Conover,
; Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 144.
2. De Facto Parenthood
A “de facto parent” is “a party who claims custody or visitation rights based upon
the party’s relationship, in fact, with a non-biological, non-adopted child.”7 Kpetigo,
Md. App. at 570
(citation modified). A putative de facto parent must demonstrate the
following to obtain de facto status:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
with the child;8
(2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;
(3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and
7
“Other jurisdictions have also referred to this status as a ‘psychological parent,’
an ‘equitable parent,’ a ‘de facto custodian,’ or being in loco parentis.” Kpetigo,
n.3. The Maryland Supreme Court defined “‘psychological parents’ as ‘third parties who have, in effect become parents’” or who have, “essentially, like de facto parents, . . . assumed a parental role.”
(citation modified).
8
Where there are two existing legal parents, both parents must be shown to have
consented to a third party’s formation of a parent-like relationship with a child or, in the
alternative, that one or both parents are unfit or exceptional circumstances exist before
establishing de facto parenthood. E.N. v. T.R.,
.
19
development, including contributing towards the child’s support,
without expectation of financial compensation; and
(4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time
sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent
relationship parental in nature.
Conover,
(emphasis added) (citing In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W. 2d at 435–36). In Conover, our Supreme Court made “explicit that de facto parents are distinct from other third parties.”
. Thus, a de facto parent has “standing to contest custody or visitation and need not show parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances before a trial court can apply a best interest of the child analysis.”
In so doing, the Court adopted the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s H.S.H.-K. de facto parent test.
.
The adoption of the H.S.H.-K four-part test was grounded in setting a “high bar for
establishing de facto parent status,” and in the “knowing participation” of the legal
parent. Conover,
. Importantly, the factors ensure that the proceedings are
properly “focus[ed] on the child” and are intended to “protect[] a child’s best interest by
preserving the child’s relationship with an adult who has been like a parent.” In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W. 2d at 436. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
[w]hen a non-traditional adult relationship is dissolving, the child is as likely
to become a victim of turmoil and adult hostility as is a child subject to the
dissolution of a marriage. Such a child needs and deserves the protection of
the courts as much as a child of a dissolving traditional relationship.
Id. at 421.
Once the status of de facto parent is established, it “counterbalances (or
supersedes) [the legal parent’s] otherwise preemptive right to determine whether and to
20
what extent another adult is involved in his child’s life, and turns the court’s focus to the
best interests of the child.” Id. Stated differently, “a de facto parent is accorded the same
constitutional rights as a biological or adoptive parent, and with that, the presumption that
the child’s best interests are to be with that parent.” Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 144.
“A putative de facto parent transcends third party status when the party can
establish, first and foremost, ‘that the biological or adoptive parent consented to and
fostered the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the
child.’” Kpetigo,
(quoting Conover,
). The Conover Court “highlighted that the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test—the consent prong—is ‘critical because it makes the biological or adoptive parent a participant in the creation of the psychological parent’s relationship with the child.’” Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 145 (quoting Conover,
). Indeed, “de facto parenthood ‘cannot be achieved without knowing participation by the biological parent.’”
at 146 (citing E.N.,
at 398
(quoting Conover,
)).
Notably, “[n]ot just any relationship will work: the putative de facto parent and
the child must have lived together in the same household, with the de facto parent taking
on real parenting responsibilities over a sustained period of time.”
(emphasis added).
Maryland has yet to examine the second Conover prong; however, courts in other
jurisdictions have, to which we now turn.
Maryland is one of several sister states that has adopted the H.S.H.-K. test to
determine de facto parenthood. Appellate courts in two of these states, South Carolina
and New Jersey, have considered whether the second prong prevents (or does not
21
prevent) a putative de facto parent from maintaining another residence. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina concluded that the second prong was met even though the child,
legal parent, and putative de facto parent never resided together under the same roof.
Middleton v. Johnson,
(Ct. App. 2006). In Middleton, the child spent half of their time at the legal parent’s residence and half of their time at the putative de facto parent’s residence.
. The child considered each residence to be “home.”
