Commercial United Kingdom

United Living (South) Limited v Dovista UK Limited & Ors

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2676 (TCC)

Case No: HT-2024-000247

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT

Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building

Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL

Date: 03/11/2026

Before:

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EYRE

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between:

UNITED LIVING (SOUTH) LIMITED
(formerly UNITED HOUSE LIMITED)
Claimant
– and –
(1)
DOVISTA UK LIMITED
(formerly VELFAC LIMITED)
(2) DANTAAG LIMITED
(3) HAWKINS BROWN LIMITED
Defendants

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

David Streatfeild-James KC and Diarmuid Laffan (instructed by Charles Russell Speechlys LLP) for the Claimant

Nicholas Maciolek (instructed by HCR Hewitsons) for the First Defendant

The Second Defendant did not appear and was not represented

Krista Lee KC and Elizabeth Donnelly (instructed by DWF Law LLP) for the Third Defendant

Hearing dates: 21st & 22nd July 2026

Further written submissions: 29th July 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on [date] by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EYRE

Mr Justice Eyre:

Introduction.

1. The Claimant brings these proceedings (“the Current Proceedings”) seeking damages said to flow from the Third Defendant’s alleged breach of its duties as architect. The Claimant entered a design and build contract to convert (“the Works”) 50-56 and 60 Wharf Road, London N1 into what is now the Wenlock Building (“the Property”). The Claimant engaged the Third Defendant to act as architect in relation to the Works. By virtue of a collateral warranty and a subsequent assignment Workspace 14 Ltd (“Workspace”) had the benefit of the Claimant’s obligations under the design and build contract. Workspace brought proceedings against the Claimant (“the Workspace Proceedings”) alleging defects in the performance of the Works. Those proceedings were in due course settled by an agreement (“the Workspace Settlement Agreement”) and Tomlin Order. The Claimant in turn brought proceedings (“the Previous Proceedings”) against the Third Defendant and others to recover the sums for which it was liable to Workspace which became the sums due pursuant to the Workspace Settlement Agreement[1]. The claim against the Third Defendant in those proceedings was settled by a settlement agreement of 20th March 2023 (“the Settlement Agreement”) and a Tomlin Order sealed on 28th March 2023.

2. The matter is before me on the Third Defendant’s application to strike out the Current Proceedings as an abuse of process. The Third Defendant says that the Claimant could and should have brought the current claims in the Previous Proceedings and that the bringing of the Current Proceedings is an abuse of process within the principle derived from Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100. In addition, the Third Defendant contends that the Current Proceedings were an abuse by reason of the Claimant’s failure to comply with the requirements set out in Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc [2007] EWCA Civ 1260, [2008] 1 WLR 748. Alternatively, it seeks summary judgment in favour of its claims for two declarations. First, that the claims made in the Current Proceedings were within the scope of the Settlement Agreement and have been compromised by that agreement. Second, that the Claimant is estopped from bringing the Current Proceedings by reason of an estoppel by representation. The third limb of the Third Defendant’s application was that the court should order the trial of a preliminary issue. However, that was only put before me as a fall-back position and no draft issue had been formulated. Although there was some doubt as to the Third Defendant’s position at an earlier stage it was accepted before me that the cause of action in the Current Proceedings is different from that on which the claim in the Previous Proceedings was based and the Third Defendant did not seek to assert a cause of action estoppel.

3. The Claimant accepts that some, but not all, elements of the Current Proceedings could have been included in the Previous Proceedings. It denies that the Current Proceedings are an abuse of process and contends that even if abuse is found the sanction of striking out would be disproportionate. It does not accept that the claims now being made were within the scope of the Settlement Agreement and denies that there is any scope for an estoppel by representation.

4. It follows that the issues to be addressed are:

i) Whether the bringing of the Current Proceedings was an abuse of process applying the approach set out in Johnson v Gore Wood [2002] 2 AC 1.

ii) The extent of any failure to comply with the requirements set out in Aldi Stores and the effect of such failure.

iii) The consequences of a finding of abuse. If I conclude that there was an abuse of process it will be necessary to resolve the issue between the parties as to the consequences of that finding. The Third Defendant says that as a matter of law such a finding must lead to the striking out of the claim. The Claimant does not accept this and says, instead, that the court has a discretion and must consider whether striking out is a proportionate response to the abuse in question. If I conclude that the Current Proceedings are an abuse of process and also accept the Claimant’s interpretation of the law it will then be necessary to consider whether to strike out the Current Proceedings as a matter of discretion.

iv) The proper interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and whether the claims being advanced against the Third Defendant in the Current Proceedings were compromised by that agreement.

v) Whether the Claimant’s actions in the Previous Proceedings and/or the entry into the Settlement Agreement amounted to a representation that the Settlement Agreement was in final settlement of all potential claims arising out of the Third Defendant’s involvement in the Works such as to give rise to an estoppel.

5. The assertion of an abuse of process was the Third Defendant’s primary argument but it will be convenient to address the two subsidiary contentions before turning to that.

6. On behalf of the First Defendant Mr Maciolek submitted a helpful note explaining that his client had been a party neither to the Previous Proceedings nor to the Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, the First Defendant took a neutral stance in respect of the Third Defendant’s application. Although Mr Maciolek attended the hearing this was on the basis of a watching brief only and as no matters affecting his client arose Mr Maciolek made no oral submissions.

The Background in Summary.

7. By a design and build contract of 24th July 2007 Wharf Road Developments Ltd engaged the Claimant to undertake the Works leading to the conversion of the existing properties on the site into the Wenlock Building. The Third Defendant was appointed as architect by an agreement of 12th November 2007. Practical completion was certified in respect of the Commercial Section on 29th September 2008 and of the entire development on 26th March 2009. By an agreement of 20th March 2009 the Claimant warranted to Workspace’s predecessor the proper performance of the Works.

8. As constructed the Wenlock Building was over 18m tall. It extended to 9 storeys of which the ground to seventh floors were of brickwork with timber rainscreen cladding. The facades of the sixth to ninth floors were formed by the Velfac system – a curtain wall arrangement with window frames and Velfac rainscreen panels. Kingspan TW55 insulation had been installed behind the brickwork facades. The potential inadequacies of those arrangements came to light after the tragic events at the Grenfell Tower and the subsequent enactment of the Building Safety Act 2022.

9. The Workspace Proceedings commenced with the claim form of 25th September 2020. The principal defects asserted by Workspace were as follows (adopting the summary of Gary Barker of the Claimant):

“a. Untreated timber (Thermowood) cladding being installed as cladding over 18m from ground level;

b. Combustible insulation (namely, Kingspan TW55) being installed in cavities of the Development’s external walls;

c. Combustible insulation (namely, Celotex) being installed behind the balcony soffits and glazing panels of the Development’s windows; and

d. Cavity barriers and fire stops being absent in locations where these were required in order to satisfy the functional requirements of the Building Regulations in force at the time of the Development.”

10. The amended claim form in the Previous Proceedings dated 18th November 2020 was sealed on 25th November 2020. The Third Defendant was the First Defendant in those proceedings. The brief details of claim recited the contractual background and the claim being made by Workspace against the Claimant. The claim form said that to the extent that Workspace succeeded against the Claimant it would do so by reason of breaches of contract and/or of tortious duty by the defendants. It said that the defendants would be liable to the Claimant for the same damage for which the Claimant was ultimately found liable to Workspace.

11. The claim form was served on the Third Defendant as an enclosure to the Letter of Claim of 21st December 2020. In that letter the Claimant summarized the claim being made by Workspace explaining that Workspace was seeking to recover the costs of various items of remedial work. Those works included the removal and replacement of insulation and works in relation to the Velfac window system. As set out in the claim form the Claimant contended that to the extent that it was found to be liable to Workspace for those matters such liability would have been caused by the Third Defendant’s negligence or breach of contract.

12. Although at that stage the Claimant was contending that the Third Defendant was liable, together with the other defendants to the Previous Proceedings, for all the sums for which the Claimant would be liable to Workspace that position had changed by the time of the service of the Particulars of Claim.

13. Workspace had obtained a report from Wintech Façade Engineering Consultants and their report of 28th September 2020 (“the First Wintech Report”) was provided to the Claimant on 30th November 2020.

14. Stephen Carden had been the managing director of a division of the Claimant but from December 2020 to November 2023 he was working part-time as a senior technical manager and was engaged in reviewing cladding claims. He explains (at [3.11]) that he interpreted the First Wintech Report as indicating that the lack of insulation behind the Velfac sections was different from the design which had been prepared by the Third Defendant. In light of that the Claimant took the view that “the main cause of the remedial works envisaged for the Velfac elevations was poor workmanship for which [the Third Defendant] would not be responsible”. The Claimant says that this is why in the Particulars of Claim it said that it was not seeking to recover the cost of the remedial works to the Velfac system from the Third Defendant.

15. It is significant that the Third Defendant’s solicitors had replied to the Claimant’s letter of claim on 1st February 2021. In that letter the solicitors said, at [3.8]:

“Our client contends that, rather than our client's drawings being inadequate or there being a failure by our client to review design information or liaise with your client, the issue appears to be one of workmanship namely the design drawings do not appear to have been followed with cavity barriers and fire stopping simply not being installed throughout the wall types during construction.”

16. The solicitors went on to say, at [3.9], that the Third Defendant’s “position that the issue is one of workmanship” was supported by the First Wintech Report.

17. A further report was provided by Wintech on 10th April 2021 (“the Second Wintech Report”). Mr Carden says (at [3.20]) that as at June 2021 and in light of that report the Claimant and Workspace were proceeding on the basis that, although difficult, it would be possible to effect the necessary remedial works without the total replacement of the Velfac system.

18. The Particulars of Claim were dated 26th August 2021. At [68] the Claimant set out defects in the Property. At [70] and following the Claimant identified the breaches by the Third Defendant and the other defendants which it said had caused the defects in the Property. At [78] the Claimant recited the remedial works in respect of which Workspace was claiming against it. At [81] the Claimant inserted a table setting out the amounts of the different elements of Workspace’s claim. This included the sum of £547,476 in respect of “removal and replacement of insulation and Velfac window system”. The Claimant explained, at [82], that it was seeking to negotiate a settlement with Workspace and that its best estimate of the costs associated with the remedial works was set out in the Schedule to the Particulars of Claim. It then said that the Schedule set out the costs in relation to various items of work which it listed. At [82(5)] that list said:

“Section E: remedial works to the Velfac curtain walling system – for the avoidance of doubt, no claim is addressed to the Defendants in respect of these costs”.

19. In [83] the Claimant said that it would serve a separate schedule of the costs attributable solely to Stanmore Contractors Ltd who had been engaged as building contractor. The Claimant said that Stanmore was liable solely for the costs of and occasioned by the use of Kingspan TW55.

20. There was a Costs and Case Management Conference in the Previous Proceedings. By the consequent order of 15th June 2022 the trial date was fixed for 6th June 2023 with the date for the pre-trial review being 28th April 2023.

