Administrative United Kingdom
KSR v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/69923/2026
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
| Heard at Nottingham Justice Centre (Hybrid) On 29 October 2026 |
Before
JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL S. AZIZ
Between
KSR
(anonymity direction made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: In Person
For the Respondent: Ms N. Rayasat, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant was born on XXXX. There is a dispute between the parties as to whether he is a South African or British national.
2. On 28 April 2026, the respondent made a deportation order against the appellant under section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007. Accompanying the deportation order was a decision letter rejecting the appellant’s protection and human rights representations. The appellant seeks to appeal this decision, which is the subject of these appeal proceedings.
ANONYMITY DIRECTION
3. I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. However, in the particular circumstances of this case, it is necessary and proportionate to conceal the appellant’s identity in order to protect his right to privacy and the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice in this case.
BACKGROUND
4. Immigration history: The appellant was born in South Africa. He entered the United Kingdom in 2000 on a South African passport and was granted leave to remain until 31 May 2002. On 29 November 2018 he applied for leave to remain and for British citizenship; both applications were refused on 19 July 2020. A subsequent application for further leave to remain, made on 2 September 2022, was refused on 12 September 2024 and he was served with a removal notice as a person without valid leave.
5. Following his January 2025 conviction (see paragraph 7 below), the respondent initiated deportation proceedings. In response, the appellant claimed asylum on 4 April 2025. On 28 April 2026, the respondent refused his protection and human rights claim and made a deportation order against him. It is that decision which the appellant appeals.
6. Criminal history: The appellant has an extensive criminal history beginning from when he was a youth. In October 2009 he received a police warning for assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Between 2012 and 2014 he accumulated convictions for offences including theft, burglary, robbery, threatening behaviour and repeated breaches of youth rehabilitation orders. His offending resulted in a series of referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, curfews and supervision requirements, culminating in a four-month detention and training order imposed in May 2014.
7. As an adult, he continued to offend. His convictions include possession of cannabis, drug driving, driving whilst disqualified, driving without insurance, repeated breaches of community orders, criminal damage and harassment putting a person in fear of violence. Between 13 July 2012 and 24 April 2023 he accrued 17 convictions for 22 offences.
8. His offending culminated in his conviction at Sheffield Crown Court on 6 January 2025 for possession of a prohibited firearm. On 12 December 2025 he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and forfeiture of the firearm. This conviction forms the basis of the respondent's decision to deport him.
9. The appellant's challenge to his deportation: The appellant advances four claims in opposition to deportation. Firstly claims to be British and not subject to deportation. In the alternative. Firstly, he claims international protection on asylum grounds. Secondly, he relies on Article 8 ECHR, contending that deportation would constitute a disproportionate interference with his family and private life in the United Kingdom. Thirdly, he contends that his removal would breach Article 3 ECHR by reason of his physical and mental health conditions.
10. The appellant's challenge to his deportation: The appellant advances four grounds of challenge to his deportation. First, he contends that he is British and is therefore not liable to deportation. Secondly, he seeks international protection on asylum grounds. Thirdly, he relies on Article 8 ECHR, contending that deportation would constitute a disproportionate interference with his private and family life in the United Kingdom. Fourthly, he contends that his removal would breach Article 3 ECHR by reason of his physical and mental health conditions.
11. The respondent's decision: The respondent proceeds on the basis that the appellant is a South African national, having regard to his immigration history and possession of a South African passport. The issue of nationality is not substantively addressed in the decision.
12. Protection claim: The appellant claims to fear persecution in South Africa on account of his race, asserting that, as a white person, he would be targeted and killed by black South Africans upon return. As a starting point, the respondent relied upon section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, concluding that the appellant's conviction and sentence of five years' imprisonment constituted a particularly serious crime and that he had failed to rebut the presumption that he represented a danger to the community. The respondent therefore concluded that Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention applied and that the appellant was excluded from the Convention's protection.
13. The respondent further concluded that the appellant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution. It was not accepted that the background evidence demonstrated that white South Africans are subject to systematic racial persecution, nor that the appellant would be specifically targeted. In any event, the respondent concluded that any feared harm would emanate from non-state actors, that there was a sufficiency of protection available from the South African authorities, and that internal relocation to cities such as Cape Town, Durban or Port Elizabeth would be both available and reasonable.
14. Article 8 – Human rights claim: In relation to Article 8 ECHR, the respondent accepted that the appellant had lived in the United Kingdom since childhood, albeit unlawfully since 2002, and that members of his family reside here. It was not accepted that he is a British citizen. The respondent concluded that, having been sentenced to five years' imprisonment, the appellant could not rely upon Exception 1 or Exception 2 to deportation. Given the seriousness of his offending and the sentence imposed, it was further concluded that there were no very compelling circumstances capable of outweighing the public interest in deportation.
15. Article 3 – medical claim: The respondent rejected the appellant's Article 3 claim based upon his physical and mental health, including his assertion that he may self-harm or attempt suicide if returned. The respondent concluded that appropriate medical and mental health treatment would be available in South Africa and that the evidence did not establish a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
16. Case Management Review Hearing on 19 August 2026: A Case Management Review Hearing took place before Judge Parkes on 19 August 2026. Directions were given to the appellant that he must provide a witness statement and documentary evidence appertaining to all of the matters he sought to rely upon. The Tribunal noted that the latest OASys assessment remained outstanding and directed the respondent to provide it together with any review. The respondent was also to provide a PNC printout at or before the final hearing. These directions have not been properly complied with by either party (see below). The judge also directed that the appeal be taken offline. However, this appears not to have been done either.
THE HEARING
17. The documentary evidence in this appeal is contained within the documents uploaded to myHMCTS. There appeared to be some uncertainty as to whether the appeal remained active on the portal. However, documents had been uploaded in advance of the hearing and the appellant brought further documentary evidence, which was uploaded to myHMCTS by the clerk on the morning of the hearing (see below). Accordingly, all documentary evidence before me is available on myHMCTS.
18. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.
19. Preliminary matters: Several preliminary matters required consideration. First, the appellant appeared as a litigant in person and participated in the hearing from custody. I had regard to paragraphs [1.3], [1.5] and [11.3] of the Senior President of Tribunals' Practice Direction for the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) dated 1 November 2024 and followed the guidance contained in the Equal Treatment Bench Book. I explained the procedure and structure of the hearing to the appellant and indicated that he would be afforded a full opportunity to present his case.