The Supreme Court held that the “joint custody arrangement” qualified under H.S.H.-K’s second prong.
.
Similarly, the Superior Court of New Jersey concluded that the maintenance of
separate residences did not preclude a putative de facto parent from meeting H.S.H.-K.’s
second prong provided that the de facto parent and the legal parent presented themselves
to the world as a family unit. A.F. v. D.L.P,
(2001). Although the New Jersey Superior Court there concluded that the third-party was not a de facto parent, it did not do so because the parties maintained separate residences. Instead, the court held that “it [was] not the maintenance of two homes per se that negate[d] the living-together prong, but the way the parties presented themselves to the world that warrant[ed] the conclusion that they did not live together with the child.”
.
B. Ms. R.’s Appellate Contentions
Ms. R. argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that Ms. K. is a
de facto parent to Q.D. Focusing on the second Conover prong, “living together in the
same household,” Ms. R. asserts that because Ms. K. maintained a separate residence, she
did not meet this prong. Ms. R. adds that the circuit court’s finding that Ms. K. lived with
22
Q.D. “to some degree . . . for some time . . . and then still continued to co-parent until
things got really bad” does not satisfy the second prong of the Conover test because it
does not include a definite finding that the parties lived together.
Asserting that Maryland caselaw requires that the putative de facto parent and
minor child have “shared the same single household . . . for a significant period of
consecutive time, without dividing their time at their entirely separate household” to meet
the second Conover prong, Ms. R. argues that Ms. K. does not meet this prong because
she only stayed overnight irregularly for two and a half months. She adds that because
Maryland’s courts have not yet held that a putative de facto parent may maintain a second
residence while holding themselves out as a de facto parent, that situation does not meet
Conover’s second prong.
C. Analysis
We see no error or abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s finding that Ms. K. met
Conover’s second prong or in its conclusion that Ms. K. is Q.D.’s de facto parent. De
facto parenthood arises when, “with the [legal] parent’s knowledge and consent,”
Kpetigo,
, and while “labor[ing] alongside [the legal parent] in their family,” the de facto parent becomes “a psychological parent” to the child, V.C. v. M.J.B.,
(2000) (citing cases). In these situations, “the child[] [has] a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide for them. That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the emotional bonds that develop between family members as a result of shared daily life.” V.C.,
.
23
A putative de facto parent who maintains another residence is not necessarily
precluded from meeting H.S.H.-K’s second prong. A.F.,
. In A.F. v. D.L.P., a legal parent and one claiming to be a de facto parent maintained separate legal residences, spending “many nights together at one house or the other.”
. The parties were involved in an intimate, romantic relationship from August 1990 through June 1995.
. However, the defendant “hid the romantic aspect of their relationship from her family and friends, maintaining the appearance of a close, platonic friendship.”
. The defendant traveled to China to adopt a child in May 1995, and the petitioner was “one of several” people at the airport to greet the adoptive mother and child upon their arrival home.
.
In finding the petitioner did not meet the “living together” prong, the court
observed that petitioner kept the relationship secret and was “one of several close and
interested friends who [greeted the child at the airport] and offered help and support to
the new, single mother[.]”
Although the New Jersey Superior Court concluded that the
third-party was not a de facto parent, its decision was not a consequence of the parties’
maintaining separate residences:
We are aware that married couples raising children in so-called “traditional”
families often have to live apart for periods of the week or year, as when one
of the parents travels extensively on business, or takes a job in another city.
The critical distinction from the facts before us is that in those situations, the
parties continue to hold themselves out to the world as a family unit; they do
not secrete their relationship. It is not the maintenance of two homes per se
that negates the living-together prong, but the way the parties presented
themselves to the world that warrants the conclusion that they did not live
together with the child as a family, and that plaintiff cannot prove otherwise
to satisfy the second prong.
24
(omitting footnote).
Nor is a putative de facto parent precluded from meeting H.S.H.-K’s second prong
by the fact that they spend some nights in another residence, away from the minor.
