Administrative United Kingdom

RA v THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/59925/25

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester

on 28th October, 2026

Before

first-tier tribunal JUDGE jepson

Between

RA

(anonymity direction Made)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr.Slatter, counsel instructed by Nag Law solicitors (by CVP.)

For the Respondent: Ms.Elmas, Home Office Presenting Officer.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 1st March, 2025 to refuse their protection claim made on 27th September, 2024. As such ss30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’) apply.

Anonymity Direction

2. An anonymity direction was made on a previous occasion. It remains in force until further order.

BACKGROUND

3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS.

4. The Appellant puts his case on two fronts. The first relates to claimed events in Sri Lanka. Cattle belonging to the Appellant were killed, along with those of others. He suspected a local Buddhist monk to be responsible, whom I shall call A. They are said to have ties with the military. It is worth observing that whilst the Appellant throughout his account seeks to draw a distinction between those feared and the Sri Lankan government, the Respondent makes no argument the parties involved are anything other than state agents.

5. A complaint to the police was refused, due to A’s influence. In response, the Appellant helped organise a series of protests. He then received a threatening call, accusing him of support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE.) Although the Appellant had helped former LTTE members and their children, he does not purport to have been involved with the group directly.

6. An assault then followed, in which the Appellant was injured. He left Sri Lanka via a work visa, with his wife and child. They returned, though on doing so were also threatened. As was the Appellant’s family. Based on that, the Appellant decided it was unsafe to go back. His wife and child came then returned to the UK. Asylum was sought thereafter. They are dependent on his claim.

7. In October 2024 (just after asylum was claimed,) the Appellant says he joined the Transitional Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE.) Several rallies and other events have been attended thereafter. That of itself it said to generate sufficient risk on return.

8. Although in an appeal reasons document uploaded 12th March, 2025 the Appellant refers to Articles 2,3,5,6 and 14 a later skeleton argument accepts every aspect of the appeal stands or falls on events described within the protection claim. I make that observation, given the appeal reasons suggest removal would be against the best interests of the Appellant’s child (who is dependent on the claim, as is his wife.) It is also said simply being of Tamil ethnicity would be enough whereby the appeal succeeds. Neither point is maintained in the skeleton. Nor were they mentioned in court.

9. The Respondent says nothing about sur place activity within the papers. That is because there was no mention of the topic until the Appellant’s bundle was uploaded on 1st July this year (a day after the Respondent uploaded their review.) It is suggested within the Appellant’s skeleton argument (10th June but also uploaded 1st July) political action within the UK would amount to a new mater. Consent was thereby requested. By the date of hearing that had yet to be addressed.

10. As to claimed events in Sri Lanka, the Respondent accepts nationality, ethnicity (the Appellant is Tamil,) support for the LTTE and that the Appellant was a government employee (he worked at a school.) Also conceded is a lack of available state protection or internal relocation and that the account engages the Refugee Convention. Dispute arises as to whether adverse attention was received in Sri Lanka. A number of credibility concerns are raised. I will discuss them in the main body of the judgment.

11. As to objective risk, the refusal argues any support of the LTTE is insufficient of itself to place the Appellant in peril. Reliance is placed on lack of membership of the group, that the Appellant was never detained or attended the protests himself. At the time of refusal, there had been no sur place activity beyond attendance at one Hero’s Day event.

HEARING AND ISSUES IN DISPUTE

12. The hearing was recorded. That shall stand as the record of proceedings.

Preliminary issues

13. I raised a number of matters with the advocates prior to the hearing beginning in earnest.

14. As noted, the refusal accepts LTTE support but disputes whether that would be enough whereby a well-founded risk of persecution or serious harm would result[1]. The primary argument made is that any activity in aid of the LTTE was at a low-level. To that extent, the refusal is clear. However, despite such concession, the decision-maker when assessing credibility seemingly disputed almost the entirety of the Appellant’s account. The only exception, beside fairly nebulous reference to LTTE support, was the Appellant’s work as a civil servant.

15. I asked Ms.Elmas to confirm which aspects of support for the LTTE the Respondent accepts as having taken place. Simply indicating, as the refusal does, that the existence of adverse interest is disputed was insufficient in my view.

16. Ms.Elmas requested time to confer with a colleague. The hearing was stood back for that purpose. On return, Ms.Elmas confirmed the only accepted parts of the Appellant’s account beyond his claimed work was employing ex-LTTE members as farmers and funding the education of their children.

17. The Appellant’s skeleton argument suggests sur place activity forms a new matter. It is said consent would therefore be required from the Respondent before I might take it into account. I invited Ms.Elmas to confirm her view. I also sought clarification as to the Respondent’s stance on political activism in this country – whether the evidence presented on the topic is accepted, if the Respondent accepts such action reflects genuine belief.

18. Ms.Elmas took the position sur place activity was not a new matter. Consent was therefore not required to raise it. The fact of political activism in the UK was accepted, specifically in support of the TGTE. The Respondent would, however, argue it had been undertaken purely to bolster the underlying protection claim. In the alternative, Ms.Elmas would say the extent of activity was not enough to create sufficient risk on return.

19. The Appellant’s witness statement (24th June, 2026) refers to interview corrections submitted by a solicitor. None are contained in the papers that I can see. Mr.Slatter was unaware of any, though indicated he would ask when the hearing was stood down. He also agreed to take instructions as to whether (per paragraph {f} of a grounds of appeal document uploaded to MyHMCTS on 12th March, 2025) a suggestion therein of interpreter error during interview was to be pursued.

20. Mr.Slatter later confirmed there were no interview corrections. Nor would it be argued interpreter error had arisen. Nothing would be raised on either issue, beyond reference them within the Appellant’s witness statement. That changed to an extent during his live evidence. I will discuss the subject in the main body of the judgment.

21. Part of the account involves people having been to the Appellant’s family home since he left. At page eighteen of a supplemental bundle submitted is a YouTube link said to show footage of that. When clicked on, the link says ‘video not available.’ I asked if that could be rectified. Mr.Slatter agreed to make enquiries when the case was stood back. He told me on return You Tube had apparently blocked the video. The Appellant had it on his phone. I did not invite viewing of that during the hearing. It would have introduced evidence (unfairly in my view) at the very last minute. Moreover, a still said to be said footage is included within the papers. As such, no unfair disadvantage was caused to the Appellant.

Issues in dispute

22. The Respondent concedes the following matters:

(a) The Appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka.

