Administrative United Kingdom

Corburn Jenkinson v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors

Official source

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01505 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/D/2026/0612

First-tier Tribunal

(General Regulatory Chamber)

Transport

Heard by Cloud Video Platform

Heard on: 29 October 2026

Decision given on: 02 November 2026

Before

JUDGE PERI MORNINGTON

TRIBUNAL MEMBER ROANTREE

TRIBUNAL MEMBER FRY

Between

CORBURN JENKINSON

Appellant

and

REGISTRAR OF APPROVED DRIVING INSTRUCTORS

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: In person

For the Respondent: Mr Heard

Decision: The appeal is dismissed. The Registrar’s decision of 27 May 2026 is upheld.

REASONS

Introduction

1. This appeal concerns a decision of the Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors ("the Registrar") made on 27 May 2026 refusing the Appellant's application to be entered in the Register of Approved Driving Instructors ("the Register") on the ground that he was not a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register. The decision was made pursuant to section 125(3)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

2. The proceedings were conducted by Cloud Video Platform. All parties participated remotely. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair and just to proceed in that manner.

Background to the Appeal

3. On 28 March 2024, the Appellant was accepted as a Potential Driving Instructor and began the Approved Driving Instructor qualification process. Having subsequently completed that process, he applied for entry in the Register. By email dated 27 April 2026, the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (“DVSA”) notified him that the Registrar was considering refusing his application and invited him to make representations.

4. On 19 September 2024 the Appellant committed a speeding offence for which he later received a fixed penalty and three penalty points. On 22 September 2024 he committed a further speeding offence and received an additional three penalty points. Accordingly, six penalty points were endorsed on the Appellant’s driving record. Those points remained relevant for the purposes of the Registrar’s assessment and would continue to count for the purposes of disqualification under the totting-up provisions until September 2027.

5. The Appellant does not dispute either offence. Throughout the proceedings he accepted responsibility for them.

6. On 10 October 2024, the Appellant notified DVSA of the offences and sought advice as to the implications they might have for eventual registration as an Approved Driving Instructor.

7. On 14 October 2024, DVSA informed him that he could continue with the qualifying examinations, but that it was “possible” the Registrar would refuse an application for a trainee licence or registration while the points remained relevant for totting-up purposes. After the Appellant sought clarification, DVSA sent a further email that day confirming that he could continue with the qualification tests if he wished, but stating more directly that it was “unlikely” that he would be issued with a trainee licence or admitted to the Register while the penalty points remained live.

8. Before deciding whether to grant the application, the Registrar invited the Appellant to make representations concerning the speeding offences. The letter also asked the Appellant to confirm whether he had completed “a National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme such as a speed awareness course or anything similar”. Although the Registrar was not obliged to invite representations before determining the application, he did so in order to afford the Appellant an opportunity to provide any explanation, mitigation or other information which he considered relevant. The Appellant provided detailed written representations in which he accepted responsibility for the offences, expressed remorse, explained the circumstances in which they occurred and relied upon his subsequent conduct, character references and commitment to professional development.

9. The Registrar considered the Appellant’s representations together with the information available concerning his driving record. Formal notice of refusal was issued on 27 May 2026. At the time of making that decision, the Registrar knew that the Appellant had attended two speed awareness courses, but did not know the dates upon which those courses had been completed.

10. The Registrar noted that both speeding offences had been committed within a short period of one another. He also took account of the Appellant’s attendance at speed awareness courses and the mitigating matters advanced in his representations, but balanced those matters against the fact that he had subsequently committed further speeding offences. The Registrar concluded that the offences raised concerns about the Appellant’s judgment, compliance with road traffic law and suitability to undertake the responsibilities of an Approved Driving Instructor.

11. Following the Registrar’s decision, the Appellant appealed to this Tribunal.

The Appeal

12. The Appellant's grounds of appeal may be summarised as follows:

a) He accepts responsibility for the speeding offences.

b) He submits they were isolated incidents and do not properly reflect his character.

c) He relies upon his remorse and learning from his previous conduct.

d) He submits that he has taken active steps to improve his driving and professional standards.

e) He relies upon his successful completion of the ADI qualification process.

f) He relies upon positive character references and testimonials.

g) He submits that there has been no subsequent offending.

h) He contends that he remains a fit and proper person to be entered in the Register.

i) He asks the Tribunal to allow the appeal and direct that he be entered in the Register.

13. The Registrar's Statement of Case resists the appeal. The Registrar submits that Approved Driving Instructors are expected to demonstrate particularly high standards of driving behaviour because they are responsible for teaching road users to comply with road traffic law.

14. The Registrar further submits that the Appellant committed two speeding offences after attending speed awareness courses and that this demonstrated a concerning pattern of behaviour relevant to the statutory assessment of fitness and propriety.