Middleton,
. In Middleton, a legal parent and one claiming to be a de facto parent maintained separate legal residences, allowing the child to spend half their time at the legal parent’s residence and the other half at the putative de facto parent’s residence.
. The child considered each residence to be “home.”
In concluding that Mr.
Middleton had met H.S.H.-K’s second prong, the Supreme Court held that the parties’
“sort of joint custody arrangement” qualified:
As for the second prong, which considers whether the psychological parent
and child have lived together, it further protects the legal parent by restricting
the class of third-parties seeking parental rights. Normally, the child, legal
parent, and psychological parent have at one point, all resided together under
the same roof. However, we can conceive of a situation, as in this case, where
the legal parent and the psychological parent operated under a sort of joint
custody agreement where the child spends half the time at the legal parent’s
house. The other half of the time is spent at the psychological parent’s house,
which the child also considers home. This type of arrangement also suffices
to meet the second part of the test.
.
Here, when viewed with an eye toward measuring whether Ms. K. was a
psychological parent to Q.D., Ms. K.’s presence in Q.D.’s household, even if not an
everyday or every night presence, met H.S.H.-K.’s (and Conover’s) second prong.
Specifically, from Q.D.’s birth in August 2022 through March 2023, Ms. K. slept at Ms.
R.’s apartment on most nights. The three of them, Ms. R., Ms. K., and Q.D. slept in the
same bed. Ms. K. would commute to work from the apartment and return after work to
25
“be with [Q.D.] throughout the night.” Prior to her return, Ms. K. would stop at her
District of Columbia apartment to care for her cat and the grocery store to purchase items
for Q.D.’s household. Moreover, Ms. K. had clothes and toiletries at Ms. R.’s apartment.
While in Q.D.’s household, Ms. K. regularly ate meals, cleaned, and engaged in activities
with Q.D. After March 2023, the parties “did not consistently spend the nights together”
but remained in a co-parenting relationship.
Moreover, Ms. K. and Ms. R. “h[e]ld themselves out to the world as a family
unit[.]” See A.F., 339 N.J. Super at 324. Ms. R. did not keep her relationship with Ms. K.
secret. Ms. K. was the one person allowed to be with her in the operating room, leaving
Ms. R.’s mother, father, sister, and “family from all over” outside of the delivery room.
After Q.D.’s birth, Ms. B.’s testimony that Ms. K. spent “maybe three [nights] a week” at
the apartment shared by the sisters demonstrates that their sleeping arrangement was not
secret. Moreover, Ms. K. was the designated “parent” at the daycare and doctor’s office,
not “one of several close and interested friends who offered help and support to the new,
single mother[.]” See A.F., 339 N.J. Super at 324. Ms. K. took off days from work to care
for Q.D., and in instances of needing to leave work, she told her boss she needed to leave
to care for Q.D. The record fully supports the fact that Ms. K. held herself out as a parent
to Q.D. and that Ms. R. encouraged and supported Ms. K. in this role.
And their living arrangement, vis-à-vis where and with whom the minor would
live, was one that the parties consented to, even after the parties’ own romantic
relationship ended. See Middleton,
(recognizing that the parties’
agreement as to where a minor will live is pertinent to assessing whether a putative de
26
facto parent meets the H.S.H.-K.’s second prong). Here, from his birth, Q.D. lived with
Ms. R., and Ms. K. was integrated into the household by maintaining a regular routine
and commuting to the household established for Q.D.9 While at the apartment, Ms. K.
washed dishes, including the components used by Ms. R. when pumping breast milk,
changed Q.D.’s diapers, fed Q.D. bottles, and put the child to bed. The three of them, Ms.
R., Ms. K., and Q.D. would sleep in the same bed together each night. Ms. K. had clothes
and toiletries in the household. She paid for household food, baby diapers, half of the
daycare expenses, half of the expense of his first birthday party, and swimming classes.
In addition, Ms. K. paid for household expenses outside of Q.D.’s care including, air duct
cleaning for the home and tires for Ms. R.’s car. Ms. K. continued to support the
household after the romantic relationship ended through continuing to pay for a portion
of the daycare fees and purchasing food, diapers, wipes, and clothing for Q.D.