(b) He is Tamil.

(c) His account engages the Refugee Convention.

(d) The Appellant worked for the government in Sri Lanka.

(e) He supported the LTTE, to the extent set out in the previous section of this judgment.

(f) There has been sur place activity in the UK, in support of the TGTE.

(g) State protection would not be available on return.

(h) Nor would internal relocation.

23. The parties agree the following issues remain in dispute:

(a) Whether the Appellant received adverse attention in Sri Lanka.

(b) If the sur place activity shown is motivated by genuine political belief.

(c) Whether, irrespective of that, such behaviour would generate a well-founded risk on return.

Evidence and Submissions

24. I heard evidence from the Appellant. He was assisted by an interpreter, who confirmed understanding at the start of the hearing. No issues arose.

25. Following closing submissions from each advocate, judgment was reserved.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

26. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a) Applying DS[2], whether the Appellant has a relevant characteristic or one attributed to them by an actor of persecution such that the Convention is engaged.

27. This is conceded by the Respondent.

(b) Does the Appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?

28. A number of credibility concerns are set out in the refusal. I will consider each in turn, though when reaching conclusion have taken a global view. In doing so, I remind myself that even if one part of an account is accepted or rejected does not necessarily mean the same conclusion must be reached for another.

29. In the interests of clarity, I will refer to the Appellant’s screening interview as SCR and the two substantive interviews as AIR1 and 2.

30. Reliance is placed on what the Respondent deems inconsistency as to the extent of involvement in the protests which took place. Question 4.1 of the SCR is cited, wherein the Appellant said he had a ‘leading role’ (the translated phrase used) in demonstrations in 2023. That was due to anger over cattle being killed. The refusal contrasts that with comment at question 51 of AIR1 that the Appellant did not directly participate. Rather, he backed people running the events. Reliance is also placed on question 21 of AIR2, in which the Appellant said he made a deliberate decision not to be visibly involved due to being a government employee. He noted such behaviour was not permitted by those working for the state.

31. The Appellant sought to address the concern in his witness statement. Any mention of a leading role meant a behind the scenes position. Expanding on that quoted from each AIR in the refusal, the Appellant described helping to organise protests. That was because he employed former LTTE members as part of his cattle farming. Some of the profits from that work were used to help educate their children (AIR1, question 19.) A choice was made to demonstrate after the police said they were unwilling to go against A. Other farmers whose cattle had been killed asked the Appellant be what he called the ‘front runner’ due to his work for the state (question 33.) He also lost the most cows out of anyone (53.)

32. Slightly more detail was given in court. He explained that any government employee with less than three years’ service if caught engaging in political activity would lose their job. That meant taking a role which was not visible.

33. At question 57 of AIR1, the Appellant spoke of ‘we’ carrying banners. The interviewer challenged that, noting earlier claims not to have been present. In reply, the Appellant suggested he had printed the banners, saw protests via social media (58.) He described having paid for printing (AIR2, question 19.) Though reducing the weight applied given a correction was made within the space of one question, that nevertheless amounts to an inconsistency. Whilst not put to the Appellant in court, I can fairly take the point into account. It was raised during interview.

34. I bear in mind there can be no expectation of a full account during initial interview. It is fair to say from AIR1 onwards, the Appellant gave a fairly detailed description of his role within the demonstrations. He has not raised the issue at a late stage in the claim. Without engaging in undue speculation, I accept the term ‘leading part’ could hold various meanings. It does not, as the decision-maker contends, necessarily have to mean someone physically present for the protests.

35. In his grounds of appeal document, the Appellant suggested any apparent change in account on this topic was due to interpreter error. That assertion was not repeated in the later witness statement nor skeleton argument. Nor was it said in court. No specific parts of any interview have been cited as incorrect at any point, at least within the papers. As discussed at the start of the hearing, per Mr.Slatter no challenge to the interview was to be made beyond that said in the witness statement. Claims around mistaken translation were nevertheless made in court. They relate to a separate point, to which I will turn in due course.

36. Notwithstanding the above discussion, I have given no real weight to the Respondent’s concern. There was limited opportunity to give detail during the SCR. It is possible in referring to a ‘leading part’ the Appellant could have meant what he later described. Such phrase could just as likely mean behind the scenes action as being a visible face of something. That does not involve my engaging in speculation but rather observing words can sometimes have a number of different meanings.

37. The refusal went on to suggest insufficient detail was provided in interview as to why adverse interest arose. Questions 23 and 26 of AIR2 are cited. The decision-maker asked why, as the Appellant claimed, the government would be unaware of his behaviour given a report was made to the police. Also questioned was how A would know of the Appellant’s involvement.

38. Broadening that out to an extent, at question 22 the Appellant was asked why acting in a behind the scenes capacity did not jeopardise his government job in the same way as attending protests. The response was the government did not know about it. A distinction was drawn between A and the military, and the government. The Appellant said the latter would be unaware of his actions ‘..because this is a gang working on the ground trying to grab Tamil land’ (AIR 2, 25.) Any issue was not with the government, whom the Appellant said fear monks (35.) Instead, the problem was A and the military, who were said to be working with him. A distinction was drawn between the two.

39. In terms of how A would be aware, though not entirely clear the Appellant suggested at question 33 of AIR1 the police told him the military and A wanted dead cows to drive Tamils out of the area. As to how others knew about the Appellant’s role, he referred to approaching the police about the cows and being the one who lost the most livestock (question 53.) It was that which led to him heading the campaign (53.) The skeleton argument suggests, as does the Appellant’s statement, that within a rural farming community people were more aware of the actions of others.

40. That is not necessarily implausible, though nor was a clear explanation given why the government would be unaware of the Appellant’s actions. Although something to which I will return, I say that noting comment that MPs carried posters in Parliament protesting what had happened (AIR2, question 15.) The protests were also broadcast on the radio (14.) As will be discussed later in this section, it seems there was some media coverage of the events. None appear to name the Appellant specifically. However, it is difficult to reconcile the argument that A and the military knew what the Appellant had done via his relative prominence yet the government did not. If the role adopted was one people knew about locally, surely some risk of the Appellant’s job being forfeit also arose.