21. The Tomlin order settling the Workspace Proceedings was dated 21st July 2022 and was accompanied by the Workspace Settlement Agreement. This provided for Workspace and ULS to enter into a Pre-Construction Services Agreement (“PCSA”) for the design and construction of remedial works to the façade of the Property to remedy the defects in the works and subsequently to enter into a building contract for the performance of those remedial works by ULS. The cost plan attached to the draft PCSA included remedial works to the Velfac system but not its replacement.

22. Also in July 2022 there were exchanges between the solicitors for the Claimant and for the Third Defendant about the inspections to be undertaken of the Property. The Third Defendant’s solicitors had said that they considered that the upper level façade including the window system should be sampled. The Claimant’s solicitors had responded saying that this was not proposed “because there is no claim against any of the Defendants in relation to the composite window system”. In their turn the Third Defendant’s solicitors had replied confirming their agreement to the sampling methodology.

23. On 16th September 2022 the Claimant served its updated schedule of loss. This document and the accompanying appendices indicated that remedial works were being undertaken to the Velfac system but also that the cost of these works was being borne by the Claimant and was not part of the loss which it sought to recover from the Third Defendant.

24. On 15th November 2022 PS Fixing Ltd provided a report in respect of the Velfac system at the sixth to ninth floors. The authors summarized their observations thus:

“Following our investigation carried out on 07th, 08th, and 09th we found majority of frames been heavily rotten, fixings corroded and lack of insulation and fire barrier. This is sign of poor installation and weather proofing the whole system. We recommended replacement of all condemn rotten frames, dismantling of all frames, remedial works caried out to corroded primary steel structure. During reinstallation of existing/new frames all combustible polystyrene installation to be replaced with A1 Non-combustible mineral wool, all existing galvanised steel brackets to be replaced with aluminium, all fixings replaced with stainless steel.

Furthermore we recommend a meeting with Velfac/Dovista technical team, to have their input/thoughts of what are reasons for system failure and water ingress.”

25. There was a mediation between the Claimant and the Third Defendant on 16th December 2022 but that concluded without agreement being reached at that stage.

26. On 20th December 2022 Velfac emailed the Claimant saying that the Velfac system in the Property “is beyond any viable remediation” and saying that this was demonstrated by PS Fixing’s report.

27. On 6th January 2023 Taylor Hammond of Status A Ltd reported to the Claimant in relation to the upper floor façade of the Property at levels 6 – 8. This report concluded by saying that “the fundamental flaw in the Velfac façade failure is that the system was never designed or intended for the situation it has been used for”. The report also indicated that there were “many areas of failure and poor workmanship”. It concluded that “the only viable solution” would be the complete removal and replacement of the Velfac system. That report annexed emails of 6th December 2022 and 13th December 2022 to the Claimant (from Hydrock Fire Engineering and SWECO Building Control Ltd respectively) which had raised questions as to the adequacy of the fire protection of the steel structure behind the external wall.

28. Gary Barker was the Commercial Director of the Claimant in 2022 and 2023. He says that he regarded the PS Fixing report as according with his understanding that the defects in the Velfac system were principally the result of poor workmanship. At [25.4] he describes the impact of the Taylor Hammond report thus:

“The failure of the Velfac facades was down to the fact that the system was never designed or intended for the situation it was used for. This was a different proposition to what we have been told previously. We had understood that this was a basically acceptable system that was failing because of installation problems. Now we were being told by an expert that the design never should have been used in the first place.”

29. Mr Barker says that as a result of that report the Claimant came to the view by the end of January 2023 that the replacement of the Velfac system would be necessary.

30. The Claimant passed the Taylor Hammond report on to its solicitors on 12th January 2023 and those solicitors instructed architectural experts, HKA Global, to review the comments which the Third Defendant had made on Velfac’s designs at the time of the Works. On 25th January 2023 HKA indicated that it was their preliminary view that there were grounds for a claim against the Third Defendant on the basis that it had failed to undertake a competent review of Velfac’s designs and had failed to identify design defects in the drawings provided.

31. Mr Barker described the position at that stage thus at [31]:

“While no final decision was taken at this point to bring future proceedings against Hawkins, it is right to say that from around this time onwards, United Living knew there was a real possibility of it bringing a further claim against Hawkins regarding the Velfac elevations and intended to fully investigate that claim, especially in relation to the environmental performance defects that had caused the system to fail.”

32. Kevin Forsyth was the partner at the Claimant’s solicitors dealing with this matter and at [3.57] he summarized the assessment he made at that time saying:

“However, notwithstanding HKA’s views I understood that significant further work and investigation would be required to be able to understand whether the facts supported the potential claims against each of Velfac, Dantaag and Hawkins as we then understood them. There had been no pre-action protocol correspondence or engagement with any of the parties to understand the basis on which they might dispute the allegations. There was also the need to understand whether any cause of action that could be established was now time-barred, which would require evidence that the fire safety and environmental defects had rendered the Velfac apartments unfit for habitation for the purposes of the Defective Premises Act.”

33. The mediation was due to reconvene on 20th February 2023 and the parties agreed on 3rd February 2023 to vary the directions timetable by extending the time for expert reports. That agreement was confirmed by an order sealed on 9th March 2023.

34. The dealings at this time were against the background of the trial which was listed for hearing on 6th June 2023 with the pre-trial review listed for hearing on 28th April 2023.

35. The mediation was held on 20th February 2023 and an agreement in principle was reached then.

36. Mr Barker describes the Claimant’s stance at that time in this way at [37]:

“I accept that ahead of the settlement of the Previous Proceedings, United Living knew that it had a potential basis for and might in future want to bring a claim against Hawkins regarding the Velfac facades. However, the trial was listed to start on 6 June 2023 and at this time United Living had not fully investigated its further claims against Hawkins, Velfac and Dantaag and, for example, taken fully considered expert and legal advice. I do not think this could have been done prior to the 6 June 2023 trial date.”

37. Alastair Roberts is the Chief Operating Officer of the Third Defendant. He sees the Claimant’s actions in a rather different light saying at [2.3.4] and [5.16]:

“It appears to me that the Claimant was not at all open with Hawkins during the negotiations that led to the settlement. The Claimant knew there was a strong likelihood of a further claim being brought against Hawkins at the time of the settlement of the Previous Proceedings, yet it fully concealed this from Hawkins, and it sought to craft the Settlement Agreement to allow for this. Further, the Claimant unilaterally decided that the further Velfac allegations which it wished to bring against Hawkins could not be included in the Previous Proceedings; it did not raise the logistics of such allegations being advanced in the Previous Proceedings with either Hawkins or the Court.”

“On the basis of Mr Barker’s evidence, we now know that the Claimant attended the reconvened mediation on 20 February 2023 knowing that a further claim against Hawkins was a real possibility, and that it had written advice from expert architects in support of such a claim, and yet the Claimant said nothing during or subsequent to the mediation or during the negotiation of the Settlement Agreement which resolved the Previous Proceedings. It is my personal view that the Claimant was negotiating in bad faith, on the basis that it was negotiating the settlement of a claim which on the face of it explicitly said that there was no claim against Hawkins for the Velfac whilst simultaneously being aware that it was likely to bring a future claim against Hawkins for the Velfac after the settlement of the Previous Proceedings. In essence the Claimant was holding a card up its sleeve to be played at a later date. As Mr Barker himself confirms at paragraph 31 of his statement, “from around this time [January 2023] onwards United Living knew there was a real possibility of it bringing a further claim against Hawkins regarding the Velfac elevations.” At no point did the Claimant indicate this to Hawkins, but rather it was actively engaged in a mediation and settlement of proceedings that from the outset had included potential liability for Hawkins relating to repair or replacement of the Velfac claim.” [emphasis original]

38. The Settlement Agreement was made on 20th March 2023. A draft Tomlin order was sent to the court on 22nd March 2023 and was sealed on 28th March 2023. On 21st March 2023 the Claimant had received a draft report from HKA confirming the potential for a claim against the Third Defendant.

39. The relevant terms of the Settlement Agreement are as follows.

40. The agreement was between the Claimant and the three defendants to the Previous Proceedings who were all defined as being “the Parties”.

41. There were three recitals in these terms:

“(A) The Claimant is required pursuant to the Tomlin Order in Claim No. HT-2020-000346 to carry out on behalf of Workspace 14 Limited (‘Workspace’), remedial and additional works at 50-56 and 60 Wharf Road, London N1 (the ‘Property’) to replace the timber cladding, combustible insulation and cavity barriers and fire stops at the Property, as identified by the Pre-Construction Services Agreement at Appendix 1 to the Tomlin Order in Claim No. Claim No. HT-2020-000346 and the Schedules thereto (the ‘Works’).

(B) The Claimant commenced Court proceedings (claim number HT-2020-000412) (‘the Proceedings’) against the First, Second and Third Defendants alleging the Defendants are liable to the Claimant in respect of the costs of elements of the Works. The Defendants defended the Proceedings. The claims brought by the Claimant in the Proceedings and the defences raised by the Defendants together with any contribution claims by one Defendant against another are referred to hereafter as ‘the Dispute’.

(C) The Parties have agreed to settle the Dispute on the terms set out in this Agreement.”

42. “Agreement” was defined as being the agreement and then “related parties” were defined as:

“Related Parties means a Party’s parent, subsidiaries, related group companies, assigns, transferees, representatives, principals, agents, officers or directors.”

43. Clause 2 provided for sums to be paid by the Defendants to the Claimant. The Third Defendant was to pay the Claimant £1,575,000.

44. The release was set out at clause 5.1 as being:

“This Agreement is in full and final settlement of the Dispute and each Party hereby releases and forever discharges all claims, rights, demands and set-offs that it has against any other party in the Dispute (‘the Released Claims’).”

45. That was followed, at clause 6.1, by an agreement not to sue thus:

“Each Party agrees, on behalf of itself and on behalf of its Related Parties not to sue, commence, voluntarily aid in any way, prosecute or cause to be commenced or prosecuted against any other Party or its Related Parties any action, suit or other proceeding concerning the Released Claims, in this jurisdiction or any other.”

46. Clause 9 provided that:

“The Claimant shall liaise with Workspace and use reasonable endeavours to obtain Workspace’s agreement to enter into a separate agreement with the First Defendant and, if separately requested to do so, with the Second Defendant, agreeing not to pursue any claims against the First Defendant and, if separately requested to do so, the Second Defendant, in relation to the issues that are the subject of the claims brought by the Claimant in the Dispute.”

47. Then, at clause 11 there was an entire agreement clause in these terms:

“11.1 This Agreement constitutes the entire understanding and agreement between the Parties in relation to the subject matter of this Agreement.

11.2 Each Party acknowledges that it has not entered into this Agreement in reliance wholly or partly on any representation or warranty made by or on behalf of any other Party (whether orally or in writing) other than as expressly set out in this Agreement.”