Ms. R.’s argument that putative de facto parents who maintain other residences
cannot meet H.S.H.-K’s (and Conover’s) second prong is unpersuasive. To be sure, no
Maryland case affirmatively holds that the maintenance of another residence is
9
Ms. K. filed her Complaint and First Amended Complaint using the standardized
“Complaint for Custody” Form. The form asks petitioner to provide the places and
locations where the child has lived in the last five years and with whom. On both forms,
Ms. K. provided Ms. R.’s name and address. At oral argument, and in her submitted brief,
Ms. R. contends that these entries on Ms. K’s original and amended complaints are
dispositive of the second Conover prong. This contention was not raised or decided
below, however. Accordingly, we decline to address it. Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily,
an appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to
have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue
if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of
another appeal.”).
27
acceptable for the second prong. But no post-Conover case has squarely (or tangentially)
addressed, one way or the other, how the maintenance of another residence might (or
might not) affect the second prong. In other words, the issue has yet to come up in
Maryland’s appellate opinions.10
In E.N. v. T.R., there was no dispute that the minor children lived with their
biological father and the putative de facto parent for several years prior to the biological
mother filing to obtain sole legal and physical custody of her children.
. The dispositive prong in E.N. was the first Conover prong where the Supreme Court of Maryland held that where two legal parents exist, both parents must consent to and foster the parent-like relationship.
In Kpetigo, the second prong was not examined because the parties stipulated that
the child “resided full time” with the biological father and stepmother between 2009 and
2015.
. On appeal, the biological father challenged whether use of the Conover test was proper because the parties were not in a same-sex relationship.
574
. We held that “nothing in Conover suggest[ed] that de facto parenthood is available only to same-sex couples.”
(explaining that the Conover de facto parenthood test
measures the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child—a
10
We addressed whether de facto parents are entitled to attorney’s fees in David A.
v. Karen S.,
(2019). There, the circuit court found that “Ms. Karen S. is, and has been[,] the de facto parent of Child[;]” therefore, the Conover prongs were not considered on appeal.
(citation modified). We held that as a de facto parent, she
“ha[d] the status of a parent and is eligible to receive an award of attorney’s fees and
costs under § 12-103(a)(1) [of Maryland’s Family Law Article].” Id.
28
relationship formed with the biological parent’s knowledge and consent—without
reference to the parent’s characteristics or the relationship’s origins.”).
In B.O. v. S.O., Basciano v. Foster, and Caldwell v. Sutton, the second Conover
prong was not disputed because the minor children lived with the third party for multiple
years in the absence of the legal parent. Instead, each case turned on whether the legal
parent’s consent to have a parent-like relationship with the child was voluntary. Compare
Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 154 (holding that consent was not established when a child
was placed in the care of petitioner under a safety plan implemented by the Maryland
Department of Human Services), and B.O., 252 Md. App. at 498 (holding that the first
Conover prong was not satisfied when the child was placed with the third party after
being “removed from [the legal parent’s custody] due to child neglect and domestic
violence”), with Caldwell v. Sutton,
256 Md. App. 230
, 277 (2022) (holding that the first
Conover prong is met when, for a period of eight years, grandmother “fulfilled the role of
Child’s mother,” after the child’s only legal parent voluntarily left the child with
grandmother prior to turning herself into the police and consented to grandmother’s sole
legal and physical custody of the child “even if she subsequently stated that she did not
intend to consent to Grandmother having de facto parent status”).
Ultimately, whether or not a putative de facto parent is a child’s psychological
parent does not depend, exclusively, on whether that putative de facto parent maintains
another home, but on the contours of the household from the child’s point of view. The
“de facto parenthood test measures the relationship between the putative de facto parent
and the child . . . without reference to the parent’s characteristics or the relationship’s
29
origins.” Kpetigo,
. “What matters . . . is the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child and the child’s best interests, not the relationship’s title or consanguinity.”
.
Here, there is no dispute that Ms. R. “consented to, and fostered, [Ms. K.’s]
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with [Q.D.]; that Ms. K.
“assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s
care education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support,
without expectation of financial compensation”; and that Ms. K. “has been in a parental
role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent
relationship parental in nature.” Moreover, there is no dispute that—for the first seven
months of Q.D.’s life—Ms. K. regularly stayed with Ms. R., commuting to and from
work from the Maryland apartment and engaging in household activities for the benefit of
Q.D. Ms. K. contributed financially to the household and was held out as a “parent” at
Q.D.’s doctor and daycare.
Considering the particular living arrangement presented here, we find no error or
abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that Ms. K. and Q.D. lived together in the
same household. Nor do we see error or abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s ultimate
conclusion that Ms. K. is a de facto parent to Q.D. The circuit court’s factual findings
were well-supported by the evidence. We hold that Ms. K.’s maintenance of another
residence did not preclude her, per se, from establishing that she met Conover’s second
prong.
30
II. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. R.’s Motion
for Continuance to obtain new counsel.
A. Legal Framework
Maryland Rule 2-508 provides, that “[o]n motion of any party or on its own
initiative, the court may continue or postpone a trial or other proceeding as justice may
require.” Md. Rule 2-508(a). A decision to grant or deny a motion to postpone a hearing
is within the discretion of the court. Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh,
(2006). Thus, “[a]bsent an abuse of that discretion[,] we historically have not disturbed the decision to deny a motion for continuance.”
This is true “even where the ground for the requested continuance is the withdrawal of movant’s counsel from the proceedings.” Fontana v. Walker,
(1968).
The Supreme Court of Maryland has made clear that only in “exceptional
situations” will a denial of a motion to postpone constitute reversible error. Plank v.
Summers,
(1954). The Court “has consistently affirmed denials of motions to continue . . . in the absence of unforeseen circumstances to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably mitigated, where untimely requests were made, [and] where procedural rules were ignored[.]” Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, Inc.,
(2011).
The Supreme Court has never “found it to be an exceptional situation, when the
denial has had the effect of leaving the moving party without the benefit of counsel.”
Fontana,
(affirming denial of a continuance when counsel withdrew from
the case the day before the hearing). A party who is notified of their attorney’s intent to
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withdraw and fails to secure substitute counsel in a timely manner is not entitled to a
continuance. See e.g., Das v. Das,
(2000) (finding that the husband’s claim of lack of notice was not credible given the attorney’s letter and a court notice advising him to obtain alternative counsel that were issued sixty days before trial); Serio v. Baystate Properties, LLC,
, 556–57 (2013) (affirming that a litigant
is not entitled to a continuance where the litigant was aware of the trial date and the
attorney’s intent to withdraw but delayed seeking new counsel until shortly before trial).
B. Ms. R.’s Appellate Contentions
Ms. R. argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her Motion for
Continuance. She argues that: (1) withdrawal of her attorney a “mere two days before
trial in a case involving de facto parenthood issues” was an “exceptional situation where
justice required” the continuance; (2) “the assistance [of counsel] was critical given that
the de facto parenthood [matter] relate[d] to the best interests of the minor child” and
“Ms. R.’s fundamental right to parent the minor child under the Fourteenth Amendment;”
and (3) it is “unjust” given a similar continuance was granted to Ms. K. on July 17, 2025,
for the previously-scheduled July 21, 2025 hearing. Ms. R. emphasizes that her
fundamental right to raise the minor child” is “superior to any third party’s request for
custody”—increasing the criticality of the assistance of counsel.
C. Analysis
Ms. R.’s first argument, i.e., that the withdrawal of her counsel a “mere two days
before trial,” is unsupported by the record. Ms. R. requested that her counsel withdraw,
and counsel moved to do so on September 9, 2025. At the time, Ms. R. indicated to the
32
court that she consented to her counsel’s withdrawal. Thereafter, Ms. R. did not object to
her counsel’s motion. Under these circumstances, counsel’s withdrawal was not the
surprise that Ms. R. suggests.
