Administrative United Kingdom
First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), 1 November 2026, n° s7nndqn4
| First-tier Tribunal | |
| Immigration and Asylum Chamber | Appeal Number: PA/79117/2025 |
| THE IMMIGRATION ACTS | |
| Heard at Birmingham (hybrid) | |
| On 22 October 2026 | |
| Before | |
| TRIBUNAL JUDGE ASPINALL | |
| Between | |
| SM (Anonymity Order Made) |
|
| Appellant | |
| and | |
| THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | |
| Respondent |
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sadeghi of Counsel, instructed by Biljana & Co
For the Respondent: Ms Shah, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 4 July 2025.
Anonymity
2. The appeal concerns a claim for international protection. I am satisfied that an anonymity order is necessary to protect the Appellant and members of his family.
Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan born on 28 June 2000. He arrived in the United Kingdom by small boat on 14 September 2024 and claimed asylum the following day.
4. The Appellant fears the Taliban for three related reasons. He says that Taliban cousins attempted to recruit him and regarded his refusal as opposition to them. He says that his sister married a journalist who later worked for the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission. He also says that he was accused of deliberately setting fire to a mosque after accidentally dropping a lantern. The Respondent rejected the material parts of his account and refused his protection and human rights claims.
The Hearing
5. The appeal was heard as a hybrid hearing, with some participants attending in person and others by CVP. The Appellant was represented by Mr Sadeghi of Counsel. The Respondent was represented by Ms Shah. The Appellant gave evidence through Mr Janbaz, a Pashto interpreter. I was satisfied that they understood one another.
6. The Appellant was the only witness. I admitted his late supplementary statement, the letter said to have been issued by the Taliban, and its translation. I also admitted the Respondent’s supplementary material concerning the availability of false Taliban threat letters. Neither party objected to the admission of the other’s late evidence. The material was relevant to the issues, each party had an opportunity to consider the other’s material, and neither sought an adjournment. Its admission caused no unfairness (Maleci (Non-admission of late evidence) [2024] UKUT 00028 (IAC)).
7. I heard submissions from both representatives. The hearing was recorded. I have considered the documentary evidence, the oral evidence, the representatives’ submissions, and my record of the hearing.
Issues
8. The principal issues are whether the Appellant has a Convention characteristic and genuinely fears persecution because of it, whether he would face a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return, and whether he qualifies for humanitarian protection or succeeds under Articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
9. Article 8 was not pursued.
Agreed Matters
10. The Appellant’s identity and Afghan nationality are accepted.
11. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Shah confirmed that the Respondent maintained the position taken in the decision letter. If the material facts of the Appellant’s account were accepted, he would have no sufficiency of protection and no reasonable internal relocation alternative. The material facts in dispute included whether the Appellant is of adverse interest to the Taliban (decision letter, paragraph 12). The central issue was therefore the reliability of the account, including the Appellant’s claim that he remains of adverse interest to the Taliban.
Evidence
12. The Appellant relied upon his screening interview, two substantive asylum interviews, two statements dated 19 February 2026, his supplementary statement dated 20 October 2026, documents concerning his sister and brother-in-law, a certificate of employment issued by Resolute Support, and the letter said to have been issued by a district police command in Nangarhar Province, dated 15 September 2026.
13. The Respondent relied upon the decision letter, the Respondent’s Review, the asylum interview records, and the supplementary collection of news reports concerning false Taliban threat letters.
Legal Framework
14. The asylum claim was made after 28 June 2022. Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 therefore applies.
15. I have followed DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 413 (IAC). I must first decide on the balance of probabilities whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. I must then decide on the balance of probabilities whether he genuinely fears persecution because of that characteristic. If both questions are answered affirmatively, I must decide to the lower standard whether there is a reasonable likelihood of persecution, an absence of protection, and no reasonable internal relocation alternative.
16. The Appellant bears the burden of proving Questions 1 and 2 on the balance of probabilities. All other matters bearing upon the existence of a real risk are assessed by applying the lower standard of a reasonable degree of likelihood. I have applied those standards separately in the findings which follow.
17. I have considered the Appellant’s documentary evidence in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan [2002] UKIAT 00439 and Hoxha & Others (Tanveer Ahmed; fraudulent applications; procedure) [2026] UKUT 378 (IAC). The question is whether a document may properly be regarded as reliable when considered with all the evidence. The Respondent does not have to prove that a document is forged before I may decide that it carries little or no weight.
18. The Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in safe countries through which he travelled is conduct to which section 8(4) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 applies. I must take it into account as potentially damaging to his credibility, but the weight to be given to it is a matter for me and it is not determinative (JT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 878).
19. The claims under Articles 2 and 3 and for humanitarian protection fall to be determined separately. The question is whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of serious harm, a standard equivalent to a reasonable degree of likelihood.
