Administrative United Kingdom
AS v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/54045/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester
On 7 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McQuillan
Between
AS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Imran
For the Respondent: Ms Germain, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 20 January 2025.
Anonymity Direction
2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (‘UK’) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS. The Appellant is Tunisian man aged 29. He entered the UK on 24 October 2024 and applied for Asylum on 30 October 2024. His application was refused on 20 January 2025.
4. The Appellant claims to fear persecution if returned to Tunisia on the basis that he encountered terrorists who he refused to co-operate with and who he reported to the Police. He would not further co-operate with the Police and he fears the authorities will detain him for this and the terrorists will kill him.
5. The Respondent accepts the Appellant’s identity and his occupation but none of the rest of his account. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant belonged to a group included in the Refugee convention.
Hearing
Issues in dispute
6. I discussed the issues in the case and it was agreed that the case turned on the credibility of the Appellant’s account and in particular whether it is credible that the Appellant faces persecution if returned to Tunisia. The Respondent further submitted that the Appellant could relocate if his did face a risk.
Evidence and submissions
7. The Appellant gave evidence with the assistance of an Arabic interpreter and was cross examined. Ms Germain and Mr Imran made submissions.
Legal Framework
8. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and
(b) whether the Appellant does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality as a result of that characteristic.
9. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic, and fears persecution as a result of that characteristic, I must go on to determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that:
(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return;
(b) that there would be insufficient protection; and
(c) they could not internally relocate.
10. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
Findings
11. In this decision, I have regard to JCK (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 and DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) [2026] UKUT 00413 I am directed by those cases to address each of the questions posed by section 32 of the 2022 Act expressly and sequentially and I do so. I have taken account of everything I have heard, and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round, in line with the guidance in Ravichandran v SSHD [1996] Imm AR 97 and Karanakaran v SSHD 2000 EWCA Civ.
Credibility
12. The Respondents in their Reasons for Refusal letter (RFRL), Review and at the hearing raised issues about the credibility of the Appellant’s account. I consider that, in this case, the credibility of past events are relevant to the questions that the 2022 Act requires me to answer, including whether a convention right exists and the Appellant has a subjective fear. In assessing the credibility I note that DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) confirms that section 32 of the 2022 Act has not changed the approach I should take to assessing evidence. It does not require that each alleged fact must be proved on the balance of probabilities, nor that evidence of such an alleged fact must be ignored unless the alleged fact is proved on the balance of probabilities. All that section 32(2) requires is that, having taken account of all of the relevant evidence as approved in Karanakaran, and having given to each item of that evidence the weight I consider appropriate, I then determine on the balance of probabilities whether the asylum seeker either has a relevant characteristic or has a relevant characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution and that they do, in fact, fear persecution by reason of that characteristic.
13. The main issues in respect of the Appellant’s credibility were as follows;
(a) Ms Germain raised that, in an email dated 12 January 2025, the Appellant stated that from the beginning of his work as a cattle dealer he refused any form of co-operation with the terrorists and he confirmed that he began work as a cattle dealer in 2019. She highlighted to the Appellant that he said in his asylum interview that he first had problems with the terrorists 3 months before he came to the UK. The Appellant’s evidence was that when he first started working he had no problems. There are issues with this account and it is to some extent inconsistent.
(b) Ms Germain also submitted that there was inconsistent evidence about whether he had been approached by the Terrorists with the Appellant saying in his witness statement dated September 2025 that he had never been personally approached but that his family had been threatened and that was what he was saying in his interview. In interview he said that he had been directly threatened by the terrorists at answers 16 and 57 of his interview when he mentioned that when he first met the terrorists they threatened to kill him if he informed on them or didn’t cooperate with them. At the hearing this was put to the Appellant and he stated that he did not meet the terrorists again after reporting them and only received further threats from them when he was in the UK. I find that there is an inconsistency here that was not adequately explained.