20. Secondly, I noted that neither party had fully complied with the Tribunal's directions dated 19 August 2026. Ms Rayasat confirmed that, despite efforts to do so, the respondent had been unable to obtain the OASys report, which may have assisted in the assessment of risk. It was also accepted that no respondent's review had been undertaken, although no explanation was provided for that omission. Ms Rayasat had a copy of the appellant's PNC record at the hearing and confirmed that it disclosed no ‘new’ convictions other than those already set out in the respondent's decision letter. As the appellant did not dispute the criminal history recorded in the decision letter and no new matters arose from the PNC record, I indicated that there was no need for that document to be formally served.
21. The appellant did not comply with the directions requiring the service of an Appeal Skeleton Argument and witness statement. Nevertheless, he uploaded a substantial volume of documentary evidence to myHMCTS, much of which comprised medical records. He also produced further documentation at the hearing, including handwritten/typed letters from family members, some of whom attended to give evidence, certificates and records of courses completed whilst in custody, additional medical evidence, and a news article.
22. Although no explanation was provided for the late production of this evidence, I took into account that the appellant was unrepresented and that the appeal concerns his deportation from the United Kingdom. I further noted that several of the family members who had authored the handwritten/typed letters attended the hearing and were intending to give evidence on his behalf. In the absence of witness statements, the letters represented the substance of their written evidence. Having regard to the overriding objective and the interests of fairness, I admitted the additional material. The documents were uploaded to CCD by the clerk and Ms Rayasat was afforded sufficient time to consider them before cross-examining the appellant and his witnesses.
23. Identifying the issues: Following discussions with the parties, it was agreed that I would need to determine the following issues:
(i) Nationality
Whether the appellant is a British citizen by descent. If he is, the remaining issues do not arise and the appeal succeeds.
(ii) Protection claim
The following issues arise in relation to the appellant's protection claim:
(a) Whether the appellant has rebutted the presumption under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 that, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime, he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. If the appellant rebuts that presumption, his protection claim falls to be considered under the Refugee Convention, the humanitarian protection provisions and Article 3 ECHR. If he does not, the protection claim falls to be considered under Article 3 ECHR only.
(b) Whether the appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution and/or a real risk of serious harm on return to South Africa on the basis that, as a white person, he would be racially targeted and subjected to harm by black South Africans.
(c) If so, whether there would be a sufficiency of protection available to him from the South African authorities.
(d) If not, whether he could reasonably and safely relocate to another part of South Africa.
(iii) Human rights claim – medical grounds (Article 3 ECHR)
Whether the appellant meets the Article 3 medical threshold identified in AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 17, namely whether, as a seriously ill person, he would face a real risk, on return, of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy, by reason of the absence of, or lack of access to, appropriate treatment.
(iv) Human rights claim – family and private life (Article 8 ECHR)
Whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above the exceptions contained in sections 117C(4) and 117C(5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, sufficient to outweigh the strong public interest in the appellant's deportation.
24. The Evidence: I heard oral evidence from the appellant, his mother, father, sister and brother. Following the conclusion of the evidence, both parties made closing submissions. I reserved my decision.
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
25. Protection claim: Section 32(4) of the UK Borders Act 2007 provides that the deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good. Section 32(5) requires the Secretary of State to make a deportation order in respect of a foreign criminal, defined, so far as is relevant, as a person who is not a British citizen and who has been convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence for which they have been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least twelve months. That obligation is subject to the exceptions contained in section 33. In this appeal, the relevant exception is found in section 33(2):
"Exception 1 is where removal of the foreign criminal in pursuance of the deportation order would breach –
(a) a person's Convention rights, or
(b) the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention.
26. By virtue of section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 ("NIAA 2002"), a person subject to a deportation order may appeal against the refusal of a protection claim and/or a human rights claim. The appellant relies upon both protection and human rights grounds in this appeal.
27. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(i) Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason?
(ii) Does the appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?
If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) The appellant could not internally relocate.
28. To succeed on humanitarian protection grounds, the appellant must not qualify as a refugee and must show substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in his country of origin and that he is unable, or owing to that risk unwilling, to avail himself of the protection of that country. The burden of establishing that risk rests on the appellant. Entitlement is also subject to the applicable requirements of paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules, including that he is not excluded from humanitarian protection under paragraph 339D.
29. Section 72 of the NIAA 2002 gives effect to Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention. Under the regime applicable to convictions on or after 28 June 2022, a person convicted in the United Kingdom and sentenced to imprisonment of at least 12 months is treated as having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime: section 72(2). Section 72(5A) gives rise to a presumption that the person constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. That presumption is rebuttable under section 72(6), and the burden of rebutting it rests upon the appellant. Where the respondent has issued a certificate, section 72(10) requires the Tribunal to begin its substantive deliberations by considering that certificate. If, having afforded the appellant an opportunity to rebut the presumption, the Tribunal concludes that it applies and has not been rebutted, it must dismiss the appeal insofar as it relies upon a breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention. The effect is to disapply the protection against expulsion or return in Article 33(1), rather than to exclude the person from refugee status under Article 1F. Section 72 does not itself determine entitlement to humanitarian protection, which requires separate consideration under the applicable Immigration Rules. Nor does it dispose of the human rights grounds of appeal. In particular, Article 3 ECHR remains an absolute prohibition: removal is unlawful if substantial grounds establish a real risk of prohibited ill-treatment, irrespective of the appellant’s criminality or danger to the community. The Article 8 claim must also be determined separately under the applicable statutory framework.
30. Human rights (Article 8 ECHR): It is now settled law (see HA (Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22) that Parliament has established, through Part 5A of the NIAA 2002, a structured approach and a complete code for determining Article 8 deportation appeals. Part 13 of the Immigration Rules must be construed consistently with those statutory provisions. The appellant received a sentence of five years' imprisonment. Accordingly, section 117C(6) of the NIAA 2002 applies and the issue is whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, sufficient to outweigh the strong public interest in deportation.
31. Human rights (Article 3 ECHR – medical grounds): The question is whether the appellant's removal would breach Article 3 ECHR, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Following AM (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 17 and AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC), the appellant must establish that he is a seriously ill person and that substantial grounds have been shown for believing that, as a result of the absence of appropriate treatment or lack of access to such treatment in South Africa, he would face a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy.
FINDINGS OF FACT
32. Having heard from the appellant and his immediate family members, I accept that they appreciate the seriousness of his predicament. The appellant benefits from a strong family support network in the United Kingdom. In addition to those who gave evidence, a number of other family members attended the hearing in support of his appeal. On the evidence before me, his parents and siblings have led law-abiding lives and have provided him with longstanding support. His father explained that he had provided financial support to the appellant for virtually his entire life, apart from a period of employment after leaving school, which ended when it was discovered that the appellant did not have permission to work. Against that background, the appellant's extensive offending history, beginning in his youth and continuing into adulthood, is difficult to reconcile with the strength of that support. The appellant advanced a number of explanations for his criminality, to which I return below. For the reasons that follow, I did not find those explanations wholly persuasive and conclude that significant rehabilitation work remains to be undertaken.