41. There is potential balance to that, at least in the sense of addressing how A and the military knew the Appellant’s part. In court, he described himself as the one person in the village who had an education. His clothing – a smart shirt, trousers and shoes – marked him as distinct from others. They were unaware how to complain about dead cattle or to whom. Although perhaps not to quite the same level of detail, much the same had been said in interview (AIR 2, question 17.) Whilst that might not explain how the government would be unaware, it could deal with how A and his military associates knew. When asked in court, the Appellant said he wore his ‘uniform’ (the smart clothing) to the police station. Within a community of one hundred cattle farmers who were otherwise uneducated, he may therefore have been more likely to stand out.

42. Comment was made A might have been aware of events due to it being the Appellant’s cattle killed ; it was also the Appellant who went to the police. He asserted they had told A (AIR 1, question 17.) A was someone of influence (AIR1, question 33.)

43. Part of the account involves a threatening call made to the Appellant. Per question 33 of AIR1, the caller was anonymous. They were aware of the Appellant’s behaviour, said they would tell the government he was trying to resurrect the LTTE. A friend advised the Appellant should leave Sri Lanka as a result. By the time of AIR2, it was A who made that call (question 23.) That was said in reply to a question around how the Appellant could claim A knew of his actions. In his witness statement, the Appellant reverted to claiming the call was anonymous.

44. I will address that momentarily but first will re-visit the question how A knew what the Appellant had done.

45. The extent of any link between A and the police was, prior to the hearing, rather clear. At question 11 of AIR2, the Appellant said the police told him if they took action A would attack them. Other than what appeared to be speculation, there was little clarity in interview (nor via the later witness statement) as to why the police would necessarily tell A of the Appellant’s role. The above question from AIR 2 suggested they were in fear of A rather than working with him. There was complaint to the village head (AIR 1, question 19) but no suggestion they might have told A of events.

46. An explanation as to how A knew was given in court. During cross-examination, the Appellant suggested because police officers attended a church operated by A, he may have learnt of the complaint that way. It might be asked how that fits with the assertion in interview the police feared A. Then again, fear could be a reason to inform on someone as much as any other factor. I equally bear in mind unless the Appellant knows how A found out any answer he gives would inevitably involve a degree of speculation. That means the point carries little weight.

47. Even if one puts that aside, there remains a variable account as to who called the Appellant. That is potentially significant, given the call formed the reason he was advised to leave Sri Lanka – specifically, that he feared A. It might be said in reply whether the call was from A or (as suggested in court) his associates does not matter. The threat remained the same. Whilst not ignored, that fails to address the change in narrative.

48. Comment was invited from the Appellant in court. He denied having ever said A made the call. Doubt thereby arises, given a clear assertion to that effect in interview. Compounding things, the Appellant also claimed to have received many calls. He accepted not having mentioned them in interview. Nor were they described in his statement. The explanation was that only the last call – that which was described – had been discussed.

49. I struggle to find that particularly plausible. Surely if, as is now claimed, there had been a series of calls prior to the Appellant leaving Sri Lanka he would have raised that. Even if was not possible in interview, an opportunity to address the issue arguably existed via the later witness statement. In saying that, I note comment made later in the hearing about being limited in interview replies by an interpreter. My findings about that – set out later in this section of the judgment – apply equally to this point.

50. Some damage is thereby done to credibility. That is both in terms of who made the call and how many were received.

51. Any claimed fear of A was said in the refusal to be vague. It was suggested therein the Appellant had not reported things to the police. As discussed above, that is clearly incorrect and so put aside.

52. Reliance was placed on question 12 of AIR 2, wherein the Appellant suggested A as a monk was above the law. He gave the example of such people being able to ride motorcycles without helmets. Whether that means the Appellant was claiming monks have total impunity, as the refusal claimed, is perhaps debatable. In his statement, the Appellant clarified he meant people in that position have influence and so the police are unwilling to act against them. Though not supported by external information, there is nothing necessarily implausible about that. Regardless, I find it slightly difficult to understand the point the decision-maker was trying to make. If clarity was needed, the interviewer had an opportunity to ask follow-up questions.

53. Objective evidence is cited[3], said to show monks have only low-level influence. Nothing from within the source given is quoted. It talks only of a parliamentary bill to limit behaviour rather than anything currently being in place. I cannot for that reason apply any weight. Perhaps more fundamentally, the Appellant’s position is not that A holds power on a national or even regional basis. Rather, his case is A acted with the military locally in the pursuit of Tamil lands. None of that in my view damages credibility.

54. Linked comment was made in the refusal about question 14 of AIR2. The Appellant said he was still of interest through being able to ‘vent’ to people and in Parliament. When asked by the interviewer about going there, the Appellant replied he had not done so. He then went on to talk about adverse interest through having organised the protests and their being mentioned on the radio (question 15.) The refusal deemed that to be unclear and thus a source of doubt.

55. Although clarity can be a relevant consideration when assessing credibility, I do not find the point to be one of any real significance. Via his statement, the Appellant explained any reference to Parliament was meant to convey that MPs had raised the issue there. Whilst accepting that was not quite what the Appellant said in interview nor is it something on which the appeal turns.

56. I say that given external material submitted on the Appellant’s behalf. At page eighty-seven to ninety of the Respondent’s bundle are a series of newspaper articles. They talk of protests against violence inflicted on dairy farmers in the area the Appellant describes. The Respondent’s review does not challenge the accuracy of that, commenting only that none of the evidence refers to the Appellant personally. That is correct, though it does go some way towards establishing the background events to account did take place. The refusal relied on one of the articles being from 2024, thus after the Appellant left Sri Lanka. Again, that is right though given it refers to two hundred days of protests the timeline generally fits with the Appellant’s account. At page one hundred twenty-four of the Appellant’s main bundle are similar articles. They can only support his case so much but do demonstrate conflict arose in the area over dead cattle.

57. At pages eighty-one and two of the Respondent’s bundle are pictures of the Appellant in what seems to be a graveyard and a dead cow respectively. From the papers, I am unclear as to the relevance of the first image. Nothing is said about it. The second may be broadly supportive of the narrative, though equally one deceased animal establishes little. As does images of a similar nature beginning at page one hundred fourteen of the Appellant’s main bundle. That said, given the existence of various news articles there seems little doubt dispute arose locally about livestock being killed. The issue was not addressed by either party in court.

58. The Respondent accepts the Appellant was a government employee. No concession is specifically made about him working at a school, though nor has doubt been raised on the topic. The refusal criticised a document at page eighty-three of their bundle due to its being untranslated. That is dealt with in the Appellant’s bundle, the English version found at page fifty-three. It comprises a job offer at the school. At pages fifty and fifty-one is correspondence from the school itself and a Zonal Education Office. Each notes the Appellant had vacated his post in January 2024.