48. There was an inspection of the Property in April 2024. The Claimant says that this showed that the structural steel beams and columns were exposed and not adequately protected by rigid fire boarding. Mr Barker says that he was informed of this by the Claimant’s Operations Manager on 24th April 2024.

49. The Claimant’s letter of claim in the Current Proceedings was sent on 7th May 2024. The Third Defendant replied on 2nd July 2024. In its reply the Third Defendant foreshadowed its current application. It said that any claim was either already compromised by the Settlement Agreement or barred by reason of the fact that the claim could have been made in the Previous Proceedings but that the Claimant had chosen not to include it in those proceedings. The Third Defendant said that it would attend a protocol meeting solely for the purpose of answering questions arising from its letter but that it would not engage further in the protocol process beyond that.

50. The claim form in the current proceedings was issued on 18th July 2024 and the Particulars of Claim were served on 13th November 2024.

51. At [6] the Claimant says that “due to the widespread and serious nature of the fire safety and environmental performance defects” in the Velfac system the Claimant had to remove and replace that system completely. At [8] it says that in the course of carrying out remedial works to the Property it has identified defects in the fire protection of the structural steelwork which result from deficiencies in the Third Defendant’s design work.

52. In the summary of the claim the Claimant says:

i) At [9(1)(a)] that the Third Defendant:

“failed to complete the design intent system designs and specifications for the Velfac system, to review and provide comments on Velfac’s fabrication drawings and to carry out site inspections competently and in a professional manner, which breaches of duty have led to pervasive fire safety and environmental performance defects in the Velfac system”.

ii) At [9(2)(a)] that:

“failed in its Fire Strategy Plans, NBS Specification and/or detailed designs to indicate how the structural steelwork at levels 6-9 of the Property should achieve the 90 minutes fire resistance required by ADB and/or comply with functional requirement B3(1) of the Building Regulations through other means”.

53. The alleged defects in the Velfac system are described in the Particulars of Claim as being “the Fire Safety Defects”, the alleged rotting of the wooden frames and other deficiencies relating to the environmental performance of the Velfac system are described as “the Environmental Defects”; and the alleged defects in the fire protection of the structural steel at the upper levels of the Property as “the Structural Steel Defects”. The claim is set out in some detail but it suffices for current purposes to note that the Claimant expands on the points made in the summary and says that those defects are the result of breaches by the defendants including the Third Defendant.

54. The Claimant estimates the cost of replacing the Velfac system at £3.142m and the cost of remedying the Structural Steel Defects at £4.209m and seeks damages in those sums.

55. In the Defence and Counterclaim the Third Defendant responded in detail to the substance of the claim denying that it was in breach as alleged by the Claimant. However, it also advanced the abuse, settlement, and estoppel arguments with which I am concerned.

56. The Claimant accepts that the claim in respect of the Velfac system could have been brought in the Previous Proceedings but does not accept that it should have been. It does not accept that it could or should have known of the potential claim in respect of the structural steel defects at the time of the Previous Proceedings. It is, however, apparent that some questions were being raised about the fire protection of the steel in December 2022.

57. Before me Miss Lee KC for the Third Defendant analysed the Wintech reports in some detail. Her contention was that these should have alerted the Claimant to the possibility that the Velfac system could not be remedied and needed to be replaced. To some extent she took issue with the interpretation which Mr Carden placed on these. However, it is not necessary for the purposes of this application to analyse those reports in detail. That is because the Claimant accepts that the Fire Safety Defects claim in relation to the Velfac system could have been brought in the Previous Proceedings. In the Reply at [33(2)] the Claimant accepted that the First Wintech Report gave it sufficient notice to allow it to investigate those details and to bring a claim against the Third Defendant in relation to them.

58. Thus the Claimant accepts it could have commissioned at an earlier stage the investigations and reports which led to the conclusion that the Velfac system had to be replaced and could not be remedied and that this was the responsibility of the Third Defendant. It is also apparent that if those investigations had taken place the Environmental Defects and very probably the Structural Steel Defects would have come to light at a markedly earlier stage than they did.

59. Those are potent considerations. However, there was no application to cross-examine either Mr Carden or Mr Barker and I must proceed on the basis that their statements contain their honest recollection of matters. In that regard it is of note that Mr Barker’s statement appears to be entirely frank and straightforward making a number of admissions potentially favourable to the Third Defendant. It follows that, although the Claimant could have made further investigations earlier and could have included the Fire Safety Defects and Environmental Defects claims (and probably the Structural Steel Defects claim in relation to the steel structure) in the Previous Proceedings its stance was based on a genuine assessment of the position. It was, moreover, an assessment which the Third Defendant had urged upon the Claimant. As noted above the Third Defendant’s solicitors had said that the First Wintech Report supported the contention that the problems were the result of poor workmanship for which the Third Defendant was not responsible. The Claimant is not to be criticized for abandoning an element of its claim when it believed that element could not be pursued. That is what it did in respect of the costs of the remedial works on the Velfac system when it believed that those works were required because of poor workmanship for which the Third Defendant was not responsible. The reality is that it was not until January 2023 that the Claimant actually knew that it had a potential claim against the Third Defendant in relation to the Velfac system (although it knew earlier of the matters which should have led to the investigations leading to that conclusion). Further, I have to remember that the claim against the Third Defendant is for breach of its professional duties and the fact that the Velfac system needed to be replaced did not mean, without more, that there had been a breach of duty by the Third Defendant.

60. The application now before me was issued on 17th March 2026.

61. In his two witness statements for the Third Defendant Mr Roberts points to a number of difficulties which the Third Defendant faces as a consequence of the bringing of the Current Proceedings after the Third Defendant believed that matters had been resolved. In bare summary those are as follows:

i) The fact that the settlement monies under the Settlement Agreement were paid by the Third Defendant itself rather than by insurers and constituted a very large sum for an operation such as the Third Defendant to pay.

ii) The fact that the Third Defendant is an employee-owned SME with limited resources. This means the revival of the proceedings will place a considerable burden on its resources and staff.

iii) Those difficulties are compounded by the fact that two of the three members of the team who worked on this project are no longer employed by the Third Defendant and so will be less readily available to assist with the defence of the claim.

62. In his first witness statement at [3.8] Mr Roberts said that he believed that the Settlement Agreement was in full and final settlement of all the Third Defendant’s obligations arising out of its involvement in the development of the Property and added that the Third Defendant only agreed to the settlement on the basis of that understanding. At [5.6] he said:

“Had Hawkins, or I, known that the Claimant was reserving certain defects and/or claims for damages for additional defects with a view to bringing further proceedings against Hawkins in relation to the Development, I would not have agreed to the settlement either at the monetary level or on the terms that were agreed in order to resolve the Previous Proceedings. At no time prior to settlement of the Previous Proceedings did the Claimant indicate any intention to reserve or pursue any additional claims against Hawkins.”

63. Mr Roberts made the same point in his second witness statement saying that if the Third Defendant had known of the possibility of a further claim it “would not have settled on the terms it did”. I have no doubt that in his statements Mr Roberts was setting out his honest assessment as it was at the time of his statements in March and July 2026. I will explain below the caution with which those statements must be viewed. It suffices at this point to note that save in the respect I will mention next Mr Roberts does not spell out the details of what the Third Defendant would have done differently if it had known of the potential for the claim now being brought.

64. In his first witness statement Mr Klimt said at [3.71]:

“It is worth emphasising that had Hawkins been aware that the settlement was not final, it would have taken a different approach to inspecting the Development and the remedial works. In reliance on (a) the withdrawal of the claim in relation to the Velfac windows and (b) the settlement, Hawkins had no need to either carry out a wider inspection of the alleged defects or be concerned with the detail of the remedial works agreed between Stanmore and ULS.”

65. In relation to the last point made by Mr Klimt it is to be noted that when it received the letter of claim in the Current Proceedings the Third Defendant took its stand on the points now being made. It said in terms that beyond attending a meeting to expand on those points it would not engage further in the pre-action protocol process.

The Relation of the Current Proceedings to the Previous Proceedings.

66. In the written submissions from Miss Lee and Miss Donnelly and in the former’s oral submissions they set out a substantial analysis of the extent to which the Current Proceedings mirrored the Previous Proceedings. This provided a background to the substantive submissions. However, in light of the way in which the submissions of both parties developed before me and the common ground which I will summarize next it is not necessary for me to return to that analysis.

67. The Third Defendant accepted that this was not a case where there could be said to be a cause of action estoppel. The Current Proceedings and the Previous Proceedings both arose out of the Claimant’s engagement of the Third Defendant to act as architect in relation to the Works and the claims in both asserted that breaches by the Third Defendant of the terms of that engagement had caused loss. Accordingly, in both sets of proceedings the Claimant was and is claiming in relation to the Defendant’s alleged breaches of the same duties in relation to the same engagement. In those circumstances it is not surprising that the language in the Current Proceedings mirrors that used in the Previous Proceedings.

68. As noted above the Claimant accepts that it could have pursued the claim in relation to the Fire Safety Defects in the Previous Proceedings (although it does not accept this in relation to the Structural Steel Defects claim). At the time of the claim form and the letter of claim in those proceedings it intended to do so. The Claimant changed its position in that regard and dropped that element of the Previous Proceedings because it took the view that those defects were the result of poor workmanship for which the Third Defendant was not responsible. It is not suggested on behalf of the Third Defendant that this was not a genuine decision. It was, in fact, the course for which the Third Defendant’s solicitors had pressed in their response to the initial letter of claim. Miss Lee did point out that the Claimant alleged that the Third Defendant had inspection responsibilities and that the Claimant could have advanced a claim for the Fire Safety Defects on the footing that there had been a failure in that regard. That, however, is common ground to the extent that the Claimant accepts that it could have brought this part of its current claim in the Previous Proceedings and that the First Wintech Report gave it sufficient notice to begin investigations in respect of the Fire Safety Defects. The Claimant also accepts that by the time the Previous Proceedings were settled both (a) it was aware of the prospect of further proceedings against the Third Defendant arising out of the same engagement and (b) it did not inform either the Third Defendant or the court that further proceedings might be brought.

The Interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.

69. The Third Defendant seeks summary judgment for a declaration that the claims in the Current Proceedings are caught by the Settlement Agreement. It contends that the Settlement Agreement is to be interpreted as having been a binding settlement and compromise of “any claim that [the Claimant] may have against [the Third Defendant] in relation to any alleged defects in the Property and, in particular, any claim for an indemnity/contribution towards [the Claimant]’s liability under the Workspace Settlement Agreement”. For the following reasons I am satisfied not only that the Third Defendant’s application for summary judgment is to be dismissed but also that the Settlement Agreement was a compromise of only those claims which were live in the Previous Proceedings at the time of that agreement. The claims being advanced in the Current Proceedings were not such claims and it follows that there is no basis for the declaration sought by the Third Defendant.

The Approach to be taken in interpreting the Settlement Agreement.

