Administrative United Kingdom
SA v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/71314/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester
On 23rd October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE hollings-tennant
Between
sA
(anonymity order Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Khan (Counsel), instructed by Jackson Lees Group Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Royle, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Iran. She appeals under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’) against the Respondent’s decision to refuse her claim for international protection lodged on 4th December 2024. Her appeal is brought on grounds that her removal would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
2. I have considered whether it is appropriate to make an anonymity order, bearing in mind the importance of the principle of open justice. I have decided to do so because this case involves matters relating to international protection and the importance of fulfilling the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice. I also take into account that the Appellant is a vulnerable young woman who suffers from mental health concerns.
BACKGROUND
3. The background to this appeal is set out in documentation contained on MyHMCTS in a consolidated hearing bundle of [320] pages and a short additional witness statement of [2] pages. The Appellant left Iran in November 2024 and travelled to Turkey by lorry before boarding a flight to the United Kingdom. She entered this country by plane on 4th December 2024 and claimed asylum on arrival. The Respondent refused that claim by way of a decision dated 20th March 2025. That refusal is the subject of this appeal.
The Appellant’s claim
4. The Appellant claims she is an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity. When she was six years old she was subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) and from a young age she was aware that her father had arranged for her to marry a paternal cousin. Her father was strict and violent towards the Appellant, her mother and sister. He refused to allow her to go to university so she started an art course at a high school for girls. In August 2024, she met a man, (‘A’) outside the school whilst she was with a friend and he later contacted her via social media. They exchanged messages and he said he would propose marriage. The Appellant says she went to meet him at a café and when leaving her brother saw them holding hands and threatened her before chasing ‘A’. She claims ‘A’ told her family they had a sexual relationship. She called her uncle who took her to a friend’s house and whilst there she was told her brother had lodged a complaint with the police. Her uncle subsequently arranged for her to leave Iran. She fears being killed by her family or arrested by the Iranian authorities on return.
5. Since arriving in this country, the Appellant has engaged in sur place political activities by attending political demonstrations and posting against the Iranian regime on social media. She says she also posts about honour killings to raise awareness. It is argued such activities reflect genuinely held political beliefs in opposition to the Iranian regime and she cannot be expected to delete her Facebook account to avoid persecution. It is argued this also gives rise to a real risk of persecution on return.
The Respondent’s case
6. The Respondent accepts the Appellant is an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity who left her country of origin illegally but does not accept she was in a relationship with ‘A’, was threatened by her family or fears the Iranian authorities as a consequence of such. In her reasons for refusal letter (RFRL), the Respondent argues the Appellant provided inconsistent evidence which is also said to be lacking in detail. It is argued she was unable to give sufficient detail as to what attracted her to ‘A’, why she continued with the relationship after being warned by her mother, or chose to meet her boyfriend in public despite the risks involved. The Appellant’s evidence that she went to a coffee shop alone to meet him is said to be inconsistent with background information that women often require the supervision of a male guardian or chaperone to travel. The Appellant’s claim that her family were strict and kept her trapped in the house is said to be inconsistent with the fact she was able to study and visit a shopping mall alone.
7. With regards to sur place activities, the Respondent argues that the Appellant does not have a political profile likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities. There is no evidence to suggest she was motivated to get involved in political activities whilst resident in Iran and it is noted that her sur place activities only began after her claim had been refused. It is argued her attendance at demonstrations in this country and her social medial activity has been contrived to bolster her asylum claim and does not reflect genuinely held political views such that she can be expected to delete her Facebook account before she returns to Iran.
HEARING
8. The hearing took place by way of a hybrid hearing with the Appellant attending in person along with both legal representatives and a court appointed Farsi language interpreter dialling in by remote means using Cloud Video Platform (CVP). The hearing was recorded by the Tribunal and that shall stand as the record of proceedings. As a preliminary matter at the start of the hearing, I confirmed with the parties that all necessary documentary evidence was included in the bundles provided and discussed the outstanding issues to be decided.
9. Both parties agreed the key issues are whether the Appellant has provided a credible account of events said to have given rise to her leaving Iran and whether her sur place activities will bring her to the adverse attention of the authorities on return. Mr Royle conceded that if the Appellant is found to be a credible witness in respect of the core of her claim and fear of her family her appeal would succeed, having acknowledged she cannot turn to the Iranian state for effective protection or relocate within Iran.
Issues in dispute
10. As such, it was agreed with the parties that the following principal disputed issues fall to be decided by the Tribunal:
(i) whether the Appellant was threatened by her brother after he saw her with ‘A’ outside a coffee shop in a shopping mall such that she has a well-founded fear of being targeted in the name of so-called family ‘honour’;
(ii) if not, whether she faces a real risk of persecution on return to Iran on account of her political opinion, having taken part in sur place political activities in this country.