59. There is also mention of people looking for him. I give much less weight to that. It is second-hand information, lacking detail about who the individuals might be. The letters do, however, suggest in coming to the UK the Appellant left his job rather than (for example) taking a leave of absence. It might be asked – as the Respondent’s review does – how that necessarily fits with claims of always intending to return to Sri Lanka.

60. The topic was explored in court. The Appellant said his intention was to stay in the UK for ten years, then return to start a business. No-one was told of that. Nor did the Appellant’s wife inform anyone, she being at university prior to departure. It could be said leaving what is portrayed as a good job on the assumption work in the UK would be a success was somewhat of a risk. The Respondent’s review notes that via his grounds of appeal the Appellant said he left his job out of fear (paragraph {g}.) The issue was not put in court, though clearly has been raised as a source of doubt. Though not a determinative point, some tension exists between claims on one hand to have resigned from being afraid and choosing to go due to plans overseas. I accept, in saying that, both could be right at the same time.

61. Whilst not specifically contained in the refusal, the Appellant was challenged during AIR1 (question 29) about suggestion in the SCR he had claimed to support the LTTE. I cannot see anywhere in the screening interview that was said. Rather, the Appellant noted at question 4.1 he was accused of trying to bring back the Tamil Tigers. The two are not necessarily the same. Whilst not something the refusal dwells on, the Appellant sought to address the issue in his statement. He explained the protests were nothing to do with the LTTE. His link to the group was limited to helping ex-members by giving them jobs and funding their childrens’ education. Much the same was said in reply to challenge from the interviewer (AIR1, question 29.) To the extent the point is still taken by the Respondent, I place no weight on it for those reasons.

62. Concern is expressed about an apparent lack of action taken against the Appellant until after he left for the UK. The Respondent’s review (30th June, 2026) also notes a lack of obstacle to the Appellant in leaving Sri Lanka and his wife and child being able to return more recently. In reply to the latter, the Appellant via his statement argues he was never formally wanted. As such, there was no impediment to departure. While I remind myself the Respondent bears no burden, there is no external information presented as to the efficiency of the Sri Lankan authorities in preventing exit.

63. The Appellant’s account must also be borne in mind. He does not claim to be at risk – at least in terms of what happened in Sri Lanka – from the government. Rather, the peril faced comes from A and the military. I caution myself against engaging in guesswork as to how much separation exists between the two. Nevertheless, if as claimed A and those who support him have been acting as ‘gang’ (as the Appellant puts it) there is some possibility formal action such as placement on a stop list might not occur. At the very least, the picture is unclear.

64. As to action taken post-departure, during AIR2 the Appellant said threats were made after his wife and son returned to Sri Lanka around March 2024 (question 35.) That was because his mother suffered a heart attack. The Appellant’s son also became unwell, needed to go back for treatment unavailable in the UK (41.) His wife received anonymous calls (39.) The mother was visited by two people claiming to from the criminal investigation department. They questioned her, slapped the Appellant’s bother (46.) He believed they were sent by A, though nothing is presented to support that proposition (50.)

65. Why asked why adverse interest suddenly began when his wife went back, the Appellant replied ‘they’ thought he was ‘doing something’ in the UK (question 53.) The refusal expressed doubt about that, relying on comment at the time the Appellant’s sole activity here had been attendance at a Hero’s Day event (54.)

66. The implication, at least from the papers, appears to be the return of the Appellant’s wife and son to Sri Lanka prompted attempts by those he fears to find him. No travel documents are produced, albeit at page sixty of the Appellant’s main bundle are some medical notes. They suggest admission in March 2024, which fits with the timeline of returning that month. Some inconsistency arises, in the sense the Appellant said in interview his son needed care due to ‘infection for brain’ (AIR2, question 41.) The medical notes talk only of breathing issues. In court, the Appellant asserted the interview interpreter had made an error. During the above passage, he had instead talked about his child needing a vaccination for meningitis. The suggestion was that and ‘brain infection’ had someone become confused.

67. I take care not to engage in undue guesswork, though the above is not perhaps the most implausible of explanations. It is, however, one offered only on the day of court. Any concern generated is nevertheless mitigated by the other reason given for the Appellant’s wife going back. He referred in interview to his mother extremely ill (AIR 2, question 38.) The picture painted in court was one of internal conflict. The Appellant was fearful for his wife and child but equally under some pressure for them to see his mother – who ultimately passed away. As such, even if there may be some doubt around the child being unwell (or at least why,) the account has been consistent in relation to the Appellant’s mother throughout. It is plausible in my view someone might go back to say their farewells to a close relative. Equally perhaps so the Appellant felt unable to do so (assuming one believes his account.)

68. Quite why that prompted sudden adverse attention to the Appellant’s family is less clear. On his account, others – including parents – were present throughout. Despite that, there is no clear suggestion of any approach to relatives until the wife and child went back. The Appellant’s mother and other family remained in Sri Lanka throughout. It was made clear at question 46 of AIR2 any approach to the Appellant’s family took place only after his wife returned.

69. Via his statement, the Appellant addressed comment in interview that A and the military thought he was ‘doing something’ in the UK (AIR2, question 53.) That was put forward in interview as an explanation for his wife and children receiving threats when they went back. The refusal expressed scepticism, noting by that point there had been no political activism in this country beyond attendance at a single Hero’s Day event. The implication is nothing had happened to generate sudden interest.

70. An attempt was made at clarification in the statement. The Appellant said the risk faced had not gone away. Those who wished him harm believed the Appellant was still involved or could influence matters from overseas. His apparent lack of sur place activity did not therefore matter. More important was the perception of those feared. Whilst there may be some logic to that, it does not explain why a period existed between leaving in January 2024 and the wife’s return two months later where nothing seems to have happened.

71. I allow for the fact two months is not a particularly long time. Nonetheless, what followed after the wife went back (and even after she had gone again) is portrayed as regular, ongoing approaches to family members. I find it difficult to see why things would suddenly change to that extent. Arguably any perception about the Appellant’s actions continuing would have existed from the moment he reached the UK. I do not understand why that belief would only emerge some time thereafter.

72. Some evidence to show such approaches took place is produced. There are letters from the Appellant’s sister and what appears to be his father (pages eleven and fourteen, main Appellant’s bundle.) They date from March and July this year receptively. Original and translated versions are included, along with envelopes showing sending from Sri Lanka. The letters describe ongoing threats and violence.