Discussion and Conclusions
Recruitment and the move to Kabul
20. I have considered the Appellant’s evidence fairly and in the context of his age at the time, the passage of time, the use of interpreters, and the conversion of dates between calendars. I do not consider that the distinction between 2014 and 2015 is, by itself, sufficient to reject his account. The Respondent’s Review also relies upon a discrepancy as to when his sister’s engagement took place. That point was not put to the Appellant in cross-examination, and I place no weight upon it.
21. The consistent core of the evidence is that at least one of the Appellant’s cousins was a Taliban member, exercised local authority in the village, and encouraged the Appellant to join the Taliban when he was about 14 or 15 years old. I accept that this occurred. The account is plausible in its broad outline and has remained substantially consistent across the screening interview, asylum interviews, witness statement and oral evidence. I also accept that his family subsequently moved to Kabul in 2015.
22. I do not accept that this developed into persistent recruitment or a continuing Taliban interest. The Appellant was never contacted or threatened personally. His evidence is that any threats were conveyed through telephone calls to his father (asylum statement, paragraph 18). Those calls principally concerned the family’s return to the village and the possible loss of their land and house. Asked whether his cousin made threats towards him, the Appellant said that he probably did, but he could not describe any. There was no attempt to compel the Appellant to join and no approach from any other Taliban member.
23. The Appellant lived in Kabul from 2015 until 2021 and was not approached, arrested, threatened, or otherwise harmed there (AIR2 Q64). I recognise that Kabul was then under the control of the former government and give the Appellant’s safety there limited weight when assessing the risk he would now face. More significantly, after the Taliban takeover he returned with his family to his grandfather’s village, in the area where the cousin had exercised local authority. Although his stay was brief, he was not harmed or threatened by the cousin before leaving Afghanistan.
The Appellant’s brother-in-law
24. The sister’s identity document and the brother-in-law’s United States residence document, together with the Appellant’s consistent account in interview (AIR2 Q6 to Q14), provide some support for the claimed relationship. I accept that the man named in the certificate is the Appellant’s brother-in-law. I also accept that the certificate provides some support for the claim that he held a civilian role with the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission between 2020 and 2021.
25. The certificate does not establish that the Taliban were interested in the Appellant. It records a contract expiring in July 2021, and the Appellant did not know whether that contract was renewed. The brother-in-law and his family left Afghanistan at the time of the takeover and now live in the United States. The Appellant’s knowledge of his brother-in-law’s work, and of any threats made to him, was limited. There is no statement from the brother-in-law or from the Appellant’s sister, although the Appellant remains in contact with them and they support his family financially, so that such evidence could reasonably have been obtained. The Appellant’s evidence is that his cousins disapproved of the marriage, but he himself said that the risk arising from it was ‘not that much’ (AIR2 Q25). There is no evidence of any interest in him on that account since he left Afghanistan.
26. I have considered this association cumulatively with the other parts of the claim. It does not establish a present risk to the Appellant.
The mosque incident
27. I accept that an accident occurred in a mosque shortly before the Appellant left Afghanistan. His account of dropping a lantern while assisting his grandfather is reasonably detailed and has remained substantially consistent. I also accept that some of those present accused him of acting deliberately.
28. The Appellant’s evidence was that nine or ten people witnessed the incident and that opinion was divided. Some regarded it as an accident. His grandfather, who was respected locally, spoke on his behalf and persuaded at least some of those concerned that it had not been deliberate.
29. The Appellant said that Taliban members later visited his grandfather and proposed that the matter should be considered through a gathering of local elders. I accept that evidence. It shows that the incident came to the attention of the Taliban and that they intended to enquire into it. It does not establish what, if anything, they concluded about the Appellant’s conduct or intentions.
30. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the mosque incident caused the Taliban to attribute a religious or political opinion to the Appellant. Applying the lower standard, I am also not satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that the incident has given rise to any continuing adverse interest in him. I have taken into account the material concerning the Taliban’s criminal law and the punishment of offences against religion. It demonstrates the serious consequences which could follow if the Taliban concluded that a person had deliberately attacked a mosque. It does not establish that they reached that conclusion about this Appellant.
The late letter
31. The translated document is headed as a letter from the Police Command of a district in Nangarhar Province. The original bears a date in the Islamic calendar, which the translator has rendered as 15 September 2026. It directs the Appellant to attend the following day and states that, if he fails to appear, he will have no right to complain. It does not state why he is required to attend. It does not mention recruitment, his brother-in-law, the mosque, political opinion, religious conduct, or any alleged offence.
32. The Appellant said that two Taliban members gave the letter to a cousin in the family’s home village on 16 September 2026. That cousin is the son of an aunt and not one of the cousins said to be members of the Taliban. He sent the letter to the Appellant through Facebook Messenger on 19 September 2026. There is no statement from the cousin, no copy of the Messenger exchange, no metadata, and no other evidence of the circumstances in which the document was obtained.