Evidence and submissions
11. Thereafter, the Appellant gave oral evidence in Farsi through the interpreter having confirmed she fully understood the interpreter. I then heard closing submissions from the legal representatives before reserving my decision. I am grateful to Ms Khan and Mr Royle for their assistance and I have taken note of all relevant documentary evidence, the oral evidence from the Appellant, and submissions on behalf of the Respondent and the Appellant, as contained in the record of proceedings.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
12. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must establish she is a refugee as defined in Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. Given her asylum claim was lodged after 28th June 2022, I must apply a two-stage test pursuant to section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’). I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause her to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to her by an actor of persecution); and
(b) whether she does in fact fear persecution in Iran as a result of that characteristic.
13. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic and fears persecution as a result, I must determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that she would face persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, there would not be effective state protection available to her and she could not safely relocate to another part of Iran.
14. If I am not satisfied the Appellant is a refugee, I must consider whether she meets the requirements for humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. To qualify, she must show there are substantial grounds for believing she faces a real risk of suffering serious harm in Iran and is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail herself of state protection there. I must consider whether the decision to refuse, and as a consequence of that decision her removal to Iran, breaches her human rights on grounds that she faces a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.
FINDINGS
15. In coming to a decision in this appeal, I have taken into account all relevant evidence adduced. I have referred in my findings to material aspects of the claim and considered all the evidence in the round, applying the relevant standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities, when assessing whether the Appellant genuinely fears persecution and the lower standard of proof, that of a reasonable degree of likelihood, when considering whether she would face persecution on return. Any absence of a reference to a particular piece of evidence should not be taken to mean I have not considered that evidence before reaching my decision.
16. In assessing the Appellant’s credibility, I have given full consideration to the guidance provided in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491, in which it was made clear indicators such as sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility provide a helpful framework in which to conduct a credibility assessment. I have also had regard to relevant country guidance caselaw on ethnic Kurds returning to Iran and XX(PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23, when considering risk arising from sur place political activities.
Issue (i) – relationship with ‘A’
17. I turn first to the question as to whether the Appellant has a characteristic (or would have such a characteristic attributed to her), which could cause her to fear persecution under section 32(2)(a) of the 2022 Act. Following JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100, this question is to be considered taking the claim at its highest. In her RFRL, the Respondent accepts the Appellant’s claim brings her within the scope of the Refugee Convention on grounds of ethnicity and as a member of a particular social group as a Kurdish woman fearing gender-based violence in the name of so-called ‘family honour’. Further, the political opinions she has expressed during protests against the Iranian regime and via social media also engages the Convention. Plainly, these characteristics could cause her to fear persecution on return to Iran.
18. The second question under section 32(2)(b) of the 2022 Act is whether the Appellant does in fact fear persecution as a result of those characteristics (the ‘subjective fear test’). In considering this issue, the Appellant’s account of events said to have given rise to her leaving Iran, the extent to which her sur place activities represent genuine political opinions, and country background material is of relevance. Having considered the evidence presented before me, I find she has discharged the burden of proof upon her to establish she holds a genuine subjective fear of being subjected to persecution. I reach this conclusion for the reasons set out in paragraphs [19] to [29] below.
19. The Respondent argues that the Appellant has given inconsistent and vague evidence about having a relationship with her boyfriend and the way in which this was discovered by her brother. I do not agree with this contention. I find the Appellant has provided a coherent, entirely consistent and detailed account of her family background and events which gave rise to her fleeing Iran in fear of being killed by her father or brother. In oral evidence, she gave candid responses to the limited number of questions put to her in cross-examination and gave plausible explanations for apparent discrepancies in her account. I find that I can place considerable weight on her written and oral testimony as corroborative of her claim to hold a genuine subjective fear of being targeted by her family members in the name of so-called ‘family honour’ on return to Iran.
20. The Appellant has given a consistent and plausible account as to how she came to meet and start to develop a relationship with ‘A’, largely through exchanging messages via social media. She explains she often walked to school with a friend who introduced her to ‘A’, who was her cousin. The subsequently messaged each other on Instagram, she confided in him and he promised her more freedom once they were married. The Respondent argues the Appellant’s evidence is vague as to what attracted her to ‘A’, though this assertion is based on just two questions posed during her asylum interview, in which she referred to his personality, the fact that he respected and listened to her and he gave her freedom (Asylum Interview Record (AIR), question [50]). When this is considered in the context of social and cultural norms for a young woman growing up in a traditional Kurdish family who was embarking on an illicit and potentially dangerous relationship with a man she was just getting to know, I find she gave credible and sufficiently detailed answers to questions she was asked. If her evidence was deemed to be vague additional questions could have been put to her to elicit more detail.
