Administrative United Kingdom
First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), 1 November 2026, n° 5zddb4mq
| First-tier Tribunal | |
| Immigration and Asylum Chamber | Appeal Number: PA/55695/2025 |
| THE IMMIGRATION ACTS | |
| Heard at Birmingham | |
| On 22 October 2026 | |
| Before | |
| TRIBUNAL JUDGE ASPINALL | |
| Between | |
| TK (Anonymity Order Made) |
|
| Appellant | |
| and | |
| THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | |
| Respondent |
Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss H Masih, Counsel
For the Respondent: Miss S Shah, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 5 February 2025.
Anonymity
2. The appeal concerns a protection claim. Publication of the Appellant’s identity may expose him or members of his family to harm. I therefore maintain the anonymity order.
Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan, born in 2001. He appeals against the refusal of his protection and human rights claims.
4. The Appellant’s case is that paternal relatives associated with the Taliban sought to recruit him in 2020. He and his father opposed his recruitment. He says that he was assaulted and threatened, his father was killed, and the Taliban have continued to look for him since taking control of Afghanistan.
The Hearing
5. The appeal was heard remotely by video on 22 October 2026. The Appellant was represented by Miss H Masih and the Respondent by Miss S Shah. The Appellant gave evidence through a Pushtu interpreter. The hearing was recorded by the Tribunal.
6. At the beginning of the hearing I admitted a certified translation of the document described by the Appellant as a warrant. I also admitted, without objection, the Respondent’s supplementary bundle concerning the availability of false Taliban documents. Both parties had an adequate opportunity to address that material.
Issues
7. The issues were
(a) whether, on the balance of probabilities, the Appellant has a Convention characteristic capable of causing him to fear persecution
(b) whether, on the balance of probabilities, he genuinely fears persecution because of that characteristic
(c) whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would be persecuted because of that characteristic
(d) whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that sufficient protection would be unavailable
(e) whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that there is no reasonable internal relocation alternative
Agreed Matters
8. The Respondent accepted the Appellant’s identity and Afghan nationality.
9. In the refusal decision the Respondent accepted that being killed by the Taliban for refusing recruitment would amount to persecution. At the hearing Miss Shah confirmed that credibility was the sole issue and that, if I found the material facts of the Appellant’s account credible, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation would not arise.
10. The parties agreed that credibility was the central disputed issue. No separate Article 8 case was pursued.
Evidence
11. I considered the hearing bundle of 341 pages, the Appellant’s certified translation, the Respondent’s supplementary bundle, the Country Policy and Information Note, Afghanistan, Fear of the Taliban, version 6.0, February 2026, the parties’ written cases, and the oral evidence and submissions.
12. The Respondent submitted that the recruitment account was implausible, the Appellant had not established who killed his father, the claimed current position of one relative was unsupported, and the warrant was unreliable. Relying on the Country Policy and Information Note, she submitted that the Appellant had at most a vague or non-specific fear of the Taliban. The Respondent also relied on section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
13. The Appellant submitted that the central account had remained consistent, the apparent discrepancies were peripheral or explicable, and the recruitment method was consistent with the relatives’ Taliban affiliation and the father’s position within the family. He relied on the warrant and the evidence of post-takeover visits to the family.
Legal Framework
14. Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applies because the protection claim was made after 28 June 2022.
15. DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 413 (IAC) requires the statutory questions to be addressed expressly and sequentially. The Convention characteristic and the existence of a genuine subjective fear are determined on the balance of probabilities. The questions of persecution, protection and internal relocation are determined to a reasonable degree of likelihood.
16. The balance of probabilities does not apply separately to each asserted historical fact. All the evidence must be evaluated in the round and given the weight it is due. The rejection of one part of an account does not require rejection of the whole.
17. There is no general requirement for corroboration. The absence of evidence which might reasonably have been obtained may carry weight, but it is not a condition of succeeding in a protection claim. I have applied MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216.
18. Section 8 conduct must be taken into account as damaging to credibility where the statutory conditions are met. It remains part of the overall assessment and is not the starting point or a substitute for considering the evidence as a whole.
19. The reliability of a document is assessed in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 and Hoxha and Others (Tanveer Ahmed; fraudulent applications; procedure) [2026] UKUT 378 (IAC). The question is whether the document can be relied upon when considered with all the other evidence. A finding that a document is unreliable is distinct from a finding that it is forged.
20. The Taliban are the de facto authority. A person genuinely perceived as opposing them may face persecution. Where the feared persecution is by the Taliban as the de facto authority, sufficient protection and internal relocation are unlikely to be available.
Discussion and Conclusions
Convention characteristic
21. Considering all of the evidence in the round, I find on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant has a characteristic attributed to him by the Taliban. That characteristic is an imputed political opinion of opposition arising from their perception that he refused recruitment and resisted their demands. It is a Convention characteristic capable of causing him to fear persecution. Section 32(2)(a) is therefore satisfied.
Subjective fear
22. I find on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant genuinely fears persecution because of that attributed political opinion. He left Afghanistan shortly after the events forming the basis of his claim and has maintained his fear throughout the asylum and appeal processes. The matters weighing against his general credibility do not persuade me that his subjective fear is not genuine.