33. Having heard from the appellant and his family members, I found their evidence concerning his family and private life in the United Kingdom to be broadly credible. However, insofar as their evidence addressed the support available to him in South Africa, I approached it with greater caution. I considered there to be a degree of reluctance to acknowledge the extent of any support that may be available to him there, including the support that family members in the United Kingdom could continue to provide in the event of his deportation. It is against that background that I make my findings on the issues in dispute.
Nationality: Whether the appellant is a British citizen by descent?
34. The appellant submits that he is a British citizen. He relies upon the fact that his father is a British citizen by descent, that his siblings are British citizens, that his grandparents and great-grandparents were British citizens, and that he has lived in the United Kingdom since early childhood. I heard evidence from the appellant's father, who confirmed that he is a dual British and South African national and that he acquired British citizenship by descent.
35. I am not satisfied that the appellant is a British citizen. The evidence before me demonstrates that he was born in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 30 September 1998 and has consistently been recorded as a South African national. The respondent relies upon the appellant's South African passport (contained at page 39 of the respondent’s bundle). The appellant also described himself as a South African national during both his screening and substantive asylum interviews. The documentary evidence further demonstrates that applications for indefinite leave to remain and British citizenship made in 2018 were refused or rejected in 2020. There is no evidence before me that the appellant has been registered as a British citizen, issued with a British passport, or otherwise recognised by the relevant authorities as a British citizen.
36. Whilst I accept that the appellant's father is a British citizen by descent, that fact does not, without more, establish that the appellant is also a British citizen (this was explained to the appellant by Judge Parkes at the CMRH in August 2026). The appellant has produced no documentary or other evidence demonstrating that he acquired British citizenship, whether automatically at birth or subsequently through registration. Nor do the British citizenship of his siblings, his ancestral connections to the United Kingdom, or his lengthy residence in this country establish that he is a British citizen. Those matters may be relevant to the assessment of his family and private life, but they do not demonstrate British nationality.
37. Accordingly, on the evidence before me, I find that the appellant has not established that he is a British citizen. I find that he is a citizen of South Africa.
Protection claim – Section 72 Certificate: does the appellant constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom?
38. There are a number of issues that arise in relation to the appellant's protection claim. I begin with the respondent's certification of the claim under section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
39. The conviction giving rise to the present deportation proceedings occurred on 6 January 2025. Accordingly, the amendments introduced by section 38 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 apply and the appeal falls to be determined under the amended section 72 regime.
40. Under that regime, a person who has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least 12 months is presumed to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime and to constitute a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. The appellant accepts that his conviction for possession of a prohibited firearm, for which he received a sentence of five years' imprisonment, brings him within those statutory provisions.
41. The appellant does not dispute that he is to be treated as having been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The issue for determination is whether he has rebutted the presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. If he has not done so, the section 72 certificate must be upheld.
42. There is no OASys report before the Tribunal and the appellant has not relied upon any independent risk assessment evidence. However, he was extensively cross-examined regarding his offending history and was given a full opportunity to explain why he says he no longer constitutes a danger to the community (his family members were not questioned on this subject by Ms Rayasat).
43. The appellant's evidence: In his oral evidence, the appellant expressed remorse for his offending and maintained that he is committed to leading a law-abiding life following his release. He attributed much of his offending behaviour to circumstances arising after the loss of his employment, which he said occurred when it was discovered that he did not have permission to work in the United Kingdom. According to the appellant, the loss of employment led to substance misuse and a cycle of offending which ultimately culminated in the index offence.
44. The appellant also relied upon extensive evidence of rehabilitation whilst in custody. He produced a substantial number of certificates demonstrating engagement with educational, rehabilitative and personal development programmes. These included (but are not limited to) successful completion of the NHS "12 Sessions to Change" programme, alcohol awareness, drug awareness and mental health awareness programmes. The Substance Misuse Team commended his participation, describing his contributions as thoughtful and positive and noting that he completed the programme to an exceptional standard.
45. The appellant has also undertaken educational and vocational training whilst in custody. The certificates before me demonstrate that he obtained a City & Guilds Functional Skills Qualification in English Level 1 on 20 May 2025, a Highfield Level 2 Award in Customer Service on 22 September 2025 and a Level 1 qualification in Health and Safety in the Workplace on 4 February 2026.
46. In addition, the appellant completed the "Making Sense of My Worries" psychoeducational programme and the Epictetus Self-Mastery Programme. He also relies upon evidence of his baptism as a Christian in April 2025. The baptism certificate records congratulations from the chaplain at HMP and YOI Doncaster and encourages him to continue in his Christian faith.
47. Assessment: I accept that the appellant has engaged positively with rehabilitative, educational and personal development opportunities whilst in custody. I further accept that he expressed remorse for his offending and presented himself as committed to living a law-abiding life upon release. These are matters that weigh in his favour.
48. Those matters must be assessed against the wider background of his offending history and the explanations he has advanced. The appellant sought to explain the index offence by reference to a chain of events beginning with the loss of employment. His case was that this led to substance misuse and the accrual of drug debt, which ultimately resulted in his agreeing to store the prohibited firearm.
49. Neither the appellant nor his father was able to identify precisely when his employment ended. The appellant described undertaking a welding course linked to the University of Sheffield, although he could not identify the qualification involved. His father confirmed that he had secured employment for the appellant at the factory where he worked. Their evidence was that the employment ended when the employer discovered that the appellant did not have permission to work in the United Kingdom. The documentary evidence provides some assistance with the chronology. The respondent’s bundle contains an RJD Works training log dated 28 November 2018 (page 29 RB), an apprentice card issued by the University of Sheffield bearing an unclear date (page 34 RB), payslips for 2017–2018 (pages 35–37 RB), and evidence of courses completed at Dearne Valley College, Rotherham, in 2016 (pages 32–33 RB).
50. The respondent’s records show that the appellant applied for leave to remain and British citizenship in November 2018. Although the precise date on which his employment ended remains unclear, the evidence establishes that he attended college and subsequently worked as a trainee welder during part of the period between 2014 and 2019, when there is a gap in his recorded offending. I accept that there is some force in his contention that education and employment provided structure and stability and helped him to refrain from offending during that period. That is a material consideration in his favour. I also accept that the loss of employment may have contributed to his subsequent substance misuse and return to offending, and I have taken that possibility into account.