(c) Ms Germain asked the Appellant why he would risk applying for a visa after he became aware that the Police had informed the terrorists that he had reported them. The Appellant said that not all the Police passed on material to the terrorists and everything about his departure from Tunisia was legal with the authorities. He was asked why would the authorities pass on that he had informed on the terrorists if they wanted him to work with them against the terrorists. The Appellant said there were two types of police; some who helped the terrorists and some who did not. Mr Imran submitted that there were elements within the Police who worked with the terrorists. The Appellant’s account lacks credibility and it is not clear why he was confident that there was no risk from the Police of leaving as he did.
(d) The Respondent submitted that it was not credible that the Appellant’s parents would have stayed in their homes and been safe when others felt they had to move away to escape the terrorists. The Appellant stated that his parents were tied to the land and had no other choice but to stay and could not have lived with others as this would be against the Muslim culture. His other relatives who left stayed with their children who had moved away but his parents could not. This does not impact on the Appellant’s credibility to any great extent.
(e) Ms Germain submitted that there was an inconsistency that the Appellant stated at one point he received a message by text and at another that it was in fact via Facebook but I consider this to have little significance. She submitted that the issues around the screening interview that the Appellant had raised were not raised in the interviews and the correct procedures were followed. Mr Islam did not point to a specific issue with the interviews but highlighted that they had been conducted via a remote interpretation system. I don’t find this to have much significance.
(f) The Respondent’s review highlighted that the Appellant had applied to enter the UK as a tourist but then claimed asylum and that this was behaviour that engaged section 8(2) of Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc. ) Act 2004.When asked in interview about this the appellant stated that he had intended to come as a tourist as there had been no contact between the terrorists and his family at that time. Mr Islam submitted that the delay in claiming asylum was only a matter of days and that limited weight should be given to this issue. It is a matter for the Tribunal to assess the weight to be given to any section 8 behaviours but notwithstanding the short period of time involved the Appellant’s claim to be visiting as a tourist who intended to return to Tunisia does engage the 2004 Act and will feature in my assessment of his credibility.
Conclusions on credibility.
14. The Appellant’s account of terrorist activity in his area is supported by the country evidence. He gave an account of having cousins killed by the terrorists and of his receiving threats from them that lead him to contact the Police, elements of whom passed his report on to the terrorists. The Appellant provided some evidence of 2 brothers, who he said were his cousins, being killed by terrorists in Tunisia. There are, however, aspects of the Appellant’s evidence that are concerning. The Appellant was inconsistent about the direct approach from the terrorists between his witness statement and his comments in interview where he said he was threatened. There was also some lack of clarity around when he began to have problems with the terrorists although this was not as significant.
15. The Appellant’s evidence around the Police passing on his information to the terrorists but his legally leaving Tunisia by a visa lacked credible. The explanation that there were some good and some bad Police did not fully account for how he would have known that none of the Police who were passing information to the terrorists would be aware of his application and therefore alert to his intention to leave. Whilst it is plausible that there was some corruption in the Police and contact with the terrorists could not be ruled out, it does not explain why the Appellant took the risk he did in leaving by a visa. The circumstances of his departure also have an adverse impact on his credibility. He states that he had been threatened with death by the terrorists and that when he had reported this to Police some elements of the Police had passed this on to those that had threatened him. He was aware that his Police report had been leaked and yet decided to travel to the UK as a tourist, only claiming asylum when he found out in the UK that his family had been contacted. This account and the sequence it describes does not ring true and does not reflect the Appellant’s evidence that he had been threatened with death and had his Police report revealed to the same people. Although not determinative on the question of the Appellant’s credibility it does damage to his account.
16. Overall, whilst there is some support for the Appellant’s account in the objective material about the activity of terrorists in Tunisia, and he has provided some limited documentation his account has inconsistencies and aspects that lack credibility to an extent that his overall credibility and that of his account is damaged.
