Administrative United Kingdom

First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), 1 November 2026, n° t677fv3m

Official source
First-tier Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber Appeal Number: PA/77892/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Birmingham
On 20 October 2026
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE ASPINALL
Between
VK
(Anonymity Order Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr M Azmi, Counsel

For the Respondent: Ms K Lagan, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 11 November 2024 refusing his protection and human rights claims.

Anonymity

2. This appeal concerns a claim for international protection and allegations of serious violence affecting the appellant and members of his family. I am satisfied that an anonymity order is necessary and proportionate to protect them from the possibility of harm.

Background

3. The appellant is a citizen of Namibia. He says that S, a police officer who had been in a relationship with the appellant’s sister, assaulted him in 2022, and that S and two associates attacked him again in early 2023. His sister has since died, and the appellant believes that S killed her. He says that S then threatened him, that associates of S attacked him in his home village shortly before he left Namibia, and that S and others have continued to look for him since his departure. The appellant claimed asylum on arrival in the United Kingdom in May 2023.

The Hearing

4. The appeal was heard in person. The appellant was represented by Mr Azmi of Counsel and the respondent by Ms Lagan, a Home Office Presenting Officer. The appellant gave evidence in English without an interpreter. He was the only oral witness. The hearing was recorded. The appellant’s skeleton argument and bundle were served after the respondent’s review. Ms Lagan did not object to their admission, and she addressed the later evidence in cross-examination and in submissions.

5. Mr Azmi confirmed that Article 8 was not pursued. The parties agreed that the claims under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights depended upon the same assessment of future risk.

Issues

6. The issues were

(a) whether the appellant possesses, or is attributed, a characteristic capable of engaging a Refugee Convention reason and genuinely fears persecution because of that characteristic;

(b) whether the appellant’s account of past harm and continuing adverse interest is reliable;

(c) whether S or his associates would present a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return;

(d) whether the Namibian authorities would provide sufficient protection;

(e) whether the appellant could safely and reasonably relocate within Namibia; and

(f) whether removal would breach Articles 2 or 3, or the appellant qualifies for humanitarian protection.

Agreed Matters

7. It was agreed that the appellant’s identity is as claimed and that he is a citizen of Namibia. The respondent accepted that the harm feared by the appellant, namely being killed, would be sufficiently serious to amount to persecution or serious harm if a real risk of that harm were established. It was also agreed that Article 8 was not pursued.

Evidence

8. I considered the appellant’s oral evidence, his screening and asylum interviews, his witness statement, the refusal decision, the respondent’s review, the parties’ written and oral submissions, and the documentary evidence. The documentary evidence included police and medical records from Namibia, sworn statements made to the Namibian police by the appellant’s mother and former landlord, a death certificate, and country material concerning the Namibian police, corruption and mechanisms of accountability. Ms Lagan also relied upon the respondent’s December 2025 Country Policy and Information Note concerning women in Namibia who fear gender-based violence.

Legal Framework

9. The appellant claimed asylum after 28 June 2022. Sections 31 to 35 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply. I follow the sequential approach required by section 32 as explained in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 00413 (IAC), which amended part of the guidance in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC).

10. I must first determine, on the balance of probabilities, whether the appellant possesses, or is attributed, a characteristic capable of engaging a Refugee Convention reason, and whether he genuinely fears persecution because of that characteristic. The subsequent questions of prospective persecution, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation are assessed to the lower standard of a reasonable degree of likelihood. The evidence is considered in the round throughout.

11. Past persecution or serious harm is a serious indication of future risk unless there are good reasons to consider that it will not be repeated. Protection is sufficient where the state takes reasonable steps to prevent persecution by operating an effective legal system which the appellant can access. Internal relocation is available where the appellant would not face a well-founded fear in another part of the country and could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain there. The burden of showing that relocation would be unsafe or unreasonable rests on the appellant to the lower standard, and the assessment is holistic.

12. The humanitarian protection and Articles 2 and 3 claims are not governed by the section 32 split standard. The appellant must establish substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of unlawful killing or treatment contrary to Article 3. His circumstances and the country evidence are assessed together to the lower standard.

13. No conduct adverse to credibility under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 was relied upon. The appellant claimed asylum upon arrival in the United Kingdom.

Discussion and Conclusions

Convention reason and subjective fear

14. The respondent’s position, in the refusal decision and at the hearing, was that the claim engages no Convention reason. No Convention reason was identified in the appellant’s skeleton argument or in Mr Azmi’s submissions. The appellant’s account does not concern race, religion or nationality. Reporting a personal assault allegedly committed by a police officer does not, without more, establish an actual or imputed political opinion. There is no evidence that the appellant expressed a political opinion concerning the Namibian state or its police, or that S attributed such an opinion to him.