51. However, the evidence does not establish that the loss of employment was the sole or principal cause of his subsequent offending. His criminal conduct began in childhood, well before he entered employment. Whilst college and work appear to have had a positive influence for a time, and the loss of that structure may help to explain his later difficulties, it does not excuse his decision to engage in further criminal conduct. I therefore give weight to his explanation as part of the context of his offending, but do not accept that it adequately accounts for his offending history as a whole.
52. Viewed as a whole, the appellant’s criminal history demonstrates repeated offending extending from childhood into adulthood, interrupted by the significant gap between 2014 and 2019 which I have acknowledged above. His convictions include theft, burglary, robbery, public order offences, drug offences, motoring offences, harassment, breaches of court orders and, ultimately, possession of a prohibited firearm. The period without recorded offending shows that he was capable of responding positively to structure and opportunity. Nevertheless, his subsequent return to offending and its escalation in seriousness demonstrate that the benefits of earlier education, employment and judicial interventions were not sustained. Those matters remain relevant to the assessment of whether he has rebutted the presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community.
53. The appellant also relied upon his ADHD diagnosis. He submitted that untreated or inadequately treated ADHD led to impulsivity and poor decision-making, which significantly contributed to his criminal behaviour. He further contended that the treatment now being provided in custody has addressed those difficulties and substantially reduced the risk of reoffending.
54. I accept that the appellant has been diagnosed with ADHD and that the condition may have affected aspects of his behaviour. I have taken into account the findings contained in the NHS ADHD Healthcare Summary and Management Plan prepared by Salinder Kaur, Neurodiversity Practitioner, dated 17 August 2026, to which I return in greater detail below. However, the medical evidence demonstrates that the appellant was diagnosed in November 2013 whilst still a minor and has been known to NHS services since that time. This was therefore not a condition that remained wholly unidentified until his imprisonment. In the absence of expert evidence, I am unable to determine the extent to which any inadequately treated ADHD may have contributed to his offending. However, even taking the appellant's case at its highest, I do not accept that it relieves him of responsibility for the choices he repeatedly made over many years.
55. Having heard the appellant give evidence, I am not persuaded that he has yet developed full insight into his offending behaviour. Throughout his evidence, he frequently sought to attribute responsibility to external factors, including the loss of employment and the effects of ADHD. Whilst those matters may provide part of the context, they do not adequately explain a pattern of persistent offending extending from youth into adulthood. The appellant was afforded repeated opportunities to alter his course through both custodial and non-custodial interventions, yet repeatedly returned to criminal conduct. I consider that he has still to accept the degree of personal responsibility warranted by his offending history.
56. I also attach weight to the sentencing remarks of Judge Dixon, who described the index offence as involving a particularly dangerous weapon and expressed concerns regarding the appellant's behaviour whilst in custody. The judge noted that the appellant had failed to comply with prison rules, had resorted to violence, and had demonstrated irresponsible and reckless behaviour. Although Judge Dixon stopped short of finding that the appellant was dangerous, he nevertheless recorded that he had "very real concerns" that he may be. Whilst made in the sentencing context, those observations remain relevant to the issue I am required to determine.
57. In conclusion, I accept that the appellant has engaged constructively with rehabilitation in custody and that there is evidence of progress. Nevertheless, when that evidence is considered against the persistence, breadth and escalating seriousness of his offending, the failure of previous interventions to prevent further criminality, and the limited insight that he presently demonstrates into his offending behaviour, I am not satisfied that he has displaced the statutory presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. The section 72 certificate is therefore upheld. The appellant is excluded from the protection of the Refugee Convention by operation of Article 33(2).
58. Further and in the alternative, I find that the appellant is excluded from humanitarian protection pursuant to paragraph 339D of the Immigration Rules. For the reasons set out in my assessment of section 72, I am satisfied that there are serious reasons for considering that he has committed a particularly serious crime and that he constitutes a danger to the community of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the appellant is not entitled to humanitarian protection. The remaining issue is whether his removal would breach Article 3 ECHR.
Protection claim – Fear of being racially targeted as a white person by black South Africans
59. The appellant's case is that, as a white person, and in particular as a white person who speaks with a British accent, he faces a real risk of serious harm from black South Africans if returned to South Africa. He contends that racial tensions in South Africa have escalated to the point that white people are routinely targeted and that he would be unable to live safely there.
60. The appellant first advanced this claim during his screening interview (section 4.1, page 85 of the respondent's bundle). He stated that there was a "civil war" between black and white South Africans, that black people were killing white farmers, that white people were losing employment opportunities, and that he believed he would be "tortured and killed" if returned. He also asserted that white people were living in shanty towns and were no longer safe in South Africa.
61. During his substantive asylum interview, the appellant repeated those claims. He stated that black South Africans were attacking white South Africans throughout the country, that white people were being forced to live in compounds for protection, and that white people were being targeted because of their race. He maintained that he would be identifiable as a white British person and would therefore be at risk if returned (see, for example, AIR 11-26).
62. The appellant accepted that he had no personal experience of events in South Africa, having left the country as a very young child. The information upon which he relied was derived primarily from media reports and information provided by family members. During his asylum interview he stated that his views were based upon reports he had watched on BBC News and Sky News, comments made by President Trump concerning South Africa, material he had viewed on YouTube, and articles he had read between 2023 and 2025. For example, when asked at AIR 17, "Where have you got your information regarding the civil war?", he replied, "Well I watch BBC News and watch Donald Trump, he was speaking to the ZAF president." He also referred to reports concerning attacks on white farmers and allegations that white South Africans were being persecuted (AIR 20).
63. The appellant additionally relied upon accounts provided by family members. He stated that his father had informed him that white South Africans experienced hostility and discrimination. He claimed that his grandparents and father had left South Africa because of deteriorating conditions there and that his uncle and cousin had returned to the United Kingdom after spending time in South Africa because of concerns regarding conditions in that country.
64. In his oral evidence before me, the appellant repeated the substance of the account advanced during his interviews. He maintained that he would be identifiable as a white person with a British accent and would therefore be targeted. His evidence evolved to some extent in that he asserted that not only ‘whites’ were being targeted, but also that foreigners and persons perceived to be different from the majority population were at risk. He further contended that the South African police were corrupt and unwilling or unable to provide effective protection.
65. The appellant also relied upon the experiences of his uncle and cousin. He stated that they had relocated to South Africa in or around 2012 before returning to the United Kingdom approximately two years later because of corruption and what he described as the persecution of white people. During cross-examination, he stated that they had been stopped by police officers and required to pay bribes before being allowed to proceed. Ms Rayasat put to the appellant that he had not mentioned this aspect of his account during his asylum interview. The appellant responded that he had not been in a good place at the time of interview and had therefore omitted certain matters. Having reviewed the interview record, however, I note that the appellant did refer to his uncle and cousin returning to South Africa around 2012-2013 and to an incident in which they were stopped by police officers and required to pay a bribe (AIR 34).