The 2022 Act
17. Adopting the approach of the Upper Tribunal I now turn to the specific provisions of section 32 of the 2022 Act.
Section 32(2)(a): Convention Ground.
18. Under s32(2)(a) I am firstly required to determine, on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution)
19. Although this was not the subject of detailed submissions it was not accepted by the Respondent in their RFRL. If I had found the key aspect of the Appellant’s claim to be credible I would have found that he would have a political opinion attributed to him by those he fears, both Police and the terrorists, as they would likely have adopted a ‘if not with us then you are against us’ attitude. However for the reasons I have given at paragraphs 12 to 16 above I find that the credibility of the Appellant’s account is damaged to the extent that I find that, on balance, he does not have the imputed political opinion he claims.
Section 32(2) (b); Subjective Fear
20. Section 32(2)(b) requires the decision-maker to also determine, on the balance of probabilities.
(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.
21. For the same reasons as above I find that it is not more likely than not that the Appellant does in fact fear persecution. He may not wish to return to Tunisia and indeed he may fear the violence that exists there more generally but he has not established on balance that he, in fact, fears persecution as a result of his imputed political opinion.
22. This is determinative of the Asylum claim but as approved by the Upper Tribunal in JCK (Botswana) I take a ‘belt and braces’ approach and address the other aspects of section 32 namely whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that:
(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return;
(b) that there would be insufficient protection; and
(c) they could not internally relocate.
23. The Upper Tribunal characterised the first of these questions as an evaluation of objective risk.
Section 32(4)(a); risk of persecution
24. To answer this question I must ask myself whether there is a reasonable likelihood that if the Appellant were returned to Tunisia:
(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a)
25. I have reached the view that the Appellant’s account lacks credibility. The burden is on the Appellant to show to the lower standard that there is a real risk of persecution on return. It is well established that this ‘standard of proof’ could more accurately be described as an assessment of risk and that even with a risk as low as 10% an Appellant could succeed[1]. Having stood back and considered the evidence in the round before asking myself whether there is a real risk of persecution I find that there is not. It is possible that the Appellant’s account could be true but that is not the question I must answer. Given the number and nature of the inconsistencies and aspects which lack credibility, notwithstanding those objective aspects which were supportive, I consider that there is not a reasonable likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted if returned to Tunisia.
Section 32(4)(b): protection
(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.
26. Section 34 states
Article 1(A)(2): protection from persecution
(1)For the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, protection from persecution can be provided by—
(a)the State, or
(b)any party or organisation, including any international organisation, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State.
(2)An asylum seeker is to be taken to be able to avail themselves of protection from persecution if—
(a)the State, party or organisation mentioned in subsection (1) takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution, and
(b)the asylum seeker is able to access the protection.
27. It was conceded by the Respondent that if the key aspects were true that the Appellant could not seek the protection of the state. As I have concluded that the Appellant’s account lacks credibility then they would not need to seek the protection of the authorities.
Section 32(5): internal relocation
(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).
28. Whilst initially the Respondent conceded this in the same terms as protection, the Review took the position that even if the Appellant’s account was accepted they could relocate. Mr Imran contested this and the Appellant’s evidence was that he could be found as his cousin who left the area was despite moving more than 3 hours away. If I had accepted that claim and his account more generally I would have found that there was a real risk that the Appellant could have been found if he relocated and it would not have provided a route to protection. However, as I have not accepted his account I find there is no need to relocate.
Humanitarian protection
29. As I have found at paragraph 25 that there is not a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted if returned for the same reasons and applying the same standard of proof I find that the Appellant has not shown substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned. Their Humanitarian Protection claim fails also.
Notice of decision
30. The Appeal is dismissed.
ANONYMITY ORDER
31. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant [and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified], is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
32. [To the Respondent]
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed Date 2 November 2026
CA McQuillan
First-tier Tribunal Judge McQuillan
Notes
[1] MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 paragraphs 51-52, Singh LJ.
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