73. A death certificate is submitted (page twenty-one of the Appellant’s bundle,) said in the index to relate to his mother. Although the translated version (there is also an original) is poorly copied and so hard to read, the date of passing seems to be both 2020 and 2025 (section 01 of the certificate.) Whilst the later of those dates fits the timeline presented, it is hard to reconcile mention of 202 with claims that the mother was approached after the Appellant’s wife and son returned to Sri Lanka in March 2024. Should the date of death be 2020, that also clashes with claims in the Appellant’s statement his mother died in April 2025.

74. I asked the Appellant in court if he wished to address that. He confirmed his mother passed in 2025. Quite why 2020 was also mentioned on the certificate was unknown. I temper any concern with the fact both dates are featured. Nor is there any external information about how such documents are formatted in Sri Lanka. That means any doubt generated is reduced, though still present to an extent. I can fairly take the issue into account, having given the Appellant an opportunity to comment upon it.

75. At page seventeen of the same bundle is what looks to be a CCTV still. As discussed at the start of the judgment, Mr.Slatter confirmed that is taken from the inoperative YouTube link. The still depicts a man in uniform, standing in a courtyard. He is with a male and female. The date displayed is 28th September, 2026. Given the dates discussed above, the female shown logically cannot be the Appellant’s mother. She would have been long-since passed by then. When asked, the Appellant said in court the people shown are his in-laws.

76. There is some evidence to show continued adverse attention. If one accepts what is said, that has continued to date. No doubt had there been no such material, the Respondent would have commented accordingly. That said, it can only go so far in giving credence to the Appellant’s account. I note a lack of statement from the Appellant’s wife. On his account, she was threatened by telephone and present for several key events in the timeline ; an important witness. Without simply setting aside the two letters from family members, they are not accompanied by ID documents. I make no assumptions but the argument could be made anyone might have written them. That limits the weight which can be given to them, though tempered as discussed above by their existence.

77. The CCTV still has been given a little weight but again could depict any location or event. Nothing shows it necessarily contains people or an address linked to the Appellant. The question still exists why adverse interest only began after his wife had returned to Sri Lanka (and continued after she left.) If the Appellant’s explanation is correct, it might be argued his wife’s departure would mean such activity ceased.

78. A related issue arises. It is not something the Respondent could have addressed in either the refusal or review, having been mentioned for the first time in the Appellant’s statement. He referred therein to having been assaulted on 5th October, 2023. Two men in a van confronted the Appellant and attacked him. He had not spoken of the incident before due to lacking medical evidence and finding it difficult to discuss. The Appellant was frightened in interview.

79. It is correct to say nowhere in any of the interviews did the Appellant describe the above event. Some doubt must I find stem from that. It is a significant part of the timeline. As a broad point, I recognise it may be difficult to speak of traumatic incidents. Interviews can be daunting if someone is not used to them. A distinction could perhaps be drawn between a threatening call – which the Appellant did talk about – and an actual attack. On the other hand, the Appellant was seemingly able to talk about every other aspect of the narrative without apparent challenge. My attention has not been drawn to anywhere during interview where difficulty was voiced. At no stage did the Appellant indicate he was unable to continue.

80. Potential balance to that arises from comment at question 3 of AIR1 that a GP had been seen due to injuries suffered from torture. The Appellant also said at question 1 of AIR2 he suffered pain from being hit. That lends some support to the account, though it could be asked if able to refer to the injuries suffered why the Appellant was then unable to say more. I accept neither interviewer chose to explore the subject. Nonetheless, an opportunity existed to have given more detail. Though mention is made in the records of anxiety and depression, it has not been directly argued that stems from claimed events – be it the assault or anything else said to have occurred. The picture is therefore mixed.

81. As to medical evidence, at page sixty-two of the Appellant’s main bundle are his GP records from the UK. They refer to back and knee pain, along with flashbacks from what is described as violence in Sri Lanka (page sixty-seven.) That means at least in part the incident has been mentioned to a physician. However, the medical notes say nothing about the extent of injury nor comment on possible caution. One might not necessarily expect the latter in particular from a GP but nor can it be said the material presented lends much credence to the Appellant’s account. No medial evidence from Sri Lanka has been produced, despite (as discussed earlier in this section) there being similar documentation provided relating to the Appellant’s son.

82. The issue was not raised in court. It is nonetheless something I can fairly take into account, having been addressed in the Appellant’s witness statement. Although in relation to another subject (discussed elsewhere in the determination,) it was claimed in court one of the interview interpreters restricted what the Appellant was able to say. They told him to be brief, cut off his answers. Aside from what I find to be rather different claims around interpretation issues in the grounds of appeal document, the topic was not otherwise raised prior to court. Even then the context was one of meaning being lost in translation, as opposed to being restrained from giving a full account. That weakens what weight can be given to the explanation. No passage from any interview has been identified in which the interpreter is said to have prevented a full account being given. I similarly have some concern about failure to mention the assault.

83. A delay existed between arrival in the UK and asylum being sought. The refusal said nothing about that. It is, however, something the Appellant sought to address both in AIR2 and his later witness statement. At the end of the interview (page seventy-eight, Respondent’s bundle,) the Appellant suggested he only realised the risk faced when his wife returned to Sri Lanka. I have already discussed the events said to have occurred thereafter. From his statement, the Appellant said he hoped things would calm down. That is not ignored but it creates what I find to be a degree of tension within the narrative. Concern remains as to why adverse interest would only begin on the arrival of the Appellant’s wife. Other relatives were present who could have been targeted (and were thereafter on the account given.)

84. On what was said in interview, the Appellant was so frightened on receiving the threatening telephone call he made efforts to leave (AIR 1, question 33.) He was assaulted before doing so. Some time elapsed between those and events and before departure. Significant risk therefore arguably existed before the Appellant had left Sri Lanka. He had been assaulted and threatened by telephone ; the latter more than once, per what was said in court. An opportunity existed to target him further. I am careful not to apply undue weight to the point. Assumptions have not been made about how often someone in the Appellant’s position might have been attacked. It is nevertheless potentially odd nothing happened for several months, only for problems to re-start as soon as his wife went back.