21. Further, in her detailed witness statement the Appellant explains that when she was introduced to ‘A’ she was sexually attracted to him, though she did not mention this in her interview because she was embarrassed, the interviewing officer was male and she is not used to expressing her feelings (paragraph [65]). I note the Respondent’s own policy guidance entitled, ‘Asylum interviews’, published on 10th October 2025, explicitly recognises that the social and cultural position of women within a particular society may make it difficult for them to disclose information about certain issues. In this case, it is not in dispute that the Appellant is from a strict and traditional Kurdish family and her evidence must be considered in the context of the position of women within Iranian society. I consider her failure to specifically mention in interview that she was sexually attracted to ‘A’ does not undermine her credibility, particularly bearing in mind she was not asked any follow-up questions about such matters so as to give her fair opportunity to provide additional details.
22. In his closing submissions, Mr Royle argued the Appellant’s failure to mention in her asylum interviews that she had started a two-year art course undermines her credibility. This is said to be of direct relevance because she claims to have first met ‘A’ outside the high school whilst attending that course. I do not agree with this contention. First, in her screening interview she described herself as a student (at question [1.14]) and whilst she does not specifically refer to an art course, she does refer to having received a high school diploma in response to a question about her level of education, which appears to focus on qualifications (at question [2.6]). It is noteworthy that she did not complete the art course before she fled the country. Further, in her asylum interview the Appellant refers to having received a college diploma and provides the name of the high school she attended but she was not asked about the courses undertaken (AIR, questions [10] and [11]). In oral evidence, she explained that she had not graduated so did not refer to that course when asked about qualifications. I find this is an entirely reasonable explanation for any omission, even if this can properly be regarded as such.
23. I find the Appellant has also provided detailed and credible evidence as to why she chose to pursue a relationship with ‘A’, notwithstanding the fact she believed her family would not accept him. In her witness statement, she explains that having grown up in a strict Kurdish family with the knowledge that she would be forced to marry within the family and having witnessed her father’s behaviour towards her mother she was attracted to the lifestyle that ‘A’ offered. It is entirely understandable that she did not want the life that her mother and sister were living and instead wanted more freedom. This is what she conveyed during her asylum interview (at question [55]), though again she was not asked further follow up questions to elicit more detail. Given her family circumstances, it was plainly risky for her to meet ‘A’ in person, though she explains that she was young, falling in love and her excitement overtook rationality (witness statement, paragraph [70]). I find this is a reasonable explanation, particularly bearing in mind that ‘A’ said he would ask her family for permission to marry. If her paternal cousin had married someone else contrary to the arrangements previously made, it is also quite possible she may have hoped her family would agree to such a proposal.
24. The Respondent argues that the Appellant’s account of having met ‘A’ at a coffee shop is inconsistent with country background evidence that women often require a male guardian or chaperone to travel and face harassment when travelling alone. First, the source of that evidence has not been provided. The more recent Home Office Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) on women fearing honour-based violence in Iran, published in June 2025, states that some women require the permission of a male guardian to leave the home and travel alone, though this appears to relate more to married women (see sections [5.1.3] and [11.2.4]). In any event, given the Appellant was able to walk to school with friends and also says she confided in her mother, who often covered for her, even though she was worried and told her not to go (witness statement, paragraph [33]), I find it is not implausible she was able to leave the house and visit a shopping mall around 15 minutes away in order to meet ‘A’.
25. The Respondent also asserts the Appellant’s account as to how her brother found out about her relationship with ‘A’ is inconsistent. This is said to be because in her further representations she referred to them having been seen in a shopping mall whereas in interview she said it was in a café. In her witness statement, the Appellant explains the coffee shop was in a shopping mall and asserts this is common in Tehran. I consider this to be an entirely reasonable explanation for the apparent discrepancy.
26. There is perhaps more merit in the Respondent’s contention that the Appellant has been inconsistent in her evidence as to whether she engaged in sexual intercourse with ‘A’. In her screening interview, she refers to having been threatened by her family because she had sex with him (at question [3.2]) whereas later confirmed she did not do so. However, it is of some significance that she sought to correct her answer to that question in further representations submitted by her legal representative on 24th February 2025, notably before her substantive interview took place (see consolidated bundle, page [309]). Further, whilst it was arguably risky for ‘A’ to lie to her brother by saying he was in a sexual relationship with the Appellant, I find it is plausible he may have done so because he thought her family may consent to marriage to restore ‘family honour’. Further, I take into account she was told by her uncle that ‘A’ disclosed this information and he is said to have found out from her brother, who wants to kill her. She has not spoken to ‘A’ since the incident at the coffee shop to confirm that is what he actually said and is relying on hearsay evidence arising from a person intending to kill her in the name of so-called ‘family honour’. On balance, I do not consider these factors can properly be regarded as undermining the Appellant’s credibility.