70. There was no dispute as to the general approach I should take to the interpretation exercise as a matter of law. The task for the court is to ascertain the objective intention of the parties as shown by the language they used when that language is read in context. As Carr LJ, as she then was, explained in ABC Electrification Ltd v National Rail Infrastructure Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1645, [2021] BLR 97 at [17] – [19]:

“17. The well-known general principles of contractual construction are to be found in a series of recent cases, including Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; [2012] BLR 132; [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 34; [2011] 1 WLR 2900; [2012] 1 All ER 1137; 138 Con LR 1, Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; [2015] AC 1619; [2015] 2 WLR 1593; [2016] 1 All ER 1 and Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24; [2017] AC 1173; [2017] 2 WLR 1095; [2017] 4 All ER 615; 171 Con LR 1.

18. A simple distillation, so far as material for present purposes, can be set out uncontroversially as follows:

(i) When interpreting a written contract, the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean. It does so by focussing on the meaning of the relevant words in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of: (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause; (ii) any other relevant provisions of the contract; (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the contract; (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed; and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any party’s intentions;

(ii) The reliance placed in some cases on commercial common sense and surrounding circumstances should not be invoked to undervalue the importance of the language of the provision which is to be construed. The exercise of interpreting a provision involves identifying what the parties meant through the eyes of a reasonable reader, and, save perhaps in a very unusual case, that meaning is most obviously to be gleaned from the language of the provision. Unlike commercial common sense and the surrounding circumstances, the parties have control over the language they use in a contract. And, again save perhaps in a very unusual case, the parties must have been specifically focusing on the issue covered by the provision when agreeing the wording of that provision;

(iii) When it comes to considering the centrally relevant words to be interpreted, the clearer the natural meaning, the more difficult it is to justify departing from it. The less clear they are, or, to put it another way, the worse their drafting, the more ready the court can properly be to depart from their natural meaning. However, that does not justify the court embarking on an exercise of searching for, let alone constructing, drafting infelicities in order to facilitate a departure from the natural meaning;

(iv) Commercial common sense is not to be invoked retrospectively. The mere fact that a contractual arrangement, if interpreted according to its natural language, has worked out badly, or even disastrously, for one of the parties is not a reason for departing from the natural language. Commercial common sense is only relevant to the extent of how matters would or could have been perceived by the parties, or by reasonable people in the position of the parties, as at the date that the contract was made;

(v) While commercial common sense is a very important factor to take into account when interpreting a contract, a court should be very slow to reject the natural meaning of a provision as correct simply because it appears to be a very imprudent term for one of the parties to have agreed, even ignoring the benefit of wisdom of hindsight. The purpose of interpretation is to identify what the parties have agreed, not what the court thinks that they should have agreed. Accordingly, when interpreting a contract a judge should avoid re-writing it in an attempt to assist an unwise party or to penalise an astute party;

(vi) When interpreting a contractual provision, one can only take into account facts or circumstances which existed at the time the contract was made, and which were known or reasonably available to both parties.

19. Thus the court is concerned to identify the intention of the parties by reference to what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the contract to mean. The court’s task is to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their agreement. This is not a literalist exercise; the court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality, and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective meaning. The interpretative exercise is a unitary one involving an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences investigated.”

71. It is to be noted that although commercial common sense is a very important factor to which the court is to have regard caution must be exercised in its application. While it can, as Popplewell J, as he then was, explained in Lukoil Asia Pacific Ptd Ltd v Ocean Tankers (Pte) Ltd [2018] EWHC 163 (Comm) at [8] tip the balance between competing linguistically possible interpretations it will not, of itself, warrant the rejection of the natural meaning of a provision.

72. It is not uncommon for parties to agree general releases which are not confined solely to known claims. However, here also a degree of caution is required before a provision will be regarded as having such an effect. In BCCI v Ali [2001] UKHL 8, [2002] 1 AC 251 Lord Bingham explained, at [17], that there will be a reluctance to infer that a party intended to give up a claim of which he was unaware and of which he could not have known. At [27] and following Lord Nicholls explained that the terms of general releases commonly make it plain that the release is not confined to known claims and said that where the words have that effect there is no reason to exclude from the scope of the release a claim of which a party was unaware. However, even when wide language is used the circumstances may well indicate that the release extended only to claims “relating to a particular subject matter”. In this context Mr Streatfeild-James KC and Mr Laffan for the Claimant referred me to the judgment of Lord Leggatt in Triple Point Technology Inc v PTT Public Company Ltd [2021] UKSC 29, [2021] AC 1148 at [108] but the guidance given there in relation to the interpretation of exclusion clauses does not assist in the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.

73. Although the court must be cautious in having regard to its assessment of commercial common sense the facts that general releases are commonly used and are known to be available do have consequences.

74. Thus, in Bin Obaid & others v Al-Hezaimi & others [2024] EWCA Civ 612 Nugee LJ, with whom the other members of the court agreed, explained at [45]:

“Normally when the parties to proceedings agree to settle those proceedings they mean to settle the disputes they have been litigating, and if they wish to have a broader settlement and also compromise other disputes or waive other claims, they usually signal their intention clearly.”

75. Similarly, in Dawnvale Cafe Components Ltd v Hylgar Properties Ltd [2024] EWHC 1199 (TCC) Neil Moody KC, as he then was, sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, said, at [30(a)]:

“I consider that if these two commercial parties, acting with the benefit of legal advice, had intended to settle all potentially related future claims, they would have said so. In particular, they would most likely have used wording which achieved that objective by referring to all claims arising from or in connection with one or all of ‘the contract’, ‘the works’ or ‘the dispute(s)’; they would not have referred to claims arising from or in connection ‘these proceedings’.”

76. As Lord Millett explained in Johnson v Gore Wood at 59C, albeit in the context of considering an abuse of process argument, the court will be concerned “to protect the integrity” of settlement agreements. It follows that where there is a general release the court will look to the reality and substance of what was agreed. If a claim is within the scope of a release the court will not allow the revival of the same claim and will not be distracted by arguments as to the form in which that claim is presented. In that regard see the approach taken by HH Judge Halliwell sitting as a judge of the High Court in Re Electrical Control Installations Ltd [2021] EWHC 2661 (Ch), [2022] BCC 199 at [93].

77. Finally, it is to be noted that where an agreement settles the claims in issue in particular proceedings or in issue at the time of the agreement such a settlement does not include matters which had formerly been part of a claim but which had been abandoned before the time of the agreement: see Bin Obaid at [63] and [69].

The Correct Interpretation of the Settlement Agreement.

78. In my judgement the proper interpretation of the Settlement Agreement is clear. The agreement can only properly be read as being a settlement and release of those claims in the Previous Proceedings which were in issue at the time of the agreement. It follows that the claims being advanced in the Current Proceedings are not within the scope of the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement is to be read as a whole but the terms of three provisions in particular lead to that conclusion.

79. First, “the Dispute” is defined at recital B. It is significant that this recital states expressly that the proceedings relate to liability for the costs of “elements of the Works”. “The Works” had been defined in the preceding recital as being the works which the Claimant was to undertake pursuant to the Tomlin Order in the Workspace Proceedings. The reference to “elements of the Works” can only properly be read as indicating that the proceedings related only to parts of the works which the Claimant was to undertake.

80. Next, clause 5.1 provides that the agreement is a settlement of “the Dispute” as so defined. The opening words of that clause are clear and explain that it is a particular dispute (consisting of particular claims) which is being settled. I have considered whether a different interpretation is warranted by the balance of that clause which refers to the release of claims “against any other party in the Dispute”. Are those words identifying the parties between whom the claims are being released (and so potentially covering any claims between such parties) or are they identifying the claims being released? The latter is the correct interpretation. This is shown not only by reading the clause as a whole and in context but also by the fact that the claims are defined at the end of the clause as “the Released Claims”. This is again a potent indication that the clause is concerned with identifying the claims being released not the parties between whom there is a release. Moreover, “the Parties” are defined in the preamble to the Settlement Agreement with the consequence that there was no need for a further definition of a party.

81. Clause 6.1 is to be read in the light of that definition of “the Released Claims”. When that is done its meaning is clear and it covers only the claims in the Previous Proceedings.

82. Miss Lee advanced a number of arguments as to the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. For the reasons I will now explain they did not, whether seen separately or cumulatively, warrant a different interpretation from that flowing from consideration of the language of the agreement.

83. I was referred to a number of authorities in which courts had held that words similar to those used in the Settlement Agreement had a wide effect. They did not assist. Conclusions reached on the meaning of words used in different agreements made in different contexts from the Settlement Agreement did not take matters further save to indicate the need for attention to the particular language used in the particular context.

84. Miss Lee submitted that the purpose of the Settlement Agreement was to achieve finality as between the Claimant and the Third Defendant and invoked commercial common sense, contending that the parties were to be taken to have intended to resolve all matters between them. To the extent that there may be force in that submission it relates more to the question of abuse than to that of the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. As I have already noted caution is needed before giving weight to what is thought to be commercial common sense. To the extent that commercial common sense is relevant here it tends to support the Claimant’s interpretation rather than that of the Third Defendant. As was pointed out in Dawnvale in the passage quoted above legally-advised commercial parties seeking to settle potential future claims as well as existing proceedings could have used words clearly apt to achieve that result and would have been expected to do so. The absence of such clear words here points to there having been no such intention. Although I accept Miss Lee’s submission that the parties are to be taken to have been seeking to achieve finality, it remains necessary to identify the matters in relation to which they were seeking finality. That requires consideration of the terms of the Settlement Agreement and an acknowledged desire for finality does not assist in the task of identifying the matters covered by the agreement and in relation to which there was to be finality.

85. In addition, Miss Lee pointed to the wide scope of recital A which referred to all the works which the Claimant was to perform pursuant to the Tomlin Order in the Workspace Proceedings. She submitted that this should be seen as an indication that the Settlement Agreement was to be seen as having a wide ambit and as not being confined to the matters in issue in the Previous Proceedings. However, that argument founders on the fact that the next recital makes it clear that “the Dispute” is only in respect of some elements of those works.

86. Miss Lee pointed me to the wide definition of “Related Parties” and to the fact that the agreement not to sue in clause 6.1 extended to related parties. She submitted that the inclusion of related parties would have been unnecessary if the Settlement Agreement was concerned solely with the Previous Proceedings and said that its inclusion was an indication that the agreement had a wider scope. There is some force in this argument but the reference to related parties can readily be seen as having been made out of abundance of caution and to protect against a renewed claim against a related party in respect of the subject-matter of the Settlement Agreement. The definition and the inclusion of the reference to related parties in clause 6.1 does involve an element of redundancy on the interpretation which I have found to be correct but this does not, without more, warrant a departure from the natural meaning of the words used. As Carr LJ said in ABC Electrification, at [20(ii)], “the mere fact that a natural interpretation of a contract could render another term redundant is an insufficient basis for an unnatural construction”. Carr LJ said that this was especially so where a standard term was involved and I accept that the Settlement Agreement did not involve such a term but nonetheless the position remains that minimal weight can be attached to the fact that a natural interpretation will lead to redundancy.