66. At the hearing, the appellant also relied upon a newspaper article entitled; "This cannot go on, says President after 27 die in South Africa attacks". In summary, it is a general news report concerning serious violent crime in South Africa. It describes a number of mass shootings committed by unidentified armed criminals and records concerns regarding levels of violent crime, organised criminality and policing. However, it does not suggest that the violence was directed at any particular racial group, nor does it indicate that white South Africans are specifically targeted for persecution. Rather, the reported violence appears to be associated with criminal activity affecting the population generally.
67. The respondent relied upon a range of country material to challenge the appellant's assertion that white South Africans are subject to race-based persecution. In particular, reliance was placed within the decision letter upon reports published by The Emancipator, Institute for Security Studies Africa (ISS Africa) and Factually, which were said to demonstrate that attacks upon South African farmers are manifestations of violent criminality rather than a coordinated campaign directed at white South Africans because of their race. The respondent additionally relied upon material concerning the South African Police Service, information published by the Government of South Africa regarding policing, anti-corruption measures and public services, and country material from Freedom House concerning freedom of movement within South Africa. Further reliance was placed upon demographic, linguistic and labour-market data from sources including SouthAfrica.info, World Atlas, Eighty20, Statista, SABC News and the Straits Times. The respondent's case was that this material demonstrated the availability of state protection, the reasonableness of internal relocation and the absence of objective evidence establishing a real risk of persecution to white South Africans as a racial group.
68. I note that the respondent does not publish a Country Policy and Information Note relating specifically to South Africa. I have also considered the ‘2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Africa’ published by the United States Department of State. Whilst that report refers to political rhetoric concerning Afrikaners, concerns surrounding land reform and reports of attacks upon farmers, it does not establish that white South Africans generally are subject to persecution. Nor does it establish that persons in the appellant's circumstances face a real risk of persecution or serious harm throughout South Africa solely because they are white.
69. Findings on the appellant’s protection claim:I remind myself that the burden of establishing a well-founded fear of persecution, or a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, rests upon the appellant. The applicable standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood.
70. Having considered the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant's claim is founded largely upon media reports, utterances by the current US President, anecdotal accounts said to have been provided by family members and his own interpretation of conditions in South Africa. I accept that the appellant may genuinely hold the views that he expressed. However, I do not consider that the evidence before me establishes that white South Africans, as a group, face a real risk of persecution throughout South Africa or that persons who speak with a British accent are at any heightened risk of serious harm.
71. I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that the appellant has established a real risk of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, or a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, by reason of being a white South African or because he speaks with a British accent. The objective evidence does not support such a conclusion, and the appellant's account is based largely upon media reports, anecdotal information and speculation rather than reliable evidence of a current and individualised risk. I therefore reject this aspect of the appellant's protection claim. In any event, I am satisfied on the evidence presented by the respondent that a sufficiency of protection would be available to the appellant in South Africa and that internal relocation would be a viable and reasonable option.
Article 3 ECHR – Medical Grounds
72. Much of the documentary evidence relied upon by the appellant consists of medical records. These confirm that his principal diagnosis is Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), diagnosed during childhood and currently treated with methylphenidate. The records also refer to longstanding symptoms of impulsivity, hyperactivity and poor concentration, together with reported improvement following treatment. In addition, the appellant suffers from low mood, anxiety, sleep disturbance and trauma-related symptoms, for which he has received mental health support and treatment with mirtazapine. The records further refer to chronic thoracic back pain following a motorcycle accident in 2020, a history of low body weight requiring monitoring and nutritional supplementation, and previous misuse of cannabis, cocaine and synthetic cannabinoids.
73. The most significant and up-to-date document relied upon by the appellant is an NHS ADHD Healthcare Summary and Management Plan prepared by Salinder Kaur, Neurodiversity Practitioner, dated 17 August 2026. The report confirms a diagnosis of ADHD made on 19 November 2013 and records a longstanding history of inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity dating from childhood. It notes difficulties with concentration, remaining seated, completing tasks, complying with rules, emotional regulation and sleep. The report further records that the appellant was excluded from mainstream education and attended a school for excluded children. According to the report, these symptoms affected his education, behaviour and decision-making from an early age and pre-dated both his substance misuse and offending behaviour.
74. The report also records that he described positive relationships with his parents and siblings and disclosed previous involvement with children's services, including a period as a looked-after child. The report also records a significant history of substance misuse, including cannabis use from a young age, cocaine use, alcohol misuse and the use of other substances.
75. The appellant is prescribed methylphenidate for ADHD and mirtazapine for low mood and anxiety. His methylphenidate dosage had previously been reduced from 20mg to 10mg because of concerns regarding weight loss. During a psychiatric review in August 2026, he reported that medication had helped him feel calmer, less restless and less prone to racing thoughts. The reviewing clinician recorded that he was "doing well" and noted that he had begun regaining weight. A further medication review was planned.
76. In terms of his current presentation, the report records no significant concerns. Physical health observations were normal and healthcare staff recorded that the appellant was generally compliant with medication, albeit with some missed doses. The management plan recommends continuation of medication, ongoing monitoring and engagement in activities promoting focus, routine and stability. The report also notes that healthcare staff were aware of stress arising from the appellant's ongoing court proceedings and were providing support.
77. I accept that the appellant suffers from the conditions identified within the medical records and that he has required ongoing treatment and support. However, the existence of medical conditions is not, of itself, sufficient to engage Article 3 ECHR. Applying AM (Article 3, health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 131 (IAC), the appellant must establish substantial grounds for believing that, as a seriously ill person, he would face a real risk, as a consequence of the absence of appropriate treatment or the lack of access to such treatment, of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy.
78. During cross-examination, the appellant did not contend that treatment for his conditions was unavailable in South Africa. Rather, he asserted that he would be unable to afford treatment because he believed he would be unable to obtain employment following his return. The thrust of his case was therefore directed towards access to treatment rather than its availability.
79. The respondent relies upon objective material concerning healthcare provision in South Africa. That material indicates that South Africa maintains both public and private healthcare systems and that healthcare services are available to South African citizens. Reliance is placed upon information published by the South African Department of Health concerning healthcare infrastructure, public healthcare provision, national health strategy and mental health reforms. The respondent also relies upon evidence indicating the availability of primary healthcare services, community healthcare programmes, hospital-based treatment and specialist services, including mental health care.