Recruitment, refusal and past threats
23. I turn to the wider account, which I assess to the lower standard applicable to the question of future persecution. I accept to a reasonable degree of likelihood that Taliban members associated with the Appellant’s paternal family sought to recruit him through his father, that the Appellant and his father resisted those attempts, and that the Appellant was assaulted and threatened as a result.
24. The broad account has remained consistent through the asylum interviews, the witness statement and the oral evidence. The fact that other men joined voluntarily does not make the attempt to recruit the Appellant implausible. The Appellant’s evidence was that his father was the head of the family and that, in his community, such matters required the permission of the family elder. The approach through the Appellant’s father was consistent with that evidence.
25. The Respondent relied on a suggested inconsistency concerning whether the Appellant was at home with his father or tending livestock when he was assaulted. The interview questions were capable of referring to separate encounters, and Miss Shah did not pursue that particular point once the distinction was identified. In oral evidence the Appellant said that he was beaten in front of his father, whereas an interview answer placed him with livestock. I do not accept that a general reference to interpretation errors fully explains the difference, and his failure to seek a correction attracts modest adverse weight. The consistent substance of his evidence was that he was assaulted and told to persuade his father to permit him to join the Taliban. Viewed in that context, the difference about his precise location is peripheral and does not amount to a material inconsistency.
26. The Appellant said that one relative now holds a senior position in the Taliban in his home province. His source was his aunt’s husband, but he could not explain how that person knew. I do not accept that part of his evidence. That rejection does not undermine the central account. It concerns later and second-hand information rather than the recruitment attempts, refusal and threats which the Appellant described from his own experience.
27. I accept to the lower standard that the Appellant’s father was killed. The Appellant did not witness the killing. His mother heard voices which she attributed to the relatives, but did not see the perpetrators. I make no finding as to who killed the Appellant’s father, or as to whether the killing was connected with the recruitment dispute. I do not rely on the father’s killing when determining whether the Taliban retain an interest in the Appellant.
The warrant
28. I place limited weight on the purported warrant. It contains the Appellant’s and his father’s names and is broadly consistent with the asserted Taliban interest. There are, however, material differences between the two translations. The certified translation includes passages concerning the father’s killing, the taking of family members as hostages and the seizure of property, none of which appears in the earlier translation. The translator responsible for the earlier translation is not identified. The provenance of the document and the route by which it was obtained were not satisfactorily explained.
29. The Respondent’s supplementary material demonstrates that false Taliban letters have been available, but it is general evidence and does not establish that this particular document is false. I make no finding that the warrant is forged. Its deficiencies mean that it provides limited support and cannot establish the claim by itself.
Continuing Taliban interest
30. I accept to a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Taliban retain an interest in the Appellant. His evidence was that Taliban members visited and raided the family’s accommodation after the takeover, including the aunt’s home in Kabul, and continued to ask about his whereabouts. The most recent reported visit was approximately four months before the hearing. He also said that the family’s land was seized and that the family moved to the aunt’s home.
31. This evidence came to the Appellant through his mother and there are no statements from relatives in Afghanistan. I take those limitations into account. They reduce the weight of the evidence but do not prevent me from accepting it. There is no requirement for corroboration, and the account of the visits is consistent with the core claim and with the family’s move from their home.
32. The evidence establishes more than a private dispute with two relatives. The recruitment, threats and later visits were carried out by persons acting as Taliban members. The search extended to the aunt’s home in Kabul after the Taliban became the de facto authority. I therefore find to the lower standard that the continuing interest is held by the Taliban and is based on the political opinion they attribute to the Appellant.
Section 8
33. The Respondent relied on section 8(4). On his own account the Appellant travelled through Greece, Bulgaria, Austria and Italy without claiming asylum, and he remained in France for about eighteen months. The records contain inconsistent information about whether he claimed asylum in France. That inconsistency was not put to him at the hearing and I therefore place only modest weight upon it.
34. I have nevertheless taken the relevant conduct into account as damaging to general credibility. Considered with the evidence as a whole, it does not outweigh the consistency of the core account or the evidence of continuing interest.
Risk on return
35. Taking all of the evidence together, I find that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be identified as a person who refused Taliban recruitment and is perceived as opposing them. This is not a vague or non-specific fear of the Taliban of the kind described in the Country Policy and Information Note. The threats of serious violence and the continuing attempts to locate him establish a real risk of persecution for reasons of imputed political opinion.
Protection and internal relocation
36. The parts of the account I have accepted are the material facts upon which the Respondent’s concession depended. In any event, I reach the same conclusion independently.
37. The Taliban are the de facto authority. The Appellant could not obtain effective protection from them against persecution by their own members. The interest is not confined to a private family dispute and has already extended to the aunt’s home in Kabul. Internal relocation would not remove the risk and would not be reasonable.
Article 3 and humanitarian protection
38. The same findings establish substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
39. The Appellant is a refugee. He is therefore not eligible for humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. No separate Article 8 case was pursued.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds and on human rights grounds under Article 3 ECHR, is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds because the Appellant is a refugee, and no separate Article 8 claim was pursued.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
FEE AWARD
I have allowed the appeal but make no fee award. The appeal succeeded on the basis of evidence, including the oral evidence and the certified translation, which was not before the Respondent when she made her decision.
M Aspinall
Tribunal Judge Aspinall
1 November 2026
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