27. In his closing submissions, Mr Royle pointed out there is no documentary evidence to support the Appellant’s bare assertion that she had a relationship with ‘A’ and argued her failure to try to retrieve evidence from social media undermines her credibility. However, this ignores the Appellant’s evidence that they were not friends on Instagram and she deleted his messages for safety reasons (see witness statement, paragraph [28]). Whilst she could have taken steps to see whether evidence could have been retrieved from her social media account, there is no evidence before me to suggest deleted messages can be retrieved some time after having been deleted. In her submissions, Ms Khan noted that both Facebook and Instagram are owned by Meta and pointed out the Tribunal in XX was referred to evidence indicating that material deleted from Facebook is not retrievable after 30 days. I find this is capable of carrying some weight in assessing whether the Appellant could have provided documentary evidence of messages, in the absence of any evidence to confirm Instagram messages are recoverable for a longer period. I also take into account that corroborative evidence is not required in asylum claims (see MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216).
28. Mr Royle also argued it is unlikely the Appellant’s brother would reveal to her maternal uncle that he had been informed she had engaged in a sexual relationship with ‘A’ because this would only bring shame on the family. However, I agree with Ms Khan’s submission that the Appellant cannot be expected to explain what was going through her brother’s mind at the time. As a person intent on killing his sister to restore so-called ‘family honour’, he may well have disclosed such information in an attempt to find out her whereabouts through her uncle, bearing in mind the Appellant’s evidence that her brother is said to have made a complaint to the authorities because he thought they would be able to find her more quickly (witness statement, paragraph [39]). I do not consider this factor serves to undermine her credibility.
29. The Appellant’s account is also consistent with relevant country background evidence in the Home Office Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) on ‘Zina’ (sex outside of marriage and adultery) in Iran, published in April 2026. Whilst the evidence suggests there is no real risk that the Appellant would face criminal prosecution, notwithstanding the fact that a complaint was made, there is reference to the fact that so-called honour-based violence does occur in Iran, most commonly against women and girls who are suspected of having committed ‘zina’. The CPIN refers to triggers for such violence, including engaging in a romantic relationship disapproved of by the family and cites several examples of young women having been killed by family members for reasons related to pre-marital relationships (see section [9.4.10]). Further, the country information schedule relied upon by the Appellant also refers to human rights violations against Kurdish women targeted by their family in the name of so-called ‘honour’. I also take into account that the risk of honour-based violence is considered to be greater for women from traditional, poor and rural areas of Iran, particularly in the Kurdish region.
Application of the law to the facts
30. Having considered all the evidence presented in the round to the appropriate standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities when assessing whether the Appellant holds a genuine fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, and applying the lower standard to the assessment of risk, I find the Appellant has provided sufficient evidence to discharge the burden of proof upon her to establish she was threatened and targeted by her family members as claimed. I accept she met and began a relationship with ‘A’, exchanging text messages via social media before meeting at a coffee shop, and was threatened by her brother when he saw them together. I found her to be a credible witness who gave coherent, consistent and detailed evidence as to the circumstances which gave rise to her fleeing Iran in fear of her life. In light of my findings of fact, I accept there is at least a reasonable degree of likelihood that she faces a real risk of being targeted by her family members on return to Tehran such that the question under section 32(4)(a) of the 2022 Act also falls to be answered in her favour.
31. Given the Respondent’s explicit concession, that if the Appellant’s account of events is found to be credible there would be no effective state protection available to her nor could she safely relocate to another area within Iran to avoid the risk of becoming the victim of so-called ‘honour’ based violence at the hands of her father or brother, her appeal falls to be allowed. In the circumstances, it is not necessary for me to consider issue (ii) relating to the extent of any risk arising due to her sur place activities, though I note the fact that she has posted about honour-related crimes is consistent with her claim to have been threatened with such violence herself and lends further support to her overall credibility.
NOTICE OF DECISION
I allow the appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
No fee was paid therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed: D. Hollings-Tennant Date: 2nd November 2026
First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their name or address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify her. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of Court.
This order does not restrict disclosure of information relating to this appeal to law enforcement or regulatory agencies, the Bar Council, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Law Society, the Immigration Advice Authority, or where disclosure is otherwise required by law.
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