80. In relation to the appellant's physical health, the respondent notes that the appellant reported taking Naproxen for pain associated with his back condition. The objective material relied upon indicates that equivalent medication is available in South Africa, whether over the counter or by prescription. The respondent therefore maintains that treatment for the appellant's physical health needs would remain available following return.
81. In relation to the appellant's mental health, the respondent relies upon objective evidence indicating the availability of mental health services in South Africa. Reference is made to the National Mental Health Policy Framework and Strategic Plan 2023-2030, which describes the provision of psychiatric care, counselling services, psychological treatment and mental health interventions. The respondent also relies upon evidence of support organisations, crisis intervention services and suicide prevention support, including services provided by the South African Depression and Anxiety Group (SADAG).
82. Having considered the evidence as a whole, I am not satisfied that the appellant has discharged the burden of establishing that the Article 3 threshold identified in AM (Zimbabwe) is met. Whilst I accept that he suffers from the conditions identified in the medical evidence and continues to require treatment and support, the evidence falls well short of demonstrating that he is a seriously ill person who would face a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his health resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy, upon return to South Africa.
83. On the contrary, the most recent medical evidence records that the appellant is responding positively to treatment. The healthcare records identify no significant current concerns, describe him as generally compliant with medication and record reported improvements in his symptoms. There is no medical evidence before me suggesting that his conditions are unstable, life-threatening, or that interruption of his current treatment would give rise to consequences approaching the high threshold required by Article 3 ECHR.
84. Nor is there any expert evidence indicating that appropriate treatment would be unavailable in South Africa or inaccessible to the appellant in practice. Whilst the appellant asserts that he may be unable to afford treatment because he may struggle to secure employment, that contention is speculative. The objective evidence relied upon by the respondent demonstrates the existence of public healthcare and mental health services in South Africa, and there is insufficient evidence before me to conclude that the appellant would be unable to access such services.
85. I further note that the appellant's own case was not that treatment for ADHD, his mental health conditions, or his physical health needs does not exist in South Africa. Rather, his concern was that he may experience financial difficulties in obtaining treatment. On the evidence before me, that concern remains speculative and falls substantially short of demonstrating the level of risk required by Article 3 ECHR.
86. For completeness, I have considered the appellant's evidence that he would self-harm or take his own life if returned to South Africa. The medical records demonstrate a history of mental health difficulties, including depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation and contact with crisis services. I accept that the appellant has experienced such difficulties in the past. However, I place significant weight upon the most recent prison healthcare records which record no current suicidal ideation, no thoughts of deliberate self-harm, and no significant current mental health concerns. When assessing the appellant's current circumstances and risk on return, I attach greater weight to that more recent evidence than to the earlier records.
87. Whilst I accept that the appellant has, at times, expressed suicidal thoughts and fears concerning his return to South Africa, there is no up-to-date psychiatric evidence before the Tribunal indicating that he currently presents a significant suicide risk. Nor is there any expert evidence establishing that his removal would give rise to a real risk of suicide capable of engaging Article 3 ECHR. The most recent healthcare records do not identify any acute mental health crisis or significant current risk of self-harm. Taking the evidence as a whole, I am not satisfied that the appellant has established substantial grounds for believing that his removal would expose him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR by reason of suicide or self-harm.
88. Accordingly, I find that the appellant has failed to establish substantial grounds for believing that his removal to South Africa would expose him to a real risk of a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his state of health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The requirements of Article 3 ECHR on medical grounds are therefore not met.
Article 8 ECHR – Family and Private life
89. I next turn to the appellant's family and private life. I consider that aspect of his claim within the statutory framework established by Parliament. Before doing so, I set out my findings regarding the nature and extent of the appellant's family and private life in the United Kingdom. Having considered the oral and documentary evidence, I broadly accept the following:
(i) The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom with his family at approximately 14 months of age and has lived here continuously ever since, although for the majority of that period he has not held lawful immigration status.
(ii) The appellant was raised in the United Kingdom by his parents alongside his siblings. His siblings are British citizens, his mother is a South African national, and his father holds dual British and South African nationality. I accept that the appellant has maintained strong and positive relationships with his parents, siblings and wider family members.
(iii) The appellant was educated in the United Kingdom, attending school and later college. Salinder Kaur’s NHS report (referred to above) records longstanding difficulties associated with ADHD. The appellant was excluded from mainstream education and attended a school for excluded children. I accept that his ADHD symptoms affected his education, behaviour and decision-making from an early age.
(iv) There is evidence that the appellant worked as a trainee welder between approximately 2017 and 2018, which broadly coincides with the completion of his college education in 2016.
(v) The appellant's brief period in employment came to an end in 2018 after it was discovered that he did not have permission to work in the United Kingdom and that he has not undertaken lawful employment since that time. Since then, he was maintained and accommodated by his parents up until his incarceration.
(vi) The evidence concerning the appellant's residential history was less clear. The appellant, his brother and his father gave differing accounts as to where he had lived at various times. Whilst the appellant's father suggested that he had always lived at the family home, both the appellant and his brother indicated that he had lived elsewhere for periods of time, particularly when he was working. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that, prior to his imprisonment, the appellant had been residing with his parents for a number of years following the loss of his employment in or around 2018.
(vii) The appellant has a significant criminal history, a history of substance misuse, including cannabis use from a young age, together with cocaine, alcohol and other substances.
Section 117B
90. I am required to consider the factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The maintenance of effective immigration control under section 117B(1) weighs in favour of the respondent. Sections 117B(4) and (5) are engaged because large portions of the appellant's private life were established during periods when his immigration status was unlawful or precarious, with the consequence that little weight should be attached to those aspects of private life. The appellant's ability to speak English and the issue of financial independence are neutral factors. Section 117B(6) is not engaged.
Section 117C
91. The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest: Section 117C(1) of the 2002 Act makes clear the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. A foreign criminal is defined at section 117D of the 2002 Act as someone: a) who is not a British citizen, b) who has been convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence and c) who has, i) been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months, or ii) been convicted of an offence causing serious harm, or iii) is a persistent offender. The appellant is a South African national and it is accepted that he has been convicted and sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months. His deportation is clearly in the public interest.
92. Seriousness of the appellant’s offence: The seriousness of the appellant's offending weighs heavily in the proportionality assessment. Section 117C(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides that the more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater the public interest in deportation. There can be no real dispute that the index offence falls within the most serious category of criminal conduct.
93. A copy of the sentencing remarks is contained at pages 6-9 of the respondent’s bundle. On 6 January 2025, at Sheffield Crown Court, the appellant was sentenced by His Honour Judge Dixon following his conviction for possession of a prohibited firearm. Before passing sentence, the judge emphasised the grave seriousness of the offence, noting that the appellant had possessed a highly dangerous weapon. The judge observed that offences involving firearms give rise to significant public concern because of the obvious risk of serious harm and the wider danger posed to the public.