87. A further argument was advanced based on clause 9 and the provision there that the Claimant should seek to cause Workspace to enter an agreement not to pursue claims against the Third Defendant. That argument might have had some force if the agreement which Workspace was to enter was to be in general or absolute terms. However, that was not what the clause required. The obligation is limited by the last words of the clause which provide that the claims which Workspace is to agree not to pursue are those “in relation to the issues that are the subject of the claims brought by the Claimant in the Dispute” and so this clause does not advance matters.

88. Finally, Miss Lee said that the entire agreement provision at clause 11 favoured the Third Defendant’s interpretation. I cannot accept that contention. The effect of clause 11 is that the Settlement Agreement is the entirety of the parties’ agreement in relation to the subject matter of the agreement. It cannot assist with the separate question of what that subject matter was.

89. Applying the approach set out in Bin Obaid the current claims were not in issue between the parties in the Previous Proceedings. To the extent that the Claimant had been advancing a claim in relation to the Velfac system at the time of the claim form and the letter of claim it had abandoned that claim by the time of the service of the Particulars of Claim. The current claims were, therefore, outside the definition of “the Dispute” in the Settlement Agreement and they were not compromised or settled by that agreement.

Estoppel.

90. The Third Defendant seeks summary judgment on its counterclaim for a declaration that the Claimant is estopped from pursuing the claim against it.

91. The Third Defendant asserts an estoppel by representation which was pleaded thus in the Amended Defence and Counterclaim at [32]:

“Further, and in any event, ULS is estopped from pursuing the Current Proceedings against Hawkins in all the circumstances set out above. By entering into and making payment in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, Hawkins relied to its detriment on ULS’ express and/or implicit representations that the Settlement Agreement was in full and final settlement of any claims arising out of the Deed of Appointment and/or involvement in the development of the Property and/or arising out of ULS’ settlement of Workspace’s Claim.”

92. At [23] the Third Defendant had pleaded that:

“By reason of ULS’ conduct of the Previous Claim and the wording of the Statements of Case against Hawkins (as summarised above), ULS represented to Hawkins and Hawkins understood that the Previous Proceedings contained the entirety of ULS’ claim against Hawkins:

(a) arising out of the Deed of Appointment;

(b) arising out of any alleged breach of the Deed of Appointment and/or negligence and/or breach of statutory duty (whether under the Building Regulations or DPA) in relation to the Property;

(c) for an indemnity/contribution to ULS’ liability to Workspace arising out of Workspace’s Claim and/or the settlement of Workspace’s Claim; and/or

(d) in relation to any alleged defect and/or insufficiency relating to fire safety; the requirements of the Building Regulations and/or the recommendations in ADB.”

93. Miss Lee conceded that the estoppel argument was the weakest limb of the Third Defendant’s application and it was not expanded on in the skeleton argument of Miss Lee and Miss Donnelly. However, it was not abandoned and was maintained in the oral submissions. As a fall-back position Miss Lee invited me to direct that the issue be heard as a preliminary issue.

94. On 25th July 2022 the Claimant’s solicitors had responded to a query from the Third Defendant’s solicitors as to the investigations being undertaken into the façade. In that response the Claimant’s solicitors had explained that the upper level façade had not been investigated because there was no claim against the Third Defendant “in relation to the composite window system”. Miss Lee initially submitted to me that, because the Claimant knew by July 2022 that there was a possibility that the Velfac system would need to be replaced, this was a representation that the Claimant would not pass on to the Third Defendant any claim in that regard. However, in the course of her oral submissions she accepted that any representation needed to be as to present fact and that, as a consequence, this would have been at most a representation that at the time of that response the Claimant had no present intention to pass on such a claim which would not provide the basis for the contention that the Current Proceedings were precluded by an estoppel by representation.

95. The same difficulty arises in respect of the representation pleaded at [23] of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim. The facts that the claim was brought in particular terms and that in its final iteration it contained allegations less extensive than those which had been made in the letter of claim were nothing more than indications that at that stage the Claimant was advancing a particular claim and was choosing not to pursue all the matters which had been put forward in that letter. To the extent that it was a representation as to the Claimant’s understanding and intention it was a representation as to those matters at the time the claim was being progressed. It does not advance matters here and cannot be seen as a representation that the Claimant’s understanding and intention would not change.

96. Although not put this way expressly in the Amended Defence and Counterclaim the Third Defendant’s case appeared also to be that the Claimant’s entry into the Settlement Agreement was itself part of the representations giving rise to the estoppel.

97. Mr Streatfeild-James submitted that the issue of the asserted estoppel by representation was not suitable for determination on a summary judgment application. He said that, at most, there should be a direction for the trial of a preliminary issue because there would need to be evidence and potentially cross-examination on the issues of the representations, reliance, and detriment. Mr Streatfeild-James said that in any event the estoppel contention was fundamentally flawed.

98. I am satisfied that the material before me is sufficient to determine whether the Third Defendant should be granted summary judgment for the declaration it seeks in this regard. For the reasons I will explain shortly I decline to grant summary judgment. I do not accede to the submission that as an alternative I should direct the hearing of a preliminary issue. The first reason for declining to do so is that there is no clearly formulated issue before me. That difficulty could be overcome but there are more potent reasons for not ordering such a hearing. The hearing of the preliminary issue would require oral evidence and would, I estimate, require a hearing of two days. Neither the expense that would be involved nor the disruption to the progress of the proceedings could be justified in circumstances where the prospects of the asserted estoppel being established are poor for the reasons which have caused me to decline to grant summary judgment and to which I now turn.

99. Even if the estoppel issue is considered solely by reference to the requirement for a representation it can be seen that the Third Defendant has failed to make out a case for summary judgment in its favour. The representations relied on are those referred to at [23] and [32] which I have quoted above. If I were making a final determination on the asserted estoppel I would say that the assertion is untenable. It suffices for present purposes to say that, at the very lowest, there is a real prospect of a successful defence to the argument that claim is precluded by an estoppel by representation and that summary judgment is not appropriate. That is because:

i) The representation which is said to give rise to the estoppel is not adequately particularized. The Third Defendant does not say whether the representation was express or implied. Paragraph [32] begins with a reference to “all the circumstances set out above” but the only reference in the preceding paragraphs to a representation is that at [23] which, as I have explained above, does not advance matters. That leaves the apparent case that the representation arose by implication from the fact of the Claimant’s entry into the Settlement Agreement. It suffices for the purposes of the current summary judgment application to say that for the following reasons such a contention is debateable at best with the consequence that a defence to it would have a real prospect of success.

ii) I have found that the Settlement Agreement, properly interpreted, is a settlement of particular claims. Entry into such an agreement cannot amount to a representation that other claims which fall outside the scope of the agreement are also being settled by it. That is particularly so as the Third Defendant’s case is that the representation extended to a claim which had been abandoned and which was not live at the time of the Settlement Agreement. It is also relevant to note that it is common for releases to be drafted in terms that “make [it] plain that the parties intended that the release should not be confined to known claims” (see per Lord Nicholls in at BCCI v Ali at [27]). The fact that such an approach was available but was not used is a potent argument against seeing the Claimant’s entry into the Settlement Agreement as being the representation for which the Third Defendant contends.

iii) In Dawnvale Neil Moody KC addressed a similar argument to the Third Defendant’s, albeit made with reference to a Tomlin order. As he correctly said, at [32], there is “no room for an estoppel” in these circumstances.

iv) Even if the other points had not sufficed to undermine the Third Defendant’s contention it would have foundered upon the “entire agreement” provision at clause 11 of the Settlement Agreement. That is in clear and comprehensive terms. The Third Defendant has not put forward any argument as to how the effect of that provision can be circumvented. The contentions that either the Claimant’s conduct of the Previous Proceedings or the Claimant’s entry into the Settlement Agreement amounted to a representation that the agreement had a wider effect than was provided for by its terms is contrary to that provision. Moreover, even if (of which I am unpersuaded) the Claimant’s entry into the Settlement Agreement could be seen as some form of implied representation the terms of the representation must be determined by reference to the terms of the agreement which is being entered. I am unable to see how entry into an agreement which contains a clause such as clause 11 can possibly be said to amount to an implied representation that the agreement has a wider effect than that which follows from a proper interpretation of its terms.

100. It follows that the application for summary judgment in this regard must fail.

Abuse of Process.

101. The allegation of abuse of process was at the forefront of the Third Defendant’s submissions and is the aspect which has given me most pause for thought.

The Applicable Law.

102. The principle to be applied is that derived from Henderson v Henderson as explained in Johnson v Gore Wood & Co. Subject to one caveat I adopt the explanation of the effect of the authorities set out by Bright J in Skatteforvaltningen v MCML Ltd [2024] EWHC 148 (Comm) from [51] – [63] as follows:

“51. Of particular practical assistance both to practitioners and to judges is Dexter Ltd v Vlieland-Boddy [2003] EWCA Civ 14 at [49], where Clarke LJ summarised these principles in numbered form:

‘i) Where A has brought an action against B, a later action against B or C may be struck out where the second action is an abuse of process.

ii) A later action against B is much more likely to be held to be an abuse of process than a later action against C.

iii) The burden of establishing abuse of process is on B or C or as the case may be.

iv) It is wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive.

v) The question in every case is whether, applying a broad merits based approach, A's conduct is in all the circumstances an abuse of process.

vi) The court will rarely find that the later action is an abuse of process unless the later action involves unjust harassment or oppression of B or C.’

52. Despite the volume of judicial ink that has been spilt in this area during the intervening 20 years, this summary is still entirely sound. It has been referred to at appellate level with approval many times, most recently in Orji v Nagra [2023] EWCA Civ 1289, per Coulson LJ at [57].

53. It is necessary both (a) that the claimant could have raised the matter in the earlier proceedings and (b) that the claimant should have done so. These conditions are separate but related: the applicant seeking to have the claim struck out will only succeed on ‘should have’ if it can succeed on ‘could have’; but ‘should have’ does not follow inevitably from ‘could have’.

54. Moreover, these two conditions are not necessarily sufficient. Even if the claimant could have and should have raised the matter in the earlier proceedings, there still must be the broad, merits-based approach referred to by Lord Bingham in Johnson v Gore-Wood and by Clarke LJ in Dexter v Vlieland-Boddy, in order to determine whether the claimant's conduct amounts to abuse. There is no prima facie assumption that bringing new proceedings in relation to issues that have been decided in earlier proceedings is abusive: Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Sinclair [2017] EWCA Civ 3, per Simon LJ at [48(2)].