Moreover, the circuit court could not have acted on counsel’s withdrawal motion
earlier than it did. Under Maryland Rules 2-132(b) and 2-311(b), “unless the motion [to
withdraw] is granted in open court, the court may not order the appearance stricken”
“within 15 days after [service of] the motion[.]” Md. Rules 2-132 and 2-311. Here, the
Motion was served on September 9, 2025. The earliest date the circuit court could have
acted on the motion was September 24, 2025, the day it ruled on the motion.
Ms. R. next argues that the assistance of counsel was critical because it related to
the best interests of Q.D., which was of “transcendent importance” in this custody case,
and to Ms. R.’s “fundamental right to parent” Q.D. under the Fourteenth Amendment.
These arguments are not persuasive. Even though a parent’s fundamental right to parent
is implicated in a custody case, parents in such cases do not necessarily enjoy “the full
panoply of constitutional due process protections” afforded criminal defendants.
Touzeau,
. The Supreme Court of Maryland explained:
We have said that the right to parent is fundamental even in custody disputes.
The fundamental nature of the right to parent, however, does not necessarily
implicate the range of due process protections statutorily afforded to parents
in Child In Need of Assistance (“CINA”) proceedings and involuntary
termination of parental rights proceedings. Even in the two latter situations,
we heretofore have declined to require the full panoply of constitutional due
process protections to litigants, as afforded to defendants in criminal cases.
(citation modified).
33
Ms. Touzeau, as a pro se litigant in a custody modification, requested a
continuance asserting that, “she had a right to be represented by counsel because the
proceedings implicated the right to parent, a right [the Supreme Court of Maryland had
already] recognized to be fundamental.”
The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing out that even in termination of parental rights cases, and child in need of assistance cases, wherein the right to counsel is mandated by statute, a litigant is not entitled to the “the full panoply” of due process protections as is afforded a criminal defendant.
We do not doubt that this case was of critical importance to the parties and their
minor child. Nonetheless, Ms. R. provides no authority for why today’s result should
differ from Touzeau. Here, as in Touzeau, the custody trial was not a CINA or a
termination of parental rights proceeding. In other words, Ms. K. was not asking that
Q.D. be found in need of assistance or that Ms. R.’s parental rights be terminated, nor
could Ms. K. have done so.11 Given this posture, Ms. R. has not demonstrated that she
was entitled to counsel.12
11
See
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-809
(a) (CINA petition to be filed by local department);
Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-313
(b) (guardianship petition, as
antecedent to adoption through local department, to be filed by “individual who would be
subject to guardianship or a local department”).
12
Nor was the circuit court’s denial of Ms. R.’s continuance motion as sweeping
as Ms. R. suggests. At the outset of the custody trial, it was apparent that Ms. R. had one
witness (other than herself) present and prepared to testify. The circuit court then
indicated that it would receive evidence and, in order that Ms. R. have an opportunity to
secure counsel, continue the matter for the purpose of closing arguments. By October 8,
2025, counsel had entered their appearance on behalf of Ms. R. but did not ask to re-open
the evidentiary portion of the trial. Counsel did appear on behalf of Ms. R. for closing
argument.
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Finally, we see no merit in Ms. R.’s contention that the court should have granted
her a continuance because Ms. K. had been granted a continuance two months earlier.
Typically, continuance motions are evaluated based on the circumstances of the moving
party. Reaser v. Reaser,
(1985) (finding that the denial of a continuance was arbitrary because the trial provided “no reason for the denial”); In Re McNeil,
(1974) (concluding that the case must be reversed because
of the arbitrary refusal to grant a continuance to permit the mother to be present). Ms. R.
has offered no authority to the contrary. But even if the circuit court should have given
more weight to Ms. K.’s having been granted a continuance, the situation presented by
Ms. R. was not the equivalent of Ms. K.’s. When Ms. K. was granted a continuance, she
had already retained counsel; by contrast, when Ms. R. requested a continuance, she had
just discharged her counsel and did not have a replacement. On the record before us,
therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s denial of Ms. R.’s
continuance motion.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR CHARLES COUNTY AFFIRMED;
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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