94. The sentencing judge also considered the appellant's antecedent history and observed that his offending had persisted over a lengthy period. He noted that the appellant had accumulated a substantial criminal record from a young age and that previous interventions by the courts had failed to prevent further offending. Particular significance was attached to the escalating nature of the appellant's criminality, culminating in the index offence.
95. The judge further referred to the appellant's conduct whilst in custody and recorded concerns regarding his failure to comply with prison rules and his involvement in violent behaviour. Whilst the judge did not make a formal finding that the appellant was dangerous within the meaning of the sentencing provisions, he nevertheless expressed "very real concerns" that he may present a danger in the future. The judge concluded that only a substantial custodial sentence could properly reflect the seriousness of the offence, punish the appellant and protect the public. The appellant was accordingly sentenced to five years' imprisonment.
96. In his oral evidence before me, the appellant sought to explain that he had agreed to store the firearm because he had accrued a drug debt which he was unable to repay (something which Judge Dixon had also noted in his sentencing remarks). He maintained that he had never intended to use the weapon and that his involvement was limited to storing it on behalf of another. I am prepared to accept the appellant’s evidence. However, even taking that explanation at its highest, it does little to diminish the inherent seriousness of the offence. The appellant knowingly involved himself in the possession of a prohibited firearm, being a weapon which Parliament has determined should not lawfully be possessed because of the significant danger it poses to the public.
97. I find that the index offence was a serious offence. The sentencing remarks reveal not only the gravity of the offence itself but also wider concerns regarding the appellant's persistent offending, the escalation of his criminality over time and his behaviour whilst in custody. Those matters significantly strengthen the public interest in deportation in this case.
98. Public interest in deportation unless one of the exceptions to deportation applies: Given that the appellant has been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, he is unable to succeed under either the family life or private life exceptions to deportation. Nevertheless, it is argued by the appellant that he satisfies some of the underlying requirements of the private life exception and that, when those matters are considered alongside the other factors relied upon, there exist very compelling circumstances over and above the exceptions such that the high threshold in section 117C(6) is met. The appellant accepted at the outset of the hearing that he does not have a qualifying partner or child and therefore cannot rely upon the family life exception. It is therefore necessary to consider the private life exception as part of the overall proportionality assessment.
Exception 1: Private Life
99. In order to meet the private life exception, the appellant must satisfy three requirements: lawful residence for most of his life, social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom, and the existence of very significant obstacles to his integration in South Africa.
100. Lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life: In light of my finding that the appellant is not a British national the first requirement is not satisfied, namely that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life. Whilst he entered the United Kingdom lawfully in 2000 and had leave until 2002, he has been living in the United Kingdom without any form of leave since May 2002.
101. Social and cultural integration: The factors relied upon by the appellant in support of his claim that he is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom are as follows:
(i) He arrived in the United Kingdom at approximately 14 months of age and has spent virtually his entire life here.
(ii) He received all of his education in the United Kingdom.
(iii) He regards himself as British and identifies the United Kingdom as his home.
(iv) He has developed all of his social, cultural and personal ties in the United Kingdom.
(v) His parents, siblings, nieces, nephews and wider family members reside in the United Kingdom.
(vi) His entire support network is based in the United Kingdom.
(vii) He undertook employment and vocational training in the United Kingdom, including training as a welder.
(viii) He has no meaningful memory of living in South Africa and claims to have no significant ties there.
(ix) He relies upon the educational, rehabilitative and personal development courses undertaken whilst in custody as evidence of his efforts to reintegrate into society.
102. The respondent relies upon a number of factors said to undermine the appellant's claim to social and cultural integration:
(i) The appellant has not held lawful immigration status for many years.
(ii) He has an extensive criminal record dating from childhood.
(iii) His offending has been persistent and has escalated in seriousness over time.
(iv) He has had repeated involvement with the criminal justice system over a prolonged period.
(v) There is evidence of disciplinary and behavioural issues whilst in custody.
103. I have considered these competing factors in the round. I accept that the appellant's offending history is a highly relevant consideration. However, criminal offending is not determinative of the question whether a person is socially and culturally integrated. As the Court of Appeal observed in CI (Nigeria) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2027, the question is whether the offending is of such a nature and extent as to demonstrate a rejection of, or exclusion from, the social and cultural norms of the society into which the individual would otherwise be integrated.
104. Applying that guidance, I find that, notwithstanding the appellant's extensive and serious offending history, his social and cultural integration has not been destroyed. His entire social identity has been formed in the United Kingdom. Whilst his offending demonstrates repeated disregard for the law, I am not persuaded that it is sufficient to outweigh the very substantial evidence of integration established by his lifelong residence, education, family relationships and social ties within this country.
105. Taking all matters into account, I conclude that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom for the purposes of section 117C.
106. Very Significant Obstacles to Integration: The appellant contends that there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in South Africa. He relies upon the fact that he left South Africa at approximately 14 months of age and has spent virtually his entire life in the United Kingdom. He has no meaningful memory of South Africa, no established support network there and no family members upon whom he could realistically rely, save for an elderly maternal grandmother with whom he has no relationship. He contends that he would have no accommodation, employment or financial support available upon return. The appellant further relies upon his close family ties in the United Kingdom, his identification as British, his ADHD diagnosis, his mental health difficulties and his limited knowledge of contemporary life in South Africa. Taken together, he submits that these factors would create very significant obstacles to his integration.
107. The respondent disputes that contention. The respondent relies upon the fact that the appellant is a South African national, speaks English and is an adult male of working age. The appellant has educational qualifications, vocational training and previous employment experience obtained in the United Kingdom. There is no medical evidence demonstrating that the appellant's physical or mental health conditions would prevent him from living independently, obtaining employment or functioning within South African society.
108. The respondent also relies upon the evidence concerning the availability of support. The appellant's mother confirmed that her own mother continues to reside in South Africa in her own home. Whilst the evidence did not establish the existence of a close relationship between the appellant and his grandmother, it nevertheless demonstrates that he has not entirely lost all family connections with South Africa. In addition, although the appellant's family members were initially reluctant to accept the proposition during cross-examination, they ultimately acknowledged that they would be willing and able to provide the appellant with at least some degree of financial assistance from the United Kingdom following his return. In particular, the appellant's father accepted that he had been financially supporting the appellant for a number of years after he was unable to work and was unable to identify any reason why some support could not continue, at least during any initial period of resettlement.