55. This is because a claimant is not lightly to be shut out from bringing a genuine cause of action: Stuart v Goldberg Linde [2008] EWCA Civ 2, per Lloyd LJ at [65] (adding that ‘it must clearly be shown to be an abuse’); Clutterbuck v Cleghorn [2017] EWCA Civ 137 per Kitchin LJ at [66] (therefore there must be ‘a scrupulous examination of all the circumstances’); Orji v Nagra [2023] EWCA Civ 1289, per Coulson LJ at [56] (the applicant faces ‘a high hurdle’, needing to show that the claimant's conduct is ‘so objectionable that they should forfeit their right to take part in a trial’). It follows that, even where the court concludes that abuse is made out, it will not necessarily strike out the claim. There are numerous alternative remedies; striking out a valid claim should also be the last option: Orji v Nagra per Coulson LJ at [58].

56. Usually, in addition to ‘could have’ and ‘should have’, there must also be unjust harassment or oppression of the applicant: Dexter Ltd v Vlieland-Boddy [2003] EWCA Civ 14, per Clarke LJ at [53]; Orji v Nagra [2023] EWCA Civ 1289, per Coulson LJ at [57]. The reason for this is the importance of what Lord Bingham identified in Johnson v Gore-Wood as the primary factor underlying the public interest that justifies the doctrine: ‘… that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter.’

57. The additional factor that Lord Bingham treated as having a reinforcing effect in justifying the doctrine is also significant: ‘… the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole.’ In other words: the CPR overriding objective. The role of this additional factor as a possible reason for finding A's conduct abusive was given extra prominence by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc [2007] EWCA Civ 1260, per Thomas LJ at [29] to [31], culminating with this guidance:

‘… for the future, if a similar issue arises in complex commercial multi-party litigation, it must be referred to the court seised of the proceedings. It is plainly not only in the interest of the parties, but also in the public interest and in the interest of the efficient use of court resources that this is done. There can be no excuse for the failure to do so in the future.’

58. The importance of this has been underscored in a number of judgments since then. Confining myself to cases in the Court of Appeal, the examples I have been made aware of include Stuart v Goldberg Linde [2008] EWCA Civ 2, per Sedley LJ at [77] and per Clarke LJ at [86] and [90] to [97]; Gladman Commercial Properties v FisherHargreaves Proctor [2013] EWCA Civ 1466, per Briggs LJ at [64] to [66]; Clutterbuck v Cleghorn [2017] EWCA Civ 137 per Kitchin LJ at [74] to [82]; Otkritie Capital International Ltd v Threadneedle Asset Management Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 274; Orji v Nagra [2023] EWCA Civ 1289, per Coulson LJ at [57]. In the language of Sedley and Clarke LJ in Stuart v Goldberg Linde, the claimant should put his cards on the table, rather than keeping them up his sleeve.

59. However, neither side drew to my attention any case where the claim was been struck out on the basis of Henderson v Henderson abuse of process merely because the claimant failed to comply with Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc, in circumstances where there was no element of harassment or oppression or unfairness to the applicant – or, at least, some kind of prejudice (whether or not the court used the terms harassment, oppression or unfairness).

(1) In Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc, Stuart v Goldberg Linde, Otkritie Capital International Ltd v Threadneedle Asset Management Ltd and Orji v Nagra, the claims ultimately were not struck out, despite a failure to follow the Aldi guidance. In Otkritie Capital International Ltd v Threadneedle Asset Management Ltd, the failure to follow the Aldi guidance was reflected in the court’s treatment of costs.

(2) In Gladman Commercial Properties v FisherHargreaves Proctor, the claimant’s conduct was expressly said to constitute oppression.

(3) In Clutterbuck v Cleghorn, the Court of Appeal upheld the Judge’s decision to strike out two claims (the Pont Street claim and the Oriel claim) that the Judge had said involved oppression (see at [54]) and an abusive collateral attack on the earlier judgment (see at [72] to [73]). The Court of Appeal agreed with the Judge's reasoning on these claims and noted that re-litigating the same issues again in these claims would have involved huge expense (see at [91], [93] and [95]). The claimant's appeal against striking-out was allowed in relation to a third claim (the Cliveden claim) where there was a breach of the Aldi guidance but no other factor indicative of abuse (see at [103] to [107]). The Court of Appeal also said that breach of the Aldi guidance is not dispositive, on the question of abuse: [91].

(4) In Re Lehman Brothers Holdings Plc the court concluded that Aldi was not engaged (see at [116]). In any event, the claim was not struck out.

60. I note that, in Re Lehman Brothers Holdings Plc, Hildyard J said at [109] that the Aldi guidance should not be elevated to the status of an inflexible, overriding rule:

‘That would not be consistent with the decision and guidance given by the Supreme Court in Johnson v Gore Wood (which Thomas LJ cited as the principal authority) and Lord Bingham's emphasis in that case (a) that it was wrong “to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment” and (b) that “there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceedings involve what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party”’

61. Once again, I agree with Hildyard J.

62. This does not mean that failure to comply with the Aldi guidance could never, by itself, amount to abuse. If the overall circumstances were that the failure was especially egregious, and if it was clear all along that the consequences were likely to be especially serious, it might be appropriate to strike out the claim even without harassment or oppression or unfairness to the applicant. However, such extreme circumstances are likely to be rare.

63. I was referred to Zuckerman, Civil Procedure (4th ed., 2021) at §26.122 to §26. 128, where Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc and Otkritie Capital International Ltd v Threadneedle Asset Management Ltd are criticised on the basis that the claims should have been struck out in both cases. I am of course bound by appellate decisions, but, even if I were not, I would regard it as (in general) draconian to strike out what may be a sound claim, because of a mere failure to follow the Aldi guidance. I have in mind the authorities that I have cited in paragraphs 55 and 56 above.”

103. The qualification to the adoption of that explanation is that the Third Defendant takes issue with the last two sentences of [55]. Miss Lee submitted that if abuse is made out then the court has no discretion and the claim must be struck out. In support of that contention she and Miss Donnelly referred me to the dictum of Lords Reed and Hodge in FII Group Test Claimants v HMRC [2020] UKSC 47, [2022] AC 1 at [75]. The Claimant contends that Bright J’s summary is correct and that if the claim is found to be an abuse it should only be struck out if to do so would be a proportionate sanction. I will have to address that dispute as to the law in the event that I conclude that the Current Proceedings are an abuse of process.

104. There is, however, no dispute as to the correctness of the balance of Bright J’s summary. In that regard it is of note that there is no dispute as to the preceding part of [55] with the emphasis which Bright J placed on the high hurdle to be surmounted before subsequent proceedings can properly be held to be an abuse of process. Indeed, if striking out is the inevitable consequence of a finding of abuse it becomes all the more important that such a finding should only be made in a clear case. This was apparent in the Test Claimants case. There Lords Reed and Hodge followed the reference on which the Third Defendant relies at [75] with a reminder, at [76], that even if a claim could and should have been brought in earlier proceedings the bringing of that claim in subsequent proceedings will not be an abuse of process unless it is oppressive.

105. In addition I will address the effect of the guidance set out in Aldi Stores more fully below.

Whether the Current Proceedings are an Abuse of Process.

106. If it were not for the coincidence between the timing of the Claimant’s realisation that it had a potential claim against the Third Defendant and the second mediation and the consequent Settlement Agreement I would have no difficulty in concluding that the Current Proceedings were not abusive. Thus, if the Claimant had only realized that it potentially had such a claim after the Previous Proceedings had been settled the strike out application would fail. I reach that assessment in light of the following matters.

107. It is common ground that the Claimant could have brought the current claim in the Previous Proceedings. The Claimant accepts that the First Wintech Report, which it received in November 2020, gave it sufficient notice of matters, which if investigated further, would have led to the realization that the Velfac system had to be replaced and that there was a potential claim against the Third Defendant as a consequence. I have already explained that such investigations would have revealed the Environmental Defects and also on the balance of probabilities the Structural Steel Defects.

108. I am not, however, persuaded that it can properly be said that the Claimant should have brought the current claim in the Previous Proceedings. The assessment of what the Claimant should have done has to be an objective one. It has, moreover, to be made having regard to the important public interest in the finality of litigation; in the efficient use of court time; and in having all issues between parties resolved together. That objective assessment must nonetheless have regard to the context and the realities of the parties’ dealings and the court must be conscious that it has the benefit of viewing matters in hindsight.

109. I have already noted, at [59] above, that the Claimant is not to be criticized for abandoning the claim against the Third Defendant in relation to the Velfac system in the Previous Proceedings. The Claimant did so because it had genuinely taken the view that the difficulties with that system were the result of poor workmanship for which the Third Defendant was not responsible. That was the view which had been set out by the Third Defendant’s solicitors in the response to the letter of claim. Parties are to be encouraged to narrow the issues between them. A claimant is to confine its claim to those matters which it believes to be tenable and to abandon others. The court must be wary to penalize a party which has acted in that way in good faith (and in response to contentions from the other side) and which later seeks to change its approach in the light of further information.

110. The context here is also of note. It was legitimate and appropriate for Workspace and the Claimant to seek to resolve the problems at the Property by undertaking remedial works rather than by moving immediately to the complete replacement of the Velfac system. They are to be commended for seeking to minimise the loss and to repair rather than replace. Not only would that course (if it had ultimately proved possible) been less costly than the full replacement but it would have caused less disruption to the occupants of the Property (and it is apparent that Workspace and the Claimant were seeking to avoid that).

111. Miss Lee submitted that even on the basis of the Claimant’s approach that it believed that the problems arose from poor workmanship there had still been scope for a claim against the Third Defendant. That is because the Third Defendant had inspection obligations and so would, at least potentially, have been in breach of duty even if the problems in the Velfac system had been the result of poor workmanship. It is right that the Claimant could have mounted a claim on that basis but such a claim would have been very different from that which is now being brought. Moreover, the Claimant is not to be criticized for looking at matters in the round and for focussing on the major claims while discounting those which were more debateable or peripheral.

112. The position was that until November 2022 the Claimant was proceeding on the basis that the Velfac system was not inherently unsuitable and was looking to remediation of the defects instead of the wholescale replacement of the system. When, late in 2022, it came to the view that the Velfac system was beyond remediation the Claimant obtained further reports in respect of the system and the Third Defendant’s responsibility. Even though those steps could have been taken earlier it cannot be said that the Claimant should have acted more expeditiously in the period from late 2022 to early 2023. The Claimant was right to point out that there is a difference between the conclusion that the Velfac system was not suitable for use in the Property and a finding that the Third Defendant was in breach of its duties. The former gave rise to grounds for investigating the latter question but the issues are different and needed to be considered separately.

113. Even if a different view were to be taken and if the position were to be that the Claimant not only could but should have brought the current claim in the Previous Proceedings it would still be necessary to undertake the broad merits-based assessment to consider whether the bringing of the claim in the Current Proceedings is oppressive and an abuse. In the absence of the issues arising from the mediation and the settlement there would not be a finding of abuse for the following reasons.