15. The appellant’s family relationship with his sister is an innate characteristic. However, no particular social group was advanced on his behalf, and no evidence was produced to establish that his family has a distinct identity in Namibia because it is perceived as different by the surrounding society, as required by section 33 of the 2022 Act. I therefore find, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant neither holds nor is attributed a political opinion, and that his family is not shown to be a particular social group. He does not have, and is not attributed, a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for a Convention reason. In any event, even if his family were a particular social group, the necessary causal connection is absent. The appellant’s own case is that S wishes to harm him because he intervened in the relationship, witnessed abuse and complained to the police. Any pressure placed upon his mother was intended to discover his whereabouts. The asserted motive is personal retaliation or the silencing of a witness, rather than hostility towards the appellant because of his family membership.

16. I accept, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant genuinely fears S. His prompt asylum claim, his movements before leaving Namibia and the broad consistency of his expressed fear support that conclusion. I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that he fears persecution because of a Refugee Convention characteristic. Both questions under section 32(2) are therefore answered against him, and his asylum claim fails. I have nevertheless considered the remaining questions because they determine his alternative claims.

Past events and documentary evidence

17. I have considered the evidence as a whole. The medical and police documents provide meaningful support for the appellant’s evidence that he was injured on two occasions and reported the incidents. Applying the lower standard, I accept that he was assaulted in 2022 and again in early 2023, that he sustained injuries, and that S was involved. I also accept that S was employed as a police officer. The evidence does not establish his rank or that he possessed influence over the police beyond his immediate locality.

18. There were differences in the detailed descriptions of the first assault, in particular whether the appellant chased S from the house and was attacked after locking the door or was attacked from behind while opening the door for S to leave. The appellant attributed the difference to the officer who recorded his police statement. I give the difference some weight, but it does not cause me to reject the broad account that an assault occurred.

19. I do not consider that the evidence about the sequence of the second incident reveals a material contradiction. The appellant’s evidence that he was stabbed and was then shot at while fleeing is reasonably consistent with the substance of his earlier account. I also place no adverse weight on the expression “first information of crime” in an investigation record. That expression may refer to the opening of that particular police file and does not establish that the appellant had never previously complained.

20. I am prepared to accept that the deceased woman named in the death certificate was the appellant’s sister and that she died before he left Namibia. The certificate records damage to vital organs as the cause of death. It does not state that she was shot or unlawfully killed, and it does not identify any person as responsible. In his asylum interview the appellant said that the police had told him that nobody was at the scene, and that he believed S was responsible because S was the only person with whom she had a problem. In his witness statement he said that he had witnessed her abuse before her death. His belief that S killed her is therefore an inference drawn from the previous relationship and alleged abuse. I do not find that the evidence establishes, even to the lower standard, that S killed her.

21. The appellant also says that S telephoned him with threats after the second assault and that, in May 2023, two men attacked him in his home village. He recognised one of them as an associate of S. There is no medical or police evidence of that incident, which he did not report. He left Namibia two days later, which provides a reasonable explanation for that absence. Applying the lower standard, I accept that the attack occurred and that the appellant believed one of the attackers to be associated with S. The evidence does not establish that S directed the attack. I also accept that the appellant received threatening telephone calls before leaving Namibia. Most came from numbers he did not recognise, and on one occasion the caller reached him through his mother’s telephone. His identification of S as the caller rests on his own account of what was said. I do not find it established, even to the lower standard, that S made the calls. These incidents provide limited assistance in determining S’s present reach or influence.

Continuing interest

22. The appellant relies upon sworn statements made to the Namibian police by his mother and his former landlord. I have not rejected them merely because neither person attended the hearing. The mother could give direct evidence about visits to her home, and the landlord could give direct evidence about inquiries made of him. Their absence nevertheless prevented the respondent from testing the identity of the visitors, what was said, and any connection with S.

23. The mother’s statement reports that men began asking about the appellant in June 2024. That is difficult to reconcile with the appellant’s answer in his asylum interview of 15 October 2024 that his parents were not then experiencing problems with S. He explained that he learned of the visits only after his interview. I have considered that explanation but do not accept that it resolves the difficulty. He said that he was in regular contact with his mother, and the alleged inquiries were directly concerned with his whereabouts.

24. The mother’s statement was made in support of a request for a protection order. It names two men who she says have repeatedly come to her home asking for the appellant and making threats. It does not mention S or explain any connection between those men and S. The landlord’s statement says that S himself has come to his home asking where the appellant is but gives no dates or particulars of what was said. The appellant also said in oral evidence that his mother had asked the police about his complaints, but her statement does not refer to this.