109. Having considered all of the evidence in the round, I accept that the appellant would face genuine hardship upon return to South Africa. He has not lived there since infancy, has no meaningful recollection of the country and has established the entirety of his family, social and private life in the United Kingdom. I further accept that relocation would involve a significant degree of disruption and emotional difficulty.
110. However, the statutory test is not whether relocation would be difficult or undesirable. I accept that the appellant has spent virtually his entire life in the United Kingdom and has no meaningful memory of South Africa. Nevertheless, the question is whether he would be enough of an insider to understand how life in South Africa is carried on and to have a reasonable opportunity to participate in it within a reasonable period of time. Having considered the evidence in the round, I am satisfied that he would. The evidence before me does not establish obstacles of the elevated severity required by the statutory test. The appellant is a relatively young adult of working age. He speaks English fluently (which is one of the main languages spoken in South Africa), has educational qualifications, vocational skills and a demonstrated willingness to work. Indeed, his own evidence was that he wished to work but was prevented from doing so because of his immigration status rather than any incapacity. Whilst I accept that he has ADHD and has experienced periods of poor mental health, the medical evidence demonstrates that those conditions are currently being managed through treatment and does not establish that they would prevent him from functioning independently in South Africa. I also attach weight to the fact that some support would be available. Whilst I accept that the appellant's support network is overwhelmingly based in the United Kingdom, there remains a family connection in South Africa and the evidence satisfies me that his family members in the United Kingdom would continue to provide him with practical and financial assistance, at least during any period of transition. I do not accept that the appellant would be returned entirely without support or resources. The appellant would undoubtedly experience hardship, culture shock and significant emotional difficulties upon return to South Africa. However, those difficulties fall short of establishing very significant obstacles to integration. For the purposes of completeness, even if I were to have made a finding in the appellant’s favour on this issue, it would not have made an overall difference to the outcome of the appeal. The appellant would still have been unable to meet the private life exception because of his inability to meet the lawful residence requirement.
111. For the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that Exception 1 is met.
Very Compelling Circumstances
112. I turn finally to consider whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, sufficient to outweigh the strong public interest in the appellant's deportation.
113. Section 117C(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 requires a holistic assessment of all relevant circumstances. The authorities make clear that factors falling within Exceptions 1 and 2 may continue to carry weight, even where those exceptions are not met. Those factors must, however, be considered cumulatively and weighed against the very strong public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals.
114. In the appellant's favour, I take into account all of the matters relied upon in support of his private and family life claims. Although I have not found that Exception 1 is satisfied, I did conclude that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, for the reasons set out above. In particular, I found that he has lived in the United Kingdom since approximately 14 months of age and has spent virtually his entire life here. His education, social development and family life have all taken place in the United Kingdom. He identifies this country as his home and has no meaningful memory of South Africa.
115. I further accept that the appellant would experience genuine hardship upon return to South Africa. Whilst I have not found that there would be ‘very significant obstacles’ to his integration, I accept that relocation would involve substantial disruption. He would be separated from the family members upon whom he presently relies, would be required to establish an independent life in a country in which he has not lived since infancy and would have to rebuild his life in unfamiliar surroundings. All these factors weigh heavily in his favour.
116. In relation to family life, the appellant accepted that he has neither a partner nor any children. However, I accept that he enjoys close and longstanding relationships with his parents, siblings and wider family members in the United Kingdom. Prior to his imprisonment, he had been residing at the family home and there was clear evidence that his family members remain committed to supporting him. Having heard from his parents and siblings, I accept that they are a close family unit. Nevertheless, I agree with Ms Rayasat's submission that the relationships relied upon do not extend beyond the ties that would ordinarily be expected between adult family members. Whilst the appellant's father provided financial assistance after the appellant ceased working around 2018, the evidence was that this arose because the appellant was unable lawfully to work rather than because of any dependency arising from ill health or other exceptional circumstances.
117. I also take into account the appellant's medical circumstances. He has an established diagnosis of ADHD, has received treatment for low mood and anxiety, has engaged with substance misuse services and experiences chronic back pain. I further take into account the positive steps he has taken whilst in custody, including educational courses, vocational training, rehabilitative work and engagement with treatment services. Whilst these efforts are commendable, they have largely taken place following the offence that has given rise to the present deportation proceedings.
118. During closing submissions, I explained to the appellant that the statutory test required him to identify very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. In response, he relied principally upon the matters already advanced in support of his protection claim, his Article 3 medical claim, his private life in the United Kingdom and his family relationships with relatives’ resident here.
119. I have taken into account the factual matters relied upon by the appellant in support of those claims. However, for the reasons already given, I have found that the appellant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution, entitlement to humanitarian protection, or a breach of Article 3 ECHR. Those claims therefore do not attract the significant weight that would have attached had they been made out.
120. Looking at everything in the round, I accept that the appellant's circumstances are unusual in several respects. He has lived in the United Kingdom since infancy, all of his close family members reside here, he is socially and culturally integrated in British society and his removal will undoubtedly be difficult for both him and his family. I further accept that his ADHD diagnosis provides some context for aspects of his behaviour and personal history, although it does not excuse his offending.
121. However, these factors must be weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation set out by Parliament and reflected in the statutory framework that I have applied in determining this appeal. The appellant's offending has been extensive, persistent and serious. It began in his youth, continued into adulthood and culminated in an offence involving possession of a prohibited firearm, for which he received a sentence of five years' imprisonment. As I have already found, he has not rebutted the presumption that he constitutes a danger to the community for the purposes of section 72. Moreover, notwithstanding the significant rehabilitative work he has undertaken whilst in custody, am not persuaded that he has yet demonstrated full insight into his offending behaviour or full acceptance of responsibility for it.
122. Taking all matters into account cumulatively and standing back to consider the evidence as a whole, I am not satisfied that the factors relied upon by the appellant, whether considered individually or collectively, amount to very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. Whilst I accept that deportation will have harsh consequences for the appellant and his family, those consequences do not outweigh the very strong public interest in deportation in this case.
123. Accordingly, I find that the appellant has failed to establish very compelling circumstances sufficient to outweigh the public interest in his deportation. His appeal therefore falls to be dismissed on Article 8 ECHR grounds.
124. For the above reasons, the appellant's appeal does not succeed on any of the grounds advanced.
NOTICE OF DECISION
125. The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.
Anonymity Direction Made
Pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, until this appeal is finally determined the appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and his family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This order does not restrict disclosure of information relating to this appeal to law enforcement or regulatory agencies, the Bar Council, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Law Society, OISC, or where disclosure is otherwise required by law.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
As I have dismissed the appeal, there can be no fee award.
Signed Date: 2 November 2026
S. Aziz
First Tier Tribunal Judge S. Aziz
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