85. The Appellant’s statement implies he had no need to seek protection immediately. There was an ability to remain in the UK via the work visa. There is some logic in that, though similarly a claim was not made until six months after his wife had returned to Sri Lanka. Not perhaps the longest of times but if as suggested threatening calls to her were received soon after that might have spurred the Appellant to action more quickly.

86. Given the issue was not addressed in the refusal, the Appellant was given opportunity to comment further on it in court. He explained there were problems bringing his wife and child back to this country. The Appellant was afraid of them travelling via an airport. An agent was used, with whom they stayed. He said to be patient, would arrange something with an immigration official. Whilst there was mention of the wife going into hiding during interview, the rest of the above account was not given. Not perhaps something which determines the appeal but again something added only during the hearing. I do accept a protection claim was lodged fairly soon after the Appellant’s wife and child re-entered the UK.

87. Before setting out my conclusions around events in Sri Lanka, I will address sur place activity – at least in terms of credibility. That goes to whether the Appellant’s claimed political beliefs are genuine. In doing so, I direct myself even if one part of the account is disbelieved that does not require me to reject the rest without further consideration. It is, however, equally correct that credibility must be considered in the round.

88. Ms.Elmas asked the Appellant why he had not mentioned TGTE membership during interview. Per the TGTE card submitted (page 21 Appellant’s bundle) he was a member from October 2024 ; well before both AIRs. The response was that by then only one event had been attended.

89. It was also at that stage the Appellant raised criticism of an interpreter. I have addressed that earlier in the judgment. Without rehearsing things excessively, I bear in mind two AIRS took place. Nothing suggests the same interpreter was used. The fact each had different staff numbers strongly indicates otherwise. If so, that would mean two separate individuals both limited what the Appellant was able to say. One could suggest that is so unlucky as to be unlikely. To believe what is said, both interpreters must have completely prevented the Appellant from saying anything about sur place activity.

90. The Appellant did, in fairness, give a fairly detailed answer in court when asked about the aims of TGTE. Without repeating that in its entirety, he spoke of freedom for women, self-determination of Tamil people. That goes at least a little way towards showing an element of knowledge. However, other replies to Ms.Elmas’ questions generate some doubt.

91. It was claimed the Appellant had received calls in the UK about his sur place activity. People had taken screenshots from media posts, such images featuring the Appellant engaging in what he called ‘dramas.’ He explained that involved, for example, appearing at an event portraying an injured person. On being asked to expand on the topic, the Appellant told me the calls were from people in Sri Lanka. One of them sent a screenshot to him via Facebook messenger. Two have links with A. He perceived the calls to be threatening.

92. That would in my view be a fairly significant event within the timeline. Nonetheless, no mention was made of it before the hearing. There is no sign of any Facebook message. The Appellant confirmed he still has the material on his phone. Easy to produce that to a solicitor. No clear explanation was given for failing to describe these events prior. Even if the calls were after interview (it was suggested as much in court,) the Appellant could have included them in his statement.

93. The Appellant also described in court men armed with knives coming to his address in the UK. They wore facemasks. The Appellant was not there, though his wife was at home. The police were called. None of that was said before court. When asked why the incident was not in his statement, the Appellant simply said ‘no’ (the translated reply given.) That seems to me no explanation at all. If, as seems implied, the event was related to his sur place activity or what happened in Sri Lanka, it is of some significance. I struggle to see why it would not have been mentioned far sooner. As noted earlier in the determination, the Appellant’s wife has not given a statement. She could have provided valuable support to such claimed events.

94. Though I will deal with evidence served showing the extent of sur place activity primarily in the next section of the judgment, a letter is provided from TGTE (page 1 Appellant’s supplemental bundle.) That confirms membership, lists events attended. He is described as a volunteer. It was accepted in court the Appellant has no formal title. No claim is made to hold a position of significance. That said, a lack thereof does not have to mean any engagement with the group is less than genuine.

95. Per the membership card, the Appellant joined TGTE a month after seeking asylum. He had by that point been in the UK for approaching seven months. When asked in court why membership was not sought sooner, the Appellant said he did not know who to approach. A friend introduced him. There is nothing implausible per se about that. Equally, however, something could potentially be drawn from timing so close to asylum being sought. Perhaps particularly so when coupled with a lack of reference to TGTE in the two AIRs which followed.

96. By way of conclusions, the evidence relating to events in Sri Lanka is decidedly mixed. As Mr.Slatter observed in his closing, several elements of the account are accepted – the Appellant’s job, prior support (at least indirectly) to LTTE. Whilst not explicitly conceded, nothing has been said to detract from claims of having cattle. I see no reason to doubt that part of the narrative. A similar view is taken as to whether disputes and subsequent protest did arise in the area around livestock being killed. There is external evidence to show that.

97. It could be argued those elements form the bedrock of the Appellant’s account. Putting aside for a moment concerns about whether he was part of the protests or in the background, some logic exists in the notion the sole educated cattle farmer in the village might be at the forefront of any complaint to the police. Potential force also exists in the suggestion that may have meant any adverse interest arising would fall largely on the Appellant. Other than questions around role at the Sri Lankan protests, the Repsondent does not identify any significant inconsistency between what was said in the SCR and then later.

98. All of that stands in the Appellant’s favour. As does to an extent the various documents produced, including (though not exclusively) letters from family about subsequent adverse attention, the CCTV still. A lack of direct attack on that evidence – beyond arguing it cannot mitigate the credibility concerns raised – has been taken into account. The Respondent makes no explicit criticism of the material produced. That does not, however, mean its contents are conceded.

99. I accept the Appellant’s wife and child went back to Sri Lanka. As with at least other elements of the narrative, nothing has been highlighted by the Respondent which would cause me to doubt that. Whilst there is some lack of clarity around the son’s health, I find plausible he and the Appellant’s wife could have gone back if his mother was unwell. That is not to say, however, the issue of when she died is entirely clear from the certificate provided. If the mother passed in 2020, she could not logically have been threatened by the authorities after the Appellant left Sri Lanka some years later.

100. A number of aspects detract from the account. I do not propose to repeat them at length, having discussed the competing issues in detail above. Several additional elements to the narrative were introduced for the first time in court. Some – such as threatening calls and received in the UK – are in my view relatively significant. The identity of who called the Appellant in Sri Lanka has changed over time. As has the number of calls. I remain concerned the Appellant’s wife has not given a statement. Men armed with knives coming to the family home was had not been mentioned before. Despite having joined TGTE some months before his two substantive interviews, the Appellant said nothing about them. Were that the case, there was opportunity to raise the topic sooner. The claimed assault – another important event – was not described until the Appellant’s post-refusal statement. I reject as implausible last-minute claims of being constrained by interpreters and thus unable to give a full account.