114. The claim is a potentially meritorious one for sums totalling over £7m. The Third Defendant has advanced a substantial defence on the merits and it is apparent that, if the claim is not struck out, there will be a major dispute on the facts. However, the Third Defendant does not suggest that the claim is capable of being struck out as failing to show a cause of action or that it will be susceptible to a summary judgment application on the merits. The court is to be slow to prevent a party from bringing potentially legitimate claims to the court and the striking out of the claim as an abuse of process could provide the Third Defendant with a windfall. Although relevant these are points of comparatively limited weight because they will almost always be present in cases where the principle of Henderson v Henderson is invoked – there is no need to rely on the principle against a claim which is not potentially meritorious and which is capable of being struck out on the merits. Similarly, although relevant the fact that the Current Proceedings are in respect of a different cause of action from the Previous Proceedings carries little weight – again this is a factor which will almost inevitably be present when an abuse of this kind is found.

115. However, it is relevant to note that it is not uncommon for separate proceedings to be brought about separate aspects of a building project and such a course is acceptable or at least not inherently abusive. Thus:

i) In Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Ltd & another v Trollope & Colls (City) Ltd & others (1986) 33 BLR 81 the relevant building owner had brought proceedings against the building contractors, engineers, and architects in respect of a failure of the air conditioning system. Subsequently it sought to amend so as to claim against the same defendants for separate damage to the building flowing from the use of the wrong kind of cement. The issue was whether the further claim was in respect of the same cause of action as the original claim. May LJ explained that whether a further claim was a separate cause of action was a mixed question of law and fact. He made it clear that claims against the same party for breach of the same duties in relation to the same building but arising out of damage to different parts of the building could be separate causes of action. For present purposes it is relevant to note the explanation which Lloyd LJ gave for rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the claims related to the same cause of action. He said (at page 101):

“It may seem hard on the plaintiffs in this case that they cannot amend their statement of claim to include damage to the brickwork. But in general, the proposition for which Mr. Harvey contends would work against the interests of building owners. Thus, if in the present case there had been no question of limitation, and if the plaintiffs had brought an action for damage to the air conditioning and recovered judgment at a time when the damage to the brickwork had not yet occurred, then, if Mr. Harvey's propositions were correct, it would be too late for the plaintiffs to bring an action for the brickwork, not because of any question of limitation, but because of the so-called rule in Conquer v. Boot under which a plaintiff must bring forward his entire case in respect of one and the same cause of action at the same time. That rule could work obvious injustice to a plaintiff if Mr. Harvey's universal proposition were correct. In general, justice between the parties to a building contract will best be served by allowing that there may be separate causes of action in relation to the same building, depending upon the facts of the case. Where the limitation period has intervened between pleading the first cause of action and applying for leave to amend to plead the second cause of action, as it may have done here, then RSC Ord.20, r.5 goes at least some way to mitigate the hardship to the building owner.

Nor could it, in my view, be in the overall interests of the good administration of justice, that a plaintiff in a building case should have to spin out, or even abandon his claim for a relatively minor item of damage in case a major item of damage should come to light within the limitation period but after judgment.” (emphasis added)

In the second of those paragraphs Lloyd LJ clearly contemplated that it would be appropriate for new proceedings to be brought in respect of damage to a building after proceedings against the same defendant in relation to different damage to the same building had concluded.

ii) In Secretary of State for Transport v Pell Frischmann Consultants Ltd [2006] EWHC 2909 (TCC) Jackson J, as he then was, had to determine an application to amend particulars of claim after the expiry of the limitation period. The first three of the five propositions which the judge derived from the authorities and set out as follows at [38] are of note:

“(i) If the claimant asserts a duty which was not previously pleaded and alleges a breach of such duty, this usually amounts to a new claim.

(ii) If the claimant alleges a different breach of some previously pleaded duty, it will be a question of fact and degree whether that constitutes a new claim.

(iii) In the case of a construction project, if the claimant alleges breach of a previously pleaded duty causing damage to a different element of the building, that will generally amount to a new claim.”

iii) In Co-operative Group Ltd v Birse Development Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 474 Tomlinson LJ, with whom the other members of the court agreed, approved at [22] Jackson J’s five propositions adding only:

“I would simply add my own gloss to the effect that if the new breach does not arise out of the same or substantially the same facts as those already in issue on a claim previously made in the original action, it is likely to be a new cause of action.”

Tomlinson J explained in the following terms at [23] why in that case the new claim was a new cause of action. The similarity to the circumstances here is of note:

“In my judgment it is very clear on which side of the line the present case falls. As Miss Fiona Sinclair for Birse succinctly submitted, the original allegation here was of a group of relatively disparate defects in the floors capable of disparate replacement and repair. There was no existing case of structural inadequacy of the entirety of the concrete floors in the two warehouses. What is now alleged is that the concrete of which the floors are constructed suffers from a systemic defect which must result in its entire condemnation and replacement because of its inability to withstand the design load to which it has never yet been subjected. The allegation by way of re-amendment is in my judgment an allegation of an entirely new and different cause of action. It relies upon a particular and specific facet of the contractual duty owed of which no breach was hitherto asserted, viz the design capability to withstand a pallet racking leg load of 70KN. The relevant specific duties of which breach had hitherto been alleged are the obligation to design to BS8110, to design and build in accordance with Concrete Society Technical Report TR 34 and to comply with that part of the Specification which requires sawn joints at not less than 9m spacing. There is no reference to any of these duties in paragraph 33A because they are irrelevant to the case being there advanced. The new allegation relies upon facts wholly different in kind from those hitherto relied upon, viz, the inadequate steel fibre content. Finally the consequences alleged are, again, wholly different in kind from those hitherto alleged, giving rise to the need to replace the entirety of the two floors and thereby rendering academic the question whether the contractors were, so far as concerns the concrete floors in the warehouses, in breach of duty in the manner hitherto alleged.”

116. There is no overlap between the issues in the Current Proceedings and those in the Previous Proceedings. Both sets of proceedings derive from the same engagement; they concern the Third Defendant’s actions in relation to the same development; and breaches of the same duties are alleged. It is, therefore, entirely unsurprising that the language used to express the claim in the Current Proceedings mirrors that used in the Previous Proceedings. The issues are, nonetheless, distinct. The core of the Current Proceedings is the allegation that the Third Defendant was in breach of duty in its consideration of the design and suitability of the Velfac system. That allegation was not in issue in the Previous Proceedings.

117. It follows that the Third Defendant was not at risk in the Previous Proceedings in respect of the matters now alleged against it. The claims relate to obligations under the same engagement and in relation to the same development but, as I have explained at [115], that is not uncommon. In those circumstances the bringing of the Current Proceedings would not amount to oppression or unjust harassment of the Third Defendant.

118. I have considered the matters to which Mr Roberts referred in explaining the real impact of the Current Proceedings on the Third Defendant. I have no doubt that those difficulties will be real. Those are, however, principally the result of a claim being brought so long after the events to which it relates rather than being caused by the bringing of separate proceedings. In its Defence and Counterclaim the Third Defendant says that aspects of the claim are statute-barred but it does not say that the claim is statute-barred in its entirety and it accepts that claims which have the benefit of the extended limitation periods under ss. 4B(4) and/or 10 of the Limitation Act 1980 are in time. The fact that the Third Defendant will face those difficulties does not make the Current Proceedings oppressive or an unjust harassment of the Third Defendant.

119. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether the assessment changes when account is taken of the Claimant’s knowledge and actions at the time of the mediation and Settlement Agreement or by reference to the Aldi Stores guidelines.

120. By the time of the second mediation and the agreement which was reached then the Claimant knew that the Velfac system would have to be replaced. It also knew that there was scope for an argument that the system had been inherently unsuitable for use at the Property and that the Third Defendant should have realized that. It also knew that there was, therefore, scope for a claim against the Third Defendant for breach of its duties. The Claimant did not tell the Third Defendant that it saw matters in that light and that it was considering the possibility of a further claim against the Third Defendant. It allowed the negotiations to proceed to a settlement involving a payment being made from the Third Defendant to the Claimant.

121. Mr Roberts says that the Third Defendant would not have entered the Settlement Agreement if it had known that the Claimant was considering the possibility of a further claim against the Third Defendant. I have to approach with considerable caution the evidence given by Mr Roberts in statements in 2026 about what the Third Defendant would have done differently in February and March 2023 if it had known of those matters. I emphasize that I have no doubt that Mr Roberts is giving his honest account of what he believes would have been the position. He is doing so, however, from a viewpoint some years on and in light of Current Proceedings.

122. It is difficult to see how knowledge by the Third Defendant that the Claimant had been told that there was potential for a further claim against it could have altered the outcome in the early part of 2023. It is inconceivable that the Claimant would have agreed to a settlement which prevented it from pursuing that further claim (let alone one settling all potential claims) without requiring some further payment from the Third Defendant. For his part Mr Roberts does not suggest that the Third Defendant would have been prepared to pay more to obtain a release from all claims. It is significant that at the time of the second mediation and the Settlement Agreement the trial was imminent. If the Previous Proceedings had not been resolved the parties would either have to prepare for trial or seek an adjournment of the trial. There were four possible courses which could have been adopted if the Claimant had told the Third Defendant that it was aware of the possibility of a further claim but that the preparation of the claim had not yet progressed. Those were:

i) A settlement which included a general release not only of the claims in the Previous Proceedings but of all claims arising out of the Third Defendant’s involvement with the Property. It is hard to see how that could have been achieved and, as already noted, inconceivable that it could have been achieved without further payment from the Third Defendant.

ii) A settlement such as that which was made settling only the Previous Proceedings.

iii) That the parties would proceed to the trial of the Previous Proceedings.

iv) That the parties would either by agreement or on the application of one or other of them seek the adjournment of the trial to await and then to run alongside the bringing of the further claim which the Claimant was considering. Given the very early stage at which that consideration was that seems unlikely.

123. I remind myself of the need to guard against speculation about what would have happened if something which was not done had been done. Nonetheless, it is hard to see how there would have been any other outcome than the second of those namely entry into the Settlement Agreement. The difference would have been that the Third Defendant would have been aware that the Claimant was considering a further claim in relation to the Third Defendant’s consideration of the Velfac system. I accept that would have been of some benefit to the Third Defendant.

124. My conclusions on the proper interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and on the contention that there was a representation from the Claimant are relevant here also. The Settlement Agreement was a settlement of a particular claim and was not a general release and the Claimant made no representation that the settlement had any wider scope. As I have noted above it is not uncommon for agreements providing for a general release to be made. The Third Defendant did not require the settlement to be in those terms and is to be taken to have been proceeding on the basis that the Settlement Agreement was a compromise of particular claims only. The Third Defendant’s subjective understanding, as Mr Roberts now recalls it to have been, that the Settlement Agreement had a different effect cannot carry any weight.