33. The document appeared about five years after the Appellant left Afghanistan. There is no explanation for the timing, or for directing a person who had left the country five years earlier to attend the following day. The Appellant did not know whether there had been any previous letters or how often the Taliban had visited. He said that the letter had been sent to him electronically by his cousin and that he passed it to his representatives on 19 September 2026. I accept that the subsequent filing delay was not his fault and do not treat it as conduct damaging to his credibility. That does not, however, cure the absence of evidence about the provenance of the document, which limits the weight I can attach to it.
34. The Respondent’s supplementary material comprises a report by the Associated Press from November 2015, reproduced by two other outlets, and an investigation published by The Telegraph in October 2025, together with two reports of that investigation. It shows that false Taliban letters, including documents on official headed paper bearing official stamps, can be obtained. The letters it describes accuse the recipient of cooperating with a Western government and threaten serious harm, which is not the form or content of the document in this appeal. As I indicated at the hearing, I have given this material the weight appropriate to news reporting. It does not prove that this document is false, and I do not find that the letter was forged. Having considered its contents, provenance, timing, and the evidence as a whole, however, I am not satisfied that it is a document upon which I can safely rely. I attach little weight to it.
35. Even if the document were genuine, it is an unexplained direction to attend a district police command. It does not establish that the Appellant is wanted for a Convention reason or that he would face persecutory treatment.
Section 8
36. The Appellant travelled through Bulgaria, Slovenia, Switzerland, Italy and France without claiming asylum. His explanations were that the journey had been arranged for him and that he wished to reach an English-speaking country. Those explanations do not amount to a reasonable explanation for failing to seek protection when he had the opportunity to do so.
37. I treat that conduct as damaging to his general credibility. I nevertheless give it limited weight. He claimed asylum promptly after arriving in the United Kingdom, and I have assessed the substance of his protection claim on all the evidence rather than treating his route as determinative.
The statutory questions
38. I find on the balance of probabilities that at least one of the Appellant’s cousins was a Taliban member, sought to recruit him, and regarded his refusal as opposition to the Taliban. I therefore find that opposition to the Taliban was imputed to the Appellant. The Taliban are now the de facto state authorities. The imputed opinion is a political opinion and is a Convention characteristic. Question 1 is answered in the Appellant’s favour.
39. I also find on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant genuinely fears the Taliban because of that perceived opposition and the events which he says followed the takeover. A genuine subjective fear does not establish that the fear is objectively well-founded.
40. Having answered Questions 1 and 2 in the Appellant’s favour, I have considered the three asserted sources of risk separately and cumulatively, taking into account all of the evidence. Applying the lower standard, I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted because of the political opinion imputed to him, or that he is presently of adverse interest to the Taliban for any other reason. The recruitment approach began more than ten years ago, when he was about 14 or 15 years old. He thereafter lived in Kabul without being harmed by the cousin. After the Taliban takeover, he returned briefly to the area in which the cousin had exercised local authority, but was not approached or harmed by him before leaving Afghanistan. I take into account the short duration of that stay, but it remains material that there is no evidence of any attempt by the cousin to locate or punish him then or since. There is no reliable evidence of continuing enquiries, threats to his family, or any present interest in him arising from the refusal to join. The evidence concerning his brother-in-law does not establish any adverse interest in the Appellant. The mosque incident came to the attention of the Taliban, but there is no reliable evidence that they reached any adverse conclusion about him or that any enquiry continues. The late letter does not reliably establish present interest. Considered together, these matters do not establish a reasonable likelihood of persecution.
41. As recorded at paragraph 11, the Respondent’s concession concerning protection and relocation was conditional upon the material facts of the claim being accepted, and those facts included whether the Appellant is of adverse interest to the Taliban. I have not accepted that he is. Questions of protection and internal relocation therefore do not arise. Had I found that the Appellant faced a real risk from the Taliban, the Respondent’s concession would have resolved both questions in his favour.
42. The Appellant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. The asylum appeal is dismissed.
Articles 2 and 3 and humanitarian protection
43. I have considered these grounds separately and have applied the lower standard to all the evidence. For the reasons already given, I do not find a real risk that the Appellant would be killed or subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment by the Taliban.
44. The Respondent’s April 2026 Country Policy and Information Note concerning the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan records continuing hardship, food insecurity and pressure on public services. Those conditions are serious, but the country guidance in AS (Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2020] UKUT 130 (IAC) remains applicable. On the evidence before me, the general humanitarian conditions do not establish substantial grounds for believing that the Appellant would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.
45. The Appellant is a healthy man aged 26. He speaks Pashto, completed his education to Year 12, lived in Kabul for several years, and has work experience in Iran and Turkey. His mother and siblings live in Iran, and his sister and her husband, who live in the United States, support the family financially. He remains in contact with them. His return and reintegration would be difficult, but the evidence does not establish substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that he would be unable to obtain the essentials of life or would otherwise face treatment contrary to Article 3.
46. The Appellant has not established an entitlement to humanitarian protection or a breach of Articles 2 or 3. Article 8 was not pursued.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds, humanitarian protection grounds, and human rights grounds.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
M Aspinall
Tribunal Judge Aspinall
1 November 2026
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