101. Though not a point which determines things, a suggestion adverse attention towards the Appellant’s family only began after his wife and child went back to Sri Lanka seems potentially strange. There was a delay in seeking protection, both after arrival of the family unit in the UK and after the Appellant’s wife began receiving threats in Sri Lanka. Those elements carry less weight, however, for the reasons set out.

102. Though I have borne in mind the possibility even if one part of the account is disbelieved that does not mean the same view need be taken on another, to the balance of probabilities standard I largely do not believe the Appellant’s version of events.

103. To be clear, I accept he was a cattle farmer. I also accept he may have been the only educated person in the village. There is sufficient evidence to show dispute arose over the death of cattle within the locality. Beyond that, the narrative is rejected. Positive aspects do exist. They are in my judgment entirely outweighed by the various concerns discussed. I do not accept the Appellant was identified as part of a complaint or subsequence demonstrations. Nor am I persuaded threats were then issued or an assault took place – be it via A, the military or anyone else. Though acknowledging there is some medical evidence showing injuries, that of itself is not enough to persuade me they were suffered as described. I reject claims of adverse interest since the Appellant left Sri Lanka.

104. Also disbelieved is claims to genuinely support TGTE. The timing of membership is a concern, though not a central one. More problematic I find is a failure to mention the group at all in either substantive interview or the threats said to have been made since due to involvement. Those are key parts of the narrative. Each could have been raised sooner. In my view, obtaining TGTE membership and engaging in sur place activity is entirely cynical. It is designed for no more purpose then securing asylum.

105. In that sense, the asylum claim is dismissed. Notwithstanding my findings, I must however move to consider other elements of the case. First amongst them is the question of objective risk.

If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;

106. The first argument made under this heading by the Respondent is the Appellant’s account cannot be believed. I have already addressed that.

107. It is suggested that any activity in Sri Lanka was at a level whereby a well-founded risk would not follow. That in my view again depends primarily on whether one accepts the Appellant’s version of events. The Respondent has not suggested were one to believe adverse attention was received from A and the military anything other than sufficient danger would exist on return. As with the first point, I need not set out my credibility findings again. It is not argued simply being a farmer whose cattle was killed would be enough to generate a well-founded risk.

108. The refusal notes an acceptance the Appellant was never detained (AIR1, 60) or distributed political material himself (61.) His support for the LTTE was limited to assisting ex-members by employing them as cattle farmers and their children. The Appellant was never a member (AIR2, 29.) It was accepted (at least at the time of interview) the only other political action claimed had been attending a Hero’s Day event in the UK. The Appellant accepted therein Tamils would typically go to such an event (AIR2, 27.)

109. Given rejection of much of the factual account, I find the Appellant’s LTTE support went no further than that described above. Even on his version of events, there was no arrest nor other period of detention. That means unless once accepts the narrative put forward, simply helping ex-LTTE members did not generate any adverse interest. It has not been argued such help would of itself would generate sufficient risk on return. Nor is there evidence to suggest they are reasonably likely to be so in future. No argument is made that simply being Tamil or going to a single Hero’s Day event would place the Appellant in peril.

110. In the alternative, consideration must also be given to whether sur place activity which has taken place in the UK of itself creates enough risk whereby the appeal might succeed. The Appellant’s skeleton cites KK and RS[4], that TGTE is viewed with hostility by the Sri Lankan authorities[5]. GJ[6] was held in KK to remain valid, the primary question being whether someone is perceived to have a significant role in separatist political action. That does not require a formal or high-profile part being played.

111. Rather, the following factors are to be considered –

i. the nature of any diaspora organisation on behalf of which an individual has been active. That an organisation has been proscribed under the 2012 UN Regulations will be relatively significant in terms of the level of adverse interest reasonably likely to be attributed to an individual associated with it;

ii. the type of activities undertaken;

iii. the extent of any activities;

iv. the duration of any activities;

v. any relevant history in Sri Lanka;

vi. any relevant familial connections[7].

112. The TGTE is seen as a front for the LTTE[8]. Sharing of intelligence has increased since GJ was decided[9]. If one were to accept prior adverse attention in Sri Lanka, per KK it is reasonably likely the Appellant might already be on a watch list[10]. Even if not and should the Appellant still have a valid passport (which would preclude interview on return,) those factors would not necessarily discount his having been identified as engaging in separatist activity in the UK[11]. I say that bearing in mind I have rejected claims he received calls and Facebook messages about such behaviour whilst in this country. Also disbelieved is the suggestion of armed men attending the Appellant’s address here.

113. Before applying the factors listed above from KK, I must first set out the evidence presented. Some was discussed in earlier parts of the judgment, though rather more detail is required when considering objective risk. Much of the relevant material is found in a supplemental bundle uploaded 12th October this year. As with other aspects of the appeal, the late submission of evidence means the Respondent had no chance to comment upon it prior to the appeal being heard.

114. At page one of the supplemental bundle is a TGTE letter dated 28th July, 2026. It confirms the Appellant is a member, lists six events attended between November 2024 and April this year. Most of the letter is devoted to the groups history and aims, rather than the Appellant himself. No role is attributed to him.

115. Without rehearsing material in unnecessary detail, from page three of the bundle onwards is a variety of photographs. Each is captioned, showing the location, date and purpose of the events depicted. All appear political in nature. One set of images shows people laid under shrouds, the stated purpose being to raise awareness of genocide. The Appellant is shown throughout, albeit with limited though potentially notable exceptions (to which I will turn) he is within groups rather than being particularly visible. He cannot be identified from the pictures of being with shrouds.

116. Pages twelve to sixteen contain a series of what look to be newspaper articles. They are presented in original and translated form, describe several of the events the Appellant attended. Their reliability has not been challenged. He is circled in photographs embedded within the articles. Page eighteen provides a series of weblinks. Of those relating to sur place activity, two links go to Facebook pages. They are, at least as of the time of writing this judgment, publicly accessible. The point was not raised in court, though nor do I simply assume such access was set throughout. The posts contain photographs of events that appear similar to those in the other images. The Appellant is pictured, albeit the text is not in English.