15. The Registrar submits that public confidence in the Register would be undermined if a person with this recent driving history were admitted to the Register.

The Relevant Law

16. Section 125(3)(e) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 provides that a person may only be entered in the Register if he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in it.

17. Whether a person is a fit and proper person is a broad evaluative judgment. The expression is not exhaustively defined by statute and requires consideration of the person's conduct, integrity, judgment and suitability for registration.

18. Registration carries with it an official indication that the person has met the standards required of an Approved Driving Instructor.

19. The importance of maintaining public confidence in the Register was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Harris v Registrar of Approved Driving Instructors [2010] EWCA Civ 808.

20. The Tribunal exercises a full merits jurisdiction and reaches its own conclusion on the evidence before it, whilst giving appropriate weight to the Registrar's expertise and statutory role.

21. The Tribunal may also have regard to the standards reflected in the Approved Driving Instructor Code of Practice, which emphasises professionalism, compliance with the law, promotion of road safety and conduct which maintains public confidence in the profession.

The Evidence

22. The Tribunal considered the hearing bundle together with the oral evidence and submissions presented at the hearing. The Tribunal heard evidence and submissions from the Appellant. The Tribunal also heard submissions from Mr Heard on behalf of the Registrar.

The Appellant's Evidence and Submissions

23. The Appellant accepted responsibility for both speeding offences. He explained that the offences occurred within a short period and the second took place before he had become aware of the first offence.

24. He emphasised that neither offence involved dangerous driving. He described the relevant exit slip road as “unfamiliar”, although he accepted that the M1 was not an unfamiliar road to him and that it was not his normal route home. He stated that temporary speed restrictions and enforcement cameras were in operation due to roadworks.

25. He submitted that he had been candid with DVSA from the outset and had proactively disclosed the offences.

26. The Appellant expressed genuine remorse for his conduct. He accepted that Approved Driving Instructors are expected to meet high standards.

27. He submitted that he had reflected upon his driving and had taken active steps to improve his standards. He relied upon his successful completion of the ADI qualification process, his commitment to road safety and the advice and guidance he had sought from a retired police driver. He also relied upon a document submitted shortly before the hearing recording that he had undertaken a RoSPA-accredited Initial Driver Assessment on 13 October 2026.

28. He submitted that there had been no further offending and that he should be judged on his current suitability.

29. The Appellant further relied upon correspondence received from DVSA following his disclosure of the offences. He submitted that the correspondence indicated it was only "possible" that his application for registration would be refused because of the penalty points. He argued that he understood from that email that registration remained a realistic prospect and that he therefore continued with the ADI qualification process, investing considerable time, effort and expense in doing so. The Appellant submitted that it was unfair for significant weight now to be placed upon matters which had already been disclosed to DVSA at an early stage and in respect of which he had not been advised that refusal was likely.

30. The Appellant invited the Tribunal to find that he remained a fit and proper person.

The Respondent's Submissions

31. Mr Heard for the Respondent submitted that the appeal should be dismissed.

32. He accepted that the Appellant had been candid and remorseful. He further accepted that there was evidence of positive character and professional commitment.

33. However, he submitted that Approved Driving Instructors are entrusted with teaching lawful and safe driving and are expected to exemplify those standards themselves.

34. Mr Heard submitted that particular significance should be attached to the fact that the Appellant had attended speed awareness courses before committing the September 2024 offences.

35. Mr Heard also addressed the Appellant's reliance upon the DVSA correspondence stating that refusal of registration was a "possible" outcome. He submitted that the Appellant's reliance on that wording was misplaced when the correspondence was read as a whole. Mr Heard referred the Tribunal to a further email sent on the same day in which the Appellant was informed that, whilst he could continue with the qualification process if he wished to do so, it was “unlikely” that an application for registration would be granted whilst the penalty points remained live. Mr Heard submitted that the correspondence did not provide any assurance that registration would be successful. Rather, it made clear that the Appellant could choose whether to continue pursuing qualification, whilst recognising that his driving record was likely to present a significant obstacle to registration. He submitted that the Registrar's eventual decision was therefore entirely consistent with the information provided to the Appellant at the time.

36. Mr Heard submitted that the issue was not punishment but public confidence in the Register and suitability for registration.

37. He submitted that the Registrar was entitled to conclude that two speeding offences committed after the Appellant had attended a second speed awareness course demonstrated a lack of judgment inconsistent with the standards expected of an ADI. He therefore invited the Tribunal to uphold the decision.

Conclusions

38. We have considered all the evidence and submissions before us. Although the statutory decision under appeal was made on 27 May 2026, we have considered the evidence of the Appellant’s conduct and professional development since that date insofar as it assists us in determining the matters raised by the appeal. This included the document submitted shortly before the hearing concerning the RoSPA-accredited Initial Driver Assessment undertaken on 13 October 2026. The Respondent had an adequate opportunity to consider and address that evidence, and we concluded that it was fair to admit it.