125. The inchoate nature of the potential further claim as at February 2023 is also of note. I have quoted above Mr Forsyth’s assessment of the further steps which were needed at that time before the Claimant would be in a position to advance the further claim. The points made there are realistic ones. I note, in that regard, that the letter of claim in the Current Proceedings was not sent until May 2024. It is possible that there could have been some compression of that time interval. Nonetheless, there would necessarily be some months between HKA’s initial provisional indication in late January 2023 that there might be scope for a claim against the Third Defendant and the sending of a letter of claim let alone the commencement of proceedings. It is to be remembered that the Current Proceedings are against two further defendants as well as the Third Defendant. The position in February and March 2023 was that the Claimant had been told that there was potential scope for a claim against the Third Defendant. That is very different from a position in which the Claimant knew that it definitely would be bringing such a claim. Mr Roberts describes the Claimant as negotiating while “holding a card up its sleeve”. In my assessment Mr Roberts overstates the extent to which the Claimant knew, as at February and March 2023, that a further claim would be likely. To the extent that there was a card up the Claimant’s metaphorical sleeve it was knowledge of a potential claim which would need to be investigated further. The situation was very different from that which would have been the case if the Claimant had draft particulars of claim or even a draft letter of claim ready to be served the moment the ink was dry on the Settlement Agreement.

126. In considering the effect of the Claimant’s failure to inform the Third Defendant that it was considering investigating a further claim I have reminded myself that dishonesty is more likely to make later proceedings abusive.

127. Thus in Johnson v Gore Wood at 31C Lord Bingham said that proceedings could be abusive even if there had not been dishonesty on the part of a claimant – the test remained that of whether the new proceedings were oppressive or an unjust harassment of the defendant. However, where dishonesty was present the subsequent proceedings “will be much more obviously abusive”.

128. In BCCI v Ali at [32] Lord Nicholls said:

“Thus far I have been considering the case where both parties were unaware of a claim which subsequently came to light. Materially different is the case where the party to whom the release was given knew that the other party had or might have a claim and knew also that the other party was ignorant of this. In some circumstances seeking and taking a general release in such a case, without disclosing the existence of the claim or possible claim, could be unacceptable sharp practice. When this is so, the law would be defective if it did not provide a remedy.”

129. However, it is to be remembered that was said in the context of a party which not only knew of a potential claim against it and that the other party was unaware of this but which then took the benefit of a general release covering that claim. That is rather different from the circumstances here where the Settlement Agreement only covered the Previous Proceedings and where I have found that there was no representation that it had a wider effect.

130. In MW High Tech Projects UK Ltd v Outotec (USA) Inc [2024] EWCA Civ 844, [2024] 4 WLR 85 Coulson LJ, with whom the other members of the court agreed on this point, gave this salutary warning at [44] summarizing the effect of the decision in Stuart v Goldberg Linde [2008] EWCA Civ 2; [2008] 1 WLR 823:

“On the Henderson v Henderson point, Lloyd LJ reiterated at [65] that the courts will not lightly shut out a party from pursuing a genuine claim, unless abuse of process can clearly be made out. As to the proper approach in ongoing litigation, this court was clear that parties should not keep future claims secret, even where the second claim might involve other complex issues (Sir Anthony Clarke MR at [96]). The approach of the CPR was to require cards to be put on the table in cases of this kind and, if that did not happen, the claimant was, in the words of Sedley LJ at [77] at ‘high risk’ of the second action being struck out.”

131. I return to the particularly significant factors of: (a) the inchoate nature and uncertain status as at February 2023 of the claim which eventually manifested itself in the claim in the Current Proceedings; (b) the absence of any representation that the Claimant was agreeing to a release of all potential claims against the Third Defendant arising out of the latter’s involvement with the Property; and (c) the fact that it would have been open to the Third Defendant to seek a general release but it did not do so. The Claimant did not reveal that it was considering a further claim but neither did it indicate that it was foregoing its right to bring further claims. Moreover, if the Claimant had disclosed that it was considering a further claim the disclosure would necessarily have been limited to the state of affairs as they were at that time namely that the Claimant had been told that there was the potential for a further claim against the Third Defendant but that the issue had not been considered fully and that no decision had yet been made as to whether such a claim should be brought.

132. It follows that the Claimant’s failure to inform the Third Defendant in February and March 2023 of the potential further claim did not, even in light of Coulson LJ’s salutary warning, make the bringing of the Current Proceedings abusive.

133. Does the position alter when the requirements of Aldi Stores are considered?

134. In Aldi Stores Thomas LJ, as he then was, gave the guidance set out at [29] – [31]. He said at [30]:

“Parties are sometimes faced with the issue of wishing to pursue other proceedings whilst reserving a right in existing proceedings. Often, no problem arises; in this case, Aldi, WSP and Aspinwall each in truth knew at one time or another between August 2003and the settlement of the original action in January 2004that there was a potential problem, but it was never raised with the court. I have already expressed the view that it should have been. The court would, at the very least, have been able to express its view as to the proper use of its resources and on the efficient and economical conduct of the litigation. It may have seen if a way could have been found to determine the issues applicable to Aldi in a manner proportionate to the size of Aldi’s claim and without the very large expenditure that would have been necessary if Aldi had to participate in the trial of the actions. It may be that the court would have said that it was for Aldi to elect whether it wished to pursue its claim in the proceedings, but if it did not, that would be the end of the matter. It might have inquired whether the action against excess underwriters could have been expedited. Whatever might have happened in this case is a matter of speculation.”

135. At [31] Thomas LJ said that in future there would be no excuse for a failure to bring the question before the court. Longmore LJ agreed with that saying, at [42]:

“I also agree with paras 29–31 of Thomas LJ s judgment. The parties should have raised the possible difficulties of a further set of proceedings with the court at a stage when the matter could have been sorted out in a proper way at a case management conference and not left it to fester in a way that has now made the difficulties problematic, time-wasting and expensive at a later stage.”

136. It is necessary to have regard to the circumstances of that case and the context in which the guidance was given. The proceedings had arisen out of the construction of large stores. The claimant had brought a claim against excess layer insurers and had subsequently sought to bring proceedings against contractors. The claimant had chosen not to pursue the contractors in the earlier proceedings. An important part of the context was that there had been a substantial trial of related proceedings. The nature of the issues can be seen from the submissions which were made in favour of the contention that there was an abuse. The flavour of the matter is shown by these passages from Thomas LJ’s summary of those submissions:

“i) The allegations made by Aldi in these proceedings were essentially the same as those made by Holmes against them in the original actions. (ii) By bringing the actions against Holmes, it was almost inevitable that Holmes would bring Part 20 claims against WSP and Aspinwall. (iii) There had been nothing to prevent Aldi pursuing those claims in its original action; it had brought that action and it was in that action that the claims should have been pursued. … (vii) Aldi could and should therefore rejoined the action in the autumn of 2003. … (ix) The trial of these proceedings would relitigate at a cost in excess of £2.5m the issues which had been the subject of the original actions which had cost in excess of £7.5m.”

137. It is also of note that although Jackson J had found at first instance that the further proceedings were an abuse of process the Court of Appeal concluded that they were not.

138. In Outotec Coulson LJ explained the effect of a breach of the Aldi guidelines at [53.4] and [53.5] thus:

“53.4 In ongoing litigation, a party who realises that he may have connected claims which are not currently pleaded must follow the Aldi guidelines, and at least raise with the court the existence of such new claims. A breach of those guidelines will give rise to a ‘high risk’ that the second action will be found to be an abuse of process (Stuart v Goldberg Linde) and will always be a relevant factor to be taken into account in any application to strike out (Gladman).

53.5 However, a breach of the Aldi guidelines does not automatically mean that the second action is an abuse of process and will be struck out. The Aldi guidelines are simply one facet of the broad merits-based evaluation (Okritie).”

139. Bright J summarized the authorities from [58] onwards in the passage from Skatteforvaltningen which I have set out above.

140. Bright J was not referred to any case where a breach of the Aldi guidelines had led to a striking out in the absence of harassment or oppression of the other party. However, since Bright J’s decision there has been the decision of HH Judge Paul Matthews sitting as a judge of the High Court in Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Ltd v McGeoch [2026] EWHC 1575 (Ch.) There, at [145], Judge Matthews found that the respondent’s failure to present her full case to a court in Jersey had been a serious breach of the Aldi guidelines and had resulted in an abuse of process in subsequent English proceedings. Judge Matthews also pointed out that where a matter should be raised with the court it is no excuse to say that doing so would have made no difference. However, the circumstances with which Judge Matthews was concerned were unusual and markedly different from those here. In summary there had been an improper failure to explain matters fully to the Jersey court which had led to English proceedings being launched on a false basis.

141. The circumstances of this case are very far removed from those which gave rise to the Aldi guidelines and from those which Judge Matthews considered in Ocorian. The claim which is being advanced in the Current Proceedings was no more than a potential claim at the time of the mediation and settlement. I have accepted Mr Forsyth’s assessment of the further investigations and consideration which were needed before the Claimant could be in a position to decide whether to pursue it. It is also relevant to note that the Current Proceedings include other defendants who were not parties to the Previous Proceedings. In those circumstances it was not incumbent on the Claimant to make an application to the court for directions as to what should be done in the Previous Proceedings in light of that speculative position. It follows that the Aldi guidelines were not engaged. Alternatively, if that is wrong and there was scope for criticism of the Claimant the failing was not such as to warrant a change of approach in the assessment of whether the Current Proceedings are abusive.

142. It follows that the Claimant’s failure to tell the Third Defendant or the court of its awareness that there was a potential further claim against the Third Defendant does not alter the assessment and does not make the Current Proceedings abusive. Although I have broken down my consideration of this question into stages it is to be remembered that the broad merits-based assessment required by Johnson v Gore-Wood involves looking at matters in the round. I have done so and the position remains that the Current Proceedings do not amount to an abuse of process in relation to the Third Defendant.

The Consequences of a Finding of Abuse of Process.

143. The conclusion which I have reached on the absence of abuse means that it is not necessary for me to address the competing arguments as to whether a finding of abuse must, as a matter of law, result in the striking out of the claim or instead the court has a discretion in the application of which an abusive claim is only to be struck out if that is a proportionate response in the circumstances. In the case of a finding of abuse of process after application of the Johnson v Gore Wood approach there is likely to be little practical difference between the two views. Even if there is a discretion as to striking out it will be a rare case in which a court having found that the proceedings are oppressive and an unjust harassment of the defendant will not conclude that striking out is a proportionate sanction.

144. In the circumstances of this case if, contrary to the conclusion I have in fact reached, I had concluded that the Current Proceedings were an abuse of process then the claim would have been struck out. That is because a finding of abuse would have meant acceptance of the Third Defendant’s contention that the Claimant’s conduct in the mediation and settlement negotiations amounted to the illegitimate keeping of a card up its sleeve such as to cause the Third Defendant to settle the Previous Proceedings on a false basis and to cause the Current Proceedings to be oppressive. If I had come to that view I would have struck the claim out even if that was the result of an exercise of discretion rather than an inevitable consequence.

Conclusion.

145. Accordingly, the Third Defendant’s application is dismissed.

Notes

[1] Although the Third Defendant was the First Defendant in the Previous Proceedings I will refer to it as the Third Defendant throughout.

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