117. One of the links goes to a TGTE.tv website – specifically, some video. As with the Facebook posts, the accompanying text is not in English. The footage shows what may be a demonstration. The Appellant is captured for some of it. He is stood ahead of a crowd, dressed in a brightly-coloured top and wearing presumably fake bandages with blood on them. That event is captured, based on the distinctive clothing, in some of the photographs elsewhere in the bundle. It mirrors what the Appellant said in court about participating in ‘dramas,’ whereby he portrayed an injured person.

118. Further material intended to show sur place activity is contained in the Appellant’s main bundle. At page twenty-four is a TGTE membership card. It shows a ‘valid from’ date in October 2024 and is due to expire this month. Accompanying that at page twenty-five is a second letter – dated 27th January, 2026 – from the TGTE. As with that found in the supplemental bundle, it confirms membership but otherwise does little beyond set out the aims and history of the group. There is no indication of a specified role the Appellant holds within the group. He is not said to be anything beyond a volunteer, albeit the Respondent raises no dispute about membership per se. Quite why there is a second TGTE letter is unclear, though the Respondent raises no concern about that.

119. Photographs much like those in the supplemental bundle are provided at pages twenty-seven to forty-nine. They show other events attended, bear captions explaining the date, location and purpose. The Appellant is shown in each, though as before being part of a group rather than necessarily distinctive.

120. Applying the relevant factors set out above, there seems no dispute the Sri Lankan authorities perceive a link between TGTE and LTTE. Both are in any event proscribed[12]. From the photographs provided, the Appellant has engaged in sur place activity over a relatively short period of time. It was nevertheless fairly concerted over that span. A comparatively large number of events are depicted. Some have been published in newspapers and in one instance the TGTE website. I have applied weight in particular to the latter, given the Appellant from the corresponding image by his outfit (portraying injuries) and position in front of the crowd stands out from them. He is one of a very small number behaving as such, the rest of the crowd being further back. They are more homogenous. The video and stills taken thereof act in tandem with one another, adding to the Appellant’s visibility. They appear over a series of mediums.

121. Such relative distinctiveness does not extend to the other images, however. The Appellant is no more than one of the crowd in those. He is Tamil, which whilst a source of potential suspicion on the part of the Sri Lankan authorities does not of itself mean a well-founded risk arises[13].

122. I note no social media published by the Appellant himself has been submitted. It is not claimed any family members in Sri Lanka engage or have engaged in political activity. There is no need to rehearse my findings around adverse attention before the Appellant reached the UK (or since.) I reject as before claims any material published showing involvement in protests here has resulted in messages and threatening calls. That does not have to mean sur place activity is undetected, however.

123. Given I have rejected the Appellant’s claim to hold genuine political beliefs, he could be reasonably expected to say nothing about sur place activity on return. I must nevertheless consider if the behaviour shown is of itself reasonably likely to have attracted state attention. The Respondent has not argued the Sri Lankan authorities would see any distinction between someone engaging in political action due to believe in it as against another doing so for personal gain.

124. I am just about persuaded that standard has been met here. It is reasonably likely the Appellant’s sur place action when taken together could have drawn state interest. That is notwithstanding my refusal to accept what he says happened in Sri Lanka and claimed threats made in the UK. Had the evidence presented been no more than the Appellant at a series of protests in the crowd, a well-founded risk could not have been established.

125. Two related factors tip the balance in his favour. Firstly, there is participation in the ‘dramas.’ That means on at least one occasion, via the photographs produced, the Appellant stood out considerably from other attendees. Those images were reproduced over several different mediums. They appear to have been published in print and online. I make no assumptions about the extent of circulation of such media. Nevertheless, the Appellant has featured at the relative forefront of a protest the authorities would perceive as directly related to Tamil separatism and thus the LTTE.

126. It is on that basis reasonably likely the Sri Lankan authorities have identified the Appellant as someone of interest to them – specifically due to sur place activity in support of a proscribed organisation. His role in my view reaches the significant threshold, by which a well-founded risk arises. I reach that conclusion even having rejected the disputed elements of what is said to have happened in Sri Lanka and claims that sur place activity here is based on true belief.

127. The asylum appeal therefore stands to be allowed on that narrow basis.

(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and

(e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.

128. Neither of the above aspects is disputed by the Respondent.

The Humanitarian Claim

129. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. I remind myself the reasonable likelihood standard applies to all elements, including credibility.

130. Although a distinct limb of the appeal, the same competing factors apply as discussed. Notwithstanding the lower standard of proof in relation to credibility, my view of the Appellant’s factual account – both within Sri Lanka and via sur place activity here – remains the same. Though perhaps more finely-balanced given the positive aspects discussed, those which detract hold considerably greater weight.

131. The humanitarian element of the appeal is thereby dismissed but for (as with the asylum claim) that relating to sur place activity. It is reasonably likely by virtue of having been identified as engaging in acts supportive of separatism, even if not based on genuine political views, the Appellant would face a significant risk of serious harm on return. This part of the appeal is thereby allowed on that basis.

Other Issues

132. As with the humanitarian limb of the claim, any Article 2/3 element based on the same factual matrix is subject to the reasonable likelihood standard. The Appellant’s skeleton argument accepts each stands or falls with the protection claim. Identical conclusions are therefore reached.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal on asylum grounds is allowed, on the basis set out.

The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is allowed on the same basis.

The appeal is allowed on Article 2 and 3 grounds, on the same basis.

ANONYMITY DIRECTION

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

If a fee was paid, no award is made. That reflects the mixed outcome in these proceedings.

Signed Date 30th October, 2026

FTTJ Jepson

First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson

Notes

[1] I make that observation bearing in mind the Appellant’s case is not that he directly supported the LTTE. Rather, he describes having employed ex-LTTE members and having funded the education of their children. His case focuses primarily on dispute with those who killed his cattle and accusations of LTTE support which stemmed from that.

[2] [2026] UKUT 413, specifically paragraph 44.

[3] Refusal page eight, paragraph d – Buddhist Channel | Sri Lanka

[4] [2021] UKUT 130.

[5] Ibid., headnote 6.

[6] [2013] UKUT 319.

[7] KK, citing GJ, Op.Cit., paragraph 536(21.)

[8] KK, Op.Cit., paragraph 536(6.)

[9] Ibid., paragraph 407.

[10] Op.Cit., paragraph 536(19.)

[11] Ibid., paragraph 536(10.)

[12] KK, Op.Cit., headnote 6.

[13] Per KK, Op.Cit., headnote 4.

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