39. We found the Appellant to be honest in his evidence. He accepted responsibility for the speeding offences and did not seek to minimise them. We accept that he demonstrated genuine remorse.

40. We also accept that he has taken positive steps since the offences, including continuing professional development and efforts to improve his driving standards. We have taken account of the favourable references and testimonials provided on his behalf. We further accept that there is no evidence of subsequent offending. Those matters weigh significantly in the Appellant's favour.

41. However, the issue for the Tribunal is not whether the Appellant is generally a person of good character. The issue is whether he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered onto the Register.

42. Approved Driving Instructors occupy a position of trust and responsibility. They do not merely teach the mechanics of driving. They are expected to promote lawful, safe and responsible driving behaviour and to model those standards themselves.

43. The ADI Code of Practice is not itself the statutory test. It nevertheless provides relevant context as to the professional standards expected of an Approved Driving Instructor, including lawful conduct, road safety and professional integrity.

44. We attach significant weight to the Appellant’s driving history during the relevant period. The September 2024 offences did not occur in isolation. The Appellant informed the Tribunal that he had attended a speed awareness course in 2022 and a second speed awareness course on 15 May 2024. We accept that the dates of those courses were not known to the Registrar when he made his decision because they were not recorded on a database accessible to DVSA. They were, however, provided by the Appellant in his evidence to this Tribunal and are relevant to the assessment which we must undertake for ourselves. Notwithstanding those two previous educational interventions, the Appellant committed two further speeding offences approximately four months after attending the second course.

45. Both September 2024 offences occurred on the M1 in the Appellant’s home county and in materially similar circumstances. On each occasion, he was recorded driving at approximately 57 mph in a 50 mph limit while accelerating towards an exit. Those common features cause us to attach less weight to his description of the exit slip road involved in the September 2024 offences as “unfamiliar”. The temporary speed restriction was associated with roadworks and was accompanied by the usual road signs and traffic-management measures.

46. We accept the Appellant's submission that he had not had the opportunity to alter his behaviour following the first September 2024 offence before the second occurred. However, that point does not address the wider concern arising from the earlier speed awareness interventions.

47. We have considered the Appellant’s reliance upon DVSA’s initial email of 14 October 2024, which stated that it was “possible” that an application for registration would be refused. That email must, however, be read together with the further email sent later the same day. In that email, DVSA made clear that, although the Appellant could continue with the qualification process if he wished, it was “unlikely” that he would be issued with a trainee licence or admitted to the Register while the penalty points remained live. Read as a whole, the correspondence did not assure the Appellant that registration would be granted or suggest that successful completion of the qualification process would determine the separate question of fitness and propriety. It placed him on notice that he could continue with the process, but that doing so carried a significant risk that registration would ultimately be refused. We therefore do not accept that the correspondence renders the Registrar’s decision unfair or otherwise materially assists the appeal.

48. In our judgment, the significance of the case lies not simply in the existence of two speeding offences but in the fact that they occurred after previous educational interventions specifically designed to improve compliance with speed limits.

49. We accept that neither offence individually was at the most serious end of motoring offending. Nevertheless, repeated speeding behaviour remains directly relevant to the assessment of suitability for registration as an Approved Driving Instructor.

50. Registration carries with it an official assurance that the individual satisfies the standards required of the profession. Public confidence in the Register depends upon those standards being maintained.

51. We recognise that the refusal of registration prevents the Appellant from working for monetary reward as an Approved Driving Instructor at present, and that he has invested considerable time, effort and expense in completing the qualification process. We have taken those consequences into account. They cannot, however, determine the separate statutory question whether he is a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register.

52. We have carefully considered whether the Appellant’s remorse, insight, subsequent conduct and professional achievements are sufficient to outweigh the concerns arising from his driving history. We give those matters substantial weight. In particular, we accept that he has been candid about the offences, has reflected upon his conduct and has taken positive steps to improve his driving standards.

53. Nevertheless, we find that the two speeding offences cannot properly be treated as isolated events. They were committed approximately four months after the Appellant had attended his second speed awareness course. Although he did not know of the first September 2024 offence before committing the second, both offences occurred against the background of two previous educational interventions directed specifically at speeding.

54. Applying the statutory test for ourselves, we are not satisfied that, at the date of the Registrar’s decision, the Appellant was a fit and proper person to have his name entered in the Register. His positive qualities and subsequent efforts do not, in our judgment, outweigh the concern arising from repeated speeding after earlier speed awareness interventions, particularly in the context of a profession whose members are expected to teach and model lawful and responsible driving.

55. The Registrar’s decision is therefore upheld and the appeal is dismissed.

Signed: Judge Peri Mornington Dated: 31 October 2026


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