25. I accept that inquiries may have been made about the appellant after his departure, including by S at the appellant’s former address. I do not find that the evidence establishes that the visits to the family home were made at S’s direction, or that any of the inquiries demonstrate a continuing ability and intention to harm the appellant throughout Namibia. The inquiries are said to have continued at his family home and former address long after he left, which suggests that those making them did not know that he had left the country. The appellant has received no direct threat since his departure.

Future risk

26. The past assaults are a serious indication of possible future harm. I have therefore considered paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules. The evidence nevertheless provides good reasons to consider that the harm would not be repeated if the appellant returned to another part of Namibia.

27. The last established incident of violence occurred in May 2023, before the appellant left Namibia. The later evidence of inquiries is of limited weight for the reasons given. There is no reliable evidence that S killed the appellant’s sister, directed the village attack, or has access to police systems enabling him to locate the appellant nationally. General evidence of corruption and police misconduct does not establish that this individual officer possesses such influence.

28. Taking the evidence together and applying the lower standard, I do not find a reasonable likelihood that S or his associates would locate and seriously harm the appellant wherever he lived in Namibia.

Sufficiency of protection

29. The appellant was able to report the first two assaults. The police accepted his complaints and created records. Since his departure his mother and former landlord have each been able to make sworn statements to the police, and the landlord’s statement records that a case has been opened in respect of S’s visits. I accept that the evidence does not show that either of the appellant’s complaints resulted in a prosecution, and that the appellant was understandably dissatisfied with the response.

30. The failure of particular investigations to produce a prosecution does not establish that the Namibian state is generally unable or unwilling to protect him. There is no reliable evidence that S interfered with either investigation. His rank and influence have not been established. The country material in the appellant’s bundle records police misconduct and corruption, but also records internal investigations, criminal charges against officers, arrests by the Anti-Corruption Commission and complaints to the Ombudsman. The respondent’s December 2025 Country Policy and Information Note concerning women in Namibia who fear gender-based violence does not directly address complaints against a police officer. I give it limited weight on this issue.

31. In interview the appellant said that a complaint must be pursued at the station where it was opened. That may explain why his existing complaints remained with one station, but it does not show that he could not seek protection from police elsewhere, from senior officers or from another competent authority in respect of any future threat. He did not report the telephone calls, explaining that his earlier complaints had produced no result and that he was afraid. I understand that reluctance, but in the absence of any report it cannot be said that the authorities failed to protect him from that conduct. Mr Azmi submitted, relying on Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37, that protection must be effective. I do not treat the availability of protection as a guarantee that no harm could occur. I find, applying the lower standard, that Namibia operates a system capable of providing reasonable protection which the appellant could access.

Internal relocation

32. The appellant stayed in another part of Namibia for approximately two weeks. He said in oral evidence that he received no threats there, and he did not seek police protection. He left after hearing that a relative of S lived in that area. He accepted that his departure was preventative, and that neither S nor the relative had approached him there.

33. The appellant is a healthy adult of working age. He speaks languages used in Namibia, has previous employment experience, understands the country and remains in regular contact with family members there. His family has previously provided him with practical and financial assistance. There is no evidence that he has a medical condition or other personal circumstance which would prevent him from establishing himself elsewhere.

34. I have considered the relatively short period for which he previously remained away from his home area. That period does not by itself establish that relocation would be safe. It is nevertheless consistent with the absence of evidence that S has national reach. The appellant said that he returned to his home village because he had nowhere else to stay. That explanation goes to the practical difficulty of finding accommodation rather than to any risk from S, and his age, employment experience and family support bear on his ability to overcome it. Considering the appellant’s circumstances together with the country evidence, I find that he could travel to and remain in another urban area where he would not face a real risk from S. It would not be unreasonable or unduly harsh to expect him to do so.

Humanitarian protection and Articles 2 and 3

35. I have considered the humanitarian protection and human rights claims separately and throughout to the lower standard. The past assaults were serious, but the appellant has not established substantial grounds for believing that he would now face a real risk of being unlawfully killed or subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. In any event, reasonable state protection is available, and he could safely and reasonably relocate.

36. It follows that the appellant does not qualify for humanitarian protection and that his removal would not breach Article 2 or Article 3. No independent Article 8 case was pursued.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds, humanitarian protection grounds, and human rights grounds.

ANONYMITY ORDER

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

FEE AWARD

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

M Aspinall

Tribunal Judge Aspinall

1 November 2026

At Kohen Avocats, our immigration lawyer in Paris can review your situation.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.